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ABSTRACT

A continuation of the study of those factors that lead to persecutions and acts of genocide is presented. As students read the materials included in the case studies, they should be referred to the organizing concepts discussed in "Teaching about the Holocaust and Genocide: Introduction. The Human Rights Series, Volume I." Unit 1 in that volume defines the following five concepts as they apply to the roots of intolerance and persecution: denial of reality, indifference, prejudicial attitudes, conformity, and obedience to authority. Students reapply these concepts as they study about the forced famine in the Ukraine and the actions of the Khymer Rouge in Cambodia. (Author/BZ)

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CASE STUDIES: PERSECUTION GENOCIDE

THE HUMAN RIGHTS SERIES
Volume III

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FOREWORD

This volume represents a continuation of the study of those factors that lead to persecutions and acts of genocide. As students read the materials included in the case studies, they should be referred to the organizing concepts discussed in *Teaching About the Holocaust and Genocide: Introduction, Volume I*. Unit I in that volume defines the following five concepts as they apply to the roots of intolerance and persecution: denial of reality, indifference, prejudicial attitudes, conformity, and obedience to authority. Students will reapply these concepts as they study about the Forced Famine in Ukraine and the actions of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. These case studies serve as only a sample of the persecutions and genocidal acts that students might learn about. Teachers should continue to develop and expand these case studies as additional materials become available. Teachers should also identify other case studies of persecutions and genocidal acts that students might study.

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How to Use This Guide

This teacher's guide is divided into 5 separate units. Each unit includes a statement of purpose, a list of objectives, and a group of learning activities and student materials. Each activity is marked by a bullet (•) symbol. The learning activities are not arranged in a developmental order so that they may be taught in any order. Teachers should begin by reviewing the entire guide before they plan their units of study. Teachers can design lessons by using those activities and materials most appropriate for their students.

Because of the sensitivity of the materials, teachers should select readings and classroom activities with great care. The handouts included in each Unit should be fully explained to students so that they understand the purpose of each handout. Teachers should also recognize the need for students to reflect upon each lesson. If possible, students should be allowed time after class to talk about their thoughts and feelings and to discuss the lesson informally. Students may also be asked to keep a journal in which they express their feelings and reactions on a daily or weekly basis.

Before using this guide, teachers should read through the entire publication and select those readings and activities which best fit their course or program. Please remember that this guide is *not* a textbook but rather a collection of materials and activities about the Forced Famine in Ukraine and the genocide in Cambodia. The last unit in the guide presents an overview for developing case studies about other acts of genocide.

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Commemoration of the Great Famine in the Ukraine

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

The Ukrainian famine of 1932–1933 was a tragic chapter in the history of the Ukraine, all the more so because it was not the result of disasters of nature, but was artificially induced as a deliberate policy.

The leaders of the Soviet Union, although fully aware of the famine in the Ukraine and having complete control of food supplies within its borders, nevertheless failed to take relief measures to check the famine or to alleviate the catastrophic conditions resulting from it. In complete disregard of international opinion, they ignored the appeals of international organizations and other nations.

More than seven million Ukrainians, and millions of others, died as the consequence of this callous act, which was part of a deliberate policy aimed at crushing the political, cultural, and human rights of the Ukrainian and other peoples by whatever means possible. The devastation of these years continues to leave its mark on the Ukrainian people and has retarded their economic, social, and political development to an enormous extent.

In making this a special day to honor those who were victims of this famine, we Americans are afforded as well another opportunity to honor our own system of government and the freedoms we enjoy and our commitment to the right to self-determination and liberty for all the peoples of the world. In so doing, let us also reaffirm our faith in the spirit and resilience of the Ukrainian people and condemn the system that has caused them so much suffering over the years.

The Congress, by House Concurrent Resolution 111, has urged the President to issue a proclamation in mournful commemoration of the great famine in the Ukraine during 1933.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Sunday, November 4, 1984, as a Day of Commemoration of the Great Famine in the Ukraine in 1933.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirtieth day of October, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and ninth.

Ronald Reagan

Topical Outline for the Human Rights Series

- **Studying About the Holocaust and Genocide: A Rationale**
- **The Roots of Intolerance and Persecution**
  - Denial of Reality
  - Indifference
  - Prejudicial Attitudes
  - Conformity
  - Obedience to Authority
- **Precursors of the Holocaust**
  - Genocidal Theories
  - Pseudoscientific Racism
  - Technological Aspects of Genocide
  - Case Study: The Armenians
- **The Nazi Holocaust**
  - Anti-Semitism – Traditional, Religious, and Racial
  - Nazi Thought
  - Nazi Rise to Power
  - "The Final Solution"
  - Perpetrators and Victims
  - Responses by Individuals, Institutions, and Nations
  - Judgments, Justice, and Survivors
- **Implications for Our Future**
  - Individual Choices
  - Group Choices
  - Connections
- **Case Studies: Persecution/Genocide**
  - Forced Famine in Ukraine
  - Human Rights Violations in Ukraine
  - The Killing of Cambodia
  - Human Rights Violations in Cambodia
  - Guidelines for Case Studies
- **Teaching About Human Rights**

UNIT I. FORCED FAMINE IN UKRAINE

"...The famine is the direct consequence of a particular social order; so long as this social order exists, such famines are inevitable: they can be abolished only by the abolition of this order of society...."

Vladimir Lenin

Statement of Purpose:

On the eve of Hitler's assumption of power, Ukraine* experienced a tragedy which rivals in magnitude the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis. Precise estimates vary, but it is generally accepted that about 7 million Ukrainians or about 22% of the total Ukrainian population died of starvation in a government planned and controlled famine. As a result of this experience, victims and survivors alike were dehumanized; victimizers and perpetrators served as direct tools of the established authority; and the reality and causes of the Famine were universally and consistently obliterated from world view. In the face of this genocide, few people in the West were even aware of the existence of the Famine and even fewer comprehended its significance. Only recently have historians and researchers in the West become aware of this little known genocide as a subject for serious inquiry.

* Many Ukrainians deeply resent the employment of the article as in "the Ukraine," because it represents anachronistic English usage applied to Ukraine when it was a part of the Czarist Russian Empire and perceived as a region of Russia in the sense in which one speaks of "the steppes" or "the marshland." For example, one never refers to other countries as "the Poland" or "the Russia." The article will therefore be avoided.

Taken from: Bohdan Wytwycky. *The Other Holocaust* (Washington, DC, 1980), p. 22.

Objectives:

- Students will describe the national diversity of the Soviet Union;
- Students will summarize the methods and practices of totalitarian systems of power;
- Students will review the historical events in Ukraine prior to the Famine and describe how the Famine originated;
- Students will describe, through the analysis of personal accounts of famine victims, the ways in which victims of the Famine were dehumanized by the tactics of a centralized government;
- Students will explore the causes of the Forced Famine;
- Students will discuss the role of the media in recording historical events nd its susceptibility to manipulation and disinformation.

Introduction:

To understand the tragedy fully, one must remember that this wholesale starvation of Ukrainian farmers took place in one of the most agriculturally-rich countries of the world, known for its fertile "black soil." People died in a region which customarily abounded in harvest. Harvests in Ukraine had proved sufficient not only to feed its own population, but also to rank Ukraine among the world leaders in the grain export market. In the years 1932-33, victims perished in what had rightly been called the "bread basket" of Europe.

There is mounting evidence that proves that the Ukrainian Famine was a deliberate, planned event, a radical political program engineered by the powers in Moscow for the purpose of bringing a recalcitrant Ukraine to its knees in order to transform it into an obedient Soviet colony.

Glossary:

C.E.C. – Central Executive Committee (of the Communist Party)

Chekist was a member of the original Soviet secret police, Cheka, which is an abbreviation for Extraordinary Commission, or more precisely, All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Fighting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (1917-1922). It was succeeded by the GPU. The old title, Chekist, is still being used, and even today's members of the KGB are often referred to as Chekists.

Collectivization of agriculture – The policy adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. on November 17, 1929 to combine privately-owned farms into huge collectively-owned farms. The bulk of the farms were collectivized from 1929 to 1932 under heavy political pressures.

Commissariat was the name given to central government departments from 1917-1946. In 1946, these "People's Commissariats" were renamed ministries.

C.P.C. – Council of People's Commissars; the name of the executive branches of the government of the U.S.S.R. In 1946 it was renamed the Council of the Ministers.

"Liquidation of the kulaks as a Social Class" – policy affecting the well-to-do farmers proclaimed by Stalin on December 27, 1929. It was legalized by the Central Executive Com-

mittee of the U.S.S.R. on February 1, 1930. According to the law directed against the kulaks, the government could dispossess their property, banish them from their villages, deport them to Arctic regions of the U.S.S.R., jail them, or even execute them under any pretext. As a result of this policy, millions of farmers labeled "kulaks" disappeared.

GPU is the abbreviation for Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, or State Political Administration. It is the name of the Soviet secret police which took the place of the Cheka in February 1922. In 1934 it was absorbed into the NKVD, The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. After several reorganizations and name changes, in March 1954 the secret police or state security agency emerged as the KGB, which is an acronym for Komitet Gosudarstvenno Bezopasnosti, The Committee for State Security.

KGB – Committee for State Security (for additional information see "GPU")

Kolkhoz – (Russian) collective farm

Kolhosp – (Ukrainian) collective farm

Komnezam is the abbreviation for the Ukrainian Komitet Nezamozhnykh Selian which means Committee of Non-Wealthy Farmers. Such committees were first set up in Russia in the summer of 1918 by the local Party organizations from agricultural laborers and poor farmers, and were known by the Russian acronym Kombedy (Committee of Village Poor; Kombidy in Ukrainian). In Russia the Kombedy were soon dissolved (in November of 1918), but in Ukraine, these Committees of Poor Farmers lasted until 1933 and became one of the most effective instruments of the aggressive Communist policy in the Ukrainian countryside, where the Komnezam was an

important feature of most Ukrainian villages. Its purposes were twofold: to assist in the enforcement of food deliveries to the state, to reinforce Soviet power and foster "class struggle" in the village, and to help to carry out the policy of collectivization of agriculture.

Komsomol is the Russian (and Ukrainian) acronym for Communist Youth or Young Communist League, established in 1918. Young people between fourteen and twenty-six years of age may be members of this organization. The Komsomol played a decisive role in carrying out collectivization.

Kulak – The Russian word kulak, Ukrainian kurkul, originally meant village usurer. Any farmer who employed hired labor, possessed heavy machinery, hired out such machinery, contracted to work on other farms, or leased land for commercial purposes, etc., was branded as kulak (kurkul). Later the Communists applied this label indiscriminately to all farmers, even to genuine paupers. During collectivization the label kulak was widely used, and it became an epithet of abuse for all those farmers who refused to join the collective farm. The label kulak was attached to anyone, even to nonfarmers who showed the slightest sign of disagreement with or opposition to the Communist agricultural policy during that time.

Kurkul – (Ukrainian) see "Kulak"

MTS is the abbreviation for Machine and Tractor Stations, a state enterprise which, until 1958, supplied all machine works for collective farms and received payments in kind for their services. Since January 1933, the political sections of the MTS replaced the Thousanders as the main instrument of state control in the countryside.

M.V.D. – the Ministry of Internal Affairs (see "GPU"). The Soviet political police, which was part of the Ministry, carried the same name (See also "GPU").

N.K.V.D. – the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs – the Soviet political police (See "G.P.U.")

Otaman (Ukrainian) – cossack title for a military leader. During the Revolution, this title was used mostly by the anticommunist military leaders in Ukraine.

Pood – unit of weight, slightly over 36 lbs.

"Potemkin village" – showcase village used to give the impression to Western visitors of higher standards of living in U.S.S.R. than actually existed. The name originated in the 18th century when Field Marshal Potemkin was ordered to construct false facades on the houses that fronted on the Dnieper River. He wanted to give Empress Catherine II the impression that these settlements had been established on newly -conquered territory.

Presidium – subcommittee of top officers of an effective council (see Soviet).

Seksot – the Russian acronym for a Secret collaborator (Sekrety Sotrudnik) who collaborates with the political police.

Soviet is a Russian word that means council and/or assembly. It denotes the organ of government, central and local. There is a Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and Supreme Soviets in each constituent republic. There are also regional, local, and village soviets.

Thousander – a member of a group of 25,000 Communists and activists, mostly non-Ukrainian city dwellers, who were recruited from Russia to collect the grain quotas and to

carry out the policy of collectivization in Ukraine.

The village soviet – the village council (see "Soviet"). The building where the office of the village soviet is located is called by the same name.

Learning Activities and Student Materials:

- On a map of Europe that includes the European sections of the U.S.S.R., have students:
  - locate Ukraine
  - identify the following locations:

Kiev	Dnieper River	Black Sea
Odessa	Dniester River	Don River
Kharkiv	Sea of Azov	Bug River
Uman	Poltava	Dnipropetrovsk
Rostov	Vinnytsya	Chernihiv
Bila Tserkva		

  Using the maps which precede the student handouts and an atlas such as Hammond's *World Ambassador Atlas* (Maplewood, New Jersey, 1982), students should investigate Ukrainian and Soviet:

topography	vegetation
climate	land uses

  Using evidence gathered in their investigations, students should discuss the following questions:

  - Given the climate and topography of Ukraine, how productive do you think Ukrainian agriculture might be?
  - Given conditions elsewhere in the Soviet Union, why is agricultural production a serious concern to the Soviet government?
  - Why might Ukraine play an important role in any Soviet agrarian policy?

- "Harvest of Despair," an excellent film about the Ukrainian Famine in 1932-1933, is available for use by schools and other educational institutions. This film might serve as either an introduction or a summary to this unit. The film, which documents the events surrounding the Famine, was produced by Slavko Nowytski and Yurij Luhovy. For further information contact: Center for Learning Technologies, New York State Education Department, Room 9A47, CEC, Albany, NY 12230, (518) 474-5823.

- As an introduction to the topic, provide students with copies of Handout A-1.1, "Introduction," by Dr. James E. Mace. Dr. Mace is a research associate at the Harvard University Ukrainian Research Institute. Ask students to draw a time line for the years 1900 to 1933 which they can fill in with information as they read. Also have students define the following words before they begin reading this handout: bard, collectivization, tsarist, Aesopian, and dekulakization. Then have students respond to the following questions:
  - According to Dr. Mace, what caused the Famine in Ukraine?
  - What is the difference between the Soviet Union and Russia?
  - What events occurred between 1917 and 1930 which led to the Ukrainian Famine?
  - Why did the Soviet regime adopt a "Ukrainization" (indigenization) policy in 1923? Why was this policy discontinued in 1933?
  - What were some socio-economic differences between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine?
  - What do the following terms mean: Belorussianization, Tatarization, and Yiddishization?

- Provide students with copies of Handout A-1.2, "Forced Famine in the Ukraine: A Holocaust the West Forgot," and Handout A-1.3, "1933/1983: Remember the Ukraine." If possible, have students consider Handouts A-1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 together. Then ask them to prepare written responses to the following questions:
  - What happened in Ukraine from 1931 to 1933?
  - What caused the Forced Famine?
  - To what extent was the Forced Famine anti-Ukrainian? Did the Ukrainians suffer more than other groups?
  - Why did the Western press remain silent?
  - Why does Mr. Karatnycky feel that the 1933 Famine is important both morally and politically?
  - How did this murder by starvation of millions of Ukrainians differ from the Nazi Holocaust?

• Ukraine, Background Information*

CAPITAL:

Kiev (Ukrainian: Kyiv), population 2,297,000 in 1983.

TERRITORY:

232,000 square miles. Ukraine is bordered by the Black Sea on the South, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania on the west and southwest, and by Byelorussia and Russia on the north and northeast.

POPULATION:

Approximately 50,000,000 (about 75% Ukrainian, with Russian, Jewish and Polish minorities).

HISTORY:

The first period of Ukrainian statehood lasted from the ninth through the thirteenth centuries, when Ukraine, Belorussia, and parts of Russia were collectively known as Rus'. During this era of vigorous activity Rus' accepted Christianity (in 988) and developed close ties with the rest of Europe. Following the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, almost all of Ukraine came under Polish-Lithuanian rule. In the mid-seventeenth century, however, the Ukrainian Cossacks created their own state and managed to maintain it until the end of the eighteenth century, when Eastern Ukraine was finally absorbed into the expanding Muscovite state (from 1721, Russian Empire). During the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary (Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia) stimulated a Ukrainian cultural and political revival. Writers such as Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko raised Ukrainian literature to new heights. The Tsarist Russian government carried on intense suppression of the Ukrainian renewal, even banning printing in the Ukrainian language. With the collapse of the Russian Empire, a popularly-elected congress, the Ukrainian National Republic, and its successors fought both Bolshevik and monarchist Russian imperialism. In the formerly Austro-Hungarian Ukrainian lands, the Western Ukrainian Republic was declared on November 1, 1918, but was immediately attacked by Poland. After the loss of the war of independence, the Ukrainian lands were annexed by the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Following a short period of concessions in Soviet Ukraine, the Communists persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Repression culminated in 1933, when Stalin engineered a famine which caused the death of seven million Ukrainian villagers.

* Based on: *Ukraine – A Concise Encyclopedia*. University of Toronto Press. Compliments of: Harvard University-Ukrainian Studies Fund.

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At the turn of the 20th century, 90% of all ethnic Ukrainians were farmers. The majority of these farmers were small-scale property owners tied to their land by the tradition of many generations. The lifestyle of the village continued to be the major cultural influence throughout the countryside, despite increasing industrialization in the region.

Ukraine differed from Russia in a number of important respects. The Russian and Ukrainian languages are different, though related. Ukrainian agriculture was more productive than its Russian counterpart, thanks to the former's rich black soil (*chernozem*). But, perhaps most importantly, the areas had different histories which shaped different relationships between the farmers and the land they tilled. When in 1861 serfdom was abolished in the Russian Empire, the Russian peasants had known centuries of servitude and retained communal institutions as an important part of village life. For most Ukrainians, serfdom had come only in the 1780s, and at the time of its abolition, the villages still contained among its oldest inhabitants individuals who remembered or knew from their parents how Ukrainians had lived as free farmers. Communal institutions like the Russian *mir* (which redivided the land among farm households) were practically unknown. For this reason, Ukrainian farmers had a much stronger sense of individuality and ownership than did their Russian counterparts.

Ukrainian attachment to the land and social individuality had its drawbacks. As cities grew and technologies developed in Ukraine, the Russian and Jewish minorities frequently became urbanized and trained in trade or industry-related skills. Ukrainian cities developed an identity which was more profoundly cosmopolitan than Ukrainian, while Ukrainian cultural and political life continued to be centered in the villages.

During the War of Liberation (1917-21), the villages supported the Ukrainian Independence Movement while much of the urban proletariat, largely ethnically Russian, sympathized with the Bolsheviks. In 1922, for example, Russians made up 53% of the Communist Party of Ukraine even though they comprised less than 10% of the population.

Provide students with Handouts A-2.1, and 2.2 and discuss the following questions:

– According to Helene Carrere d'Encausse, how is the Soviet Union different from other countries?

- How many Ukrainians lived in the USSR in 1926?
- Did the population of Ukraine in 1939, as compared to the Ukrainian population in 1926, increase or decrease?
- According to Handout A-2.2, what percentage of Ukrainians worked in industry?
- What percentage of Ukrainians worked in agriculture?
- Since industry in the region centered in urban areas, what might you conclude about the ethnic composition of Ukrainian cities?
- Read Handout A-2.2. According to the November 19, 1929 issue of *Pravda*, how many Communist centers were there in Ukraine?
- How many Communist party members were involved in agriculture?
- In Ukraine, in 1922, what percentage of Ukrainians were members of the Ukrainian Communist Party?
- How many Russians, as compared to Ukrainians, were members of the Communist Party?
- What can you conclude about the sympathies held by the Ukrainian population regarding Communism?

• Dekulakization.

"First we support the peasantry en masse against the landlords... then we support the proletariat against the peasantry en masse."

V. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow, 1960-1970), vol. 9, p. 237.

"Kurkuls" (Ukrainian) or "Kulaks" (Russian) were, by definition, relatively prosperous farmers who tilled their own soil, or who were able to afford hired labor outside their immediate families. The term, as was also true of the status of the individuals identified as such, meant little beyond vague distinctions between the run-of-the-mill villager and the better-off farmer. Soviets have, however, traditionally viewed the "kulak" to be a "class enemy," an exploiter of fellow peasants; thus, the very vagueness of the term could be used by the government to discredit, or punish, any person of the lower class it wished. In later years, more extreme punitive measures would be taken.

In the 1920s, the Soviet government at first encouraged farmers to get rich, that is, become kulaks, then initiated an anti-kulak campaign in the countryside. Kulaks were blamed for multiple political and adjustment problems which beset the regime at that time. Initially, the penalties inflicted on this group consisted chiefly of strong psychological pressure combined with heavy taxation.

On December 27, 1929, Stalin, in one of his speeches, declared the necessity to pass from "the policy of 'restricting' the exploitative tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of 'liquidating' the kulaks as a class." Hence, dekulakization became a stated government objective and the new law of the land, the result of which during the years 1930-1931, approximately 2.4 million people were deported to Siberia, the majority of whom were never heard from again.

Since the definition of "kulak" was left deliberately vague, anyone the government considered a threat could fit the description. This policy came to include such people as school teachers, store owners, priests, lay church activists, and others, who were labeled kurkuls/kulaks or their agents and were dispossessed and often arrested. Many of these people were executed in secret; others were deported; still others were able to flee the village and seek work elsewhere, hiding their past identification as a "hostile class element."

Since those persons thus labeled were the social leaders, or organizers of village cultural life (i.e., choir directors, artists, or sports figures), they were viewed by the regime as potential political leaders in the expected resistance to collectivization. With the kulak class stripped away from the social order, the remaining peasants, who were less educated, were left to fend for themselves.

Not long after the initial arrests of kulaks, a second wave swept the same villages. This time the arrested individuals were those who were accused of being kulaks. The secret police found itself unable to handle this program by itself thus, a new administration was mobilized consisting of the Thousanders and other functionaries. Thousanders were the members of a group consisting of 25,000 activists recruited from urban workers of long seniority. In Ukraine, they were recruited in the cities from mostly non-Ukrainian groups and sent to the villages to carry out the policies of the regime during collectivization. Moscow had proclaimed that the kulaks must be destroyed as a class, with no quarter shown. They were not to be regarded as human beings; consequently, party propagandists coined the most derogatory names for them, including *vermin*, *hyenas*, and *snakes*.

Provide students with copies of Handouts A-3.1, A-3.2, and A-3.3. Have students prepare responses to the following questions:

- What was the attitude of the party activists (Thousanders) toward Ukrainian farmers?
- What distinction does W.E.D. Allen make between Ukrainians and Russians regarding private ownership?
- How does Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko define the kulaks? Why was this definition useful to the regime?

- Personal accounts of dekulakization. Handouts A-4.1, A-4.2, and A-4.3 present accounts of the process the Soviets used to exterminate the kulaks in Ukraine. After reading Handout A-4.1, ask students to define the term *quota* and to explain why each village was asked to "give" kurkuls (kulaks). After reading the two personal accounts of dekulakization, have students respond to the following questions:
  - Were these people real kurkuls? What, if anything, did that mean?
  - In a number of situations, the Communist party justified its actions by saying that "the end justifies the means." What was the end it worked toward?
  - Why do you think "outsiders" were utilized to bring about the "re-settlement" of kurkuls?
  - What evidence can you find in these articles that the Communists wanted to bring about the extermination of kurkuls (kulaks)?

- Collectivization

Ukraine: A Soviet Laboratory

"Ukraine...was to serve as a colossal laboratory of new forms of socio-economic and productive-technical reconstruction of the rural economy for the entire Soviet Union."

The Five-Year Plan for Agricultural Construction (Moscow, 1930) 3rd. ed., vol. III, p. 127.

Collectivization and the Countryside

The year 1928 was a landmark in the history of Soviet agriculture. In 1928, the Soviets initiated a system they called collectivization. This system replaced individually held land with huge government controlled farms based on the premise that increased production and equitable distribution would result. What the government planners intended was that 25,000,000 small farms would be transformed into 250,000 collectivized agricultural factories. Land, stock, and, in some cases, private dwellings were to be confiscated from individual owners and reassigned, in theory at least, to the community-at-large. The collective was to be a cooperative venture; in practice, it was the state that received and disbursed goods and resources and supervised the members. Collectives came to resemble more closely penal colonies in which the labor, interests, and lifestyles of their inhabitants were proscribed by the directives of a political hierarchy often quite ignorant of the practice of agriculture or the conditions of the locale.

The Communist Party, distrustful of the peasants' willingness to conform to the new programs, sent about 25,000 loyalist enforcers into the countryside to ensure compliance. Calling themselves the "Thousanders," these political agents were taught to regard farmers as potential "petty capitalist" offenders or, in non-Russian areas like Ukraine, latent nationalists.

Government suspicions were not unfounded. Many farmers resented these inroads on their property and village lifestyles, and resisted collectivization. The result was a series of desperate, short-lived uprisings.

The government responded swiftly with reprisals. Moscow's answer to these rebellions was to send punitive expeditions which razed whole communities. These expeditions were particularly fierce in Ukraine as compared with the other Republics. There were a number of reasons for this difference. The richness of the soil and the psychological attachment to private agriculture as a way of life resulted in a greater proportion of the Ukrainian peasantry being defined as "kurkuls." Likewise, the nationalist sympathies inherent in village culture in Ukraine were a perceived threat to the socialist ethic. Any resistance to collectivization was interpreted as resistance to the Soviet Russian system.

Handouts A-5.1 – A-5.4 focus on the collectivization process in Ukraine. As students study these readings, ask them to prepare responses to the following questions:

- What is a collective farm (Kolhosp)?
- What were the stated reasons for creating the collective farm?
- Did most farmers want to join collective farms? Give some reasons for your answers.
- Why do you think the government wanted to create the impression that collectivization was voluntary? Why were peasants compelled to "voluntarily" join?
- Name some of the methods used by the government to force Ukrainian farmers into collective farms.
- How did farmers resist collectivization? Cite specific examples.

- Preparation for Famine

By mid-1932, seven-tenths of all Ukraine's farms had been collectivized. Since mechanization of agriculture would for some years remain out of the question, collectivization meant only that private farms were abolished and the farmers were to plant and harvest as a group. The crop for the entire collective farm was brought to a single point, and the state's quota was to be met out of "first proceeds." This meant that a state procurement official took everything the farmers harvested until the quota was met. Only if something was left over would the farmers themselves receive a share. Thus, collectivization gave the state much greater control over agricultural production; it did nothing to increase production but made it much easier

for the state to take a greater proportion of what had been produced.

There were signs prior to the Famine years that served as precursors of the disaster. For example, in the late 1920s and 1930s, Stalin and the Central Committee established extremely inflated estimates for crop yields of the unharvested grain. The quotas for the grain due to the state were derived from these high estimates. This manner of calculation resulted in persistently high quotas. The grain quotas for Ukraine, as a fraction of the total amount of grain harvested, grew astronomically:

1928	17.6%
1929	27.3%
1930	in excess of 30%
1931	in excess of 40%

When the collectives and remaining private farms fell short of these high quotas, the authorities collected and confiscated all the foodstuffs that could be found, leaving the affected villagers to starve in the midst of the harvest.

The responsibility of the Central Government in Moscow for this crisis is based on a number of actions. The most telling act took place in the summer of 1932, when the Politburo ordered that watchtowers be erected in Ukrainian fields with armed guards posted to watch over the harvest. Similarly, the government of Ukraine, on a directive from Moscow, put forth the following measures:

a. All resources of the collective farm, including crops in the field, community surpluses, cattle, co-op stores, warehouses, etc., were to be considered possessions of the state.

b. The penalty for theft within the collective farm was capital punishment–execution by a firing squad and confiscation of all possessions. For lesser offenses, the penalty was loss of freedom for a minimum of five years, with confiscation of possessions.

c. Ukraine was isolated gradually from the other regions of the USSR by a restrictive system of internal passports. Train tickets were sold only to individuals with written permission from authorities to travel.

The Soviet government took steps to conceal the climbing death rate due to starvation. Physicians certifying causes of death were forbidden to name starvation as a cause of death. The Soviet government decreed that it was a "counter-revolutionary" act to use the word "holod" (hunger) in reference to conditions in Ukraine.

During the time of the Famine, the Central Committee of the Communist Party proposed no direct aid to famine victims and took no actions to prevent the crisis from escalating. Rather, the Committee appointed Pavel Postyshev *defacto* dictator in Ukraine. The "grave procurement problem," as it has been referred to in Moscow, continued and intensified. V. Molotov, addressing a meeting of "shock activists," stated "... The worse has to be done regardless of how many lives it may cost. There is no room for softness or sentimentality."

Handout A-6.1 outlines the organized steps used to prepare for the Forced Famine. As students read this handout, have them prepare responses to the following questions:

- What evidence did you find in the readings that the government actually planned the Ukrainian Famine?
- How did the government implement the collection of food from the collective farmers?
- What were the special brigades? What were their tasks? What methods did the brigades employ to accomplish their mission?

Handout A-6.2 describes the Internal Passport System imposed by Soviet authorities in order to restrict the movement and employment of farmers. After students read Handout A-6.2, discuss the following questions:

- What does the Small Soviet Encyclopedia of 1928- 1930 say about the internal passport system?
- According to Roy Medvedev, what was the reason for reimposition of internal passports?
- What impact did the internal passport system have on Ukrainian farmers?

Handout A-6.3 includes excerpts from the official Communist periodical *Visti* as well as other descriptions of the food blockades imposed on Ukrainian villages. As students study the handout materials, have them consider the following questions:

- How did the government justify the passage of the law liquidating all private trading?
- What were the stated reasons for government- sponsored blacklisting of certain villages?
- Whom did the Central Committee in Moscow blame for the failure of grain-collections in various districts of Ukraine?
- What factors would account for the government- established commercial blockade in December of 1932?
- What is your opinion of the Soviet government's assessment of the given situation and their actions to correct it? Give reasons for your answer.
- What do you believe were the real reasons for the above actions?

Remind students that at the time of the blockades most farmers were already collectivized and that the Famine was widespread.

Handout A-6.4 includes a translation of the All- Union Central Committee decree dated January 24, 1933. In this decree, Soviet Ukrainian authorities were found guilty of criminal negligence for failing to meet grain quotas. New leaders were appointed who would more energetically carry out the grain seizures, regardless of the consequences in terms of human lives lost. After students read Handout A-6.4, ask them to define the key words and locate the regions identified in the decree. Key words include: procurement, quota, and Bolshevik. Regions to locate include: Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv. Then ask students to summarize the decree and speculate about why the Ukrainian officials were removed by the Central Committee in Moscow rather than by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine.

The last series of handout materials in this section about the preparation for the Famine focuses on Ukrainian reactions to the grain confiscations and food blockades. Discuss the following questions:

- According to the Communist Party, what was the significance of "pilfering of grain" and "theft of Socialist property"?
- According to the Government, who were the "enemies of collective order" and how did the government propose to deal with them?
- According to the witnesses of the Famine, why did the Ukrainian people resort to the "acts of sabotage" and theft of communal property?
- How did the Soviet officials deny the reality of the Forced Famine?
- How did Soviet officials demand obedience to their authority in enforcing the Famine?

• Forced Famine in Ukraine

"The clinical picture of famine is well-known. It ruins the energy-producing resources of the human system, advancing as the necessary fats and sugars are withheld. The body withers. Thin skin assumes a dust- grey tinge and folds into many creases. A person ages visibly. Even small children and infants have an old look. Their eyes become large, bulging and immobile. The process of distrophy sometimes affects all the tissues and the sufferer resembles a skeleton covered with tightly-drawn skin. But a swelling of the tissues is more common, especially those of the hands, feet and face. Skin erupts over the swelling and festering sores persist. Motive power is lost, the slightest motion producing complete fatigue. The essential functions of life breathing and circulation consume the body's own tissue and albumin, the body consumes itself. Respiration and heartbeat become accelerated. The pupils dilate. Starvation diarrhea sets in. This condition is already dangerous, because the slightest physical exertion induces heart failure. It often takes place while the sufferer is walking, climbing stairs, or attempting to run. General weakness spreads. The patient now cannot get up, nor move in bed. In a condition of semi-conscious sleep he might last about a week, whereupon the heart stops beating."

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In January 1933, Stalin said: "Do not allow your attention to be overshadowed by worries about all sorts of funds and reserves; do not be diverted from the main task; develop the grain procurement campaign from the very first days of the harvest, and speed it up; for the first commandment is fulfill the plan for grain procurements."

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The actual Famine began in Ukraine in the late fall of 1932. It reached its peak in the spring of 1933 when 25,000 people died daily as a result of starvation. During this time, the Soviet government continued its "grain procurement policy" and conducted house-to- house searches for hidden foodstuffs. During the famine years of 1932 and 1933, the USSR exported grain, albeit a modest 1.73 and 1.69 million metric tons respectively.

There are any number of interpretations possible for the causes of the Great Ukrainian Famine. One possibility was that the grain procurement program and the resulting hunger stemmed from the government's need for capital to finance its industrialization efforts. This action would certainly account for the export of grain during the height of the Famine. Another possibility was that the Famine was a method of punishing farmers for resisting collectivization to bring all such revolts to an end by crushing the spirit of the peasant class. Soviet historians customarily blame village or regional officials for overzealous behavior in this matter, rather than blame the Famine on policy agreed upon by the Central Government.

Likewise, some support the hypothesis that the Famine was created as an unintentional side effect of a poorly planned changeover to collectivized farming. The general chaos following such a change would account for some food distribution and production problems, with hunger a likely result. This would be especially true after the deportation of large numbers of kurkuls, who were by far the most productive and experienced of the farmers.

But the hypothesis that the Ukrainian Famine was a manufactured catastrophe, planned and executed by the Soviet government in Moscow, is closest to the truth. The Famine is better

understood as a genocidal act in light of two highly significant events which preceded it:

1) The Soviet's annihilation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous (Independent) Orthodox Church. Twnety-four of its 34 bishops were known to be arrested and eight disappeared; only two remained alive when World War II began. *(Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopedia,* Vol. I, p. 818.) Most of the clergy and thousands of its lay activists perished, and the church ceased to function completely. At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church, although also persecuted, continued to function.

2) The wholesale murder or exile to concentration camps of the Ukrainian cultural and scientific intelligencia. In July 1929 alone, according to some accounts, the mass arrest of the Ukrainian intelligencia affected 5,000 people. *(Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopedia,* Vol. I, p. 818.) When these two events are considered together, then the Soviet government's genocidal intent becomes obvious.

Ukrainians resorted to a variety of methods in their struggle to stay alive. Some took the risk of capture by the authorities and hoarded or hid food to feed their families. Some attempted to seek refuge in the cities, usually by way of illegal travel, and sought employment there. Others by similar means tried to go outside the territorial borders of Ukraine in search of food. The government, however, did all it could to frustrate these efforts. Officials, for example, confiscated all bread bought in Russia enroute to Ukraine and, by way of the system of internal passports, tried to keep peasants isolated in their villages. Ukrainians endured months of starvation before finally resorting to desperate measures such as suicide, cannibalism, and grave robbing in order to obtain gold used to purchase food at the State-operated stores.

Handouts A-7.1 and A-7.2 serve as overviews of the Forced Famine. These readings might provide teacher background information or might be used as reading assignments. The following questions will help students to organize the information contained in these handouts.

- In the opinion of Stalin, what was his most difficult time as leader of the Soviet Union?
- In addition to collectivization, what other campaigns did the Soviet government conduct in Ukraine?
- Which events in Ukraine alarmed the Soviet government in Moscow?
- According to Dolot, the collectivization and grain collection campaigns were instruments of war against the Ukrainian national movement. The Famine served as the weapon which delivered the final blow. Do you agree with Dolot's analysis? Explain your answer.
- Where was the Famine centered?
- How were people dehumanized by the Famine? Give some examples.
- Discuss the "diet" of the people during the Famine.
- How did the events during the Famine relate to the regulations issued by the Government one year earlier?
- What were some unusual "skills" that helped people to survive?
- According to the handout, people traveled from Ukraine to Russia to buy bread. What conclusions can you draw about the Famine?
- Discuss the plight of children during the Famine.
- According to the reading, who did not starve during the Famine?

- Handouts A-8.1 – A-8.8 present eyewitness testimony about the Famine conditions in Ukraine. You might divide the class into small groups and assign one reading to each group. Have students discuss the following questions after reading their handout:
  - How does this eyewitness portray conditions in Ukraine during the Famine years?
  - How did the actions of the Soviet authorities add to the death toll from the Famine?
  - How did people manage to survive during the Famine years?
  - According to Handout A-8.4, which groups of people survived in the greatest numbers?

- The photographs which follow the readings provide additional evidence of the effects of the Famine. As students study copies of these photographs, have them describe how the Famine affected children. Ask students to compare the eyewitness acounts with the scenes portrayed in this set of photographs.

- While 25,000 Ukrainians died every day from starvation during the spring of 1933, the Grain Procurement Brigades continued to raid Ukrainian villages and to confiscate grain and other foodstuffs from the starving peasants. After students have read the accounts of three people who took part in these brigades (Handouts A-9.1), have them answer the following questions:
  - As participants in the Forced Famine and as witnesses to the starvation, how did these individuals justify their actions?
  - In their views, what was the most important objective at the time of the Famine?
  - How would you respond to the statement: "The ends justify the means"?
  - How did these perpetrators of the Famine display indifference toward their victims?
  - Why did these Communist Party functionaries unquestioningly obey the authorities in Moscow?

- The Handouts numbered A-10.1 – A-10.2 describe Stalin's role in planning and implementing the Forced Famine during 1932-1933. Remind students that Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) served as the premier of the Soviet Union from 1958-1964. After students read Handout A-10.1, have them answer the following:
  - How does Khrushchev describe the condition of Ukrainian agriculture in 1929? What does he say life was like in Ukraine from 1932 to 1933?
  - How reliable do you think Khrushchev's account of Ukraine is? Was he in a position to know the facts about the Famine?
  - Whom does Khrushchev blame for the Famine?

Handout A-10.2 describes the roles Stalin and other Communist Party members played during the Famine. After students read this material, ask:

- According to Roy Medvedev, what did Stalin know about the Famine?
- Whom does Stalin blame for the Famine?
- What does Stalin say about the efforts of the Communist Party during the grain procurements?
- According to Robert Conquest, what role did Stalin play in planning and implementing the Famine?
- How did Stalin deny the reality of the Famine?

- When various nations of the world learned that a Famine of catastrophic proportions was occurring in Ukraine, relief efforts were instituted by Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians to save the remaining victims. All efforts were rejected by Soviet authorities, who denied the reality of the Famine and refused any Famine relief. After students read Handout A-11.1, have them consider the following questions:
  - Why did Soviet authorities not help Ukrainian farmers?
  - How would you respond to the statement that the Famine was deliberately planned by the Central Government in Moscow?

- Famine cover-up and denial

"It is the only major famine whose very existence was ignored or denied by governmental authorities, and even to a large degree successfully concealed from world opinion. The process by which it happened is a very unfortunate one, involving political reactions which are still with us to this day.... By common – though thoughtless and unfortunate – reaction, left-wing and even moderate circles were able to persuade themselves that the story was untrue or (a much easier view) greatly exaggerated."

Robert Conquest. *The Great Terror* (New York, 1968), p. 23.

Handouts A-12.1 – A-12.7 describe various reactions to the Famine as well as reasons for the Soviet cover-up of this tragic event. You might assign student groups to read the different handout materials and report to the class. All students might read Handout A-12.1, while the other handouts might be divided among the student groups.

After students complete Handout A-12.1, ask:

- According to the author, who were the people who refused to accept the truth about the Famine?
- Why did they excuse and defend the Communist system?
- According to Dr. Myron Kuropas, why did the press in the United States conceal the truth about the Famine?
- How did Eugene Lyons explain his early pro-Communist sympathies?
- How did Soviet authorities manipulate the news correspondents into reporting only favorably about the happenings in the Soviet Union?
- Who was Walter Duranty and how did he contribute to the disinformation about the Famine?

Edouard Herriot, premier of France during the Famine years, visited Ukraine in September 1933. Handout A- 12.2 describes the details of Herriot's visit and his reaction to what he saw. After students read these materials, ask:

- How did the Soviet government prepare for Premier Herriot's visit?
- Contrast the reactions of eyewitnesses with Herriot's observations.
- How can you justify Herriot's observations?
- What implications do Herriot's observations have on the validity of other reports coming from the Soviet Union?

Handout A-12.3 contains two articles written by Soviet sympathizers. Louis Fischer and Sidney and Beatrice Webb supported Soviet policies. As students read these two explanations for the Famine, have them react to the following questions:

- Why did Fischer state that "the peasants brought the calamity upon themselves"?
- What does Fischer think were the causes for the Famine?
- How does Fischer justify the actions of Soviet officials?
- According to the Webbs, which group was responsible for the Famine?
- How did the Soviet government limit the availability of news about the Famine?

• Western press reaction to the Famine

Newspaper correspondents for various British and American newspapers, including the Manchester (England) *Guardian*, the *New York Times*, and the New York *Evening Journal*, reported about the Famine. These reporters, with the exception of Walter Duranty, agreed that the Soviet government was responsible for the Famine in Ukraine. They relayed stories about the Famine and attempted to convince their readers of the reality of the Famine. As students read the reports and news items included in this set of Handouts, have them continue to investigate the Soviet government's role in attempting to hide the Famine from world view.

Malcolm Muggeridge, British journalist and author, reported from Ukraine during the Famine. Excerpts from Muggeridge's account of the Famine, *Chronicles of Wasted Time*, are included in Handout A-13.1. Ask students to answer the following questions after reading this Handout:

- Whom does Malcolm Muggeridge charge with responsibility for the Famine?
- Why were Muggeridge's accounts of the Famine challenged by other reporters?
- What methods were used to neutralize the effects of Muggeridge's article?

Muggeridge's novel, *Winter in Moscow*, vividly describes the Famine conditions in Ukraine. After students read this fictionalized account, have them respond to the following questions:

- How does this account compare to other descriptions of the Famine?
- According to Muggeridge, what caused the Famine?
- What role did propaganda play in the events he described?

William H. Chamberlin also reported the Famine conditions to his readers. Have students read Handout A- 13.3 and respond to these questions:

- According to Chamberlin, who was responsible for the Famine?
- Why did Chamberlin think the Soviet government decided to make the Famine "an instrument of national policy"?
- According to Mr. Mezhuev, what was the Soviet government's attitude toward Famine relief?

Handout A-13.4 presents an eyewitness account by journalist Eugene Lyons. Mr. Lyons reported from the Soviet Union for the United Press from 1928 to 1934. Have students compare this account with other eyewitness testimony. Ask:

- According to Mr. Lyons, where did people get bread?
- Why do you think that the law required a license to transport bread?
- Why would the Soviet government permit one village to starve and allow another nearby to live?

Handout A-13.5 presents two reports from Ukraine that appeared in the New York *Evening Journal* in 1935. Thomas Walker's report appeared on February 18, 1935, while Harry Lang's article was printed on April 16, 1935. After students read their reports, have them discuss the following questions:

- Whom does Mr. Walker blame for the Famine? Why?
- Who confiscated crops from the farmers?
- How did parents attempt to save their children from starvation?
- According to Harry Lang, where was the real Famine located? How many victims did the Famine claim?

Walter Duranty also reported about the Famine. However, Duranty's articles in the *New York Times* presented a much different assessment of the events in Ukraine. Duranty's descriptions and interpretations were challenged by other reporters and remain a source of controversy. Have groups of students read the excerpts included in Handout A-13.6 and summarize the differences between Duranty's reports and those presented earlier. Discuss the following questions:

- What did Duranty say conditions were like in Ukraine in 1933?
- How does Duranty explain the deaths due to "malnutrition"?
- Why do you think Duranty's reports differ so much from other dispatches?

In Handout A-13.7 Malcolm Muggeridge, Eugene Lyons, and Marco Carynnyk challenge Duranty's reports and provide conflicting testimony. These reporters also present reasons for Duranty's actions. After students read these reports, have them respond to the following questions:

- Why did Muggeridge think that Duranty filed false news reports from the Soviet Union?
- Why did Muggeridge think that the press was sympathetic toward the Soviet government?
- What did Eugene Lyons write about Duranty's treatment of the Famine?
- Why do you think Duranty received praise from Stalin?

• Recent Soviet statements concerning the Forced Famine

The statements and excerpts included in Handout A- 13.8 represent the Soviet government's version of the real Forced Famine. So-

viet officials deny the reality of the Famine and place the blame for any food shortages on the Ukrainian farmers, the victims. After students read this Handout, discuss the following questions:

– What is the official position of the Soviet government regarding the Famine?
– While they do not call it a Famine, whom do they blame for the "difficulties"?
– What does the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* say about the Famine?
– What does the *History of USSR* report about the Famine?

• Conclusion and Consequences of the Famine

The dire consequences of the Ukrainian Famine go beyond the sheer number of individuals who perished. It was a disaster for the entire nation, its culture, traditions, and lifestyle. It crushed the self-sufficient spirit of the farmers who ultimately became voiceless pawns in the shifting realm of Communist politics. Among the many more tangible results of the Famine are the following:

1. The disaster broke the autonomy of the Ukrainian Communist Party and its government, which until that time had been vested with actual decision- making power separate from that of Moscow.
2. It heightened the power of the Central Committee in Moscow to direct the affairs in Ukraine both overtly and through its appointed functionaries and a subservient government in Kharkiv.
3. Accompanied by a massive purge of Ukrainian intellectual and religious leaders, and by the dismantling of the Ukrainization policy, the Famine effectively neutralized the demographic basis of Ukrainian nationhood, the peasantry. This policy left the door open for intense Russification in all spheres of Ukrainian life.
4. It created economic difficulties in agriculture which have not yet been entirely solved. In spite of numerous sacrifices over the years, the Soviet Union cannot yet feed itself.
5. It created a number of social problems, including vast numbers of orphaned children whose parents were either deported or killed in the Famine. These children became wards of the state, with many of them resorting to crime as a means of survival. Many were later executed by the state.

The overarching conclusion which can be drawn from the Famine was that it was a political as well as an economic catastrophe, whatever one's point of view. It was Ukraine, together with the largely Ukrainian and Cossack North Caucasus, which was most affected. The responsibility for the Famine rests with the Soviet system of government, which remained foreign to those who would eventually become its intended victims.

It is not difficult to accept the fact that the Great Ukrainian Famine had a catastrophic and long-range influence on the people of the USSR, particularly on the Ukrainian people. No one will probably discover the exact death toll, as the Soviet regime guarded the event in the strictest secrecy and denies to this day the existence of the Famine. But as one observer writes, "It does not matter whether the number of dead is 5, 6, 7, 8, or 10 million. It is enough to show that the figure runs into the millions." It is generally believed that the victims of the Famine number somewhere between 6 and 8 million individuals, or about 20% of the national population. Translated into United States population terms, it would mean that 40,000,000 Americans would die of starvation in the course of little more than a year.

The Famine had been organized throughout the Ukrainian ethnographic territories, but its course did not have a uniform intensity, as can be seen from the following table:

Cons. No.	Village	District	Population before Famine	Population dead by Famine	% dead by Famine
1.	Rudovka	Chernihiv	6,700	700	10.4
2.	Zitniki	Poltava	4,600	1,200	26.0
3.	Zarich	Poltava	3,500	500	14.3
4.	Ivankiv	Kiev	8,000	2,000	25.0
5.	Pashkivske	Krasnnodar	7,000	3,500	50.0
6.	Veprik	Sumy	250	25	10.0
7.	Sivash	Dnipropetrovsk	5,000	1,500	30.0
8.	Sofiyivka	Odessa	4,000	800	20.0
9.	Uspenivka	Mykolayiv	2,000	800	40.0
10.	Dmitrovka	Kharkiv	330	60	12.1
11.	Snizkivka	Kharkiv	425	63	14.8
12.	Kislek	Vinnytsya	6,000	1,800	30.0

By spring of 1933, all seed and forage reserves on the collective farms had been removed by grain collectors. That spring there remained no seed for the planting of crops. The government explained this shortage as being due to "inclement climatic conditions in the summer of 1932 causing the destruction of a portion of the crop." The government was forced to dip into its reserves and issue a loan of seed to Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

There was also a manpower shortage in agriculture. Town laborers and civil servants were mobilized to work on collective farms. However, this labor shortage did not trouble the Communist government as much as it may seem. Soviet machine-tractor stations could more easily cultivate larger tracts of land with fewer people than before. This mechanization served to further the production of greater quantities of grain. Other changes on the face of the land included moving peasants from the central provinces of Russia to various Ukrainian villages that had been depopulated by the Famine.

Handout A-14.1 includes eyewitness accounts of the consequences of the Famine. Have students read this Handout and discuss the extent of the Famine in Ukraine. The second part of this Handout is entitled "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine: Postscript" by Dr. James E. Mace. In this Handout, Dr. Mace discusses the consequences of the Famine. After students read it, ask:

– According to Dr. Mace, did the Soviet State solve the Ukrainian problem? Why or why not?


POLAND
BELORUSSIAN SSR
RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
WESTERN UKRAINE
Annexed 1939
Lviv
Kiev
Kharkiv
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
Dniester R.
Bug R.
Dnieper R.
Don R.
MOLDAVIAN SSR
UKRAINE
Odessa
Danube R.
Sea of Azov
NORTH CAUCASUS (KUBAN)
Kuban
Black Sea
UKRAINE*
1. Uman
2. Poltava
3. Dnipropetrovsk
4. Kharkiv
5. Kiev
6. Rostov
7. Vinnitsa (Vynnytsya)
8. Chernihiv
9. Odessa
10. Bila Tserkva
11. Mikolayiw
12. Sumy
*Pre-World War II

UKRAINE TODAY

15

Handout A-1.1

INTRODUCTION

James Mace

When Americans think of the Soviet Union, they tend to think of Russia and assume that all those who live there are Russians. In fact, about half the inhabitants of the USSR are not Russian at all; they belong to nations as diverse as Armenians in the South, Lithuanians in the North, Muslim Kazakhs and Tatars, and an array of Siberian peoples not unlike our own American Indians. There are over one hundred languages spoken in the Soviet Union, and Russian is only one of them.

According to the 1979 census, over forty million of the Soviet Union's inhabitants were Ukrainians, a Slavic nation like the Russians and Poles and as different from them as they are from each other. The Ukrainians have a historical record that extends back to the tenth century when their ruler, Prince (St.) Volodymyr accepted Christianity and brought what was then called "Rus" into the ranks of the Christian nations of Europe. They have a rich culture of which they are rightly proud, and the central figure of their literary tradition is the poet Taras Shevchenko, a nineteenth-century bard who was born a serf and rose to the highest levels of cultured society in the Russian Empire....

In 1933 Ukraine and certain neighboring areas were victims of what those who survived remember as the *Velyky Holod*, the Great Famine or, more precisely, the Great Hunger. It is also often referred to as *Shtuchny Holod*, the Artificial or Man-Made Hunger, for it was not, like most famines, due to some natural calamity or crop failure. Figures on the Ukrainian harvest were published in the press at the time, and they show that the grain crop was only a little below the pre-collectivization average; there was certainly no crop failure capable of causing a famine. A few years earlier the Soviet government had collectivized agriculture, forced the farmers to give up their individual farms, pool whatever resources could be taken from them, work the land in common on estates... and give a far greater share of what they produced to the state. The farmers fought against this, and they also fought for their national culture, which was under attack by the Soviet regime. It was in order to break this resistance that government agents were sent into the countryside and ordered to take away all foodstuffs. As a result, the people starved.

• • •

In order to understand why the famine of 1933 occurred, one must go back at least to 1917, perhaps even to 1900 when the first Ukrainian political parties were formed in the Russian Empire. The Ukrainians were at that time almost entirely a nation of peasants, just as the Czechs had been not long before. If one visited Prague in, say, 1800, the language one would hear in the streets and shops would have been German, not Czech. Only later was Prague "Czechized." By the same token, the cities of Ukraine were predominantly Russian-speaking in 1917. Although they were largely Ukrainized in the late 1920s, they were later re-Russified to the point where today Ukrainian is seldom heard in the streets of Kiev. In order to prevent the development of a Ukrainian national movement, the tsarist Russian government made it illegal to write or publish in the Ukrainian language up to 1905. The concessions made in that year were gradually withdrawn to the point that very little could be published legally in Ukrainian by the time the First World War broke out. Ukrainian writers had two choices: either publish legally in Russian and hope to slip something past the censor through the use of Aesopian language, or publish in Ukrainian in Austrian-ruled Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia) and try to have their work smuggled over the border illegally. Despite these obstacles, the Ukrainians produced an educated stratum, the intelligentsia, and this group organized political parties, which sought national liberation, social justice for the peasants, and some sort of home rule for Ukraine.

In 1917 the Russian Empire disintegrated. The tsar abdicated, the police were slaughtered or went into hiding, and the imperial army began to fall apart. The Russian Provisional Government had little real power, particularly in outlying areas. A Ukrainian national council, the Central Rada, was organized in Kiev. Led by the two largest Ukrainian socialist parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats, it gradually evolved into an autonomous national government. After the Bolsheviks took power in Petrograd and began an invasion of Ukraine, the Rada declared Ukraine independent in January 1918. For years, Ukraine was fought over by Ukrainian governments, the Bolsheviks, Denikin's Russian Volunteer Army (which sought to turn the clock back to before the revolution), the Poles, and a number of rural warlords known as *otamans*. Although by 1921 the Bolsheviks were able to defeat their various rivals in the field of battle, large-scale guerrilla warfare continued in the Ukrainian country-

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Taken from: James Mace. Editor's introduction to *The Ninth Circle* by Olexa Woropay. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1983), pp. xi-xv. Reprinted by permission of the Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University.

Handout A-1.1 (cont.)

side. Ukrainian governments were driven from the country, but the Ukrainian peasantry remained unconquered.

The Bolsheviks decided to concede the peasants the minimum of what they demanded. In 1921 the New Economic Policy was adopted, ending forced requisitions of foodstuffs and allowing farmers to sell their products in a limited free market. In 1923, a series of policies known as indigenization were adopted in non-Russian areas. These policies provided for the recruitment of non-Russians into the Party and state, teaching Russians the local language, and actively supporting the cultural life of the non-Russian peoples. Belorussianization, Tatarization, Yiddishization, and so forth, proceeded through the rest of the decade.

Since the Ukrainians of all the non-Russian nations were the most numerous and constituted the greatest political threat to Moscow, Ukrainization went much farther than any of its counterparts. Many prominent Ukrainian intellectual and political leaders returned from exile to take advantage of the cultural opportunities afforded by this relatively benevolent policy. A national cultural revival of unprecedented creativity took place in literature, scholarship, and the arts. Even within the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, a strong Ukrainian wing demanded that Ukrainization lead to the end of Russian domination. This group, led by Oleksander Shumsky, Mykola Khvyl'ovy, and Mykhailo Volobuev, was condemned as "nationalistic deviationist," and the Party repudiated their views.

By the end of 1927 Mykola Skrypnyk emerged as Ukraine's political strongman. His official post, Commissar of Education, placed him in charge of the Ukrainization policy and of supervising cultural life in general. By eschewing any hint of anti-Russian sentiment, he was briefly able to achieve much of what Shumsky, Khvyl'ovy, and Volobuev had called for. Under Skrypnyk, Soviet Ukraine evolved more and more in the direction of a national government, defending its prerogatives from Moscow and even demanding it be allowed to defend the national interests of Ukrainians residing in Russia itself.

The regime used the respite provided by the New Economic Policy and Ukrainization to penetrate the Ukrainian countryside in a variety of ways. Committees of Non-Rich Peasants *(komnezams,* KNS), which had earlier seized peasants' crops and held absolute power in the villages, were retained. There was no counterpart to these organizations in Russia. After 1925 they were stripped of political power and turned into voluntary organizations, and during collectivization and the early stages of the famine they played an important role in expropriating those the regime wanted to get rid of, forcing the peasants into collective farms (*kolhosps*), and searching for hidden grain to seize. In this later period, however, they often performed these functions under the leadership of someone sent from the outside to supervise dekulakization, collectivization, and the deliveries of grain to the state. Village soviets were also organized, and the countryside was covered by a dense network of secret police collaborators known as the *seksoty*. Because of this penetration of the countryside, the regime was in a far stronger position relative to the peasants than it had been in 1921. Whereas the Bolsheviks had hitherto come to the villages as complete strangers, they now had organized supporters ready to do their bidding and provide information on potential opponents who could be singled out for elimination.

Stalin saw the nationalities question and peasant question as indissolubly linked. In his view, the peasants constituted the social basis of national movements, the reservoir from which such movements drew strength. As he once put it, "The nationality problem is *by its essence* a peasant problem." Thus, concessions to the peasants meant concessions to the non-Russian nations and vice versa. By the same token, repression in the countryside and repression against those nations were bound to go together. They were two sides of the same coin.

In 1929 Stalin decided to eliminate the kulaks (well- to-do peasants, *kurkuls* in Ukrainian) as a class, begin forcing peasants into collective farms, and use what could be taken from the peasants to finance rapid industrialization. This was possible because, although collectivization did nothing to increase crop yields (the current problems of Soviet agriculture are largely attributable to forced collectivization), harvesting was done in common, and the state could supervise the harvest directly and take as much as it wished directly from the threshing room floor. This is precisely what happened, and the idea that the state should take all it required from "first proceeds," that is, the threshing room, became known as the First Commandment of Soviet agriculture.

At the same time as peasants were being forced into collective farms the first steps were taken to end the indigenization policies. Since Ukraine was the largest stumbling block, these steps took the form of indirect attacks on Skrypnyk and his clients. In 1929 one of his most important subordinates, the ideological watchdog of historians, Matvyi Yavorsky, was attacked for "treating the history of Ukraine as a distinctive process." The political implication of such a charge was quite obvious: if Ukraine did not

Handout A-1.1 (cont.)

have its own history, it was not a distinctive country and ought not to be considered as such. This was the beginning of the end of Skrypnyk. At the same time, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was banned and its priests were executed on a mass scale. In 1930 a show trial was held of an imaginary conspiracy called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. At this trial some of Ukraine's most distinguished intellectual and spiritual leaders were convicted of a host of crimes known in the jargon of the day as "wrecking."

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The famine of 1933 succeeded in breaking the Ukrainian peasantry as a political force, completed the destruction of the entire social structure of the Ukrainian nation, and made possible far-reaching political changes. In addition to the fall of Skrypnyk, the Ukrainization policy was ended and a policy of Russification was instituted. The Ukrainian wing of the Communist Party ceased to be an independent policy force and over the next several years what was left of its old cadres was "liquidated" (a singularly inappropriate euphemism since such people did not melt; they were executed), and the Ukrainian culture was thus decapitated by the loss of its intellectual and political leaders, pushed out of the cities and back on the farms by a return to Russification, and Soviet spokesmen began to glorify everything Russian, including the tsarist past. At roughly the same time, internal passports were issued to urban dwellers but not to collective farmers. Since farmers could not live in the cities and towns without such documents, this meant legally attaching the agricultural population to the land. The word customarily used to describe such a state of affairs is *serfdom*.

Handout A-1.2

FORCED FAMINE IN THE UKRAINE: A HOLOCAUST THE WEST FORGOT

Adrian Karatnycky

Fifty years ago this past spring, the normally bountiful fields of the Ukraine were filled with the odor of death. Crows flew over the steppe, awaiting their feast of human carrion. Corpses littered the streets and roadways. In the June 6, 1933, issue of the London *Morning Post*, Malcolm Muggeridge depicted the following scene:

"If you go now to the Ukraine or the North Caucasus, exceedingly beautiful countries and formerly amongst the most fertile in the world, you will find them like a desert; fields choked with weeds and neglected; no livestock or horses; villages deserted; peasants famished, often their bodies swollen, unutterably wretched.

"You will discover if you question them that they have had no bread at all for three months past; only potatoes and some millet, and they are now counting potatoes one by one.... They will tell you that many have already died of famine and that many are dying every day; that thousands have been shot by the government and hundreds of thousands exiled."

The devastation Mr. Muggeridge described wasn't caused by any natural catastrophe. It was an entirely new phenomenon – history's first artificial famine: a consequence of Stalin's effort to collectivize agriculture and crush the nationally conscious Ukrainian peasantry.

With the exception of Mr. Muggeridge's reports, William Henry Chamberlin's in the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the publication of several stories and a number of shocking photographs of starving children in the Hearst newspapers, the Western press was largely silent about the genocide that was occurring in the Soviet Ukraine. Europe and the U.S. were in the throes of the Great Depression. Violence in the streets was common. Fascism was on the march. The forced famine of 1933 had regrettably come at an inopportune time.

Some reporters from the West concealed the truth because of an ideological commitment to Soviet communism. Others, like *New York Times* correspondent Walter Duranty, were seduced by official favors and access to high government circles into deliberately and shamelessly attempting to suppress the story of the famine, while writing fawning articles on Stalin's rule. For this Mr. Duranty was rewarded with Pulitzer prizes and the Order of Lenin.

None of the day's newspaper reports was able to grasp the enormity of the cataclysm. Today, reliable academic estimates place the number of Ukrainian victims of starvation at 4.5 million to 7 million. This dark event, which rivals in its magnitude the Jewish Holocaust and the massacre of the Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge, is still largely unknown outside the private memories of some survivors.

The famine was in part the by-product of Stalin's relentless drive to collectivize Soviet agriculture. That starvation was artificially induced is beyond dispute. The famine was a clear result of the fact that between 1931 and 1933, while harvests were precipitously declining, Stalin's commissars continued to requisition and confiscate ever-increasing quantities of grain, much of it exported to Western Europe. Peasants were shot and deported as rich, landowning "kulaks." Most livestock perished from the lack of feed, some as a result of peasant attempts to resist collectivization. Cannibalism was not uncommon. Although no medical quarantine was declared and non-Ukrainians were free to travel into and out of the area, starving villagers who sought to flee areas stricken with famine and its resulting outbreaks of pneumonia, typhus, and tuberculosis were turned back at checkpoints controlled by Soviet patrols that scrupulously enforced newly imposed internal passport regulations.

While the drive to collectivize agriculture was a wide-ranging phenomenon common to the entire U.S.S.R., only in the Ukraine did it assume a genocidal character. Indeed, there can be no question that Stalin used the forced famine as part of a political strategy whose aim was to crush all vestiges of Ukrainian national sentiment. As he wrote, "The nationality problem is by its essence a peasant problem." The attack against the "kulaks," therefore, was viewed as an attack against the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, the famine was accompanied by an extensive purge in the cities of the Ukrainian cultural and political elite – whose leading activists had been the precursors of a national communism similar to that which later emerged in Tito's Yugoslavia and Gomulka's Poland.

Some might ask whether today it is worthwhile to dredge up the memory of yet another act of Stalinist barbarism. What can this event from a dim and receding past tell us that Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* has not? One

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Mr. Karatnycky is research director of the A. Philip Randolph Institute and an editor of the quarterly journal *Workers Under Communism*.

Taken from: Adrian Karatnycky. "Forced Famine in the Ukraine: A Holocaust the West Forgot." *The Wall Street Journal*, July 7, 1983. Reprinted with permission of The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones and Company, Inc. 1984. All rights reserved.

Handout A-1.2 (cont.)

might be tempted to say that nothing new can be learned from this secret horror. Yet the 1933 famine is important for both moral and political reasons.

There is of course our moral obligation to honor the memory of the nameless victims by depicting the truth. Moreover, it is important to understand the forced famine as a pivotal event in Soviet history, whose consequences remain to this day.

For the famine created a disastrous situation in Soviet agriculture from which the U.S.S.R. still hasn't fully recovered. Moreover, the famine eliminated a substantial segment of the U.S.S.R.'s non-Russian population, thus ensuring that the Soviet Union would remain for the next five decades a state dominated by an absolute Russian majority. Finally, the famine caused an enormous rift within the Ukrainian nation, which had long been nationally assertive. To this day, independent and national sentiment among Eastern Ukrainians is much lower than among Western Ukrainians (who, in 1933, as part of Poland, were spared the trauma of the famine and the Great Terror).

Yet despite the pivotal importance of the forced famine, for 50 years its full story has remained untold. Not one serious book on this tragedy is available in English.

Today – at a time when some would recast Soviet communism in a friendlier mold, the better to negotiate arms reductions with may once again be an inopportune time to bring up the terrible loss of life and the painful trauma of the brutally scarred Ukrainian nation. Yet 50 years seems too long to remain silent about one of the greatest crimes in mankind's history.

Handout A-1.3

1933/1983: REMEMBER THE UKRAINE

Alexander J. Motyl

Fifty years ago this year, in the early months of 1933, both Hitler and Stalin could be content with a job well done. The former house painter had become chancellor of the mightiest nation in Europe and could now proceed with his solution to the "Jewish problem." The former seminarian, always one to tackle an issue head-on, could boast of already having solved his particular problem. For, by spring 1933, he had seen to it that at least six million Ukrainians were starved to death.

Stalin had long since been distrustful of the nettlesome Ukrainians. Their attempts at independence in 1917-1920 and stubborn resistance to Moscow's efforts at centralization in the following decade could not but have been distasteful to a man who believed that the USSR should have been constituted not as a union of republics but as a unitary Russian state. To make matters worse, most Ukrainians were peasants, and prosperous ones at that.

Collectivization was the answer to Stalin's dilemma. By forcibly extracting the peasants' grain, he could feed the rapidly expanding working class as well as use the revenues acquired from exporting it to pay for badly needed imports of Western technology. At the same time, herding the peasants into collective farms would serve to establish party control over the recalcitrant countryside.

Taken from: "1933/1983: Remember the Ukraine," by Alexander J. Motyl, from *Freedom at Issue*, July-August 1983. Copyright (c) 1983 by Freedom House, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

But more than that, collectivization could also solve Stalin's Ukrainian problem. Stalin, for one, was well aware of the connection between nationalism and the peasantry. In 1925, for example, he had asserted that "the peasant question is the basis, the quintessence, of the national question. That explains the fact that the peasantry constitutes the main army of the national movement, that there is no powerful national movement without the peasant army, nor can there be." In a word, the collectivization of the Ukrainian peasantry, if done properly, could solve two problems with one stroke.

The key was to extract, proportionately, far more grain from the Ukrainians than from the other peasants. According to available statistics, in 1930, 38 percent of the USSR's grain was extracted from the Ukraine, although it produced only 27 percent of all harvested grain. And as collectivization wreaked havoc on the Ukraine's agricultural productivity, Moscow's grain quotas remained brutally high. In 1930, 23.1 million metric tons of grain were produced in the Ukraine, while 7.7 were extracted. Nineteen thirty-one saw production dip to 18.3 million tons, while the procurements remained unchanged. By 1932, grain production had dropped to an alarming 14.6 million tons, but the procurement quota was lowered only by 1.5 million tons, to 6.2.

Such a policy could have resulted only in mass starvation, which began in the spring of 1932 and reached its peak in the winter of 1932-33. Kiev province alone experienced a population loss of two million between 1931 and 1933. According to survivors, cannibalism became commonplace.

The Soviet secret police sealed off the Ukraine to prevent the hunger-crazed peasants from acquiring food in neighboring Russia, where bread was abundant. A worker from the industrialized Don basin in the eastern Ukraine described a visit across the border to several Russian villages: "I was passing through Ukrainian territory and observing the familiar scenes of famine. But no sooner had we crossed over to Russian territory than everything changed. Life was proceeding in a normal fashion. There was not the faintest trace of any famine."

Those peasants who lacked the strength even to try to escape from the villages were simply left to die. Many were exterminated in ways the Nazis were to perfect some ten years later.

Curiously, if typically, what the historian Robert Conquest has called "perhaps the only case in history of a purely man-made famine" went largely unnoticed in the West. Some, such as French Premier Herriot, who visited a "Potemkin village" in the spring of 1933, even flatly denied the existence of any famine. Others, like Malcolm Muggeridge, then a correspondent in the USSR, were simply not believed. Most Westerners, of course, just did not **want** to believe that such atrocities could be committed.

Even more curious is the continued indifference to the famine. That it was a holocaust, in the largest sense of the word, has still to penetrate the popular mind. Academics, meanwhile, who should know better, generally don't, regarding the famine as an unfortunate, if avoidable, side effect of the Soviet regime's rush to collectivize. Stalin, it is argued, did not intend to starve six million Ukrainians; it just happened. How six million deaths can just happen is unclear. But the argument, fortunately, is academic. Jews know best that it doesn't hold water: they've heard it far too often with regard to the house painter from Braunau.

Handout A-2.1

THE SOVIET UNION: A MULTINATIONAL CONGLOMERATE

"The Soviet Union is not a country like others, but almost a continent, where Europe and Asia meet. And it is not a nation so much as an empire... it is not a state of workers and peasants it claims to be... it is primarily a state of nations."

"More than a hundred nations and nationalities lie within its borders, speaking more than a hundred languages, with all that keeps them apart."

"National diversity and intensity of national feeling characterize the Soviet political scene."

Helene Carrere d'Encausse. *The Decline of Empire* (New York, 1980).

ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE USSR WITH POPULATION OF 500,000 OR MORE (1979 CENSUS)

Russians	137,397,000	Ukrainians	42,347,000
Uzbeks	12,456,000	Byelorussians	9,463,000
Kazakhs	6,556,000	Tatars	6,317,000
Azerbaijanians	5,477,000	Armenians	4,151,000
Georgians	3,571,000	Moldavians	2,968,000
Tajiks	2,898,000	Lithuanians	2,851,000
Turkmens	2,028,000	Germans	1,936,000
Kirghiz	1,906,000	Jews	1,811,000
Chuvashi	1,751,000		
Daghestan nationalities (many different distinct nationalities and languages)			1,657,000
Latvians	1,439,000	Bashkirs	1,371,000
Mordvinians	1,192,000	Poles	1,151,000
Estonians	1,020,000	Chechens	756,000
Udmurts	714,000	Mari	622,000
Ossets	542,000		

POPULATION FIGURES FOR THE THREE EAST SLAVIC NATIONALITIES AND THE USSR AS A WHOLE

	1926[1]		1939[1]		
	Population	%	Population	%	% Change
USSR	147,027,090	100.0	170,557,100	100.0	+16.0
Russians	77,791,10	54.0	99,591,500	54.0	+28.0
Byelorussians	4,738,900	3.3	5,275,400	3.1	+11.3
Ukrainians	31,195,000	21.6	28,111,000	16.5	−9.9

[1] Taken from: *The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust*. Published by the Ukrainian National Association, p. 33. The source of information is "Natsionalnosti SSSR" by Kozlov, p. 249.

Handout A-2.1 (cont.)

Natural Rate of Population Growth in the Ukrainian SSR.



Sources: V. I. Naulko: "Etnichnyi sklad naselennia Ukrainskoyi RSR", Kiev, 1965.
V. I. Naulko: "Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei na Ukraine", Kiev, 1975.

Handout A-2.2

UKRAINIAN VILLAGES ARE SHORT OF COMMUNISTS

Notwithstanding the fact that a great majority of the members of the Communist Party of Ukraine are proletarian, the Ukrainian farm organizations are weak. Of the total farm population of 25 million there are only 3,000 Communist centers and only 25,000 Communists active in agriculture.

The proportion of farm laborers in the Communist Party is insignificant, amounting to only 10.1 per cent.

In spite of the great and positive work done recently by the Ukrainian farm organizations, such as collectivization and grain-collecting, there are many cases of corruption of the subordinate farm and Komsomol organizations who have lost their class feeling and have united with the kurkul element. There are thousands of instances of rightist leanings.

From a resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee following Kosior's speech, *Pravda*, November 29, 1929.

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COMMUNISM (BOLSHEVISM) IN UKRAINE

The following represents the composition of the Communist/Bolshevik Party in the Ukraine in 1922.

Nationality	*Total #*	*Percentage*
Ukrainians	11,920	23.3
Russians	27,490	53.6
Jews	6,981	13.6
Other Ethnics	4,845	9.5

Taken from: M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *History of the Communist Party* (Kharkiv, 1923).

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National and Social Composition of Ukrainian Population, 1926

	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews
Agriculture	90.7	51.8	8.9
Industry	3.8	20.0	40.0
Commerce	0.8	3.3	14.9
Administration	2.6	12.2	20.7
Others	2.1	12.7	15.5

Taken from: *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*. Volume I (Munich; New York, 1949), p. 138.

Ukraine as a Food Producing Center (1913)

Ukrainian share of total production in Russian Empire:

Wheat	48%
Rye	30%
Barley	72%
Oats	17%

Taken from: B. Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and Ukraine* (New York, 1956) p. 184.

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Handout A-3.1

"The theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: abolition of private property...."

Taken from: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. *Collected Works* (London, 1975), Vol. 6, p. 6.

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The Differences Between Ukrainians and Russians

"As a party activist, I was sent to Ukraine in order to strengthen a collective farm. In Ukraine, we were told, they had an instinct for private property that was stronger than in the Russian Republic. And truly, truly, the whole business was much worse in Ukraine than it was with us."

Taken from: Vasilii Grossman. *Forever Flowing*, p. 148.

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Comments of a Russian Communist party worker on being assigned to Ukraine:

"I don't like them hayseed bumpkins. Don't trust 'em. Every one of 'em is only out for himself, his own sweet home – yeah, and his own little hole in the ground and his own small change. But I'm a proletarian from my father's father's father and don't care about their dung shoveling. And I don't really know their Ukrainian lingo either...."

Taken from: Lev Kopelev. *The Education of a True Believer*, p. 185.

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"The process of collectivizing agriculture was to prove even more difficult in Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual landholding had always been traditional in Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked.... The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land....

"The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed from that of the Russian. The *obshchina* – the old Russian form of possessing land in common – was unknown in Ukraine. The creation of the *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the (Ukrainian) peasantry."

Taken from: W.E.D. Allen. *The Ukraine: A History*, p. 324.

Handout A-3.2

Deportations

Officially there were an estimated one million kulak farms.* According to the instructions, only one-fifth of the kulaks were subject to deportation, and relatively severe repressive measures were envisaged for "only 600,000." As far as the real kulaks were concerned – that is, active counter-revolutionary elements – the bulk of them had fought in the White Army, retreated with the Whites when they were defeated, and then emigrated. The real kulaks would not have waited around for representatives of the "poor peasants" to rob them and put them up against the wall. The real kulaks had long ago sold off their holdings and gone with their sons to join the city proletariat. As for their daughters, usually they tried to marry GPU men and become fine ladies. So the main blow of the expropriators and punitive expeditions fell not on the kulak but on the middle peasant.

Within one year as many as three million "kulaks" and their families were deported to harsh northern regions. Some were shot, and hundreds of thousands were sent to their deaths in the camps. After them came the so-called kulak sympathizers. Every hard-working farmer who had built up an economically solid enterprise by his own labor and the labor of his sons fell into this category. Also any poor peasant who had accidentally said anything favorable about a "kulak" or expressed dissatisfaction with Stalin's policy in any other way. And anyone else, whether a middle peasant or an agricultural laborer, against whom a neighbor had a grudge. Thus, additional millions of rural toilers were dragged off to prisons, camps, and exile colonies.

Taken from: Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko. *The Time of Stalin*, p. 62.

* For the Soviet Union as a whole

Handout A-3.3

"According to plan, Ukraine has been asked to mobilize only 7,500 workers to be included in the grand total of 25,000. A number of volunteers has appeared – around 14,500 – of whom 7,800 will be selected. Who is to be sent on this assignment?

"In first place are the industrial workers. The metal-workers union is giving 3,200 men – 40 percent; the minerals' union 1,650 men – 20 per cent; the railroad workers' union 1,100 – 15 per cent. The remaining twelve unions are to supply 2,000 men."

Taken from: *Pravda*, January 18, 1930.

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"Included in the 25,000* are recruits from the following towns and territories:

Moscow Region was asked for 6,000; the call was answered by 18,000 volunteers

Leningrad Region was asked for 4,000; the call was answered by 10,000 volunteers

Ivanov Region was asked for 3,300; the call was answered by 5,000 volunteers

Lower Novohorod was asked for 800; the call was answered by 3,800 volunteers

Ukraine was asked for 7,500; the call was answered by 16,000 volunteers

Urals was asked for 1,700; the call was answered by 2,970 volunteers

Number of volunteers who answered the call: 60,000

Taken from: *Pravda*, January 24, 1930.

* Note: These 25,000 recruits were assigned to carry out collectivization throughout the Soviet Union.

Handout A-4.1

EACH VILLAGE TO "GIVE" FIFTY KURKULS

F. Pravoberezhny

At about the beginning of the year 1931 a GPU[1] agent came to our village, Stayky, Rzhyshchiw district, summoned the head of the village soviet, Starovoyt, who was a Party candidate, and held with him the following confidential conversation.

"Comrade Starovoyt! Your village is asked to give fifty kurkuls."

"But where will I find them? They have all been taken away already."

"I am not concerned with that. This is my order."

"You know very well that only the poor farmers are now left in this village. How can we find kurkuls?"

"If you do not know whom to take I shall pick them out myself, but you will be sorry."

"All right, take them yourself. I do not know of any kurkuls."

"Well, I do. And the first one is you! The next is your father-in-law and the rest I will soon find. Give me the list of names of the village residents. Who of these was in Zeleny's gang[2], in 1919?"

"You already know that the whole village was with Zeleny."

"Very well. By morning I want you to have a list of fifty names ready. If you do you may cross out your own and your father-in-law's names. If not, you will both die in Kolyma."

The next morning the GPU agent was handed his list of fifty kurkuls."

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[1] GPU stands for the State Political Administration. It is the name for the Soviet secret police which replaced the Cheka in February 1922.

[2] Zeleny was a Ukrainian peasant leader who revolted against the Soviet government.

Taken from: S.O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: DOBRUS, Globe Press, 1955), p. 167.

Handout A-4.2

A FATHER SENT TO SIBERIA, THE CHILDREN FORCED TO BEG

I. Naddnistrovy

In a hamlet of Uchastka, Orynynka county, Podillya region, lived Trokhym Zaverukha. He had a wife and five children, the oldest of whom was ten. In 1928, during the land reorganization, he was evicted from his home and re-settled in the village. He was allotted some very poor land from which he found it difficult to support his family.

In December, 1929, the grain collecting commission was taking away all the grain and food produce he had. He wanted to hide a little for his family's needs and found a place in the cemetery where criminals and suicide victims were buried.

One night he loaded a cart with grain and other supplies and was digging a hiding place with his wife when the commission caught them. The next day he was sentenced to six years in concentration camps. His wife and children were left without any food while the next harvest was six months away.

The mother made sacks for the children and sent them through the village to beg but the people could spare nothing as they had little enough for themselves. As soon as the snow disappeared in some places the children searched for potatoes left in the fields from the fall harvest. Their mother grated the frozen potatoes and baked pancakes on which they managed to exist for a while. In spring they dug roots and sprouts out of the ground from which their mother made soup. They were refused food at the collective farm kitchen because they were children of an arrested man.

Undernourishment and hunger became prevalent throughout the Ukrainian villages in the spring of 1930, after the first grain collecting plan had swept away all food and complete collectivization really began. Hardest hit were the large families with small children.

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The following eyewitness accounts describe the methods of deporting de-kurkulized farmers to the far North. One briefly describes the trip of a group from Dniepropetrovsk and the second the journey from Poltava to Arkhangelsk.

"They walked for ten days through deep snow, sleeping with small children under the open sky, on a bed of tree branches with only the bonfire for comfort. Such were the methods of transportation to the assigned points."

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Taken from: S.O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: DOBRUS, Globe Press, 1955), pp. 180-182.

Handout A-4.3

VASYLYK'S STORY
Miron Dolot

That February night was cold and it was snowing. The column of sleighs loaded with the arrested farmers left the village under the guard of militia and soldiers of the security forces armed with rifles and machine guns.

Many tragic incidents happened along the way. A youth of about sixteen, tried to escape. He jumped off the sleigh and dashed into a backyard, but the machine gun crew opened fire and pinned him down. He was wounded, seized, and brought back to the column. Disregarding his wound, the guards tied him to the wagon by ropes. The wound proved to be fatal, and he died before the column reached the railroad station.

A GPU soldier was riding in a sleigh with one family. Ignoring all the people around him, the soldier started to make improper advances to a young girl. When he continued to annoy her, the girl's mother lost her temper, and struck him in the face. The soldier grabbed his gun, and shot the mother point-blank, killing her.

Upon reaching the railroad station, the girl was approached by the GPU officer who was in charge of the column. Speaking loudly enough to let everybody hear him, he informed her that her mother was killed by the soldier in self-defense. Her mother, an "arrested enemy of the people," he said, assaulted the guard with the intention of starting a riot among the convicted kurkuls. Thus, the action of the soldier was legitimate, patriotic, and even heroic. The girl and her two younger brothers were then taken away from the column and never seen again.

The news about the boy and the woman had not yet reached the rear of the column before several other incidents occurred. A few of the older men, among them my Uncle Havrylo, could not withstand the hardships and brutality and died before reaching the railroad station. A young couple committed suicide by slashing their veins.

As the snow continued to fall, some of the sleighs became stuck, and when this happened, the entire column had to stop. The men had to help the horses amidst the shouting and firing of the militiamen and the GPU soldiers and the screams and cries of the women and children.

A few miles from the railroad station, the column took a field road toward the railroad tracks. A freight train stood in the field on auxiliary rails. The front cars had already been filled with arrested farmers from other villages. Soldiers of the regular army stood guard at every car.

As soon as the column reached the train, the GPU officer passed the order that all had to remain in their sleighs. Guards took positions around the column. Without delay, the GPU agent moved from sleigh to sleigh with list in hand, calling the roll. Then the checked groups were escorted to the train immediately and herded into the cars, group after group.

When the first car was filled and locked, all realized that wives were separated from their husbands, and children from their parents. An angry murmur rushed through the column as the men claimed the right to be with their own families. A boy ran to the car that held his parents. A machine gun fired warning shots over the heads of the people, but the boy kept running. Three more shots rang out, and the boy fell dead.

At this point, the unrest turned into turmoil. Skirmishes broke out as people tried to escape. Several men broke from the column and ran toward the bushes that bordered the fields. A sleigh driver tried to escape as he urged the horses away from the station. Guardsmen opened fire, and the men running to the bushes fell and lay still. The man and his family on the sleigh did not escape death either. A machine gun caught up with them; he and his wife were killed, and his elderly mother and three children wounded.

Facing guns from every direction, the arrested farmers finally gave up, and order and silence were restored.

Group after group disappeared into the cattle cars. When the loading was completed, the doors were closed and locked, and a guard posted at each door. The dead were left behind in the field.

Vasylyk was in the last car. He was lucky enough to have his entire family with him, but it was torture for him to see his parents and his sister suffering under such horrible conditions. There were at least fifty people in his car, all herded into the cars that had been designed for livestock transportation. There were no beds or seats. The wooden floor, pierced by holes, was the only place where they could sit: there was no place where the sick could lie down.

It was dark inside the cars when the doors were closed. Only feeble shafts of daylight penetrated the cracks in the sides of the car. There was total confusion: those standing tried to find a place to sit down, and those sitting were trampled by the ones standing. There was shouting and arguing, and women were weeping for their husbands who were packed into other cars. Children cried for food; all suffered from the cold.

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Handout A-4.3 (cont.)

The lack of food and adequate clothing aggravated the situation. The arrested had been prohibited from taking any of their possessions, except for the personal belongings they could carry. And, since no one suspected that he or she would have to leave their home or village, the majority had failed to take their most needed belongings.

A pail in the middle of the cattle-car served as a toilet for all fifty people. A throng of people continually stood and waited their turn. Those who wanted to reach it had to literally walk over those sitting on the floor. This embarrassing situation increased the arguing and fighting.

The attempts to call the attention of the officials to the unbearable conditions were unsuccessful. Thus, hungry and cold, crowded together in the stinking cars, the arrested began their forced journey to an unknown destination.

The train was set in motion around midnight. When it crossed the bridge over the Dnipro (Dnieper) River, all realized that it was heading north. The train moved slowly, and often stopped. At times, it stood still for hours. During one stop the door was unlocked and opened halfway. The first thing the arrested saw were two soldiers armed with rifles, ready to shoot. Another group of soldiers waited with sacks and buckets. The officer in charge announced that a loaf of bread would be given to every four persons and a herring to each. The water would be distributed from the buckets. The arrested were warned that those buckets were government property, and it was the responsibility of everyone in the car to see that they did not get damaged. A "supervisor" of the car had to be chosen who would be responsible for the distribution of the food and water, and for keeping order and "cleanliness" in the car which still had no proper sanitation facilities.

After these brief instructions, the soldiers shoved the sacks containing the bread and herrings and the buckets of water into the car and the door was locked again.

Immediately, the hungry people started shoving and arguing. Each had their own idea of how the food and water should be distributed. Opinions were expressed loudly. The strong pushed aside the weaker. The shouting and fighting were accompanied by the pitiful whining of the children.

Choosing a supervisor from among the group was a problem, for the position would naturally associate the individual with the officials. Nevertheless, one was chosen and the distribution of the food began.

Toward morning on the second day of the journey, a desperate cry of a woman woke up those who were still asleep: her husband had died. During the riot in the village square, he had been slightly wounded by a bullet in his leg. Afraid to be separated from his wife and then killed somewhere behind the walls of a GPU prison, he concealed his wound from the officials. A subsequent infection killed him. His corpse was removed at the next station stop. The sobbing wife of the deceased husband begged the officials for permission to be present at his funeral, but she was not even permitted to step out of the car. The men who carried the body away said there were many deaths on the train that night, and their corpses were piled up on the platform.

This first death affected the people in the car. The crying and shouting, as well as the quarrels and disagreements ceased. Everyone realized that the next dead one might be he or she.

The train moved forward slowly but steadily. It became colder. Contrary to everybody's expectations, the train did not stay long at the Moscow freight station. After a short stop, it gave a prolonged whistle and moved forward again. Those who sat close to the walls could see the lights of Moscow through the cracks.

The next stop was Alexandrov. By then, it had become unbearably cold, and the inmates of the train were suffering severely. Here Vasylyk lost his mother and sister. His mother who had fallen asleep sitting in the car, was stricken with a heart attack and never awakened. When her body was taken away, her daughter was permitted to step out of the car and follow the bearers. Vasylyk and his father were denied this privilege. When the bearers returned to the car, Vasylyk's sister was not with them; she was said to have been detained by a GPU officer.

As the train started up again, Vasylyk's father was silent. He expressed neither sorrow nor agitation; he just kept repeating from time to time: "My dear girls; my dear girls!"

The train began moving faster after Alexandrov. It passed many towns and villages without stopping. It was still snowing.

From signs and the names of the railroad stations, it was obvious that the train was moving in the direction of Archangelsk, a port on the White Sea. However, no one knew its exact destination.

On the twelfth night of the journey, the train stopped. No sign of a settlement could be seen through the cracks in the walls but increased activity by the guards suggested that it was not a usual stop.

In the morning, the door was opened, and instead of passing the usual daily rations of food and water to everyone, the guard ordered all to leave the car and line up beside it. Those who

Handout A-4.3 (cont.)

were not able to do so were carried out and placed on the snow. The usual chain of security troops surrounded the train and its cargo. The majority of the soldiers were from Central Asia.

As soon as the unloading was finished, the empty train left. To the arrested families who remained behind in the endless solitude, the disappearing train symbolized the end of everything. Vasylyk's first thought was that this would be his grave; that they would all be executed on the spot.

There was no sign of life around: no roads; no town; only a snowy plain which stretched for miles in all directions. Only a few snowcovered weeds and shrubs interrupted the monotony of the Arctic expanse. In the distance loomed the silhouette of a forest, which would be the destination of the prisoners.

The officer in charge passed the warning that anyone attempting to leave the column would be shot. After roll call the column was set into motion. The sick who could not move were left behind on the ground under guard. No one ever saw them again. The children who could not walk were carried by their parents. Since there was no road, walking was extremely difficult and everyone had to follow in the tracks of the guards who led the way into the forest.

It was the coldest time of the winter in that region, and a blizzard blew violently from the north. Walking through the deep snow made the prisoners' feet wet, and soon they began to freeze. Many could not walk very far, and these were left behind.

Vasylyk's father had become sick during the train journey, apparently with pneumonia. Vasylyk helped his father along as much as he could, but in his sick and weakened condition, the old man collapsed. Another man in the column helped pull his father up, and Vasylyk began to carry him. It was difficult doing this through the deep snow, but he wouldn't leave his father behind. The officer in charge noticed them, and ordered Vasylyk to abandon him. He did not obey the order; he could not leave his father to die in the snow alone. The officer called the guards, and two huge Mongols came up and knocked Vasylyk down, wrestling his father away from him. Only then did he notice that his father was already dead. At gunpoint, he had to abandon his father's body in the snow.

After three or four long hours of difficult stumbling and walking, the column reached its destination deep in the woods.

It was peaceful all around: there was no sound, and no visible motion. The ground was covered by a blanket of snow. Huge, dark pine trees stood all around, their branches weighed down by snow and ice. Beneath and among them, at some distance, were several small huts, the only sign of human habitation. Those facilities were built especially for the guardsmen, the inmates learned later.

The officer in charge explained that this place was to be their new home. He pointed out that as "enemies of the people," they should have been executed, but the government had decided to let them live in the hope that they would start a new way of life. He then said that the prisoners were to be divided into three labor groups.

The first group, consisting of the young and strong, would work in the forest as woodcutters; the second group would fence the settlement with barbed wire; and the last group was to build dwellings. This latter group included all the women and children. The officer assured the prisoners that the necessary tools would arrive at any moment. There was no food either, and even though he knew the prisoners had not eaten all day, he considered this a trifling matter. He was certain they could wait until the food arrived the next morning. Then he ordered the heads of families to make shelters and build fires for the night that was fast approaching.

It was only the dim hope of survival, and perhaps a return to their homes someday that kept these villagers alive as they prepared themselves for that first Arctic night in the forest. All who were still able to walk, rushed into the woods. Although they had no axes or other tools, by sheer determination they erected temporary shelters and fires were lit before nightfall.

Vasylyk joined a family of his acquaintances to build a shelter out of pine branches, but it didn't give too much protection against the Arctic weather. Everyone sat huddled around their fires all night long as a blizzard raged and the wind howled. The snow threatened to extinguish the fires.

Morning finally came and the storm had quieted. The officer then ordered all the prisoners to come to the middle of the camp. Everyone had to stand in line for the roll call, including the children and the sick. Many people had died during the night: some from exposure, others from exhaustion and starvation. The officer in charge ordered the corpses brought to the center of the camp and piled up in front of the line of prisoners, because even they had to be counted and identified.

After the roll call, a soldier read the list of assignments to various brigades. Then the food rations were distributed, for the food and tools had arrived during the night.

Vasylyk was assigned to the brigade of woodcutters, and that morning was sent out into the forest to work.

Handout A-4.3 (cont.)

He was still determined to escape and find and bury his father's body, for he was sure it was still lying in the field where he last saw it. He also hoped that on the way back home he might find his sister who had been abducted in Alexandrov. However, his several attempted escapes were unsuccessful, as the guards were too watchful and experienced to allow an "enemy of the people" to escape easily, and he was severely punished for each attempt, but the punishments could not deter him from his intention and only increased his determination.

It took Vasylyk more than two years to finally escape.

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Handout A-5.1

COLLECTIVIZATION

Olexa Woropay

In 1929 there started what the communists used to call "complete collectivization, based on the liquidation of 'kurkuls' as a class." "Kurkuls" – "kulaks" in Russian – were better-off peasant farmers, tilling their own soil, but employing labor outside their immediate family. In the plain language of the people, collectivization thus meant that the communists intended a general and thorough plunder of the peasants. The peasants of Ukraine, foreseeing a new form of slavery, protested openly. In 1930-31 many peasant risings occurred in Russian-occupied Ukraine, but these were ruthlessly quelled by the communist regime. The following are a few examples of what occurred.

In June 1931, a cavalry regiment was sent from Proskuriv to suppress a riot of peasants in the village of Mykhailivka, in the Dunaivtsi district of Kamianets-Podillia province. The military operation was directed by the commanding officer of an army corps, a certain Diomin. He ordered the surrounding of the village on every side and its destruction and burning by artillery fire. After the village had gone up in flames, the whole male population from fifteen years upwards was arrested by the security forces. Over three hundred men and over fifty women were deported from the village on that occasion by the Stalin "heroes." Not a single one of those deported ever returned to this village. Such was the punishment for resisting collectivization, though this process was at one time actually proclaimed to be a voluntary movement.

In September 1930, there was a riot in the village of Rudkivtsi in Podillia. The peasants rioted, protesting against the collective farms – called "kolhosps" *. When land surveyors arrived to mark off the land for a kolhosp, peasants expelled them. Two days later, they returned to the village with police protection, but the police were also driven away by the villagers. After another three days, a detachment of security police came from Vinnytsia with full battle equipment. These armed "heroes" surrounded the village and forced it to surrender. They then entered it, and picked out twenty-eight people from among the most active rioters. Two of them – Ivan Haiduchenko and Ostap Prokhnytsky – were shot on the spot, without any sort of trial, while the others were deported, and their further fate is not known to anyone....

In 1920 and 1930, in the neighborhood of Bila Tserkva, near Kiev, a detachment of insurgents were operating under the leadership of "Otaman" Shpak, a veteran military hero of the Ukrainian war for liberation in 1918-19. The word *shpak* is also a bird's name. Such terror was spelled by it to the Russian communists that even yet peasants make jokes about the way it was forbidden to call the bird by its proper name at the time of collectivization.

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* Ukrainian acronym for kolektyvne hospodarstvo, collective farm.

Taken from: Olexa Woropay. Author's introduction to *The Ninth Circle* by Olexa Woropay. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1983), pp. xvi-xvii. Reprinted by permission of the Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University.

Handout A-5.2

LENIN DID NOT HELP, ALL WERE DEPORTED

M. Tohobichny

In the village of Nove Horobya, Malynka district, Kiev region, the local school teacher was a Komsomol (Communist Youth League), whom the government accused of not doing enough for collectivization. Then he began to call meetings every evening.

At one meeting after a preliminary warming-up period the agitator turned to a farmer, Tymoshenko, and said, "Tell us why you do not want to join the collective farm?"

"Well, you see, I really don't mind but my wife does not wish to, and I cannot join without her."

"Who is the head in your home, you or your wife?"

"At home I am head, but in the collective farm the head is useless without the hands," Tymoshenko tried to wiggle out of his situation.

These meetings continued all winter and still the collective farm was not organized. And then, when the news got around that women were exempt from joining collective farms, they went into action. One woman from Baraniwka rode horse-back through the neighboring village instigating women to keep out of collective farms.

The farmers in the village of Nove Horobya, believing in the government statements that collectivization was voluntary, decided that the fault lay with their school teacher. So one spring day when the gutters were full of water from the thaw, the farmers marched up to the schoolhouse in a mob, took the teacher to the village and locked him in a basement to keep him from calling the incessant meetings of which the farmers were tired.

One of the two students who had been with the teacher when the capture occurred ran through back fences and full ditches to the district headquarters, and announced that an insurgent revolt was in progress. The other hid in the attic until the following day, then went to the district headquarters with the information that the farmers were holding the teacher captive in a basement and were themselves marching through the streets in demonstration carrying Lenin's portrait and singing Revolutionary songs, proclaiming that Lenin, their father, did not create collective farms. This affair lasted for two days.

Towards evening on the third day a GPU detachment came to the village from Korosten, surrounded the village, and held it incommunicado. After several days the GPU entered the village and prohibited the farmers from leaving their premises, and later from leaving their houses. The school teacher was released, and he declared that he had not been molested but was well fed and looked after, but that the farmers had locked him up because they were tired of so many meetings.

Another week went by. Then one Sunday morning the GPU entered every home and drove all adult residents to a "meeting." Because there was no other building large enough to accommodate the crowd of people they were taken to the bathhouse. After making another thorough search of the village in case someone had hidden, the GPU surrounded the bathhouse.

They ordered the people to go outside. Then about 200 men had their hands tied behind their backs and were escorted to the railroad station. The next morning, after spending the night in a cramped barrack without food or drink, they were loaded on to a freight train and taken to an unknown destination.

Not a single Soviet newspaper mentioned this event except one small local journal which curtly stated that 87 per cent of the village of Nove Horobya was composed of kurkuls who had opposed collectivization.

Taken from: S.O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: DOBRUS, Globe Press, 1955), pp. 392-394.

Handout A-5.3

COLLECTIVIZATION IS OBLIGATORY AND VOLUNTARY

I. Yawz

In 1931 all the kurkuls and under-kurkuls had been liquidated. Their land was confiscated, their homes pillaged and closed to their families, and they were all arrested. Only the poor class of farmers remained, but they were reluctant to go into collective farms despite the persistent promises of a "happy life" there.

At this time the government passed a regulation that collective farms would be organized . . . on a voluntary and not on a compulsory basis, but compulsory for 50 per cent of the population. Taking advantage of the word "voluntary" the farmers voluntarily refused to join. This was a general condition throughout Ukraine, but my particular story is of the Vynnytsya region.

The Soviet government tried by every means to seduce the farmers into collectivization. It sent its network of agents into action, and they visited the farmers daily in their homes, talking to them, persuading them to join the collective farms. If this proved unsuccessful they brought the farmers to the village soviets* and talked some more. Nearly every night small group meetings were held. The farmers were not given any peace or a chance to sleep in this mad drive to wear down their resistance. After repeated drumming of this propaganda into the farmers, individually and in small groups, a general meeting was called by the village soviets.

At the meeting, a table was carried onto the floor loaded with completed applications. After a few brief words on the same topic, the advantages of the collective farms and voluntary-compulsory enrollment, the chairman added, "Those for the collective farms stand to the right. Those against collective farms and the Soviet government stand to the left."

The people were panic-stricken. They did not wish to join, but were afraid to admit this and be accused of being "enemies of the people," as they well knew would happen from the experiences of the kurkuls. For some minutes they sat confused and bewildered and then slowly and hesitantly they walked over to the right side of the hall – for the collective farms.

The next day the brigade came and took away all their tools, stating that they voluntarily and in good faith had joined the collective farm, that they were willingly turning over all their land and property and promised henceforth to work, with their whole families, honestly and conscientiously for the success of the said collective farm.

The day after, the brigade came and took away all their cattle, horses, and farm machinery. The homes were filled with heartbreak and despair and curses while the Soviet newspapers triumphantly reported the growing rate of collectivization.

Taken from: S.O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: DOBRUS, Globe Press, 1955), pp. 384-386.

*Village soviets were the village councils.

Handout A-5.4

HOW THE COLLECTIVE FARM IN THE VILLAGE OF HUBSKE WAS ORGANIZED

Maria Nazarets

The collective farm in the village of Hubske, in the Poltava region, was organized in 1929 by former members of the Committee of Poor Farmers and the amoral element of the village. Head of the new collective farm was Tymish Stetsenko, a well-known criminal since childhood. He had three wives at the same time of whom one, Mary, he murdered. His brother, Mykyta, was of the same type.

Five hundred acres of the best land, belonging to the villagers, was appropriated by the collective farm. The farmers protested, and took their case to higher officials but to no avail. In November the village was visited by two thousanders from Donbas (Donets Basin). The first job of these Party emissaries was to remove the bells from the church. For this they engaged the village activists who had already joined the collective farm. The farmers made a united protest, even beating up the representatives. Then a militia detachment came to the village and under their protection they were finally taken down.

After this the whole village was levied for high taxes – about 25,000 bushels of grain for 500 farms numbering around 2,500 people. The farmers met this plan with the greatest difficulty, buying grain from other villages and cleaning out their own stores. Then came another tax – 30,000 bushels of grain. But the farmers had not a kernel more and none was to be obtained anywhere. So de-kurkulization began.

To intimidate the villagers, two show trials were held at which two farmers, Musiy Panchenko and Fanasiy Varovenko – the latter owned seventeen acres of land – were sentenced, as malicious kurkuls, to eight years each in the northern concentration camps. There they both died.

After this no more trials were held. The village activists simply decided at its night sessions who was to go next and proceeded with the victim's de-kurkulization. Fifty families were thus robbed and evicted from their homes. Those who remained were forced to join the collective farm. Having shattered the village, the local activists, headed by Hotsulov, the agriculturalist, visited every marked home in turn taking away all the grain and hauling the machinery and livestock to the collective. They were on these rounds from morning until night. In this manner, in the spring of 1930, the final stages of collectivization had begun. The village farmers were helpless in the face of this robbery and could only protest.

When a similar process of collectivization was taking place in the neighboring village, Drabovo, the farmers became very indignant and staged an uprising. They secured firearms and killed all the activists. A GPU regiment then arrived and machine-gunned the village for a whole day. The uprising was quelled and the guilty were brutally punished. The village of Hubske was so stunned by this event in Drabovo that it meekly submitted to collectivization.

But in the spring of 1931 the local village Soviet in conjunction with the village activists and upon the advice of the Lazirsk County Party Committee decided that a few dozen local families must be deported to the far places of the USSR – Siberia, the Urals, and the far North. Included in that contingent were the following families. Dorosh Yurchenko, owner of 70 acres of land, was sent away with his family of seven. Iwan Kasyan, owned 49 acres of land, went with his family of five. Slynko had a family of five and 40 acres of land. Serhiy Nazarets had a family of six and 30 acres of land. Maryna Hawryk was a widow with five children and owned 40 acres of land; Maria Karpets was a widow with six children and owned 74 acres of land. Ivan Panchenko had a family of eight and 50 acres of land. Hryhoriy Panchenko had 50 acres of land and a family of seven.

Twenty other families marked for deportation fled from the village. The fate of those deported was not learned, but it is very likely that most of them died.

Taken from: S.O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: DOBRUS, Globe Press, 1955), pp. 170-172.

HANDOUT A-6.1

THE ORGANIZED PREPARATION OF THE FAMINE

The famine and the deaths from hunger in the villages of Ukraine were very well known to Moscow in the spring of 1932.* Under normal circumstances the Soviet government and the Communist party would have been prepared to prevent the repetition of a similar catastrophe in the ensuing years of 1932-33. The government and the party could have done so, but this was not their plan; Moscow required grain, but not the Ukrainian peasantry; Moscow had foreseen an increased sharpening in the struggle with the peasantry for grain, and had therefore, prepared well in advance all their organizational efforts to promote an artificial famine....

The following was done to accomplish the desired results:

1) Plans for grain-collections were prepared for Ukraine, in spite of the actual state of the harvest yield and of the food requirements of the population. Thus, a determined effort was made to strip the peasantry of all grain.

2) A special edict was issued to expropriate the entire village economy, including that of the smallest peasant. The peasants were forbidden, under pain of death, to utilize the products of their toil, regardless of whether they belonged to a collective farm or not.

3) A special law was enacted to establish a commercial blockade of the Ukrainian villages in most of the regions of Ukraine.

4) Special laws were enacted to bind all toilers, workers and peasants to specific places of employment. A passport system was established to prevent the peasants from seeking employment outside their village, thus depriving them of the right to procure food from other sources.

5) Ukraine as a whole, and especially the Ukrainian peasantry was placed under a special transportation blockade, thus depriving the population of opportunities to travel in quest of food.

6) The authorities made strenuous efforts to conceal the existence of the famine in Ukraine, not only from the outside world, but also from other national groups in the USSR.

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The summer of 1932 in Ukraine was notable for the sharp conflict between the authorities and peasants for bread. The government tried to get as much food out of Ukraine as possible; the peasants, on the other hand, did everything in their power to prevent this and to keep as much as possible for themselves.

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Some of the collective workers, individual farmers, and collective farms completed their quotas in full. But, in general, the majority of Ukrainian peasants did not fulfill the plan and used all possible means to evade it.

The government then embarked upon forcible collection of food from the collective farms, collective farmers, and individual peasants who had not given up their quotas. According to the central directives, it was proposed that every village should, depending on its size, be divided into a number of subdivisions (hamlets, etc.) and to each of these a special brigade was attached, whose task it was to complete the plan of collection.

As a rule such a brigade consisted of a member of the presidium of the village soviet or a party representative, and two or three local "activists" (this latter group would include former red partisans, former hoboes, ex-convicts and such), and there would also be an additional member from the board of the local cooperative store. Depending on local conditions the composition of the brigade would sometimes differ; if the quotas were large and poorly executed, they would include a larger number of party representatives from the regional, district or central offices. Quite often teachers, students, clerks from village and district offices would be compelled to join. The groundwork of the organization of such brigades was laid in 1930 and 1931 and they were constantly improved upon. As a rule the man in charge would be an outsider, a special functionary dispatched from the county, region, or capital. Every brigade had at least one "specialist" charged with uncovering hidden foodstuffs with the aid of a long sharp-pointed steel prong.

These brigades went from house to house, day after day, looking for hidden food. They searched homes, attics, cellars and all farm buildings, barns, stables, pens, and stacks. They would measure the thickness of the wall under the oven, to find if there was grain concealed in the foundation. They knocked on floors and walls and whenever the sound was dull they would pry the place open. Sometimes whole walls were pulled down, ovens wrecked, and the last grain

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Taken from: S. O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: DOBRUS, Globe Press, 1955), pp. 433-434; 34-37.

* After the 1931 harvest, outbreaks of starvation occurred in a number of regions in Ukraine.

Handout A-6.1 (cont.)

taken away when anything was found. The collection was characterized by acts of wanton destruction and extreme cruelty. Every brigade had its headquarters, manned by a special staff. Peasants were hauled to headquarters and there subjected to all-night interrogations with beatings, water-treatment, and semi-naked confinement in cold cells. At that time, many instances of torture were noted.

The methods employed were many and varied. A former scientist of Kharkiv University C.R. (who is now in the United States) received the following description of an action from his father, a local peasant of Lysiache, Karliw county near Poltava: "My son-in-law did not join the collective, so in the fall of 1932 a production-tax of 100 poods (1 pood = approximately 36 lbs.) of grain was levied on him. He paid this in full. Then, just before Christmas, an additional 200 poods was levied. He did not have the 200, he did not even have 20, so he was threatened with jail for failing to pay. He sold a cow, a horse, and some clothes, bought the necessary 200 poods and paid the tax. Then in February, 1933, the local authorities notified him that he had to surrender another 300 poods. He refused to pay this third assessment, because he had nothing left and was himself starving. A commission then came to his house to look for food. Of course they did not find anything except a little bag of inferior grain and a pot of beans, which they took. The only thing he had left was a sack of potatoes. This last food went fast, and then...."

Local activists who took part in the search for food for confiscation naturally by-passed their own homes, and thus succeeded in keeping some small reserves for themselves. The emissaries sent down to collect grain from the larger centers then changed their method of operation so that brigade members would not work in their own villages. Thus when working among strangers they would be more thorough and not let one house get by without search. This explains why even many activists died as a result of famine in the spring of 1933. Their food had also been taken away from them.

Eyewitnesses from all parts of Ukraine tell similar stories about food collections conducted in the fall of 1932 and the spring of 1933. "All edible products were requisitioned" village of Zorich, Orzich county, Poltava region. "They took away everything that could be eaten" – village of Veprik, Hadyach county, Sumy region. "All bread was requisitioned, and even peas, down to the last kilogram" – village of Uspenivka, Khmiliw county, Mikolayiw region. "They took grain, potatoes, and beets almost to the last kilogram" – village of Sofievka, Novo-Mirhorod county, Odessa region. "Everything, literally everything was taken, they did not leave one kilogram of bread" – village of Strizavka, Rzhyshchev county, Kiev region.

There are known cases where, in the winter of 1932-33, commissions charged with confiscating grain from the peasants examined human fecal matter in order to establish what the people were eating, because although people were swearing that they had nothing to eat, yet they were staying alive! People who, in this manner were proved to have been consuming grain bread had to flee in order to escape prosecution.

Conditions under which the plans for grain collection were being executed in 1932 can best be illustrated by the fact that the single Pavlohrad county near Dnipropetrovsk, consisting of 37 village soviets and 87 collective farms, had a team of 200 collectors sent down from the county party committee, and almost a like number from the county komsomol committee.

Assuming conservatively that other sections of Ukraine were visited by only half the proportionate number of collectors as the Pavlohrad county, their total number all over Ukraine would reach well-nigh 100,000 men, and this does not include special emissaries from county and regional centers, whose number was steadily growing in connection with collection "difficulties" and a general deterioration of the political-economic situation....

Handout A-6.2

"PASSPORTS – A BLOW AGAINST CLASS ENEMIES"

"The villages emptied out. The surviving peasants went into hiding.... Those who still had the strength to move headed for the railroad stations and the towns, paving the roads with their corpses. But there were military units and roadblocks all around, as in wartime."

Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko. *The Time of Stalin*, p. 64. (The author is a Soviet citizen living in the USSR. He spent many years in the gulags. His father led the Soviet Russian Army which invaded Ukraine in 1917.)

In order to prevent the starving peasantry from abandoning the villages, as well as to prevent the so- called kurkuls, who escaped exile by abandoning the villages; also to trap those who escaped from the concentration camps, and, last but not least, to prevent the hungry peasantry from settling in urban centres to seek employment, the soviet authorities established a system of so-called "passportization." This was more than a mere identity card, since it required permission for a change of dwelling, permission that was stamped and countersigned by the local authorities. Thus the Soviet authorities made a determined endeavour to stop the mass migration of the peasantry from famine-stricken Ukraine. The passport system also gave the authorities a chance to initiate a mass terror and persecution of that section of peasantry who, until this time, had cunningly evaded the long arm of Soviet jurisprudence by wandering from place to place.

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Another Soviet law, of equal importance, enacted prior to the passport law, was the law securing all factory and office workers to their place of employment by issuing the so-called "shopping books," binding the holder to certain cooperative stores designated to serve the needs of the workers of one particular factory or another. The customer was required to produce such a book for every article he purchased. These shopping books served almost the same purpose as the passports; they were designed to obtain an additional measure of control over the workers, and, at the same time, extend control over the peasantry.

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The Passport System

"The (internal) passport system was the most important instrument of police pressure and taxation policy in the 'police state.' A passport system operated in prerevolutionary Russia.... No passport system exists under Soviet law...."

The Small Soviet Encyclopedia (Moscow, 1928-1930), vol. 6, p. 342.

"Unable to cope with the uncontrollable displacement of millions of peasants, the Stalin leadership decided to reimpose a passport system. The right to receive a passport was confined to factory and office workers. The fact that peasants and collective farmers were excluded meant that their mobility was restricted to a much greater degree."

Roy Medvedev. *On Stalin and Stalinism*, p. 78. (The author is a Soviet citizen living in the USSR.)

Taken from: S. O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: DOBRUS, Globe Press, 1955), pp. 457-458.

Handout A-6.3

COMMERCIAL BLOCKADE

Quite original and interesting are documents dealing with the establishment of a commercial blockade in the majority of the villages and districts of Ukraine.

The first of these documents provides not only for stopping the supply of consumer goods but also for the withdrawal of local supplies of such goods from six villages in the Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Odessa regions, as a punitive measure for failure to meet the grain-collection quotas.

The second document provides material concerning the establishment by the authorities of a similar blockade in eighty-two counties of Ukraine, as well as in all those other counties and villages that failed to meet the grain-collection quotas. Since the majority of counties and villages failed in their quotas, the commercial blockade was well-nigh general, affecting the majority of the Ukrainian peasant population.

This meant that the peasant population, deprived of locally produced food supplies, had no chance whatever of obtaining such supplies as fish, sugar, salt, etc., that had reached the villages in limited quantities prior to the blockade.

THE TOTAL LIQUIDATION OF PRIVATE TRADING

"...Under no circumstances permit the opening of stores of private merchants and thoroughly root out brokers and speculators who are endeavouring to profit at the expense of the workers and peasants.

Due to the fact that, of late, speculation in consumer goods, (food products – I.D.), is on the increase, despite the fact that it has been prohibited, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of Peoples' Commissars, hereby direct the GPU (NKVD), the prosecuting organs, and the local authorities to enact measures for rooting out speculation by providing for the incarceration of culprits in concentration camps for terms of five to ten years, without privilege of amnesty.

(Resolution of the CEC and CPC * USSR, August 22, 1932.)

BLACK LIST HUNGER BLOCKADE

(Resolution of the Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, December 6, 1932).

Considering the particularly abhorrent failure of grain-collections in diverse regions of Ukraine, the Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Executive Committee hereby impose upon the County Executive Committees, County Party Committees, Regional Executive Committees and Regional Party Committees the task of smashing the sabotage of grain collections organized by the kurkuls and counter- revolutionary elements, of restoring the resistance of sections of rural Communists who literally became leaders of the sabotage and of liquidating the passive and conciliatory attitude towards saboteurs, incompatible with the task of the Party members, thus ensuring a rapid acceleration of tempo towards the full and unconditional execution of the plans for grain-collections.

The Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Committee hereby resolve that:

For evident wrecking of grain-collection plans and purposeful sabotage organized by kurkuls and counter- revolutionary elements, the following villages are to be blacklisted:

1. Verbka, Pavlohrad county, Dnipropetrovsk region,
2. Havryliwka, Mezhiw county, Dnipropetrovsk region,
3. Liutenka, Hadyach county, Kharkiv region,
4. Kamiany Potok, Kremenets county, Kharkiv region,
5. Swiato-Troyitzke, Troitzky county, Odessa region,
6. Pisky, Bashtan district.

Halt the supply of goods immediately, halt the local cooperative and state trading, and remove all visible supplies from the cooperative and state stores.

Prohibit completely all collective farm trading, equally for collective farms, members of collective farms and individual holders.

Terminate the advancing of credits, arrange foreclosures of credits and other financial obligations.

Examination and cleansing of all foreign and hostile elements from cooperative and state apparatus to be carried out by the organs of the Workers and Peasants Inspection.

Examination and cleaning of collective farm of the above villages, of all counter-revolutionary elements, organizers of the wrecking of grain- collections, to be carried out.

Taken from: S. O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: DOBRUS, Globe Press, 1955), pp. 452-455.

* CEC =Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party
CPC =Council of People's Commissars

Handout A-6.3 (cont.)

The Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Executive Committee hereby call upon the sincere and devoted members of the collective farms and on those toiling peasants who are individual holders, to organize all their resources for a merciless struggle with kurkuls and their henchmen, for the defeat of the kurkul sabotage of grain-collections in their villages, for honourable, conscientious fulfillment of grain-collection obligations to the soviet state.

December 6, 1932, Chairman of the CPC, W. Chubar, Secretary of the CC Kossior.

(Visti, December 8, 1932.)

Note: Within one week of the decree's publication, the blacklist had been extended to 82 entire counties and subsequently to an unknown number of others.

Handout A-6.4

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of January 24, 1933

The Central Committee states the established fact that the party organization of Ukraine did not manage to carry out the party task, concerning the organization of the State grain procurement and fulfillment of the quota of grain deliveries, despite the three reductions of the already reduced quota.

The Central Committee considers that the key regions, which determine the fate of the agriculture of Ukraine and which should be immediately strengthened are the regions of Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv. Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) decrees:

1. To appoint-as the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine and as the first secretary of Regional Committee of Kharkiv – the secretary of the All- Union Central Committee, Comrade Postyshev.
2. To appoint-as the first secretary of the Regional Committee of Dnipropetrovsk Comrade Khatayevich who will continue to perform the duties of one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine.
3. To appoint-as the first secretary of Regional Committee of Odessa, Comrade Veher.
4. To dismiss Comrades Muravyov, Stroganov and Terekhov from the positions they occupy and to send them to the All-Union Central Committee for further considerations.
5. Comrades Postishev, Khatayevich and Veher to start to perform their duties at their new positions not later than January 30 of this year.

Taken from the Decree which was published in Ukrainian in the Journal, *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, No. 3, 1933.

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CP(B)U* REACTS TO GRAIN COLLECTIONS

(Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U*, passed on February 7, 1933, concerning grain-collecting operations within Ukraine. This Resolution was a reaction of the CP(B)U to the Resolution passed on January 24, 1933, by the Central Committee of the CPSU.)

The Party Organization in Ukraine failed to carry out its designated tasks of organizing grain stock piles and fulfilling its grain quota, in spite of the fact that the initially reduced Plan was reduced three more times.

The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, together with the secretariats of the City Party Committees, considers that the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Stalin's speech give a stern but absolutely just evaluation of the state of the grain-collecting operations in Ukraine and a truly Communist criticism of the unsatisfactory work of the Ukrainian Party Organization and of the unsatisfactory management of grain stock piles and collective farms by the Central Committee of the CP(B)U.

The Plenary Session further considers it necessary to stress the fact that, from the very inauguration of the Grain Collecting Organization, the Central, Regional and District leaders of the Party Organization were insufficiently zealous in carrying out their duties, failing to discover in time the manoeuvers of class-enemy such as kulaks, Petlyurists * and Makhnovists,* who succeeded in infiltrating the collective farms and assumed leading positions there....

Furthermore, the Plenary Session regards as indisputably correct the decree passed on January 24, by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and welcomes the appointment of Comrade Postyshev as assistant secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, and the strengthening of leadership in the chief regions of Ukraine.

The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, together with the secretaries of the Local and District Party Organizations, accepts Comrade Stalin's criticism and observations regarding the recalcitrant leaders.

The Party Organization in Ukraine and its leaders will exert all their efforts immediately to correct their errors and definitely to redraft their program in order to achieve the consolidation of political leadership on the collective farms.
(*Visti*, Feb. 8, 1933.)

Taken from: S.O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: Globe Press, DOBRUS, 1955), pp. 708-710.

* CP(B)U is the Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine. CPSU is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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* Petlyurists followed Petlyura, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian National Army in the war for Ukrainian independence.
* Makhnovists followed Makhno, an anarchist during the Revolutionary years.

HANDOUT A-6.5

The Central Committee of the Party and the government decided: "To identify in point of importance collective property with government property and augment the protection of this property from malefactors. Applying different standards of court procedure and law against the theft of collective and cooperative property by reason of social – necessity execution by firing squad and confiscation of all property, with an alternative, under mitigating circumstances, of no less than 10 years penal servitude and confiscation of property. No amnesty would apply to felons convicted of theft of collective or cooperative property." (PRAVDA, August 8, 1932)

This decree raised the wave of terror to unheard of heights. Everyone fell under the persecution. A railroad employee would be found guilty for just picking up a few grains scattered on the ground outside the tracks leading to a warehouse, a boy for breaking off one head of cabbage, a laborer who inadvertently took home in his picket a minor tool, a clerk who unknowingly put a pencil in his coat pocket, and so ad infinitum. But the harshest blow fell upon peasants and workers on collective farms. Not only the cutting of pods,[3] even gathering scattered grain on fields after harvesting, was considered the gravest offense against the state, and children as well as adults were subject to the same kind of severe punishment.

In the process of putting this decree into effect, needless and inexcusable cruelties were perpetrated upon the peasants. Some of them were admitted by Vyshinsky, then Chief Prosecutor of the USSR.

In order to expedite the fight against all enemies of the "collective order" and to combat theft of "socialist property," the Commissariat of Justice (Moscow) created the new post of Prosecutor of the USSR, "for the purpose of unification of the activities of prosecutors of the Union republics," and with the object of "strengthening socialist justice and providing the proper protection for communal property in the USSR against the greed of anti-social elements."

The issuance of this last decree was a manifestation of Moscow's lack of confidence in local or provincial functionaries, in this case the Union Republics' Prosecutors' Offices. Dr. Ewald Ammende in his book *Human Life in Russia* (London, 1936, p. 124) has this to say about the above decree: "Thus, by this decree the entire judicial system and even the fate of the individual Ukrainian State officials were made to depend directly on Moscow."

SHOT, FOR A HANDFUL OF RYE STALKS

P. Chonusky

In the village of Bohdariwka, in Chornius county, Poltava region, there lived Hryhory Liashko (people called him Hrisha). His father was liquidated as a kurkul and exiled to a concentration camp. Hrisha was thrown out of the family home. After some time Hrisha became insane, totally harmless, and useless. People fed him and pitied him.

1933 was a year of terrible famine in Ukraine. Harvest time was approaching; the early rye was reaped and stacked. Members of the collective farms thought that they could go out and glean after the reapers, but that was strictly forbidden by the law of "Guarding Socialist Property." However, the hungry Hrisha had no idea of any such law; he went out to glean, and did pick up a few pocketfuls of stalks.

The collective farm posse, guarding the still unreaped patches in the fields, caught Hrisha with the gleanings and brought him to the village soviet. The village soviet, under the chairmanship of Stepan Kisiliov, held a public trial and, in accordance with soviet law, sentenced him to execution by a firing squad.

Hrisha Liashko did not understand what it was all about. He clutched his rye stalks and would not let them be taken away. When the trial was over, Hrisha was immediately executed on the spot.

This happened before my own eyes....

STARVING PEOPLE SENTENCED FOR GLEANING AFTER REAPERS

Natalka Lyutarevich

It was harvest time in Chornoukhiv, in the Poltava county, in 1933. Much of the land was idle, under a thick growth of weeds, but the tilled land yielded an abundant crop of wheat and rye. The summer was good, with plenty of rain. It seemed as though there would be enough to feed the starving peasantry and thus put an end to the famine, but the authorities had other ideas.

[3] The practice of cutting off pods in the fields before harvesttime became common in Ukraine in June 1932, because many peasants were then already starving as a result of heavy grain deliveries in 1931. This practice was one of the reasons for the new decree. V. Molotov in his speech at the Third Ukrainian Party Conference in July, 1932, said, "the problem of combatting pilfering of grain during and after its harvesting is of great importance in influencing grain reserves and (next season's) sowing campaign." (PRAVDA, July 14, 1932.)

Taken from: S. O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Vol. 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933* (Detroit: Globe Press, DOBRUS, 1955), pp. 31-33; 448-450).

Handout A-6.5 (cont.)

The first of the threshed grain was taken straight to the elevators. Small advances of grain were given only to those who worked on the harvest fields. Those who were emaciated and unable to work, were left to starve. Their only remaining course of action was to try and glean the fields for any left-over grain stalks, but, this was forbidden by law.

One day, when the collective farm members were returning home from work in the fields, they noticed a strange sight: a group of children, women, and men being herded by an armed man on horseback. It turned out that the chairman of the village soviet, Samiylo Zozulia, had arrested these people as criminals, caught stealing the "socialist property of the collective farm" and was herding them to the militia station. The "criminals" were all barefoot, ragged and swollen with hunger; they could hardly move their feet. Each one had a sack containing some handfuls of grain stems, a *prima facie* exhibit of the crime committed.

They were met at the station by the chief of the county militia, comrade Smushkov, who shouted to Zozulia, "Herd them all into the barn and tomorrow we will decide who goes where."

The next day several corpses of dead children were pulled out from the barn and handed to the burial brigade to be disposed of. The dead were already outside Soviet law and therefore could not be tried....

Handout A-7.1

A TERRIBLE STRUGGLE

Miron Dolot

The introduction of collectivization in Ukraine was followed by a long and exhausting struggle between the forces of the Communist Party and its government on the one hand, and the farmers on the others. It was truly a struggle for life and death. The government's aim was to wear down, exhaust, and finally destroy the farmers as independent householders and free individuals. All of the government's forces and resources were mobilized with the single purpose of breaking the farmer's innate resistance to being herded into the collective farms.

The farmers themselves thought resistance was only a matter of endurance. They would just have to persevere against all odds in order to reserve their independence and freedom. They resisted collectivization efforts by flatly refusing to join the collective farms, by wrecking the machinery, by slaughtering their cattle and horses, by killing Communist officials and burning down collective farm buildings, and by fleeing from their villages to the cities in desperation...

On one occasion Winston S. Churchill asked Stalin whether the stresses of World War II had been as difficult for him personally as carrying through the policy of collectivization. Stalin answered that the latter was more difficult and called the collective farm policy a "terrible struggle" lasting four years and involving ten million men.[1]

Taken from: Miron Dolot. *Who Killed Them and Why?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1984), pp. 10-12. Used by permission of the Ukrainian Studies Fund.

[1] Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 489.

Now let us comprehend the context of this statement. Stalin said this in August of 1942. At that time the Soviet Union was undergoing one of the most spectacular military disasters in history. The army had been routed. Millions of soldiers had already been killed or captured, and the most populated and important industrial and agricultural areas had been lost to the enemy. The city of Leningrad was besieged, its population dying of starvation, and enemy troops stood less than fifty miles from Moscow. The entire country was on the verge of collapse. And yet, at this moment, Stalin says that carrying though the policy of collectivization was more of a struggle than waging World War II.

But what Stalin failed to tell the Prime Minister was the fact that the "terrible struggle" against "ten million small men" had taken place mainly in Ukraine; that the reason for that struggle was not merely the forcing of the farmers into collective farms, as is generally believed now, but was mainly an attempt at thwarting the Ukrainian people's aspirations toward independence. He concealed the fact that simultaneously with the introduction of collectivization policy, Moscow had initiated a full-scale campaign against anything that could identify Ukraine as a separate nation. And it is precisely to this aspect of the struggle that we must address ourselves in order to fully understand what transpired during those years, the most tragic in modern Ukrainian history.

Ukraine has always been, and still is, a source of grave anxiety to Russia. Although it had been under Russian occupation for a considerable time, it has been neither assimilated nor subdued. At the root of the hostilities between Ukrainians and Russians lies the question of nationality. In spite of the long years of Russian domination, and the corresponding attempts at Russification, the Ukrainians have refused to give up their language, literature, history, art, music or customs, and above all the notion of their national independence. There was especially clear evidence of this in the last decade and a half before the Famine of 1932-1933. At the time of Russia's October Revolution, the Ukrainians rebelled against Russian rule and declared their independence. But, as was to be expected, Russia could not tolerate the loss of such a rich country, and Ukraine was soon invaded and reoccupied. The Ukrainian revolution was thus put down with savagery, and Russia – this time Soviet Russia – once again established herself in Ukraine as a colonial ruler.

But the revival of Ukrainian national life could not be stopped. The process of Ukrainization, started during the short period of independence, was to continue. Ukrainian became the official language of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Education, science, literature, and art acquired a national Ukrainian character in terms of both form and content.

The national revival went far beyond the sphere of culture. At this time the Ukrainians formed their own national church, independent of Russia's – The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. A new kind of national consciousness developed, and a highly patriotic intelligentsia began to take over the leadership of the economic, cultural, and political life of the country. Some politicians defended the rights of the Ukrainian people to practice their national way of life. Others openly opposed Russian Communist rule in Ukraine, and demanded Ukrainian independence. Certain men of letters advanced the concept of the essential incompatibility of Ukrainian and Russian culture, and proposed that Ukrainian intellectual

Handout A-7.1 (cont.)

and cultural life be based on European and Western, rather than Russian, models. A popular writer and sincere Communist, M. Khvylovyi, went so far as to call on Ukrainians to go "away from Moscow!" Khvylovyi was supported by many other prominent writers and critics, and also by O. Shumskyi, then Commissar for Education, who was later dismissed from his post by Stalin and eventually liquidated.

Some economists also dared to argue openly that it was time to stop treating Ukraine as a colony; that Ukraine was not merely the southern part of the USSR – but a country in its own right, with a distinct people and historical roots reaching back thousands of years.

When the collection of foodstuffs for the state ran into trouble, and when the policy of collectivization met the violent resistance of the Ukrainian farmers, Moscow sensed the danger and became alarmed. The Ukrainian national movement has always been identified with Ukrainian farmers. In 1926 nearly 90% of Ukrainians lived in the countryside. The farmers' refusal to deliver their assigned foodstuff quotas to the state, and especially their violent opposition to collectivization, was looked upon as a nationalist rebellion. Ukrainian nationalism was now blamed for all difficulties which the Communists encountered in Ukrainian villages. Stalin stated this openly when, in his "Marxism and the National- Colonial Question" he wrote:

> Farmers present by themselves the basic force of the national movement. . . Without farmers there can be no strong national movement. This is what we mean when we say that the nationalist question is, actually, the farmers' question.[2]

Another time, speaking elsewhere about Ukrainization, Stalin accused the Ukrainian cultural movement of assuming the proportions of a general stuggle against Moscow, against Russian culture, and against its highest achievement – Leninism.

> Yes, the danger in Ukraine is becoming more and more real. . . At a time when Western-European proletarians and their Communist Parties are full of sympathy for Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovyi is unable to say anything but to call upon Ukrainian leaders to run away from Moscow as fast as possible.[3]

Thus Ukrainization became dangerous for the Russian Communist Empire, i.e., the Soviet Union, and as such it became outright treason. Moscow could not tolerate such dissent, and, not unexpectedly, struck Ukraine with all its might. It used the policy of collectivization and the state grain collection campaign as vehicles of war against the Ukrainian national movement, and the Famine was to be the weapon with which Moscow dealt its final blow.

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[2] Stalin, J.V., *Marksizm, i natsional'no kolonial'nyi vopros*, p. 152.

[3] Stalin, J.V., *Sochineniia*, Vol. VIII, p. 152.

Handout A-7.2

ORGANIZING THE FAMINE

Nutritional difficulties existed in some regions of Ukraine as early as the spring of 1932. There were a number of instances of death by starvation; however, these were sporadic.[1]

The grain collection campaign of 1932-33, with the establishment of special brigades, thorough searches of homes and confiscation from peasants of all food supplies... conditioned the mass starvation of the rural population of Ukraine, which began in the fall of 1932 and turned into mass famine early in 1933.

What sections of the USSR were subject to famine? "The famine area, so far as I could observe and learn from reliable information, included Ukraine, the North Caucasus, a number of districts in the middle and lower Volga, and considerable sections of remote Kazakhstan in Central Asia," [2] reported W. H. Chamberlin.

Another foreigner, who witnessed the famine at first hand, mentions the same areas: "Some of the most fertile, notably the North Caucasus, the Ukraine, and the Volga district, are entirely without bread; the population is, in the most literal sense, starving; even in the large towns the food shortage is acute, and every day grows worse.[3]

Whoever had an opportunity to see the Ukrainian countryside before the famine, would be paralyzed with fear when beholding it during the famine. Vegetable gardens were overgrown with weeds; these would take over and grow right to the door of the house, and almost as high as the door itself. No voices were heard in the evening, nor laughter. No dogs barked, because they had already been consumed. Roads, unused and untravelled now, were completely overgrown. Walking singly or in pairs became dangerous, as robbery and kidnapping for cannibalism often occurred.[4]

The once famous bazaars of Ukraine, overflowing with food, had undergone a radical change. An eyewitness thus describes them in early 1933: "In the center of the village, close by the ruins of the church, which had been dynamited, is the village bazaar. All the people one sees have swollen faces. They are silent, and, when they talk, they can hardly whisper. Their movements are slow and weak because of swollen arms and legs. They trade in cornstalk, bare cobs, dried roots, bark of trees and roots of waterplants. This assortment of trade constituted these peoples' diet, a diet that was incapable of saving them from death, but merely extended their suffering a little longer."

Dogs and cats were sold at the bazaars, and their meat was considered a real delicacy. Starvation relaxed moral restraints, and homicide and suicide were on the increase. The degradation of humans to the level of animals proceeded rapidly. "M.P.", an engineer, tells of an incident on a train between Koziatyn and Uman on February 13, 1933, when "some thirteen people, adults who were collective farmworkers and looked quite exhausted, mobbed a 12 year old boy who had a half-pound piece of bread. They crushed the bread in their frenzied attack and then proceeded to pick the crumbs off the dirty floor."

Theft and other crimes against property became so prevalent in 1932-33 that it was useless to try and do anything about them. Things were being stolen that people had never dreamed of stealing before – food from ovens. Smoke coming from the chimney of a house would give the owner away as cooking something, and such a house would become the objective of thieves, who were only after one item – food. Fruits and vegetables were picked by thieves long before they had any real nutritional value.

The militia did nothing against this kind of thievery; the people therefore resorted to self-defence and lynchings. Here are examples from the village of Khorsik, Poltava county, as told by witness N. L. "In the village of Khorsik, birthplace of the famous philosopher Skovoroda, a peasant woman, Martha Prykhodko, was picking young potatoes from the garden of a government employee, Lohinov. The woman was pregnant. Lohinov caught her and beat her so severely that she died on the spot. Lohinov was never punished."

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"There was much stealing of cows, hogs, goats, etc. in the village of Chornoukhiw, and the thieves were Sizon Timoshchik and Khvedir Verteletsky. Following another in the long series of the thefts, the peasants, under the leadership of communist Cyryl Kostevich Herasy-

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[1] In the village of Shamrayivka, Velikopolovets county (Kiev) during the grain collection campaign of 1931-32, even small grain used for chicken feed was taken away, the commissar in charge, Ivakhin, stating that it would go into "seed reserves."

[2] W. H. Chamberlin, "Russia's Iron Age," Boston, 1934, p. 88.

[3] Malcolm Muggeridge, op. cit., p. 558.

Taken from: S.O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: Globe Press, DOBRUS, 1955), pp. 67-87.

[4] W.H. Chamberlin, (Russia's..., p. 87) says this about surveying a village in the company of the secretary of the village council of Cherkasy: "Mr. Fishenko found abundant confirmation in the stories of the famine survivors and in the grim mute evidence of the numerous abandoned houses with their weed-grown gardens and gaping doors and windows."

Handout A-7.2 (cont.)

menko (he was later judge in this region), lynched Timoshchik and Vertetsky, killing them in their own homes in the presence of their wives and children. There was not even an investigation in this case..."

The variety of food used through necessity in Ukraine included: bark, leeks, leaves, dogs, cats, and crows. Villages on the banks of brooks or rivers had advantages in providing extra food for their inhabitants. Hard, and normally inedible, crabs were boiled and their broth gave good nutriment. Then the hard shells would be ground up, mixed with leaves or bark and baked. The product could not be chewed but had to be swallowed, yet many a life was saved by the nutritious content of these shells.

When spring came mushrooms were picked without discrimination, with many cases of poisoning.

In some villages in the South of Ukraine people tried to eat cottoncake, usually with tragic results; the undernourished system could not manage to digest it, a rash appeared all over the body, and then death ensued by poisoning.

A bread known as "motorfuel" was in widespread use. It consisted of ground bark, leaves, corncobs, an occasional rotten potato or other such delicacy. In the Salsk region of Kuban, people moved into the steppes, where they subsisted on marmots and other small animals. Thousands survived in this manner. The people of Zavitne, a large village of a thousand houses, lived on marmots for six months and had reserves of lard from these and other animals. There were similar methods of subsistence in the southern regions of Ukraine.

Agricultural agent A. O., who stayed in the villages of Izbinske and Starytsa, Kharkiw region, from March 15, 1933, wrote: "Dozens of people died every day; the bodies were left in the homes for days at a time because there were few people strong enough to bury them. Gravedigging was a very difficult task, so mass graves were dug. Corpses were piled on cars, like wood, brought to the edge of the pit, and tipped over, falling in a heap and presenting a ghastly sight. The undertakers of today were the corpses of tomorrow. There was an incessant wail and lament coming from the two villages; one could hear repeated just one word in a long, drawn-out tone "l-o-o-o-st." A record, stating only the undisputedly true facts of events in Ukrainian villages would be disbelieved by even the most ardent Ukrainians; small wonder then, that foreigners are skeptical about them."

Special burial brigades were set up and attached to each collective farm. But often they could not cope with the amount of work. In the village of Stepaniwka near Vynnytsya, a widow carried her dead children in a sheet to the cemetery, and there died herself. In the same village, a woman died, leaving two small children. The wagon came, took the body away, and the children were left in an empty house, without food or help.

In Parkhomiwka, Kharkiw district, the following took place in the spring of 1933: "The wagon which collected corpses stopped at the home of a peasant named Koval. He was alive, but the undertakers started dragging him away. Koval pleaded with them with some difficulty, being weak – 'don't drag me, give me something to eat, I am alive;' but the undertakers replied: 'we are busy, we won't come for you again, and you are going to die anyway.' At night he crawled out from among the corpses and made his way from the cemetery to the nearest house. Some relatives brought him the boiled meat of dead animals and he slowly recovered. He was still alive in 1941. His friends gave him the nickname "Pylyp Koval, the immortal."

How many persons were buried alive? Some facts told by witnesses: In the village of Fursa near Kiev, the teamster who carried corpses away in his wagon was paid 5 grammes (about 1/5 of an ounce) of grain for every corpse. Once he brought a stack of bodies to the cemetery and as he was unloading them from the wagon into the pit, one of the "corpses" got up and started walking away. The teamster grabbed him, and wanted to throw him back in, fearing the loss of pay for one body. After some bargaining they grew friendly, and finally the "corpse" rode back with him to town. This man was also still alive in 1941.

People report that it was a rule of the burial brigades attached to collective farms to avoid the homes of those peasants who were not members of the collective. In this connection there was a tragi-comic occurrence in the village of Hermaniwka, near Kiev: "Corpses were being brought to the cemetery since morning and were stacked up at the edge of a common grave. When there were about 60 bodies, they were thrown into the pit, like so many pieces of wood. The chief of the village soviet, Nikiforov, came to inspect the place at noon. He was known as an eager "collectiviser," and when he saw the dead body of an "indus"[9] he ordered that the body be thrown out of the common grave, remarking that he was not worthy of being buried alongside members of the collective farm. Nikiforov's orders were carried out; a man was lowered into

[6] W. H. Chamberlin, Russia's..., pp. 87-88.

[9] This nickname "Indus" is taken from "individual" and was applied to peasants who were not members of collective farms, and who preferred to remain and die as individuals.

Handout A-7.2 (cont.)

the pit with a rope which he tied around a leg of the unworthy corpse, and it was pulled out and left lying unburied for about a week, until the chief of the village soviet relented and permitted burial in a grave for "individualists."

In Shulhiwka, Dnipropetrovsk region, moats and wells were filled with corpses in the spring of 1933, as there were not enough live people to bury them.[10]

The Ukrainian peasantry tried everything possible to survive the terrible famine into which it was being pushed. In the spring of 1933, the youngest and most versatile elements of the peasant class chose escape as the best means of survival. They escaped from the countryside without the essential travel documents, but were sometimes provided with the proper papers by the village soviet. The hard core of the peasantry, i.e., the older folk and children, stayed at home. But many of these, with emaciated bodies, swollen faces, wild looks in their eyes, surged toward the towns and cities in search of a piece of bread or at least potato peelings.

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Beginning with the spring of 1933 mobs of terrifying, swollen apparitions, pasty-faced men, women and children filled the streets of the larger cities. The greatest number could be seen queued up for "commercial" bread. The key to this situation lay in the fact that early in 1933, at the height of the famine in Ukraine, all over the USSR in the large cities, stores were open where it was possible to buy bread without any ration cards, but at so-called commercial prices, i.e., 4 roubles * for a 2½ lb. loaf of white, and 3 roubles for the same loaf of dark bread. It is noteworthy that in compulsory transactions with the governments, the peasant was paid 90 copecks * for 16 Kg. (40 lbs.) of wheat. As a rule, the peasants would line up in the evening and wait until next morning for the stores to open.

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Pleasants from the surrounding countryside, women and children, were dying of hunger every day in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa and other cities of Ukraine. A starved corpse in the street of a city was an everyday sight in those days. A foreigner reports about Kharkiw and Kiev: "In the streets and the courtyards scenes were often witnessed which are hardly creditable by European standards." [14]

The government authorities exerted all their efforts to remove the corpses from public view with haste. Dr. Ammende, cited above, writes: "The number of corpses was so great that they could only be removed once a day. Often, no distinction was made between the corpses and those not yet quite dead; all were loaded onto trucks, to be flung indiscriminately into a common grave. This burial work was done by convicts from the local prison. From morning until evening they were busy digging the graves. Fifteen bodies were usually buried in one grave, and the number of graves is so great, these famine cemeteries often recall a stretch of sandhills." [15]

Very often, the dead and dying peasants, being picked off the streets, dumps, and bazaars, by trucks under police supervision, would be hauled away into uninhabited parts and dumped into ravines without even a thin layer of earth on top.

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Thousands of peasants tried to obtain work with the larger government-owned agricultural enterprises. A.B., an agronomist for such an institution, says: "While inspecting an experimental field near Poltava, I noticed many people lying around a large stack of straw. In reply to my question as to who they were and what they were doing, the man in charge of the experimental field, who was not a Ukrainian, said that they were peasants from the neighborhood, who had come in thousands applying for jobs, and also expecting to get food. The farm hired only the strongest and the rest were sent away. They had nothing to go back to, so they stayed here, where many of them died. And pointing with his finger at some fresh mounds, he said that was where these individualists were buried. 'You cannot imagine how much trouble the government farm has with those Ukrainians,', he concluded."

Many peasants undertook long voyages in search of food. They went to Belorussia, the Caucasus, the Moscow region and farther north. As a rule they went illegally, without travel permits, since leaving one's own village was not permitted. Only the very lucky ones obtained papers which entitled them to purchase railroad tickets. These long trips often had a tragic ending. Professor O. O.* tells of a case, which he himself witnessed: "In March 1933, at the railroad station of Vladikavkaz (Caucasus), a great

[10] It was common practice to bury bodies in gardens, moats, sewers, and similar places.

* Roubles and Kopeks are forms of Soviet currency.

[14] Ewald Ammende, op. cit., p. 61.

[15] Ibid., pp. 61, 62.

Handout A-7.2 (cont.)

number of Ukrainian peasants, with bags across their shoulders, were waiting for a freight train. Agents of the NKVD stopped them and took away their bread. Their joint and individual pleadings to be allowed to keep the bread were of no avail. Then one of the 'rabbits' (those who travelled the railroads without tickets were called 'rabbits') climbed a tall tree near the station, and started talking to the crowd about the terrors of famine in Ukraine. He cursed the communist party, the government and its leaders, the NKVD, and all the living and dead. The crowd grew in size quickly and NKVD agents ordered the mob to disperse, threatening arrest. They ordered the orator to come down, on the threat of life imprisonment. He would not listen, and the fervor of his eloquence mounted. The NKVD then called the firemen and ordered them to play hoses on the man to force him down. He still refused, and when the sharp jet of water began to rip the bark off the tree he climbed to the topmost branches and jumped. The NKVD ordered the firemen to pick up his body and they took it away in an unknown direction. Two peasants covered the pool of blood with earth, so that the dogs would not lap up the Christian blood. Then they asked the NKVD men to show them where their comrade would be buried. The agent looked angry and, not answering, looked at one of the pleaders, then at the other. Then he ordered briskly: 'Come with me, and you will find out.' Nobody knows what happened to those two."

The plight of children during the famine was particularly pathetic. A foreign observer writes: "It was beyond my comprehension.... At Kharkiv I saw a boy, wasted to a skeleton, lying in the middle of the street. A second boy was sitting near a keg of garbage picking egg- shells out of it. They were looking for edible remnants of food or fruit. They perished like wild beasts.... When the famine began to mount, the parents in the villages used to take their children into the towns, where they left them in the hope that someone would have pity on them." [16]

Professor M. M. emphasizes that the "NKVD set up a huge concentration camp for children, ('barracks of death' it was called in whispers among the peasants) where about ten thousand children rounded up in the city of Kharkiv were placed. The mortality rate among them reached 40 per cent."

Thousands of children came to the cities alone, without parents or adults, and various stages of nervous and psychic disorders were noticeable among them. The professor cited above, Dr. M. M., quotes typical answers given by children put under observation in the psychiatric clinic during the famine. In reply to the question as to what had brought him to the city, a 7 year old boy said: "Father died, mother swelled up and could not get out of bed. She said to me 'Go and look for bread yourself,' so I came to the city." An 8 year old boy said: "Father and mother died, some brothers were left, but there was nothing to eat and I ran away from home." A boy 9 years old said: "Mother said, 'Save yourself, run to town,' I turned back twice, I could not bear to leave my mother, but she begged and cried, and I finally went for good." Another 8 year old boy said: "Father and mother were lying all swollen, so I ran away from home." Children were often left lying on sheets near police stations.

It must be noted that the urban population was also under the handicap of curtailed bread rations, which had been reduced for those not working to 200 grammes per day. Of course, the cities did not suffer anything even remotely approaching the famine of the villages. There were also the aforementioned "commercial" stores selling unrationed bread, but they were out of reach of the majority of the urban population because of high prices. All other rationed products, such as fats, sugar, flour, etc. were either unavailable, or to be obtained only with difficulty, and in very small quantities. I.K., a lawyer, relates what he saw in July, 1933, in the city of Chernihiv: "I was walking near the cemetery. It was a hot day. Almost naked children, emaciated from hunger, were playing in the sand. I saw someone throwing sand out of a pit, with hands shrivelled like a mummy's. I came closer and saw a woman, about 30 years old, dishevelled and in rags. I asked her what she was doing. 'Am I doing anything that is not permitted?' she replied. I, in turn asked her what she meant. She replied in a bare whisper, as if from a grave: 'I am digging a grave for myself, perhaps my children, who are playing here, will cover me up, and then someone might take pity on the orphans. I can no longer bear to look at them going hungry.'"

Arthur Koestler who, as indicated above, lived in Kharkiv at that time, gives a pretty good idea of general conditions in the cities: "Under my hotel room window in Kharkov, funeral processions marched past all day. The electricity supply in Kharkov had broken down. There was no light in the town, and trams functioned only for an hour or so a day to take workers to the factories and back. There was also no fuel or petrol in the town, and the winter was hard even for Ukraine, with temperatures of 30° below zero.

* Initials of individuals who do not want to reveal their full names because of fear of the KGB.

[16] Ewald Ammende, op. cit., p. 63.

Handout A-7.2 (cont.)

Life seemed to have come to a standstill, the whole machinery on the verge of collapse." [17]

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This brings us to the question: who did not starve in Ukraine in 1932-33?

In the cities and villages the only people adequately supplied with food and other products were the higher ranks of party and government workers. A county center would usually have about 30 persons belonging to such key personnel – the county party committee, the NKVD, those in charge of treasury, agricultural and judicial offices. For the purpose of providing such people with food, special secret stores were established, where everything was available at fixed government prices. The lower rural authorities were also provided for; the heads of the village soviets, party secretaries and such. Sometimes "activists" would be included in the privileged group. Within the collective farms those who "carried the keys," i.e., chiefs, accountants, warehousemen, and brigade workers were usually in a better position than the rest.

It is obviously almost impossible to relate all the combinations of circumstances which would allow a peasant family or at best, some of its members to avoid death from the famine.

The most important factor was one of the many devious ways of concealing food reserves within the household.

According to observation by U. M., an agronomist, those families of peasants who had a close member working in a city had a good chance of survival. This can be taken as a general statement, with reservation that those who lived in cities did not always have the means of aiding their rural families.

Some people, realizing that only those who had gold or silver could be sure of food, began to dig up the old graves of wealthier people who had died decades before. Graves of the clergy were especially sought after, as they were usually buried with a large gold or silver cross. As related by H. L., in Chornukhy near Poltava, in the Pokrovsky cemetery the graves of former merchants, colonels and priests were robbed. In general, very few graves of formerly wealthy people were left intact.

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Ownership of a goat by a peasant family usually assured a better chance of survival. The goat would, as a matter of course, be kept in the house, together with the family.

It was noted that peasants who drank spirits during the famine had a better chance of survival than those who did not touch alcoholic beverages.[19]

There were isolated cases of very unusual and lucky circumstances saving people from starvation. As reported by D. M., an agricultural official: "Some peasants evaded death from starvation by discovering hoards of grain in the fields, built into small earth-covered mounds by fieldmice."

In the spring, with the start of the sowing campaign, many collective farms were provided with food for the establishment of communal kitchens for their workers. Sometimes chuckwagons would go out into the fields to feed those who were able to work. The general practice of collective farms was to issue a ration of meal, from 100 to 300 grammes per day for each worker, and a like quantity for members of his immediate family. In the case of communal kitchens, a kind of paste made of flour would be boiled in water, and this soup served hot twice a day.

In the number of the rural population incorporated in the communal feeding system, Ukraine held first place in the Soviet Union. In the quality of the food served, Ukraine held the last place.

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[17] Arthur Koestler, "The Yogi and the Commissar" New York, 1946, p. 137.

[19] Alcoholic beverages were the only products which were always available in government stores in unlimited quantities throughout the Famine. (While they contain no vitamins, they are a source of carbohydrates.)

Handout A-8.1

EXECUTION BY HUNGER

Miron Dolot

There was silence and the monotony of snow everywhere throughout the village. The only signs of life came from the chimneys here and there, with tiny streams of smoke rising in the sky. Many houses in our neighborhood did not have any smoke coming out of their chimneys. Hadn't the people inside made any fires? How could they possibly stay alive, we wondered, in subzero temperatures, without their houses being heated?

To find out for ourselves, we ran first to Dmytro's house which showed no signs of life. Dmytro had never returned home after he had been taken to the county center. His young wife Solomia was left alone with their daughter. She had gone to work in the collective farm, taking her little child with her. As the wife of a banished man, she too was considered an "enemy of the people," and her child was refused admission to the nursery. Later, Solomia was expelled from the collective farm, and thus forced to seek a job in the city. That was impossible, however, because she could not show a certificate of release from the collective farm. She found herself trapped in the circle of the Communist death ring. She had to return to her village.

When winter came, Solomia went from house to house, willing to work for just a piece of bread. She was too proud to beg. People were sympathetic and helped her as much as they could. However, as the famine worsened, and the villagers were no longer able to help her, she was not seen on her rounds any more.

We found the front door of Solomia's house open, but the entrance was blocked with snowdrifts, and it was hard to get inside. When we finally reached the living room, we saw a pitiful sight: Solomia was hanging from the ceiling in the middle of the room. She was dressed in her Ukrainian national costume, and at her breast hung a large cross. It was obvious that she had made preparations before committing suicide. Her hair was combed neatly in two braids hanging over her shoulders.

Frightened, we ran to fetch Mother. We helped her take down Solomia's frozen body, and laid it on a bench, and covered it with a handmade blanket. It was only after we finished doing this that we noticed the dead body of her little daughter. The child was lying in a wooden tub in the corner under the icons, clean and dressed in her best clothes. Her little hands were folded across her chest.

On the table was a note:

Dear Neighbors:

Please bury our bodies properly. I have to leave you, dear neighbors. I can bear this life no longer. There is no food in the house, and there is no sense in living without my little daughter who starved to death, or my husband. If you ever see Dmytro, tell him about us. He will understand our plight, and he will forgive me. Please tell him that I died peacefully, thinking about him and our dear daughter.

I love you, my dear neighbors, and I wish with all my heart that you somehow recover from this disaster. Forgive me for troubling you. Thank you for everything you have done for me.

Solomia.

After reading the note, we stood there for a while, motionless and forlorn. Our mother tried to suppress the sound of her weeping, pressing the corner of her head scarf to her lips. Mykola gazed at the corpses in disbelief.

In my imagination I was recreating the agony of their dying: the child's hunger cries, and then the death convulsions of its exhausted little body.

How great must have been the sufferings of the mother. She had to listen helplessly to the pleas of her child for food, while she herself was near starvation. She must have felt great relief, I thought, when she saw her little daughter breathing for the last time. Then, in my imagination, I saw the mother attending to her lifeless child: dressing her in the best and cleanest clothing she had, praying on her knees near the body, and finally kissing her for the last time before her own suicide.

Mother interrupted my thoughts. We had to fulfill the last wishes of our dead neighbor and bury the two corpses properly. My mother always wanted to do everything correctly. But, how could we do it this time? We were too weak to dig a grave in the snow-covered frozen ground, or even to take the bodies to the cemetery.

After realizing these facts, we decided to leave them in the house. For the time being, the cold prevented their decay, so we just laid the body of the child beside her mother on the sleeping bench, covered them both with the blanket, and left.

After this sad discovery, we could not sit idly at home. There were many other houses around us that had no smoke coming out of their chim-

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Handout A-8.1 (cont.)

neys. We realized that similar tragedies had taken place there too. My mother was especially concerned about Boris' family and also about a widow who lived with her crippled daughter in our neighborhood. She thought they might still be alive and in need of help.

Without losing much time, we went to Boris' house. He also had not returned from the village jail, but had been transferred to the county center, and no one had seen him since. His wife, Khymka, was living alone with their two children. We frequently visited her, helping the family as much as we could. Lately, during the heavy snowstorms, we had lost all contact with them.

When we reached the front of Khymka's house, we noticed a dark object protruding from underneath the snow. It was Khymka. Her body was completely frozen and covered with snow. We rushed into the house, anticipating the worst about her children: we were right. On the sleeping bench lay the corpse of Khymka's eldest son, Trokhym. His hands were folded across his chest, his eyes were closed, and his frozen body was covered with an overcoat. At his head was a saucer with the remnants of a candle. Trokhym must have died before his mother. Then, in order to try and save the life of her other child, Khymka apparently left the house in search of help. But, too weakened by hunger, she collapsed a few steps in front of her house, and died in the snow.

We also found her youngest child, a boy of about eight years of age, in a bed. He was well-covered with several pieces of old clothing and miraculously still alive! He lay there totally exhausted by hunger and too weak to move. His body had stiffened and he was apparently half-frozen.

We had to act immediately to try to save the glimmer of life still in this young boy. There was no time for contemplation and emotions. We brought Khymka's body back into the house and laid it alongside the body of her starved eldest son. It became clear to us that we had to take the youngest boy home with us, if we wanted to keep him alive, for his own house was freezing with not a trace of fuel for heating or food for survival. We carefully laid him on a sled and brought him home with us to revive him and care for him. Mother put him in bed, and told us that with God's help, he might recover.

She then sent us with a sled to the widow's house to bring her and her crippled daughter back with us if they were still alive. They lived close by, and it didn't take us long to reach her house.

The widow Shevchenko and her crippled daughter Lida were also victims of government policy. A few years earlier, her husband had clashed with a Party representative when the collectivization scheme was being instituted. The representative had come to our village to organize the collective farm, and during a heated argument, Shevchenko had dared to call him "a stupid parrot!" That was his end. He was accused of assailing the dignity of the Communist Party, and he was sent to the north for five years of "corrective labor." After a year or so, his wife received an anonymous letter telling her that her husband had died while digging the Baltic Sea-White Sea Canal. His widow now lived all alone with their daughter, who had been crippled from birth and needed constant attention. Widow Shevchenko had twice as difficult a task as the other villagers in providing food and other necessities for the two of them. Being tied down at home by the daily care of her handicapped daughter, she could not go to work. She could not get any official help either, since she was the wife of an arrested "enemy of the people." She became a beggar, completely dependent upon the goodwill of her fellow villagers. When the whole village was struck by the famine, her fate was sealed.

We found her house on a hill not far from ours, completely snowbound, with the front door blocked by the snow.

We had a hard time clearing it away, and when we finally opened the door, we found the poor widow dead, just as we had feared, lying on the threshold halfway in the entrance hall. We carried her body into the living room and laid it on a bench. We found her daughter Lida, lying on a sleeping bench wrapped in many layers of rags but still alive. We carefully laid her on our sled and rushed her back to our house.

At home, Mother was still occupied with Khymka's young son. She was rubbing his body with snow, and there was also something cooking for him on the stove.

When we brought Lida indoors, Mother began ministering to her needs, and we took over the care of the young boy. After making them as warm and comfortable as we could, we tried to feed them porridge and some homemade herb tea prepared by Mother, but our efforts to force some food and warm drink into them were all in vain. Except for their slow and spasmodic breathing, they didn't show any other signs of life, lying there completely motionless. When night fell, we witnessed their horrible death throes. At midnight, Lida died and the young boy followed shortly after.

Now we found ourselves in a peculiar situation. We had two corpses of people not related to us in our house. We could not keep them like that in our house too long, and burying them in the cemetery involved certain risks.

Handout A-8.1 (cont.)

It was dangerous to show sympathy to starving villagers, particularly to people who, like this boy and girl, were looked upon by government officials as "enemies of the people." Trying to save the lives of these two young people came as natural to us as trying to save our own lives, but the Communist Party looked upon such an act as high treason. Nevertheless, come what may, we decided to bury their bodies properly in the cemetery.

The next morning, Mykola and I loaded the bodies on our sled, covered them over, and started toward the village center where the cemetery was located. It was very hard for us to pull the sled with such a heavy load; we had very little strength for such a task, especially in the deep snow and freezing cold. Moving along the main road, we saw a few more corpses, some of whom we recognized as the remains of neighbors. There were also strangers among them who had probably come from other villages in search of food. The fact that all the corpses were covered with heavy snow suggested to us that they had been lying on the road for quite some time.

As we came closer to the village center, we saw a pair of horses pulling a sleigh and galloping toward us. We knew that such a luxury was only afforded Party and government officials. The road was narrowed by the high snowdrifts, so we could not give way. The rearing horses stopped almost in front of us. At first we heard only swearing coming from the sleigh; then we were commanded to move aside. While we were trying to do this, our heavily-loaded sled became firmly stuck in the snow. As we vainly attempted to push and pull our sled out, we inadvertently uncovered our cargo. The attention of the officials was instantly riveted to our sled. They dismounted and came over to us for a closer look.

There were two of them and both were strangers to us. They were warmly dressed and looked well fed and prosperous, as in olden days. One of them with a fur coat stepped forward and demanded to know what we were pulling in our sled.

"You see what we're pulling!" I replied, pointing to the corpses. The other stranger was eyeing us with curiosity.

"Who were they, and how did they die?" the man in the fur coat continued his interrogation.

What a superfluous and ridiculous question! I casually answered that the corpses were those of our neighbors. Then, instead of explaining to him the cause of their deaths, I pointed out that one could see many corpses on the road, and that there were many more dead and dying in their homes. He apparently must have been very displeased with my answer because he asked me angrily who we were and stepped closer to us.

"You certainly don't want to tell me that the entire population of the village died, or is about to die out, do you?" he continued, raising his voice. Then hurling more insults and curses at us, he took a notebook out of his pocket and wrote down our names.

The other man watched this whole procedure silently. After the man in the fur coat put his notebook away, they both returned to their sleigh, and passed swiftly by. It was no small effort for us to finally extricate our sled from the deep snow.

It was quite a relief when we at last reached the cemetery, for we were very cold and utterly exhausted. Here we found ourselves among dozens of corpses. They lay scattered on both sides of the road. Some of them were piled up into heaps probably all members of one family or of one neighborhood. Others were thrown all over in a haphazard fashion.

The cemetery was deathly quiet. No one was around. Nobody bothered to bury the remains of these miserable wretches.

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Handout A-8.2

THE SPRING OF 1933

Miron Dolot

I cannot find the words to describe what my eyes saw in the spring of 1933, but since those awesome memories still haunt me, I shall endeavor to convey my recollections of the sufferings and deaths of my fellow Ukrainians.

World War II was a reality, and I was a part of it. I saw the multitude of dead and mutilated bodies; I heard the cries of despair, and the moans of agony all around me. Day after day, I felt cold and hunger. I was constantly in fear of death. But all of that is now seen through the mist of time. In the haziness of those memories, I see a dim spark of light. This spark is the recognition that those sufferings were caused by war, that I and others at that time had a chance to fight for our lives, to defend ourselves no matter how slim those chances might be. Above all, I realized that while fighting in the war, I had not been completely abandoned. The military was always there with daily food rations, no matter how deficient in quantity and quality. We were also clothed (after a fashion), and barracks as such for sleep when possible were provided. The sufferings of war pale in comparison with the events in our village, all of which remain in my memory as absolute in horror.

Those of us who were still alive harbored a secret and final hope that the coming of the spring of 1933 would bring us some relief. We thought that the new vegetation would help us live through the long months of waiting for the new bread. Nourished by this hope, we were able to carry on until we saw the first signs of green. Sadly, however, many of the villagers were no longer alive by the time the long-awaited spring finally arrived. And many of those who lived long enough to see the passing of winter found their death in the very vegetables and grasses they were so hopefully and patiently awaiting.

That spring of 1933 in Ukraine was unusually cold. In our region, the spring weather usually set in around the beginning of April. The snow would melt quickly, and the green blanket of vegetation would immediately appear in its place. But, in 1933, snow was still visible everywhere in mid-April. An icy-cold wind blew continually. It would often bring heavy clouds of rain or snow, or both, and the village would sink deep into mud and slush again. Then a freeze would turn all that into knobs of dirty ice.

Starvation in our village now reached a point at which death was a desirable relief. Many houses around us had already been standing for a long time with no signs of life. As the snow slowly melted away, human corpses were exposed to view everywhere: in backyards, on roads, in fields. Those dead bodies constituted a pathetic problem for the living. As the weather warmed, they started to thaw and decay. The stench which resulted plagued us, and we could do nothing about it. The villagers who survived were unable to bury the dead, and no one from the outside seemed in a hurry to do it, so the bodies were just left wherever they happened to die. Those in the fields or in the forest, fell prey to wild animals; those in their homes became the prey of countless rats.

For the third time, the village was stricken with panic. Those who were fortunate enough to remain alive were in the depths of despair. The resources they possessed had been used up long ago. They all finally had to face the shocking truth that there was nothing to eat, and no hope of getting any help: that death from starvation was their imminent fate.

Most of these desperate villagers reconciled themselves to this fact. They stayed at home, and their conditions were indescribable. They were unkempt and haggard, and so weak that they could hardly drag one foot after the other. They just sat, or lay down silently, too feeble even to talk.

The bodies of some were reduced to skeletons, with their skin hanging grayish-yellow and loose over their bones. Their faces looked like rubber masks with large, bulging, immobile eyes. Their necks seemed to have shrunk into their shoulders. The look in their eyes was glassy, heralding their approaching death.

The bodies of others were swollen, a final stage of starvation. Their faces, arms, legs, and stomachs resembled the surfaces of plastic balloons. The tissues would soon crack and burst, resulting in the fast deterioration of their bodies.

The thaw brought with it a new wave of beggars. Those who still had strength enough to move left their dwellings and took off in search of food. Old and young, mostly women and children, slowly moved from house to house dragging their rag-covered feet. They pleaded for food: a potato, or a piece of bread, or at least a kernel – a single kernel! – of corn. At the onset of the famine, I remember how the emaciated would come to the doorstep, often sobbing, and would ask for some spare food. If refused, they would excuse themselves politely and go away, apologizing for bothering us.

But this spring's beggars presented an entirely different picture. These desperate people,

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numbed by cruelty and injustice as well as hunger, were no longer the modest, honorable small farmers they had been before. Their fear of starvation was so great that they lost all semblance of self-control, becoming more like wild, hungry beasts in their search for food. They no longer distinguished friends from enemies and were ready to commit even murder for a mere scrap. Their clothes had long ago turned to rags, and they themselves were worn out and exhausted to the point of collapse.

With protruding frightened eyes and outstretched hands, they would approach someone, but this time they did not plead: they were voiceless; they just cried. Often their heavy tears were mixed with fluid slowly oozing out of the cracks in their swollen faces. They whispered and begged for a crumb of bread.

Another sign of almost imminent death from starvation was the body lice, those small, flat, wingless, parasitic insects who were the constant companions of the wretched and impoverished. The starving villagers were no longer able to take care of their sanitary needs, nor had they strength to fetch water, let alone heat it in order to bathe themselves, or wash their clothes and their bedding. Those who still had strength could do some washing, but not properly because they had no soap. For a few years now, not a single bar of soap had been seen in the village. But, even if soap had been available, we could not buy it. First, we had no money; second, we were prohibited from buying any merchandise in the stores as our grain quotas had not been met. As a result, all of us were dirty and infected with lice.

As the limbs of a starving person turn cold with the approach of death, the lice begin to migrate to the warmer facial areas such as the eye sockets, ears, mouth corners, and nostrils. When this happened, it was an unmistakable sign that the starving person's sufferings would soon come to an end.

The plight of the children was one of the most heartbreaking experiences for me during that time, and their pathetic faces, parched or swollen, and streaked with tears, will remain in my memory forever.

They could not understand why they couldn't get a piece of bread or something else to eat. They were not able to comprehend what was going on in their own small world. Thinking of them still makes me tremble with horror. God is my witness that as I write these words, the paper is wet with my tears.

Not many children in our neighborhood had survived the terrible winter, but those who had were reduced to mere skeletons, too weak to cry. The heads on their small thin necks looked like inflated balloons. Their small bony arms and legs were like sticks protruding from their little bodies. Their stomachs were bloated to unusual proportions, and water flowed uninterruptedly from their genitals. Those childish faces looked prematurely aged and twisted. They resembled old folks: wrinkled, listless, and very, very sad. At their stage of starvation, they were in a constant stupor which is peculiar to those who suffer from extreme hunger. It seemed as if nature itself had conspired with the Communist regime to add a final touch of pathos and horror to the sufferings the children had to endure. Hair had started to grow on the faces of some, mainly on their foreheads and temples. I saw a few such children and they looked so strange to me – like creatures from another planet, and they left me with a feeling of helplessness and doom.

Often starvation would sweep away an entire family. The adult members would die first, leaving the children alone in a cold house, half-naked and hungry, to fend for themselves. One can imagine what happened to such hopeless children: these orphans, scantily clad and feet wrapped in rags, joined the rest of the beggars. Struggling in the snow, they would first go to their nearest neighbors only to find that they too were dead. Then they would go to another house and yet another farther away. Compassionate villagers who were still alive would let a child or two stay with them only to watch them slowly die.

Yet miraculously some children managed to survive. These were mostly boys and girls between ten and fifteen years of age. With the coming of spring, they saw their chances of survival in terms of leaving home, and going to the city. A few, but very few, children managed to do just that and were fortunate in finding help and understanding from some of the urban dwellers. Others, less fortunate, were picked up by the militia and locked up in the Children's Detention Home. These children had a better chance of surviving the famine, although we heard that many of them also died. And then, there were those whose fate it was to join the ranks of the city's juvenile criminals. God alone knows what happened to them. Finally, there were those who neither reached the city nor were picked up by the militia. They lay dead wherever they had fallen for days or even weeks, until someone would drag them out of sight into some ditch like a dead animal.

I saw many tragic events in which children were the innocent victims, but one episode in particular emerges from my memories of that spring as a symbol of humanity gone completely mad. It was sometime at the onset of April. One early morning while we still lay in our beds, we heard a child's cry and a weak knocking on the

Handout A-8.2 (cont.)

door. I was the first to jump out of bed. As I opened the door, I saw a small girl of about four. She stood trembling from the cold and exhaustion with streams of tears flowing down her famished little cheeks. We knew her! It was Maria, the daughter of our neighbor Hana, who also had a seven-year-old son and lived about half a mile from us. Hana's husband, a young and industrious farmer, had been arrested like many others, for no apparent reason, and exiled somewhere to a concentration camp about two years before. Hana was left alone with her two children to struggle for food, like all the rest of us. However, as winter came and starvation struck us, we lost track of her.

I let the child into the house.

"My mommy won't wake up!" the child announced, wiping away the tears with the sleeve of her dirty coat.

Mother and I glanced at each other. A short while later, my brother Mykola and I were on our way to Hana's home. When we entered the house, our fears were confirmed. Hana was dead, lying on her back on the sleeping bench. Her bulging glassy eyes seemed to be looking at us. Her widely opened mouth still seemed to be gasping for air. We could see that she met her death not too long before Maria had knocked on our front door. On Hana's cheek we could still see the traces of her tears; we could also see the lice still moving back and forth like ants, in search of a warm spot. Next to her, wrapped in some cloth, lay her dead son. The one-room, house was empty and dirty. There was no furniture except for two benches, and no trace of food. The mud floor had been dug up all over, and there were holes in the walls. The chimneys of the cooking and heating stoves were totally ruined. We recognized immediately the work of the Bread Procurement Commission. There was no doubt that they had been there recently, searching for "hidden" foodstuffs.

Mykola and I stood there aghast. I felt the impulse to either run away screaming, or to sit down next to their dead bodies and hold their cold hands in mine in sorrow and sympathy, but I did neither. I just stood there petrified, and looking at the dead mother and her young son, I asked the question:

"Why? Why did they have to die?"

We left the bodies in the house hoping that soon the kolhosp burial brigade would pick them up on their daily search for bodies. This brigade was set up about two months before for the purpose of collecting and burying the corpses of the starved villagers.

Little Maria survived the famine. She stayed with us for a while until her relatives, who lived in one of the cities, took her into their family.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Handout A-8.3

TESTIMONY ON THE FAMINE

Polikarp Kybkalo

The spring of 1933 was the most horrible and tragic moment in the history of the Ukrainian people. In the fall of 1932 and the early winter of 1933 the Russian Communist government had taken away the entire grain crops and all food produce from the Ukrainian farmers in order to bring them into submission and obedient servitude in the collective farms.

In the collective farms of my native district, which numbered 672 people, 164 died that fatal spring of 1933. Actually this collective farm suffered little compared with all the surrounding places, for to induce the farmers to remain there they were given 200 grams of bread per person baked from all kinds of chaff and some liquid concoction cooked from refuse. But there were villages and hamlets where not a single person remained alive – for instance, in the large village of Chernyshyna, in the Nedrosheshanske county, which stretched for two and a half miles, though I do not recall its population, and the hamlet Rybky, of the Sukho-Mayachka village administration, where the population of 60 died.

Here is one of the many incidents of the famine. In my native village there was a stallion kept for breeding mares. He was well fed, receiving 13 pounds of oats daily, but for some unknown reason he suddenly died. This happened at the end of May, 1933. The district administration forbade the stallion to be buried until a special commission arrived and held an inquest.

The dead stallion lay in the open for three days and began to decay. A guard was appointed to shield it from the starving people who would have eaten the meat. On the fourth day the commission arrived and having completed the investigation ordered the stallion to be buried.

No sooner was that done and the commission gone than like an avalanche, the people descended on the dead, decaying stallion and in an instant nothing was left of him. Violent arguments ensued because some had grabbed more than their share.

A spectacle I shall never forget was when a 16-year-old boy, who, besides his stepmother was the only survivor in the family, swollen from starvation, crawled up to the place where the dead stallion had been and finding a hoof, snatched it in both hands and gnawed furiously. The boy was never seen again and unofficial rumors circulated that he had been eaten by his stepmother.

It was forbidden for people to leave their villages. GPU guards blocked all roads and railways. Any food that the farmers happened to be carrying was taken away from them. For picking a stray head of wheat or a frozen potato or beet left in the field a person was sentenced to ten years in prison or concentration camp, according to the ruling passed by the government August 7, 1932.

Thousands of corpses littered the streets, byways and buildings. Deaths occurred at such a rate that the government could not keep up with burying the corpses.

During all this time there was not the slightest sign of any famine in the neighboring Russian territory. The Soviet press never mentioned the famine in Ukraine but on the contrary even printed misleading propaganda about "flowering Ukraine" and her great achievements in industry and collectivization.

To cover up its bloody crime the Soviet government warned all doctors not to state the true cause of death on death certificates. Instead, they stated that a prevalent digestive ailment was the cause.

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Taken from: S. O. Pidhainy, Editor-in chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: Globe Press, DOBRUS, 1955), pp. 566-567.

Handout A-8.4

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
Nestor Korol

I lived in Moscow since 1929. Of course, there was no famine there. The inhabitants of Moscow, as well as the entire population of the RSFSR were provided with ration cards, and more important, could obtain all the necessities of life. As in previous years, I received daily 250 grams of rye bread and 250 grams of white bread. This was plenty for me. The only limitation in Moscow at that time was that there was a smaller choice of different kinds of bread. Moscow's population was aware of the famine in Ukraine and reacted in various ways. However, the opinion that "Finally now they would break the 'khakhols' (Russian disdainful name for Ukrainians) spine," was widespread. The hungry people from Ukraine began to appear in Moscow, buying or begging bread from those who did not use their entire ration. In Moscow I myself saw several death scenes of people who had arrived from Ukraine swollen from hunger. I witnessed such scenes in the Trubnyi marketplace and at the Bryanski railroad station. The people swollen from hunger ate ravenously the bread they received, and after a short while died in terrible pain. The physicians at the Sklifasovsky emergency hospital in Moscow, mostly communists, always registered "over-eating" as the cause of death in such cases.

Immediately after the crops were harvested before the famine began in Ukraine, orders were dispatched to all Ukrainian railroad stations not to sell tickets for points outside the Ukrainian SSR. Exception was made only for those who traveled on business matters for the governmental departments and institutions. However, this applied only to those institutions subordinate to the central (all-union) government in Moscow, and not to the local government (e.g., in Kharkiv). The Ukrainians tried to avoid these restrictions in the following ways: they went to the last station on Ukrainian territory, then moved on foot to the station on Russian territory situated as far as possible from the Ukrainian boundary and bought tickets to Moscow "to go for bread." After a short while at the Bryanski and Kharkiv railroad stations in Moscow (they led to Ukraine) they set up the so-called "border-commandos" of the GPU who took away the bread bought by the hungry peasants, and forced them back to Ukraine under GPU guard. To avoid these "border-commandos" the victims began to take a devious route through Byelorussia. However, these guards also appeared on the Byelorussian and Baltic railroad stations in Moscow.

Due to the nature of my work I had to go to Ukraine several times in the winter of 1933 and summer of 1932. There I saw with my own eyes the scenes of mass starvation and even cannibalism.

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The following spring when I visited these areas again, the Moscow government had transported entire colonies of Russians into these villages, where they occupied the vacant homes of the starved Ukrainian peasants.

From the biological view, it is interesting to note the succession of mortality from starvation: little boys died first, then men and after that old women died, after that the middle aged men, then the middle aged women and then little young girls. Mature girls died last of all.

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The following categories of people survived the famine in the greatest numbers:

(a) The more enlightened families, even when these had been previously "de-kurkulized," who had fled to the cities and industrial establishments.

(b) Those families, members of which were workers or civil servants, who were studying in the cities or were employed somewhere as skilled tradesmen. These broke through the blockade on transportation to the Ukrainian village by fair means or foul.

(c) Those families which were more adroit and active, including the amoral or criminal types, who associated with the village party members and usurped the rations of others, sometimes obtaining these by robbery and pilfering.

(d) Soviet party members, who frequently had the privilege of acquiring food from co-operative stores closed to the general public.

Taken from: S. O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: Globe Press, DOBRUS, 1955), pp. 693-695.

Handout A-8.5

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
Maria Zuk

The following account was provided by Maria Zuk, who left famine-torn Ukraine in September 1933 to join her husband in Canada.

The account appeared in the October 12, 1933, issue of *Svoboda*.

The conditions in Ukraine were bad enough in 1930, but in 1931 they became really critical. The present situation is as follows. There is literally no bread there; no potatoes (all the seed potatoes having been eaten up); no meat, no sugar; in a word, nothing of the basic necessities of life. Last year some food was obtainable occasionally for money, but this year most of the bazaars (markets) are closed and empty. All cats and dogs disappeared, having perished or been eaten by the hungry farmers. The same is the case with the horses, so that cows are mostly used as draught animals. People also consumed all the field mice and frogs they could obtain. The only food most of the people can afford is a simple soup prepared of water, salt, and various weeds. If somebody manages to get a cup of millet in some way, a tablespoon of it transforms the soup into a rare delicacy. This soup, eaten two or three times a day, is also the only food of the small children, as cow or any other milk has become a mere myth.

This soup has no nutritive value whatever, and people remaining on such a diet get first swollen limbs and faces, which makes them appear like some dreadful caricature of human beings, then gradually turn into living skeletons, and finally drop dead wherever they stand or go. The dead bodies are held at the morgue until they number 50 or more, and then are buried in mass graves. In the summer the burials take place more often in view of quick decomposition which cannot be checked even by liberal use of creoline (sic). Especially devastating is the mortality from hunger among children and elderly people. Nobody ventures to dress the dead family members in any clothes, as the next day they would be found at the morgue, naked, stripped of everything by unknown criminals.

There are many cases of suicide, mostly by hanging, among the village population, and also many mental alienations.

The famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1921 was undoubtedly a terrible one, but it appears like child's play in comparison with the present situation.

The village Kulmazovka was one of the more fortunate ones, but in the adjoining villages of Okshanka and Synukhin Brid the death toll defied all description. Those who were not deported to the dreaded Solovetsky Islands*, or to the Ural Mountains, died from starvation, and at present not more than one quarter of the original population is living there and they are leading a life of misery. No word of complaint or criticism, however, is tolerated by the authorities, and those guilty of an infraction of this enforced silence disappear quickly in a mysterious way.

Worst of all, there is no escape from this hell on earth, as no one can obtain permission to leave the boundaries of Ukraine, once the granary of Europe, and now a valley of tears and hunger.

Taken from: *The Great Famine* (Jersey City, New Jersey: Svoboda Press, 1983), p. 72.

* Islands in the White Sea, beyond the Arctic Circle, where the Soviet government incarcerates political prisoners.

Handout A-8.6

WHAT I SAW WITH MY OWN EYES

Olexa Woropay

In the spring of 1933 I was working as an agronomist in a sector of the Uladiv M.T.S. (Machine and Tractor Station) near Vinnytsia. My sector extended along the river Bug, six miles away from Khmil'nyk, a typical small provincial town in Podillia.

The villages I served were essentially Podillian, with rich apple orchards and vegetable gardens, reaching down to the river bank, and with green meadows spreading in a long belt along the quietly-flowing Bug.

I was living in the village of Klityshcha, which was about the largest and most prosperous village in my sector. In the farmyards there still remained some of the earlier farm buildings: barns, store-rooms, stables, pigsties. In the orchards kilns for drying cherries and apples might yet be seen. The houses, too, were not completely stripped of thatch and whitewash, as they were in some other villages. All these were signs of former prosperity. With some reason, then, the Russian Communists called Klityshcha a "kurkul village."

On every possible occasion the peasants recalled those more fortunate times when they themselves were masters on their own farms. They had not always been well-off, but at least they had not had to deal with the kolhosps, or with the "authorized agents" who swarmed like locusts into the villages.

Besides apple orchards and luxurious vegetable gardens this particular village preserved a tradition of horse-breeding.

"There was a time," the peasants would say, "when we used to go to the fair at Khmil'nyk; no-one troubled to ask whose horses we brought – he had only to glance at them and he knew instantly they were from Klityshcha!"

But all this was many years ago. Now, one could hardly see a resemblance to horses in the objects which stood in a long, semi-dark stable, under a roof of reeds. They looked more like shabby, distorted scarecrows, chewing dry chaff cut from last year's straw.

Horses fared badly in the kolhosp, but people fared even worse. I remember the first time I saw a human being with a body swollen from starvation, just out there in the kolhosp yard by the stable. He was an old, grey-haired man who came to work in the kolhosp with an axe. Under his eyes were two pocket-like swellings, and the skin on them had a peculiar glassy tint. His hands were swollen, too. On his fingers the swellings had burst, and the wounds exuded a transparent liquid with an extremely repulsive smell.

Later on in the same spring, and in that same village of Klityshcha, I had many miserable opportunities of seeing far more horrible scenes of human suffering, but this – the first case – made the greatest impression on me. Even now, twenty years later, after experiencing and witnessing so much distress, I cannot rid myself of the sight of that earlier tragedy.

I was then a young man of twenty, looking out on the world through rose-colored spectacles – as the saying goes – and I was then ignorant of the fact that behind the cleverly-woven camouflage of bolshevist propaganda those very scenes – the scenes of starving people – were the most real things of all.

This was in April, and, as yet, a man with his body swollen from hunger was an unusual sight.

May brought rainfall: it rained nearly every day, and all green things grew buoyantly. In uncultivated gardens, orchards, by the roadside, wherever there was an inch of soil, enormous weeds grew. Starving people rushed at the verdure and started to eat cooked orrach, sorrel, nettle – anything which could possibly seem edible to a starving human body.

But after consuming such wild plants – and often eating them raw – people suffered from dropsy and died from starvation in great numbers. In the second half of May, the death rate from starvation was so great that a kolhosp wagon was specially set aside for the purpose of carrying the dead each day to the cemetery.

These bodies were thrown down, several into one grave, and covered with earth without any customary or religious rites. The debasement of human dignity was carried to the limit.

And Stalin, in a speech of January 11, 1933, said: "...We have the power, we dispose of the resources of the state, we are called upon to manage the kolhosps, and it is we who should bear all responsibility for the work in the country...." (Report in *Pravda*, January 17, 1933.).

We and our descendants will hold the Bolsheviks to that responsibility in full.

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Taken from: Olexa Woropay. *The Ninth Circle* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1983), pp. 1-3. Reprinted by permission of the Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University.

Handout A-8.7

THE YOGI AND THE COMMISSAR
Arthur Koestler

I spent the winter of 1932-3 mainly in Kharkov, then capital of Ukraine. It was the catastrophic winter after the first wave of collectivisation of the land; the peasants had killed their cattle, burned or hidden their crops and were dying of starvation and typhoid; the number of deaths in the Ukraine alone is estimated at about two million. Travelling through the countryside was like running the gauntlet: the stations were lined with begging peasants with swollen hands and feet, the women holding up to the carriage windows horrible infants with enormous wobbling heads, stick like limbs, swollen, pointed bellies. You could swap a loaf of bread for Ukrainian embroidered kerchiefs, national costumes and bedcovers; foreigners could sleep with practically any girl, except party members, for a pair of shoes or stockings. Under my hotel room window in Kharkov funeral processions marched past all day. The electricity supply in Kharkov had broken down; there was no light in the town, and the trams functioned only for an hour or so a day to take workers to the factories and back. There was also no fuel or petrol in the town and the winter was hard even for the Ukraine, with temperatures of 30oC. below zero. Life seemed to have come to a standstill, the whole machinery on the verge of collapse.

These were the conditions which drove the old Bolshevik guard into opposition against Stalin, to their half-hearted conspiracy of despair; they were the real background of the purges and trials. Today the catastrophe of 1932-3 is more or less frankly admitted in Soviet circles; but at the time not the slightest allusion to real conditions was allowed to appear in the Soviet press, including the newspapers of Ukraine itself. Each morning when I read the Kharkov *Kommunist* I learned about plan-figures reached and over-reached, about competitions between factory shock brigades, awards of the Red Banner, new giant combines in the Urals, and so on; the photographs were either of young people, always laughing and always carrying a banner in their hands, or of some picturesque elder in Uzbekistan, always smiling and always learning the alphabet. Not one word about the local famine, epidemics, the dying out of whole villages; even the fact that there was no electricity in Kharkov was not once mentioned in the Kharkov newspaper. It gave one a feeling of dreamlike unreality; the paper seemed to talk about some quite different country which had no point of contact with the daily life we led; and the same applies to the radio.

The consequence of all this was that the vast majority of people in Moscow had no idea of what went on in Kharkov, and even less of what went on in Tashkent, or Archangel or Vladivostok – twelve days' train journey away, in a country where travelling was reserved for government officials; and these travellers were not of a talkative nature. The enormous land was covered by a blanket of silence and nobody outside the small circle of initiated could form a comprehensive picture of the situation.

A second belt of silence isolated the country from contacts with the outside world. Foreign missions and newspaper correspondents were concentrated in Moscow. The capital had priority in everything, from food and fuel to industrial goods, toothbrushes, lipsticks, contraceptives and other luxuries unknown in the rest of the country; its living standard was entirely unrepresentative. If the average citizen of Moscow was to a large extent ignorant of what was going on in remoter parts of his own country, the foreigner's ignorance was unbounded. He could only travel chaperoned by Security officials performing the various functions of interpreters, guides, car drivers, chance acquaintances and even amorous conquests. His contacts were restricted to Soviet officials; to the ordinary Soviet citizen social intercourse with foreigners meant running the risk of being accused of espionage or treason. In addition to the difficulty of obtaining factual information, the foreign correspondent was faced with the problem of passing it on. To smuggle out news vetoed by the censor meant expulsion; a risk which both journalists and their employers will take only reluctantly, and only when vital issues are at stake.

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Taken from: Arthur Koestler. *The Yogi and the Commissar* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1936), pp. 128-129. Copyright (c) 1936. Reprinted by permission of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.

Handout A-8.8

HARVEST IN HELL

Victor Kravchenko

What I saw that morning, making the rounds of houses with Chadai, was inexpressibly horrible. On a battlefield men die quickly, they fight back, they are sustained by fellowship and a sense of duty. Here I saw people dying in solitude by slow degrees, dying hideously, without the excuse of sacrifice for a cause. They had been trapped and left to starve, each in his home, by a political decision made in a far-off capital around conference and banquet tables. There was not even the consolation of inevitability to relieve the horror.

The most terrifying sights were the little children with skeleton limbs dangling from balloon-like abdomens. Starvation had wiped every trace of youth from their faces, turning them into tortured gargoyles; only in their eyes still lingered the reminder of childhood. Everywhere we found men and women lying prone, their faces and bellies bloated, their eyes utterly expressionless.

We knocked at a door and received no reply. We knocked again. Fearfully I pushed the door open and we entered through a narrow vestibule into the one-room hut. First my eyes went to an icon light above a broad bed, then to the body of a middle-aged woman stretched on the bed, her arms crossed on her breast over a clean embroidered Ukrainian blouse. At the foot of the bed stood an old woman and nearby were two children, a boy of about eleven and a girl of about ten. The children were weeping quietly and repeating in a plaintive peasant chant, "Mama, dear little mama." I looked around and my eyes rested on the swollen, inert body of a man lying on the shelf of the oven.

The nightmarishness of the scene was not in the corpse on the bed, but in the condition of the living witnesses. The old woman's legs were blown up to incredible size, the man and the children were clearly in the last stages of starvation. I retreated quickly, ashamed of my haste.

In the adjoining house we found a man of about forty sitting on a bench, repairing a shoe. His face was swollen. A tidy looking little boy, reduced to little more than a skeleton, was reading a book, and a gaunt woman was busy at the stove.

"What are you cooking, Natalka?" Chadai asked her.

"You know what I'm cooking," she answered, and in her voice there was a murderous fury.

Chadai pulled me by the sleeve and we went out.

"Why did she get so angry?" I asked.

"Because – well, I'm ashamed to tell you, Victor Andreyevich.... She's cooking horse manure and weeds."

My first impulse was to return to the house and stop her, but Chadai held me back. "Don't do it, I beg of you. You don't know how starving people feel. She might kill you in despair if you take away the contents of her pot."

After we had been in a dozen homes, I yielded to Chadai's urging that we stop the inspection. "It's the same everywhere. Now you know enough," he said.

My course seemed to me clear. The situation was too desperate for half-measures. Whatever the consequences to myself, I would ignore laws and orders. Unless I restored the strength of these peasants, everything would be lost. Returning to Chadai's home, I wrote a letter to Comrade Somanov, chief of our Political Department, and dispatched it by messenger. Toward evening the messenger returned with an answer:

"I am well aware of the conditions. I urge you to think the matter over again and to weigh all considerations. What you propose is a serious breach of our definite orders. If you see no other way out, however, you may do what you deem necessary. I shall try to find you some grain, but frankly I have very little hope of succeeding."

The answer satisfied me. At least he did not say "no." What I proposed was to reap some oats to feed the horses and to mow a little barley at the sides of the fields for the population. Such premature reaping was being denounced, in the **Izvestia** spread before me, as "theft of state property" and "kulak sabotage." Peasants were being arrested and deported for such "crimes."

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Taken from: Victor Kravchenko, excerpted from *I Chose Freedom*. Copyright 1946, renewed 1974 by Victor Kravchenko. Reprinted with the permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

Handout A-8.8 (cont.)

A mother and child wandering in search of food

Foodshop in Kharkov besieged by the population

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Handout A-8.8 (cont.)

Starving, homeless children—the *besprizornie*

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Handout A-8.8 (cont.)

Child Famine Victim

Handout A-8.8 (cont.)

Brothers in distress

Mass graves of famine victims, in such numbers that they resemble dunes

Reprinted from HUMAN LIFE IN RUSSIA with the permission of John T. Zubal, Inc., Publishers, Cleveland, OH.

Handout A-9.1

SOVIET ATTITUDES
Lev Kopelev

We were raised as the fanatical adepts of a new creed, the only true *religion* of scientific socialism. The party became our church militant, bequeathing to all mankind eternal salvation, eternal peace and the bliss of an earthly paradise. It victoriously surmounted all other churches, schisms and heresies. The works of Marx, Engels and Lenin were accepted as holy writ, and Stalin was the infallible high priest.

Factories, mines, blast furnaces, locomotives, tractors, workbenches, turbines were transformed into objects of a cult, the sacramental objects blessed from on high. "Technology solves everything!" Men genuflected to these objects in poetry, prose, painting, film, music....

Every day the papers printed the totals of tractors, automobiles and threshers produced. The dispassionate magnitude of statistics – the figures for plans, returns, sums obtained – held for us some spellbinding power. When the Stalingrad tractor factory began to produce 120 tractors a day, I experienced a real personal elation.

Ciphers, tables, totals were also posted on the struggle for grain. In 1926-7, 197 million poods of grain were collected in Ukraine. In 1927-8, considerably more – 261 million poods. In 1929 they collected 300 million poods. In 1930, it jumped to 464 million!

These figures signified the victory of collectivization.... Using this simple arithmetic, anyone could figure out that our countryside had become soviet. "The struggle for grain had been crowned with victory!"

For what, against whom and how exactly we should struggle at any given moment was determined by the party, its leaders. Stalin was the most perspicacious, the most wise. He said: "The struggle for grain is the struggle for socialism." And we believed him unconditionally.

GRAIN PROCUREMENTS
Lev Kopelev

Several times Volodya and I were present at plundering raids. We even took part: we were entrusted to draw up inventories of the confiscated goods.

"The comrade chiefs from Kharkov can check to make sure everything was as it should be. Give the weights. We'll reweigh all your wheat in pounds. We won't take a grain of wheat for ourselves."

The women howled hysterically, clinging to the bags.

"Oy, that's the last thing we have! That was for the children's kasha! Honest to God, the children will starve!"

They wailed, falling on their trunks:

"Oy, that's a keepsake from my dead mama! People, come to my aid, this is my trousseau, never e'en put on!"

I heard the children echoing them with screams, choking, coughing with screams. And, I saw the looks of the men: frightened, pleading, hateful, dully impassive, extinguished with despair or flaring up with half-mad, daring ferocity.

"Take it. Take it away. Take everything away. There's still a pot of borscht on the stove. It's plain, got no meat. But still it's got beets, taters 'n' cabbage. And it's salted! Better take it, comrade citizens! Here, hang on, I'll take off my shoes. They're patched and repatched, but maybe they'll have some use for the proletariat, for our dear Soviet power."

It was excruciating to see and hear all this. And even worse to take part in it. No, it was worse to be present without taking part than when you tried to persuade someone, to explain something.... And I persuaded myself, explained to myself. I mustn't give in to debilitating pity. We were realizing historical necessity. We were performing our revolutionary duty. We were obtaining grain for the socialist fatherland. For the five-year plan.

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SAVE THE PLAN
Vasilii Grossman

...So then I understood: the most important thing for the Soviet government was the plan! Fulfill the plan! Pay up your assessment, make your assigned deliveries! The state comes first, and people are a big zero.

Fathers and mothers wanted to save their children and tried to hide at least a tiny bit of grain, but they were told: "You hate the country of socialism. You are trying to make the plan fail, you parasites, you sub-kulaks, you rats."

Taken from: Lev Kopelev. *The Education of a True Believer* (Harper and Row, 1980), pp. 234, 249. The author is a recent Soviet emigre who participated in the grain procurements.

Taken from: Vasilii Grossman. *Forever Flowing* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 148. The author is a Soviet emigre.

Handout A-9.1 (cont.)

I CHOSE FREEDOM

Victor Kravchenko

Everything depended on the new harvest. Would the starving peasantry have the strength and the will to reap and to thresh in the midst of million fold death? To make sure that the crops would be harvested, to prevent the desperate collective farmers from eating the green shoots, to save the *kolkhozes* from breaking down under mismanagement, to fight against enemies of collectivization, special Political Departments were set up in the villages, manned by trusted Communists – military men, officials, professionals, N.K.V.D. men, students. An army of more than a hundred thousand stalwarts, selected by the Central Committee of the Party, was thus deployed through the collectivized areas, charged with the duty of safeguarding the new harvest. I was among those mobilized.

Three hundred of us from various city organizations gathered at the Regional Committee headquarters. The secretary of the committee and one of the foremost Communists of the Ukraine, Comrade Hatayevich, made the principal speech. He did not conceal the difficulties we would face in the villages. Again and again he referred to the "purge" of the Party scheduled for later in the year. The hint was too clear to be missed. Upon our success or failure in the famine regions would depend our political survival.

"Your loyalty to the Party and to Comrade Stalin will be tested and measured by your work in the villages," he declared ominously. "There is no room for weakness. This is no job for the squeamish. You'll need strong stomachs and an iron will. The Party will accept no excuses for failure."

Taken from: Victor Kravchenko. *I Chose Freedom* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 111. The author was a Soviet official who defected in 1944.

Handout A-10.1

STALIN AND THE FAMINE
Nikita Khrushchev

Collectivization was begun the year before I was transferred from the Ukraine, but it wasn't until after I started work in Moscow that I began to suspect its real effects on the rural population – and it wasn't until much later that I realized the scale of the starvation and repression which accompanied collectivization as it was carried out under Stalin.

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. . .One of my friends was Veklishev, the Chief of the Political Directorate (armed forces "security") of the Moscow Military District. He told me that strikes and sabotage were going on all over the place in the Ukraine, and that Red Army soldiers had to be mobilized to weed the sugar beet crop. I was horrified. I knew from my own experience with agriculture that sugar beets are very delicate; they have to be weeded at the right time and with the proper care. You couldn't expect Red Army soldiers, most of whom had never seen a sugar beet and didn't give a damn if they ever saw one again, to be able to do the job right. Naturally, the sugar beet crop was lost.

Subsequently the word got around that famine had broken out in the Ukraine. I couldn't believe it. I'd left the Ukraine in 1929, only three years before, when the Ukraine had pulled itself up to prewar living standards. Food had been plentiful and cheap. Yet now, we were told, people were starving. It was incredible.

It wasn't until many years later, when Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan told me the following story, that I found out how bad things had really been in the Ukraine in the early thirties. Mikoyan told me that Comrade Demchenko, who was then First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, once came to see him in Moscow. Here's what Demchenko said: "Anastas Ivanovich, does Comrade Stalin – for that matter, does anyone in the Politbureau – know what's happening in the Ukraine? Well, if not, I'll give you some idea. A train recently pulled into Kiev loaded with corpses of people who had starved to death. It had picked up corpses all the way from Poltava to Kiev. I think somebody had better inform Stalin about this situation."

You can see from this story that an abnormal state of affairs had already developed in the Party when someone like Demchenko, a member of the Ukrainian Politbureau, was afraid to go see Stalin himself. We had already moved into the period when one man had the collective leadership under his thumb and everyone else trembled before him. Demchenko decided to tell Mikoyan about what was happening in the Ukraine because he knew Mikoyan was close to Stalin and might be able to get something done. Active Party members in those days often referred to Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Mikoyan as the Caucasian clique. I've always held Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan in high esteem. We all have our faults and Anastas Ivanovich certainly has his, but he's an honest, intelligent, and capable comrade who has made a large contribution to the Party and the State.

The conditions that existed under collectivization have been described by Sholokhov in *Virgin Soil Upturned*. Sholokhov wrote his book while Stalin was still alive, so he had no choice but to describe collectivization according to the Stalinist interpretation. When the failure of the collectivization became widely known, we were all taught to blame scheming kulaks, rightists, Trotskyites, and Zinovievites for what was happening. There was always the handy explanation of counterrevolutionary sabotage.

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Perhaps we'll never know how many people perished directly as a result of collectivization, or indirectly as a result of Stalin's eagerness to blame its failure on others. But two things are certain: first, Stalin's brand of collectivization brought us nothing but misery and brutality; and second, Stalin played the decisive role in the leadership of our country at the time.... Therefore, if we were looking for someone to hold responsible, we could lay the blame squarely on Stalin's own shoulders.

Taken from: Nikita Khrushchev, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott. *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970), pp. 71-75. Used by permission.

Khrushchev was the former premier of the USSR. Most specialists on Soviet affairs consider his memoirs, smuggled to the West after his fall from power, to be authentic.

Handout A-10.2

STALIN AND THE FAMINE

Roy Medvedev

Stalin . . . brushed aside reports of famine, which appeared in many areas in 1932-33, as a result of crop failures and forced grain collections. Tens of thousands of peasants died of starvation, and hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, left their homes and fled to the cities. In 1932 R. Terekhov, a secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee, reported to Stalin on the terrible situation developing in the villages of Kharkiv region as a result of the crop failures. He asked Stalin to send some grain to the region. Stalin's reaction was strange. Sharply cutting off the speaker, Stalin said:

> We have been told that you, Comrade Terekhov, are a good speaker; it seems that you are a good storyteller, you've made up such a fable about famine, thinking to frighten us, but it won't work. Wouldn't it be better for you to leave the post of *obkom* secretary and the Ukrainian Central Committee and join the Writers' Union? Then you can write your fables and fools will read them.

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Taken from: Roy Medvedev. *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York, 1971), p. 94.

The author is a Soviet historian currently living in the USSR. He has recently fallen out of favor with the Soviet authorities.

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Speech by
Joseph Stalin (January 11, 1933)

What was the main defect in our work in the countryside during the past year, 1932?

The main defect was that our grain procurements in 1932 were accompanied by greater difficulties than in the previous year, in 1931.

This was by no means due to the bad state of the harvest; for in 1932 our harvest was not worse, but better than in the preceding year.

Do not allow your attention to be overshadowed by worries about all sorts of funds and reserves; do not be diverted from the main task; develop the grain-procurement campaign from the very first days of the harvest, and speed it up; for the first commandment is – fulfil the plan for grain procurements.

In speaking of the difficulties of grain procurement, Communists usually throw the responsibility upon the peasants, claiming that the peasants are to blame for everything. But that is absolutely untrue, and certainly unjust. The peasants are not to be blamed at all. If we are to speak of responsibility and blame, then the responsibility falls wholly upon the Communists, and we Communists alone are to blame for all this.

There is not, nor has there ever been, in the world such a powerful and authoritative government as our Soviet Government. There is not, nor has there ever been in the world such a powerful and authoritative party as our Communist Party. No one prevents us, nor can anyone prevent us, from managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that is required by the interests of the collective farms, the interests of the state. And if we do not always succeed in managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that Leninism requires; if, not infrequently, we commit gross, unpardonable mistakes with regard to grain procurements, say – then we, and we alone, are to blame.

Taken from: Joseph Stalin. *Collected Works* (Moscow, N.D.), Vol. 13, pp. 221, 239.

STALIN AND THE FAMINE

"The famine can be blamed quite flatly on Stalin. The crop of 1932 was about 12 percent below average. This was far from being starvation level. But procurements of food from the peasantry were up by 44 percent. The result was, and could not have been other than, large-scale starvation. It is perhaps the only case in history of a purely man-made famine."

Robert Conquest. *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (London, 1968), p. 22. The author is a specialist on the Stalin era.

Handout A-11.1

FORBIDDING FAMINE RELIEF[1]

D. Dalrymple

In light of what we have seen so far, it comes as no surprise that the Soviet government did not appear to be particularly interested in providing relief to famine victims. Rather than relax its economic and social policies, the government proceeded as if there was no famine at all. It did not lighten its procurements policies, it did not allow outside famine relief, and it provided only the slightest pittance of food aid.

...During the 1932-1934 famine period, as we have noted, the government refused to acknowledge the presence of famine, let alone allow or request aid. Even so, many aid organizations (in the West) were established.

None of these groups, as far as can be determined, were ever allowed by the government to carry out any sizeable aid programmes....

SOVIET DENIAL OF FAMINE[2]

Most Reverend MSTYSLAV S. Skrypnyk
Archbishop of Philadelphia and Metropolitan
of The Ukrainian Orthodox Church
of the U.S.A. and Diaspora

At the time of the Famine, I served as a member of the Polish Parliament. We in the Parliament were well aware of the horrendous famine that was destroying lives in the Soviet-occupied Eastern Ukraine, and endeavored to help the victims. Through my efforts, a special commission was formed in the Parliament for the purpose of organizing relief assistance for the starving people of Ukraine's affected regions. An enormous quantity of food (grain) was collected, loaded onto freight cars and brought to the Soviet border. However, the Soviet authorities – cynically denying the existence of a famine refused to accept this aid. And so the food, which could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, rotted in the freight cars on the Soviet border, while only miles away innocent human beings were dying of starvation.

THE TIME OF STALIN

Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko

In 1932, the areas hit by famine did not receive a single kilogram of grain from the government. Stalin did not have on his conscience a single child saved from death by starvation. Not one.

It wasn't enough, however, to organize a famine. The gains had to be consolidated. Stalin began to *export* grain. In 1929, 13 million centners; in 1930, 48.3 million; in 1931, 51 million. And in the year when famine was everywhere, grain exports were still 28 million. Not a huge amount. But the very fact...!

The big-time Kremlin merchant began selling grain to Western Europe – taken from the mouths of starving peasants. Call him what you want after that – Left deviationist or Left extremist – a cannibal is a cannibal.

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[1] Taken from: D. Dalrymple. *The Famine of 1932-1934*, p. 267.

[2] Taken from a letter to Governor Mario Cuomo from MSTYSLAV S. Skrypnyk, June 16, 1985. Used by permission of MSTYSLAV S. Skrypnyk.

Taken from: Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko. *The Time of Stalin* (New York, 1980), p. 65.

Handout A-12.1

AMERICA'S "RED DECADE" AND THE GREAT FAMINE COVER-UP

Dr. Myron B. Kuropas

(Dr. Kuropas has served as special assistant for ethnic affairs to President Gerald R. Ford and as a legislative assistant to Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kansas). At present he is Vice President of the Ukrainian National Association.)

In 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. Before his death in 1945, some 16 million civilians, including 6 million Jews and 9 to 10 million Gypsies, Poles, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other "untermenschen," were slaughtered to fulfill a diabolical dream.[1]

When World War II ended and the full extent of Hitler's horrors was finally revealed, the civilized world demanded justice. Thousands of Nazis and Nazi collaborators were hunted down, tried and executed for crimes against humanity. The criminals were punished, but the Nazi nightmare lingered on in hundreds of books, magazine articles, films and TV docu-dramas. Even today, in 1983, Nazi collaborators are being brought to trial to demonstrate that no matter how long it takes, no matter what the price, genocide shall not go unpunished. It is in remembering that we assure ourselves that the Holocaust shall never again become a policy of national government.

For Ukrainians, however, the Nazi Holocaust is only half of the genocide story. The other half is the Great Famine, a crime orchestrated by Joseph Stalin in the same year Hitler came to power. No one has ever been hunted down for that crime. No one has ever been tried. No one has ever been executed. On the contrary, many of those who willingly and diligently participated in the wanton destruction of some 7 million innocent human beings are alive and well and living in the Soviet Union.

Since the system which initiated the abomination is still very much intact, there is little likelihood that they will ever have to face an international tribunal for their barbarism. Nor is there any reason to believe that Communists have eschewed genocide as one of their strategies. Cambodia and Afghanistan have proven that.

While there is little the free world can do to punish Bolshevik criminals, the past can teach us to be wary of those contemporary religious and intellectual leaders who urge us to "trust" them.[2] One of the forgotten aspects of the Great Famine story is the role played by respected American clergy, diplomats, journalists and writers who, by defending Stalin in 1933, indirectly prolonged his reign of terror. Some were innocent dupes. Others were unconscionable conspirators. Almost all went on to pursue distinguished careers in their chosen professions without so much as a backward glance at the incredible human misery they helped conceal from world view. It is in remembering their actions that we can best assure ourselves that in America at least, genocide shall never again go unnoticed.

The Red Decade

During the 1930s, the United States found itself in the throes of the worst depression in its history. Banks failed. Businesses collapsed. Factories closed. Homes and farms were repossessed. Large city unemployment reached 40 percent. Bread lines and soup kitchens multiplied. The American dream, so real and vibrant during the 1920s, was shattered.

While America suffered, the radical Left reveled. Exploiting the economic turmoil and uncertainty which plagued the nation, communists and their fellow travelers pointed to the "success" of the great Soviet experiment. Suddenly, thousands of despairing clerics, college professors, movie stars, poets, writers and other well-known molders of public opinion began to look to Moscow for inspiration and guidance. As millions of jobless war veterans demonstrated in the street and workers "seized" factories in sit-down strikes, the 1930s became what Eugene Lyons has called America's "Red Decade,"[3] a time when romanticized bolshevism represented the future, bankrupt capitalism the past.[4]

In the forefront of the campaign to popularize "the Soviet way" were American intellectuals, correspondents and even government officials who grossly exaggerated Bolshevik achievements, ignored or rationalized myriad failures,

[1] See Bohdan Wytwycky, *The Other Holocaust* (Washington: The Novak Report, 1980).

Taken from: Myron B. Kuropas. "America's 'Red Decade' and the Great Famine Cover-Up," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, No. 12, March 20, 1983, (p. 4).

Used by Permission. This article also from: *The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust*, compiled and edited by the Editors of the Ukrainian Weekly. Jersey City, NJ: Ukrainian National Association, 1983, 88pp.

[2] See Sydney Lens, "We Must Trust the Russians," *Chicago Sun-Times* (January 10, 1983). Also see Myron B. Kuropas, "Trust the Russians? C'mon!," *Chicago Sun- Times* (January 26, 1983).

[3] Lens, "Radicalism in America" (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969), p. 297.

[4] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval," (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 183-185.

Handout A-12.1 (cont.)

and, when necessary, conspired to cover up Bolshevik crimes. Especially impressed were those who traveled to the USSR during the 1930s, almost all of whom, it seems, found something to admire.

Some found a Judeo-Christian spirit. Sherwood Eddy, an American churchman and YMCA leader, wrote: "The Communist philosophy seeks a new order, a classless society of unbroken brotherhood, what the Hebrew prophets would have called a reign of righteousness on earth." A similar theme was struck by the American Quaker Henry Hodgkin. "As we look at Russia's great experiment in brotherhood," he wrote, "it may seem to us that some dim perception of Jesus' way, all unbeknown, is inspiring it...." [5]

Others discovered a sense of purpose and cohesive values. Corliss and Margaret Lamont concluded that the Soviet people were happy because they were making "constructive sacrifices with a splendid purpose held consciously and continuously in mind" despite some "stresses and strains" in the system.[6]

Still others found humane prisons. "Soviet justice," wrote Anna Louise Strong, "aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in a normal way as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better; the less he feels himself in prison the better... the labor camps have won high reputation throughout the Soviet Union as places where tens of thousands of men have been reclaimed." [7]

The Soviet Union had something for everyone. Liberals found social equality, wise and caring leaders, reconstructed institutions and intellectual stimulation.[8] Rebels found support for their causes: birth control, sexual equality, progressive education, futuristic dancing, Esperanto. "Even hard-boiled capitalists," wrote Lyons, an American correspondent in Moscow, "found the spectacle to their taste: no strikes, no lip, hard work....

Contributing to the liberal chorus of solicitous praise for Stalin's new society were American diplomats such as U.S. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies who argued that Stalin was a stubborn democrat who insisted on a constitution which protected basic human rights "even though it hazarded his power and party control." [9]

Like most liberals, Davies never accepted the notion that Stalin's purge trials were staged. "To assume that," he wrote, "...would be to presuppose the creative genius of Shakespeare and the genius of Belasco in stage production." [10] Nor did he believe Stalin – whom he described as "clean-living, modest, retiring" – was personally involved in the elimination of his former colleagues.[11] Even though he had personally met and dined with many of the purge victims, Davies later concluded that their execution was justified because it eliminated Russia's "Fifth Column" which, in keeping with "Hitler's designs upon the Ukraine," had conspired to "dismember the union...." [12]

In the United States, meanwhile, the liberal press was equally enamored of Stalin. Writing in *Soviet Russia Today*, a monthly journal, Upton Sinclair, Max Lerner and Robert M. Lovett wrote glowing accounts of Moscow's important role in defending democratic principles.[13] In the words of Prof. Frederick L. Schuman, a charter member of the Soviet defense team:

"The great cleavage between contemporary societies is not between 'capitalism' (democratic or fascist) and 'communism' but between those (whether in Manchester, Moscow, Marseilles or Minneapolis) who believe in the mind and in the government of, by and for the people, and those (whether in Munich, Milan or Mukden) who believe in might and in government of, by and for a self-appointed oligarchy of property and privilege." [14]

For the *Nation*, Russia was the world's first true democracy and anyone who didn't believe it was "either malicious or ignorant." [15] For *The New Republic*, communism was "a false bogey."[16] When a group of 140 American intellectuals associated with the Committee for Cultural Freedom included the USSR in its list of countries which deny civil liberties and cultural independence, some 400 liberal Americans – including university presidents, professors and such prominent names as Langston Hughes, Clifford Odets, Richard Wright, Max Weber, Granville Hicks, Louis Untermeyer and James Thurber – signed and agreed to have published an "Open Letter" branding as "Fascists" all those who dared suggest "the fantastic falsehood that the USSR and the totalitarian states are basically alike." Joining the condemnation with pointed

[5] Cited in Paul Hollander, "Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, 1928-1978" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 124.
[6] Cited in Ibid., p. 127.
[7] Cited in Ibid, pp. 144-145.
[8] Cited in Ibid., p. 106.
[9] Ibid., p. 106.
[10] Cited in Ibid., p. 164.
[11] Joseph E. Davies, "Mission to Moscow" (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941), pp. 191-192.
[12] Ibid., p. 262.
[13] Frank A. Warren III, "Liberals and Communism: The 'Red Decade' Revisited" (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 105.
[14] Cited in Ibid., p. 109.
[15] Cited in Ibid., p. 105.
[16] Cited in Ibid., p. 149.

Handout A-12.1 (cont.)

editorial comments were *The Nation* and *The New Republic*.[17]

How the press corps concealed a famine

In January 1928, Eugene Lyons, the newly hired correspondent for United Press, arrived to take up his duties in Moscow. Although he had never actually joined the Communist Party in America, Lyons came with impeccable Leftist credentials. The son of an imprisoned Jewish laborer on New York's Lower East Side, he joined the Young People's Socialist League in his youth. Beginning his professional career as a writer for various radical publications, Lyons eventually became the editor of *Soviet Russia Pictorial*, the first popular American magazine about the "wonders" of Soviet life, and a New York correspondent for Tass, the Soviet news bureau.[18]

As an enthusiastic member of Stalin's defense team, Lyons consistently penned dispatches which glorified the Soviet Union. "Every present-tense difficulty that I was obliged to report," he wrote, "I proceeded to dwarf by posing it against a great future-tense vision." [21]

The longer Lyons remained in the USSR, however, the more disillusioned he became with Soviet reality. Eventually, his reports began to expose the sham of Bolshevik propaganda, and Moscow demanded his recall.

[17] Eugene Lyons, "The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America" (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941), pp. 342-351.

[18] Lyons, "Assignment in Utopia" (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1937), pp. 3-49.

[21] Ibid., p. 197.

Returning to the United States in 1934,[22] he wrote about his experiences in "Assignment in Utopia," a book published by Harcourt Brace in 1937. In a chapter titled "The Press Corps Conceals a Famine," Lyons described how he and other American correspondents conspired with Soviet authorities to deny the existence of the world's only human-engineered famine. The most diligent collaborators in the sordid affair were Walter Duranty, head of *The New York Times* Moscow bureau, and Louis Fischer, Moscow correspondent for the *Nation*.

The first reliable report of the catastrophe to reach the outside world was presented by Gareth Jones, an English journalist who visited Ukraine in 1933 and then left the Soviet Union to write about what he had witnessed. When his story broke, the American press corps – whose members had seen pictures of the horror taken by German consular officers in Ukraine – was besieged by their home offices for more information. Angered as much by Jones' scoop as by his unflattering portrayal of Soviet life, a group of American correspondents met with Comrade Konstantine Umansky, the Soviet press censor, to determine how best to handle the story. A statement was drafted after which vodka and "zakuski" were ordered and everyone sat down to celebrate with a smiling Umansky.

The agreed-upon format was followed faithfully by Duranty. "There is no actual starvation," reported *The New York Times* on March 30, 1933, "but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition." When the famine reports persisted over the next few months, Duranty finally admitted "food shortages" but insisted that any report of famine "is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda." [23]

Duranty, of course, was aware of the situation in Ukraine and confessed as much to *The New York Times* book critic John Chamberlain, himself a Communist sympathizer. Believing, as he later wrote, that "the Russian Revolution, while admittedly imperfect, needed time to work itself out," Chamberlain was distressed by Duranty's casual admission that "3 million people had died... in what amounted to a man-made famine." What struck him most of all "was the double inequity of Duranty's performance. He was not only heartless about the famine," Chamberlain concluded, "he had betrayed his calling as a journalist by failing to report it." [24]

Fortunately, not all members of the American press corps in Moscow were involved with the cover-up. A notable exception was William Henry Chamberlin, staff correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, who traveled to Ukraine in the winter of 1933 and reported that "more than 4 million peasants are found to have perished...." [25] In a book titled "Russia's Iron Age," published that same year, Chamberlin estimated that some 10 percent of the population had been annihilated by Stalin during the collectivization campaign.[26] In describing his journey to Ukraine, Chamberlin later wrote:

"No one, I am sure, could have made such a trip with an honest desire to learn the truth and escaped the conclusion that the Ukrainian countryside had experienced a gigantic tragedy.

[22] Ibid., p. 607.

[23] Ibid., pp. 572-580.

[24] John Chamberlain, "A Life With the Printed Word" (Chicago: Regnery, 1982), pp. 54-55.

[25] *Christian Science Monitor* (May 29, 1934).

[26] William Henry Chamberlin, "Russia's Iron Age" (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1934), pp. 66-67.

Handout A-12.1 (cont.)

What had happened was not hardship, or privation, or distress, or food shortage, to mention the deceptively euphemistic words that were allowed to pass the Soviet censorship, but stark, outright famine, with its victims counted in millions. No one will probably ever know the exact toll of death, because the Soviet government preserved the strictest secrecy about the whole question, officially denied that there was any famine, and rebuffed all attempts to organize relief abroad."[27]

First to provide extensive coverage of the Great Famine in the American press was the Hearst newspaper chain which, unfortunately, placed the event in 1934 rather than 1932-33.[28]

By that time, however, Stalin's American defense team was already busily denying the Chamberlin and Hearst reports. The most outstanding example was Louis Fischer who in the March 13, 1935, issue of the *Nation* reported that he had visited Ukraine in 1934 and had witnessed no famine. Even though he was aware of it, Fischer made no mention that the famine had occurred a year earlier. Problems with collectivization could not be denied, however. In his book "Soviet Journey," Fischer described the process in the following simple terms:

"History can be cruel.... The peasants wanted to destroy collectivization. The government wanted to retain collectivization. The peasants used the best means at their disposal. The government used the best means at their disposal. The government won."[29]

[27] Chamberlin, "The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation" (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), p. 60.

[28] See Chicago American (March 1, March 4, and March 6, 1935).

[29] Cited in Lyons, "The Red Decade," p. 118.

With help from certain members of the American press corps, the Bolsheviks succeeded in their efforts to shield the truth about Ukraine's Great Famine from the world's eyes. Concealing the barbarism until it was ended, they generated doubt, confusion and disbelief. "Years after the event," wrote Lyons in 1937, "when no Russian Communist in his sense any longer concealed the magnitude of the famine – the question whether there had been a famine at all was still being disputed in the outside world!"[30]

The "need" for a famine

The famine story, however, would not die. Even *Time* magazine eventually admitted the possibility of 3 million Ukrainians dead.[31] None of this bothered Stalin's American defense team. In a 1933 publication titled "The Great Offensive," Maurice Hindus wrote that if the growing "food shortage" brought "distress and privation" to certain parts of the Soviet Union, the fault was "not of Russia" but of the people. Recalling a conversation he had with an American businessman, Hindus proudly wrote:

"'And supposing there is a famine....' continued my interlocutor. 'What will happen?'

"'People will die of course,' I answered.

"'And supposing 3 or 4 million people die.'

"'The revolution will go on.'" [32]

If a famine was needed to preserve the revolution, so be it. "Maybe it cost a million lives," wrote Pulitzer Prize novelist Upton Sinclair, "maybe it cost 5 million – but you cannot think intelligently about it unless you ask yourself how many millions it might have cost if the changes had not been made.... Some people will say that this looks like condoning wholesale murder. That is not true; it is merely trying to evaluate a revolution. There has never been a great social change in history without killing...." [33]

[30] Lyons, "Assignment in Utopia," pp. 577-578.

[31] *Time* (January 23, 1939).

[32] Cited in Hollander, p. 120

The world has been inundated with a plethora of authoritative information regarding Hitler's villainy and vigilant in its efforts to prevent a repetition of his terror. This is good, but it is not enough. Hitler was not this century's only international barbarian, and it is time we recognized this fact lest we, in our single-minded endeavors to protect ourselves from another Hitler, find ourselves with another Stalin.

• • •

[33] Cited in Ibid., p. 162.

Handout A-12.2

HERRIOT'S "FILM STUDIO"

Nestor Korol

In the spring of 1933, Herriot, the French Premier, came to visit the USSR, traveling from Odessa to Moscow via Kiev and Kharkiv. On the way he wished to drop in on a few Ukrainian villages and collective farms to ascertain whether there actually was a famine, because, although the press of the entire world was extremely vocal about it at the time, the Soviet press did not even mention its existence.

A collective farm near Kiev, "October Revolution" by name, located in the village about 7 kilometres from Brovary, was especially embellished for Herriot's visit. For the purpose of discussing ways and means of converting the collective farm into a "Potemkin Village" * a special meeting of the Party District Committee, attended by members of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, was held in Kiev. An elderly Communist inspector in the State Commissariat of Land Workers, an agronomist by profession, was appointed as temporary head of the collective farm for those few days; other agronomists were appointed as brigadiers. The collective farm underwent a thorough clean-up campaign, for which task all Communists, Komsomols and activists were mustered.

The Country Theatre at Brovary was stripped of all its furniture, (chairs, etc.), which was moved to the "club" on the collective farm. Plush side-curtains for the windows and tablecloths for the tables were donated by Kiev. One cattle shed was hurriedly converted into a dining-room, with table-cloths and flowers gracing the tables. The telephone exchange, along with its operator, was moved in from the country town of Brovary. Several swine and bull-calves were butchered to supply the dining-room. Even beer was brought in.

All corpses and starvelings were removed from the roads and environs of the collective farm, and all the peasants were ordered to stay indoors. But before this was done, a general meeting of the collective farm workers was held, and they were informed that a film studio from Odessa was coming to visit the collective farm for a few days in order to take some photographs. For this, all work was going to be replanned, and only those chosen by a special committee were to participate. The rest were to stay in their houses, and not appear on the collective farm.

Those selected by the committee (Party members, activists, Komsomols, etc.) were especially costumed in clothing brought in from Kiev, such as shoes, suits, hats, socks, and handkerchiefs. Dresses and other items of feminine apparel were supplied to the women. Barbers arrived from Kiev to clip the shaggy collective farm workers. The whole masquerade was led by Sharapov, authorized by the District Committee, and Denisenko, his assistant. The people were informed that these two were the producer and his assistant from a film studio and truly, they were "producers," but only for the purpose of welcoming Herriot. These "producers" decided that the most effective way to welcome Herriot would be in the dining-room, with all the collective farm workers seated behind tables groaning under a variety of foods. The following day, upon which Herriot was scheduled to arrive, this was done. The collective farm workers gorged themselves on the substantial dinner and the tremendous chunks of meat, washing all this down with beer and carbonated beverages. Some of them immediately fell ill as a result of over-eating. The collective farm workers bolted the unaccustomed food with lightning speed, and the "producer" excitedly rushed about and pleaded with them to eat slowly, so that the "guest" would still find them at table when he arrived.

At that moment a telephone message arrived from the Kiev branch of the District Committee, informing him "Itinerary altered. Proceed with liquidation."

Accordingly, another meeting of the collective farm workers took place. The authorized "producer," Sharapov, thanked the participators for everything, including their excellent behavior, then Denisenko took the floor and directed them to return all the clothing and footwear, with the exception of the socks and handkerchiefs. The collective farm workers begged to be allowed to keep the clothing, promising to pay for it in money or labor, but their pleas fell on deaf ears. Everything had to be surrendered and returned to those shops in Kiev from whence it had come.

The next day all the goods that were brought for the occasion to the collective farm were taken back. It was only later that the workers learned that these had been supplied in anticipation of Herriot's visit. Herriot was not fated to observe the substantial, well-to-do life of the collective farm workers near Kiev; however, he did see a similarly embellished sample on a similar collective farm near Kharkiw. On the way to Kiev and in Kiev itself, where he attended the Opera, visited the museums, rode about in the streets, and so forth, he did not see anywhere a single hunger-distended peasant or corpse, be-

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Taken from: S. O. Pidhainy, Editor-in-chief. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, Volume 2, The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (Detroit: Globe Press, DOBRUS, 1955), pp. 696-698.

* Showcase village.

Handout A-12.2 (cont.)

cause the GPU took good care to cover-up and conceal anything not acceptable to foreign eyes. And the trusting French Premier later announced in France that nowhere in the entire USSR nor in Ukraine did he observe a single indication of famine.

THE HERRIOT CASE

Paris, September 17 – Edouard Herriot, the former Premier of France, who had just returned from a trip to Russia, told a political gathering today in Le Blanc, near his home town of Lyon:

> "When it is stated that Ukraine is devastated by famine, permit me to shrug my shoulders. On the contrary, in Russia I have seen the people who have just made a vast effort, who have industrialized themselves...."

New York Times, September 18, 1933

• • •

Paris, October 1 – Again denying reports of a famine in the Ukraine, Edouard Herriot, former Premier of France, writes in an article that... says in part:

> "There is no country at the present time about which so many stupid things have been written as Russia. Thus, now there is a campaign everywhere on the subject of the supposed famine in the Ukraine. I saw no such thing. Certainly, there were, here and there, difficulties about feeding the populace and about insufficient production, but I did not discover famine anywhere."

New York Times, October 2, 1933.

Handout A-12.3

THE ISSUE OF RESPONSIBILITY: THE PEASANTS WERE TO BLAME

Louis Fischer

The peasants brought the calamity upon themselves. Yet one can understand what prompted this suicidal action. The Bolsheviks had launched the ambitious Five Year Plan. It had to be financial. It was to cost something like forty-two billion rubles. That colossal sum had to come from within the country, for foreign nations refused loans and gave limited credits at usurious rates. The workers and the peasants had to pay. The worker paid in the form of reduced consumption goods. The peasant paid in the form of huge taxes. In many cases, the government took thirty, even fifty, indeed even sixty percent of his crop. Without such high-handed measures, the city could not have been industrialized quickly and foreign obligations could not have been met. But the result was that the peasants said: What is the use of plowing, planting and harvesting when the authorities seize a large part of my crop? The peasants accordingly sabotaged – and had nothing to eat.

It was a terrible lesson at a terrific cost. History can be cruel. The Bolsheviks were carrying out a major policy on which the strength and character of their regime depended. The peasants were reacting as normal human beings would. Let no one minimize the sadness of the phenomenon. But from the larger point of view the effect was the final entrenchment of collectivization. The peasantry will never again undertake passive resistance. And the Bolsheviks – one hopes – have learned that they must not compel the peasantry to attempt such resistance.

In the final analysis, the 1932 famine was a concomitant of the last battle between private capitalism and socialism in Russia. The peasants wanted to destroy collectivization. The government wanted to retain collectivization. The peasants used the best means at their disposal. The government used the best means at its disposal. The government won.

Taken from: Louis Fischer. *Soviet Journey* (New York, 1935), p. 172. The author, a journalist, sympathized with the Soviets in the 1930s.

THE PEASANTS WERE TO BLAME

Sidney and Beatrice Webb

So far as the Ukraine is concerned, it is clearly not Heaven which is principally to blame for the failure of crops, but the misguided members of many of the collective farms. What sort of "famine" is it that is due neither to the drought nor the rain, heat nor cold, rust nor fly, weeds nor locusts; but to a refusal of the agriculturists to sow ("whole tracts were left unsown"); and to gather up the wheat when it was cut ("even 50 percent was left in the fields")?

• • •

What the Soviet Government was faced with, from 1929 onward, was, in fact, not a famine but a widespread general strike of the peasantry, in resistance to the policy of collectivization, fomented and encouraged by the disloyal elements of the population, not without incitement from the exiles at Paris and Prague. Beginning with the calamitous slaughter of livestock in many areas in 1929-1930, the recalcitrant peasants defeated, during the years 1931 and 1932, all the efforts of the Soviet Government to get the land adequately cultivated. It was in this way, much more than by the partial failure of the crops due to drought or cold, that was produced in an uncounted host of villages in many parts of the USSR a state of things in the winter of 1931-1932, and again in that of 1932-1933, in which many of the peasants found themselves with inadequate supplies of food. But this did not always lead to starvation.

Taken from: Sidney and Beatrice Webb. *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization* (New York, 1936), Vol, I. pp. 262, 264. The authors were well-known supporters of Soviet policies.

Handout A-13.1

CHRONICLES OF WASTED TIME

Malcolm Muggeridge

My journey to Rostov* remains in my mind as a nightmare memory. The worn railway compartment, with glasses of tea endlessly served; other passengers coming and going, mostly party officials (who else could afford to travel first-class?), very companionable and amiable and ready to listen to my rudimentary Russian, but shutting up at once if I brought up the subject of what was going on outside. Then, their faces stony and expressionless again. Men in leather coats with briefcases, sucking at cigarettes, clearly used to giving orders and to being treated with deference in the Forestry Department, or the Audit Department, or I daresay in the GPU Department, but that also was unmentionable. The restaurant car, likewise cosy, with meals pleasantly served and plenty of vodka. There, too, the outside pleasantly remote, except for one intrusion: a bearded moujik in a padded coat, very drunk and wild looking, suddenly appeared, shouting out something some – sort of protest, I suppose, but I couldn't understand what. He was quickly disposed of; frog-marched out, still protesting.

It was tempting not to get down at any stations along the way as I had planned, but just to continue in the train. By comparison with its warmth and snugness, the stations looked very uninviting. I had no contacts, no transport, nowhere to go; the moment one arranged these amenities, one was back in Oumansky's charge. However, I did break my journey several times, and can never forget what I saw. It was not just a famine. No one, alas, news- gathering about the world in our time, can fail to have seen quite a lot of famine. In India, in Berlin, in Africa – people picking over garbage, scrabbling about in rubble, maybe in their desperation cannibalising one another; swollen or skeletal, with huge stomachs suspended between bony arms and ribs, and heads that, while still alive, are already skulls. This particular famine was planned and deliberate; not due to any natural catastrophe like failure of rain, or cyclone, or flooding. An administrative famine brought about by the forced collectivisation of agriculture; an assault on the countryside by party **apparatchiks** – the very men I'd been chatting so amiably with in the train – supported by strong-arm squads from the military and the police.

As I wrote in *The Guardian*, in the course of three articles of mine that appeared on 25, 27 and 28 March, 1933: 'To say that there is famine in some of the most fertile parts of Russia is to say much less than the truth; there is not only famine, but a state of war, a military occupation.' The articles were held up to follow a series by Voigt on the Terror in the Polish Ukraine, and were run side by side with another series by him on the Nazi Terror, by way, I imagine, of neutralising some of their effect. In them I tried to describe it all – the abandoned villages, the absence of livestock, neglected fields; everywhere famished, frightened people and intimations of coercion, soldiers about the place, and hard-faced men in long overcoats. One particularly remarkable scene I stumbled on by chance at a railway station in the grey early morning: peasants with their hands tied behind them being loaded into cattle trucks at gun-point (this, incidentally, was the nearest I came to being in trouble myself; I was angrily told to make off, which I hurriedly did, fortunately without having to disclose myself as a foreign journalist); all so silent and mysterious and horrible in the half-light, like some macabre ballet.

• • •

As it happened, no other foreign journalist had been into the famine areas in the USSR except under official auspices and supervision, so my account was by way of being exclusive. This brought me no kudos, and many accusations of being a liar, in *The Guardian* correspondence columns and elsewhere. I had to wait for Khruschev who surely knew the truth if anyone did, having been himself one of the chief terrorists in the Ukraine – for official confirmation. Indeed, according to him, my account was considerably under-stated. If the matter is a subject of controversy hereafter, a powerful voice on the other side will be Duranty's, highlighted in the *New York Times*, insisting on those granaries overflowing with grain, those apple-cheeked dairymaids and plump contented cows, not to mention Shaw and all the other distinguished visitors who testified that there was not, and could not be, a food shortage in the USSR. I doubt if even Khruschev's testimony, let alone mine, will weigh against such honourable and distinguished witnesses.

• • •

Taken from: Malcolm Muggeridge. *Chronicles of Wasted Time* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1973), pp. 256-258. Used by permission of William Morrow and Company, (c) 1973.

*Rostov on the Don River is a major city of the North Caucasus, a largely cossack region also ravaged by famine in 1932-1933.

Handout A-13.2

WINTER IN MOSCOW
Malcolm Muggeridge

One evening in late November (1932), when an icy wind that had been blowing for days dropped suddenly, and there was a pause, warm and still, in expectation of the winter's first snowfall, a party of six soldiers with an officer entered a farmhouse some little distance from a market town. The house was silent and dark. There seemed to be neither people nor cattle. The officer had a torch, which he used to find his way about, and which darted here and there like a little restless moon. Once he shouted angrily, but there was no reply. Once he struck his head against a beam, and swore. A room in the farmhouse was warm. It smelt of human life. The light of the torch, feeling into the darkness, illuminated two eyes, a face, pressed against the wall.

"Let's have some light," the officer, Comrade Babel, said. A peasant woman lit a lamp.

The room was scantily furnished. There were wooden chairs and a table; on the wall an ikon garlanded with coloured paper chains, and two wedding groups. An old man was sleeping on the stove, and three children sitting against it. The woman who had lit the lamp had a curious face; young-looking, although her hair was grey and her skin wrinkled; oval and plump in outline, yet actually haggard; angry and defiant, but its immediate expression frightened. She seemed to be two people in one.

Taken from: Malcolm Muggeridge. *Winter in Moscow* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1934), pp. 40-43. Reprinted by permission of Harold Ober Associates Incorporated. Copyright (c) 1934 by Thomas Malcolm Muggeridge.

Comrade Babel sat down at a table, and the soldiers stood about carelessly with their rifles. He was half Italian, but had lived in Russia for many years; eyes and eyebrows sharply tilted; projecting cheekbones and smooth black hair making his face look like a white triangle crossed by a thin line, his mouth. It was a cruel, coldly fanatical face. The woman and he looked at one another. They were class enemies.

He took some papers out of his pocket; and she stood waiting for him to speak.

"I see," he said, "that your taxes are in arrears and that you've only delivered a third of your grain quota."

"You took away my husband."

"A kulak."

"Where is he?" she asked, suddenly passionate. "Where have you taken him? Is he still alive?"

Comrade Babel shrugged. There was a pause. He lit a cigarette; then, looking up quickly, asked, "How much grain have you got hidden?"

She had expected the question and answered stolidly, "You took everything before."

"The usual answer," he said.

"Can't you see," she went on, pointing to her children, "that we're starving? We haven't any of us tasted bread for weeks."

"Yesterday," he said coldly, "five hundred poods* of grain were found that had been hidden in the ground by a woman whose children were swollen."

She began to sob; and the children, taking their cue from her, sobbed too. Only the old man on the stove, her father, slept on untroubled.

Comrade Babel ordered the soldiers to search the house thoroughly. Their heavy boots clattered up and down wooden stairs. They pulled up floor boards, and opened cupboards, and searched amongst the rafters and down in the cellar, but found no food anywhere.

"These people bury grain," Comrade Babel said. "They've always done it." Then, turning to the woman, "We'll come tomorrow in the daylight."

While he was speaking, one of the soldiers – a Mongol, face leaden and smooth like a ball except where two little slit eyes and two little nostrils and a little mouth punctured it – went over to the old man on the stove and playfully stirred him. Noticing that the top of the stove stretched farther than he had thought, he reached over, and, feeling about, gave a shout. Behind where the old man was lying was a sack of flour.

When the soldiers returned to their quarters in the market town, one of them was carrying the sack of flour, and another marching the old man along at the end of a rifle. No one who saw them was surprised. It was a common enough sight at that time.

The woman sat down to think. What was to happen to her? She and the children were starving and alone. She remembered the little procession lined up in military formation on a railway station platform in the very early morning before it was properly light, and with a thin rain falling; her husband and perhaps nineteen others, all carrying bundles, guarded by soldiers; the last she saw of him. She remembered fifteen years before a crowd round a burning house; herself in the crowd, and full of joy because the flames leaping up into the sky meant that she was to have land that she could keep for ever. She remembered her husband pushing home a barrow loaded with things he had stolen; a silver vase; a heavy plush curtain; a uniform coat; odds and ends he had picked up when they

* A pood equals 36.1 pounds.

Handout A-13.2 (cont.)

looted the house before setting fire to it. She remembered civil war; one army after another sweeping over the country; all rapacious; all needing food. She had given food and starved without losing hope. It was a matter of indifference to her which army won and which lost, as long as she could feel round her, like a body round a soul, earth that she owned. She remembered meetings by Lenin's statue, that stood outside the church in the village square, and resolutions and pledges and acclamations. These, too, had not touched her.

Now it was different. Suffering and privation had become meaningless. She felt that her life had been torn up by the roots and made insignificant. She hated the Dictatorship of the Proletariat because she recognised in it a force determined to destroy her. A ruthless, irresistible force. Something against which she was helpless. Between her and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat there was the class war.

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Handout A-13.3

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS TO BLAME

William H. Chamberlin

Of the historic responsibility of the Soviet government for the Famine of 1932-1933 there can be no reasonable doubt. In contrast to its policy in 1921-1922, it stifled any appeal for foreign aid by denying the very fact of the Famine and by refusing to foreign journalists the right to travel in the Famine regions until it was all over. Famine was quite deliberately employed as an instrument of national policy, as the last means of breaking the resistance of the peasantry to the new system where they are divorced from personal ownership of the land and obliged to work on the conditions which the state may dictate to them and deliver up whatever the state may demand from them.

"The collective farmers this year have passed through a good school. For some this school was quite ruthless." In this cryptic understatement President Kalinin summed up the situation in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, from the Soviet standpoint. The unnumbered new graves in the richest Soviet agricultural regions mark the passing of those who did not survive the ordeal, who were victims of this "ruthless school." *

* The Soviet government could easily have averted the Famine from its own resources if it had desired to do so. A complete cessation of the export of foodstuffs in 1932 or the diversion of a small amount of foreign currency to the purchase of grain and provisions would have achieved this end. The Soviet attitude was pretty adequately summed up by Mr. Mezhuev, President of the Poltava Soviet, who said to me: "To have imported grain would have been injurious to our prestige. To have let the peasants keep their grain would have encouraged them to go on producing little."

William H. Chamberlin. *Russia's Iron Age* (London, 1935), p. 89. The author, a journalist, was originally pro-Soviet. He was one of the few westerners who personally toured Ukraine during the Famine.

Handout A-13.4

ASSIGNMENT IN UTOPIA
Eugene Lyons

It was at the railroad station at R., while on a trip into the country, in the summer of 1932, that I witnessed a scene which was to prove more significant than I guessed at the moment – a tiny symptom of the shattering tragedy engulfing southern Russian (Ukraine). An old peasant, with a shaggy head and matted beard, wearing a burlap coat, patched trousers and reed shoes, was weeping aloud, unashamedly, and pleading with the stationmaster through his sobs. The peasant was holding a large heavy sack.

"You can go on the next train. Tomorrow morning, yes," the stationmaster said, not unkindly, "but not your bundle. Law is law – no bread can be transported without a license."

"But citizen stationmaster, dear one," the old man repeated, "How can I return to the village with empty hands? Without the money and without bread? Tell me, dear one, how shall I face the village? They await my return and their bellies are empty. Now I have spent all their money – no bread, no money...."

The stationmaster shrugged his shoulders. He had been listening to this refrain for hours, since his men ordered the shaggy peasant and his sack off the train. The peasant now turned to me and several other spectators.

"Some of us in the village," he mentioned a province in Ukraine, "got together. We threw our money in one pot, and they chose me to go north, where money could buy bread. I paid a fortune for what I have in the sack. And now they won't let me take it to the village. And why? Others in the nearby villages did the same, and they had bread to eat for weeks. They feasted. Why were they allowed but not I? Is that Soviet justice? Citizen stationmaster, whom will it harm if I take this bag on a train? I shall keep it on my lap and creep into a corner on the topmost shelf."

"It will do you no good, citizen," the stationmaster said. "You'll be chucked off at some other station. Law is law."

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Taken from: Eugene Lyons. *Assignment in Utopia* (1937).

Handout A-13.5

Thomas Walker, an American newspaperman who reported extensively on the Famine, provided the following account, which appeared in the February 18, 1935, issue of the New York *Evening Journal.*

I have recently toured Ukraine ... where 6 million peasants have perished from starvation in the past 18 months, due to the excessive tolls made on their crops by the Bolshevik government.

Last winter, Red Army soldiers, under orders from Moscow, took so much of the season's crops from the peasants that they were unable to feed themselves and their livestock through the winter.

About 20 miles south of Kiev, I came upon a village that was practically extinct by starvation. There had been 15 houses in this village and a population of 40-odd persons.

Every dog and cat in the village had been eaten. The horses and the oxen had all been appropriated by the Bolsheviks to stock the collective farms....

In one hut they were cooking a mess that defied analysis. There were bones, pigweed, skin and what looked like a boot top in this pot. The way that the remaining half dozen inhabitants eagerly watched this slimy mess showed the state of their hunger.

With bated breath I was watching the Soviet investigators at work. Suddenly something else caught my eye. A peasant woman, dressed in something like patched old sacks, appeared from a side path. She was dragging a child 3 or 4 years old by the collar of a torn coat, the way one drags a heavy bagload. The woman pulled the child into the main street. Here she dropped it in the mud.... The peasant woman was the mother. The child's little face was bloated and blue. There was foam around the little lips. The hands and tiny body were swollen. Here was a bundle of human parts, all deathly sick, yet still held together by the breath of life.

The mother left the child on the road in the hope that somebody might do something to save it.

My escort endeavored to hearten me. Thousands and thousands of such children, he told me, had met a similar fate in Ukraine that year.

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The following details were provided by Harry Lang, who was born in tsarist Russia and came to the United States in 1904. He witnessed the Famine as a correspondent for the *Daily Forward*, a Jewish Socialist newspaper based in New York. The accounts appeared in the April 16, 1935, issue of the New York *Evening Journal*

We arrived in Kharkov, then the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The first street scenes I saw spoke their own language. Men and women were returning at sunset from the great tractor plant and other factories. Their clothes were old, dirty strips of sacking.... Many women were carrying infants in their arms.

And all, men and women alike, thousands of them, had lumps of black bread under their tattered sleeves. On the way, they nibbled at the bread and swallowed every crumb. The hand of hunger was sticking out from the mutilated chunks of bread.

A high official of the Ukrainian Soviet, with whom we established contact, confidentially advised me to take a trip to the villages. Only there, he said, would I see the full handiwork of the Famine. And he added:

"Six million people have perished from hunger in our country in 1932-33." Then he paused, and repeated: "Six million."

Handout A-13.6

RUSSIANS HUNGRY, BUT NOT STARVING

Walter Duranty

Moscow, March 30 – ...There appeared from a British source a big scare story in the American press about famine in the Soviet Union with "thousands already dead and millions menaced by death and starvation...."

It is all too true that the novelty and mismanagement of collective farming, plus the quite efficient conspiracy of F.M. Konar, made a mess of Soviet food production. (Konar was executed for sabotage.)

But – to put it brutally – you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs, and the Bolshevik leaders are just as indifferent to the casualties that may be involved in their drive toward socialization as any General in the World War who ordered a costly attack in order to show his superiors that he and his division possessed the proper soldierly spirit. In fact, the Bolsheviks are more indifferent because they are animated by fanatical conviction.

I have made extensive inquiries about this alleged famine situation. I have inquired in Soviet commissariats and in foreign embassies with their network of consuls, and I have tabulated information from Britons working as specialists and from my personal connections, Russian and foreign.

And here are the facts.

There is a serious food shortage throughout the country, with occasional cases of well-managed state or collective farms. The big cities and the army are adequately supplied with food. There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.

Taken from: Walter Duranty. "Russians Hungry, But Not Starving," *New York Times*, March 31, 1933. Permission applied for.

BIG UKRAINE CROP TAXES HARVESTERS

Walter Duranty

Kharkov, September 17 – This visitor has just completed a 200-mile trip through the heart of Ukraine and can say positively that the harvest is splendid and all talk of famine now is ridiculous.

Everywhere one goes and with everyone with whom one talks – from Communists and officials to local peasants – it is the same story: "Now we will be all right, now we are assured for the winter, now we have more grain than can easily be harvested."

This "now" is significant. It contrasts with "then" – last winter – which, they will tell you, "was hard." Hard it was and the correspondent saw empty houses that bear witness – people ran away to find work and food elsewhere.

The populace from babies to old folks, looks healthy and well nourished....

Taken from: Walter Duranty. "Big Ukraine Crop Taxes Harvesters," *New York Times*, September 18, 1933.

Handout A-13.7

Statement by Malcolm Muggeridge in personal interview with B. Nahaylo March 1, 1983, Robertsbridge, England. Muggeridge, a well-known author, worked with Duranty in Moscow in 1932-33. Initially pro-Communist, Muggeridge became disillusioned with Communism during his stay in the USSR.

"Duranty was the villain of the whole thing. He was the correspondent of the *New York Times* and in many ways the most important.... It is difficult for me to see how it could have been otherwise that in some sense he was not in the regime's power. He wrote things about the famine and the situation in Ukraine which were laughably wrong. There is no doubt whatever that the authorities could manipulate him and that he wanted to stay in the Soviet Union. He had a Russian mistress. Quite a lot of the correspondents did. That was one of the ways foreign correspondents delivered themselves to the authorities. I think that girls were steered in their direction so that they should be in that situation. Duranty was actually at the mercy of the Soviet authorities and ultimately wrote what they wanted written. The *New York Times* seemed pleased with it. He received three Pulitzer Prizes, so he had no reason to complain."

"And he also received the Order of Lenin."

• • •

Interview with Malcolm Muggeridge by Marco Carynnyk in *The Great Famine in Ukraine* (Jersey City, 1983), p. 51.

Interviewer: You published "Winter in Moscow" when you got back from the Soviet Union, and you were attacked in the press for your views.

Malcolm Muggeridge: Very strongly. And I couldn't get a job.

Interviewer: Why was that? Because people found your reports hard to believe?

Malcolm Muggeridge: No, the press was not overtly pro-Soviet, but it was, as it is now, essentially sympathetic with that side and distrustful of any serious attack on it.

Interviewer: How do you explain this sympathy?

Malcolm Muggeridge: It's something I've written and thought about a great deal, and I think that the liberal mind is attracted by this sort of regime. My wife's aunt was Beatrice Webb, and she and Sidney Webb wrote the classic pro-Soviet book, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*. And so one saw close at hand the degree to which they all knew about the regime, knew about the CHEKA (secret police) and everything, but they liked it.

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"The first to be given permission to travel in the forbidden zones (of the USSR) were the technically "friendly" reporters, whose dispatches might be counted upon to take the sting out of anything subsequent travelers might report. Duranty, for instance, was given a two weeks' advantage over most of us.

"On the day he returned... Duranty joined us. He gave us his fresh impressions in brutally frank terms, and they added up to a picture of ghastly horror. His estimate of the dead from the famine was the most startling I had yet heard from anyone.

Taken from: Eugene Lyons. *Assignment to Utopia* (New York, 1935).

"But, Walter, you don't mean that literally?" Mrs. McCormick exclaimed.

"Hell I don't.... I'm being conservative," he replied, and, as if by way of consolation, he added his famous truism: "But they're only Russians...."

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"In *Assignment to Utopia* I tell how Duranty, returning from a tour of inspection after the 1932-33 famine, told Anne McCormick, myself, and others that the famine had killed many millions. His estimate, I say, has been the largest I have yet heard. In the book I did not mention the figure he used, but it was 7 million! Having passed on that figure to us in private conversation, he went home and wrote his famous dispatches pooh-poohing the famine."

Taken from: Eugene Lyons in a memorandum to Malcolm Muggeridge, December 1937, cited in M. Carynnyk, "The Famine the *Times* Couldn't Find," *Commentary*, November 1983, p. 38.

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"According to Mr. Duranty, the population of the North Caucasus and lower Volga have decreased in the past year by 3 million and the population of the Ukraine by 4-5 million...."

"Mr. Duranty thinks it quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from the lack of food in the Soviet Union in the past year."

Taken from: Report of the British consul in Moscow, William Strang, to Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, about a conversation he had with Walter Duranty on September 26, 1933 (from a document in Public Records Office).

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Handout A-13.8

SOVIET STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE FORCED FAMINE

"The socialist reconstruction of the village was a complex process. Along with indubitable achievements... serious mistakes and distortions in applying the Party's policy of collective farm collectivization had already come to light.... Peasants were, not infrequently,, forced to enter collective farms under the threat of being "dispossessed as kulaks," deprived of electoral rights and so on...."

"Mistakes in collectivization greatly damaged the collective farm movement and the building of socialism in general; a rupture in the alliance between the working class and the mass of the peasantry threatened."

Taken from: *History of the USSR* (Moscow, 1977), Vol. 2, p. 211.

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"In 1931-32 there was a temporary decline in agricultural production. It associated with the tremendous difficulties associated with collectivization. The Soviet state was forced to implement collectivization at the same time it was carrying out socialist industrialization. Because it invested most of its funds into large-scale industry and defense, it did not have adequate funds for socialist agriculture. Lack of agricultural machinery, great losses of livestock, and primitive agricultural methods prevented the attainment of the rich harvests which had been planned. In addition, the poor labor discipline in many collective farms led to the loss and illegal sale of bread.... This forced the State to raise projected procurements (of bread) which had a negative impact on the economic condition of the collective farms."

Taken from: *History of the Ukrainian SSR* (Kiev, 1977), Vol. 6, p. 235.

Editor's note: This indirect mention of the Famine is the only remark about the Famine in the entire eight volume history.

"Recent stories in the Western news media try to create an *impression* that there was an artificially created famine in the Ukraine in 1932-33 because Ukrainian farmers, allegedly, resisted collective farming.

Indeed, the situation in Ukraine as well as in other parts of the USSR in 1932 was quite *difficult*. Yet it was not as critical as it is portrayed in the West. And, of course, it was not because somebody wanted to make it bad, but because of a number of reasons, drought being the major one."

• • •

"The masters of the new anti-Soviet campaign (regarding the Famine) ...tend to concentrate on the emotional side of the story, overplaying human suffering.... Of course, many families were badly affected, some did suffer, especially those whose husbands and sons were murdered by Kulak bandits. Some villages felt a terrible strain after their grain reserves were burned, or cattle poisoned (by the Kulaks). Nevertheless, the whole picture in the Ukraine was not of a near collapse with a smell of a nation-wide tragedy as it is portrayed by the most zealous anti-Soviet writers in the media of Canada. On the contrary, the atmosphere of vigorous work and unparalleled enthusiasm prevailed...."

Taken from: News Release, Press Office of the USSR Embassy in Canada, April 28, 1983.

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"The representative of the United States had repeated fabrications about an alleged famine which was supposed to have occurred in the Ukrainian SSR fifty years previously. In that connection, he wished to point that the slander had been perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalist bourgeois.... They later moved to the United States and, in order to justify their presence in that country, had circulated the lie about the famine. In any case, there was famine in the United States."

Taken from: Statement by Ivan Khmil, representative of Soviet Ukraine at the United Nations, on October 19, 1983.

Handout A-14.1

TERRIBLE STATISTICS

"...I was employed as a statistician in the administration of Vinnytsia region. I visited a lot of the villages. Some of the information I obtained I carry with me even now.

"The village of Shrubky, for instance. There five people were shot for failing to deliver grain, and this number includes three men and two women. Also there, thirty-nine people were deported to Siberia.

"The village of Matkivtsi, where there were 312 households, and a population of 1293. Three men and two women were shot for cutting off ears of corn in their garden-plots; 24 families were deported to Siberia. In the spring of 1933 a part of the population fled from the village, while part died out and the village then became completely deserted. A black flag was hung up in that village as a sign that the village was sealed. In the registers an entry was made. It read: "This village died out from typhus."

"The village of Khodakivtsi in the Proskuriv county had 263 households and a population of 1228. Two men and one woman were shot. The village, however, lost 613 people most of them having died in the famine.

"In the village of Hrynivtsi there were 283 households, with 2029 inhabitants. A woman, named Hanka – I have forgotten her surname – was shot for cutting off some ears of grain in her own garden. Forty families were deported to Siberia. The village lost 792 of its people most of them dying in the famine.

"The village of Veremiyivka in the Krasyliv county of Vinnytsia province had 128 households and 1210 inhabitants. Thirteen families were deported to Siberia. How many people the village lost as a result of the famine I do not know.

"In Slobidka Krasylivska 68 people were deported, many died, but I do not know the exact numbers.

"I saw with my own eyes an N.K.V.D. man kill a woman and strike down an eight-year-old child – for plucking some green peas in a field...."

From the letter of Yakym R-uk.

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"...The village of Dukhanivka in the Borivsky county of Chernihiv region numbered over 800 households and a population of 3240. How many died in the famine of 1933 I do not know, but I have with me a list of families who died out completely." (There follows a list of names with the numbers of people against each name.) "25 families were sent beyond the Urals from that village. One third of the total number of houses were left vacant...."

From the letter of S. Ya-ky.

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About the village of Rudkivtsi in the Nova-Ushytsia county, F. H-ko says the following:

"...In our village, from a total of 1460 inhabitants, 338 people died in the spring of 1933, the majority of them men. In 1932 twelve families were deported to Siberia.

"During the twenty years of the Soviet regime, about one third of the village population passed through prison. Neither I nor my father remember anyone from our village serving a prison sentence before the revolution...."

FAMINE AND NATIONALISM IN SOVIET UKRAINE: POSTSCRIPT

James E. Mace

. . . By the time the 1936 Soviet Constitution was adopted, the Soviet Union had become a state in which the administrative competence of its constituent republics had been sharply reduced and that of the Union greatly enlarged.[66] The ideology of Soviet patriotism dominated by Russian culture and centralism was in no small part a legacy of the Ukrainian famine. While the suppression of national self-assertion and the introduction of centralization were principal features of overall Soviet policy in the 1930's, the Ukrainians, as the largest and most self-assertive non-Russian nation, seemed to be singled out for special treatment. Only they had to suffer the loss of several million villagers to starvation in an artificially contrived famine. Placed in this context, the famine of 1933 makes sense as one of a series of policies designed to neutralize Ukrainians as a political factor, indeed, as a social organism in the Soviet Union. These policies entailed the destruction of the spiritual and cultural elites of Ukraine and the

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Taken from: Olexa Woropay. *The Ninth Circle* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1983), pp. 24-25. Reprinted by permission of the Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University. Duplication for classroom use only. Other use requires the written consent of the USF, Harvard.

[66] The process of increasing Union competence at the expense of Republic authority is traced by V. Sadovs'ky, National Policy of the Soviets in Ukraine. Works of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute, vol. 39 (Warsaw, 1937), pp. 102-16.

Taken from: James E. Mace. "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine" in *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1984, pp. 49-50.

Handout A-14.1 (cont.)

subordination of the Ukrainian structures to central ones; the destruction of the officially sanctioned Ukrainian Communist political leadership as a distinct force in Soviet politics (almost all of these who turned on Skrypnyk* perished as well in the 1937-38 purges); the abandonment of Ukrainization and the gradual abolition of structures designed to prevent the assimilation of Ukrainians entering Russified urban and industrial environments; and a body blow against the main constituency of Ukrainian nationalism – the peasantry. In sum, one cannot understand the famine without understanding the turnabout in Soviet nationalities policy – from seeking to foster to seeking to absorb national cultures. By the same token, one cannot understand how this policy was imposed without reference to the famine. The famine must therefore be understood within the context of an attempt to impose a final solution on the "Ukrainian problem" as it had hitherto existed.

Nevertheless, the Soviet state never solved its "Ukrainian problem," which still haunts Soviet leaders. Stalin himself helped to undermine his policy by annexing Ukrainian territories from Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia during World War II. Western Ukraine never went through such devastation as the famine and related repressions of the 1930's, and it was invitable that the traditional cross-fertilization of ideas between Western and Eastern Ukraine would flourish when the two parts became united. In the 1960's a dissident movement arose that included Ukrainians from all Ukrainian territories and combined demands for national and human rights, while even the Soviet Ukrainian government under Petro Shelest edged a little further away from Moscow for a brief moment. Shelest was removed and the dissidents were arrested. Yet, after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, a Helsinki Monitoring Group, similar to and connected with counterparts in other parts of the Soviet Union, was formed in Kiev. Attempts to abolish the Ukrainian national churches have succeeded only in changing the official affiliation – not the spiritual essence – of Ukrainian Christianity.[69]

Only a few years ago there were Western scholars who argued that the USSR would assimilate the Ukrainians in a relatively brief period of time. No one makes such predictions today. It is difficult to see how the problem of the Soviet Union's non-Russian nations, having defied the most brutal attempts at solution, can ever be solved to the government's satisfaction.

* Mykola Skrypnyk, Ukrainian Party leader in the late 1920's and early 1930's, promoted the policy of Ukrainization.

[69] The USSR banned the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1930 and the Uniate Catholic Church in 1946. One measure of the continued strength of the Ukrainian Catholics is the fact that the region of their traditional dominance, Western Ukraine, now contains one-fourth of all officially sanctioned Orthodox parishes in the USSR, which are kept open only to prevent a greater portion of the population from attending underground Uniate churches.

UNIT II. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN UKRAINE

Statement of Purpose:

In most parts of the world, the concept of human rights is relatively new. By contrast, in the United States, these ideals are an integral part of our society and guaranteed by our Constitution. We often take for granted those freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights and the other amendments to the Constitution. We forget that very few nations of the world possess a similar document and that the principles of human rights are frequently violated in those countries.

Students should understand that in many nations human rights remain an idealistic dream. In totalitarian countries like the Soviet Union, a written constitution refers to human rights but in actuality, these rights are denied. Students should realize that in totalitarian nations, constitutions serve only as propaganda to further the aims of the state. When people in these countries demonstrate for their rights, they are often arrested and jailed as enemies of the state.

Objectives:

- Students will identify those rights guaranteed under the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- Students will make historical connections between the Forced Famine in Ukraine, and present-day human rights violations in Ukraine;
- Students will discuss how totalitarian governments violate basic human rights;
- Students will examine the relationships between human rights and national rights as exemplified by events in the Soviet Union;
- Students will describe the distinctions between the reality and the ideal of the Soviet system of government;
- Students will read from the biographies of prominent Ukrainian prisoners of conscience;
- Students will compare and contrast the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Introduction:

The American mass media routinely uses the term *Russia* as a synonym for the Soviet Union. Such usage implies that all citizens of the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) are Russian. The truth is, however, that nearly half the people of the Soviet Union belong to other nationalities, which have distinct languages, histories, religions, and customs. The Soviet Union is in fact composed of 15 national republics, and the Russian Federal Soviet Socialist Republic is only one of these. In theory, all republics are of identical legal status, and each is free to maintain its distinct school system and to cultivate its own language and culture. Each republic also has the constitutional right to secede from the Soviet Union. However, any use of this right to bring about the secession of a Union republic or to advocate such a change in a republic's autonomy is subject to severe sanctions.

Limited knowledge about the non-Russian people of the Soviet Union blinds many Americans to the human rights and national rights issues in the Soviet Union. Because of this lack of understanding of non-Russian affairs in the U.S.S.R., our mass media often minimizes the importance of human rights processes in the non- Russian republics and relegates them to the status of "provincial movements." This oversight allows the Soviet regime much more latitude for repression of human rights issues in the non-Russian republics.

In summary, many people living in the Soviet Union consider U.S.S.R. an unwilling union of 15 distinct national republics held together by force and terror. The government of the Soviet Union, which is dominated by Russians and their collaborators from other nationalities, suppresses the national cultures, falsifies the histories, and carries on other ethnocidal practices. The aim of the Soviet government is the merger of all nationalities into one "soviet nation" which in practice means the total elimination of the republics' ethnic distinctiveness.

The largest non-Russian republic within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is Ukraine with its 232,000 square miles in area and with a population of 50 million, 75% of whom are Ukrainians. Ukraine was annexed militarily by Soviet Russia in 1922 after its short-lived independence.

The short period of cultural concession in Soviet Ukraine ended in 1929, when the Communists began a systematic assault against Ukrainian patriots, the Ukrainian Autocephalous (self-governing) Orthodox Church, and the leaders of Ukrainian cultural life. Repressions culminated in an artificial famine in 1933, when 7 million Ukrainians were starved to death, representing 20% of the total population of Ukraine.

The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union brought massive destruction and loss of human life. Ukrainians resisted both systems by organizing the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. This guerilla resistance force continued into the 1950s.

Following Stalin's death, Ukrainian human and national rights were defended by scores of dissidents – intellectual and cultural activists – who opposed the policy of forced Russification. Today almost half of all political prisoners in the U.S.S.R. are Ukrainians.

Learning Activities and Student Materials:

- Begin this unit by asking students to study Handout B – 1.1 which presents an overview of Ukrainian losses during World War II. After students read this material, ask them to answer the following questions:
  - What were the causes of Ukrainian population losses during World War II in addition to the military losses?
  - How many Ukrainians died during World War II?
  - What was the attitude of the Nazis toward Ukrainians and other Eastern Europeans? Cite specific examples of Nazi policies.
  - Compare Ukrainian military losses with civilian losses. Which figure is higher? Give some possible reasons for this difference.
  - Which nation lost the greatest percentage of its population during World War II? Which nation was second?

Next, have the students read Handout B-1.2 which includes provisions from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Have students outline the main freedoms described in each article and compare these freedoms with the freedoms guaranteed by our Bill of Rights and the other amendments to the United States Constitution.

Handouts B-1.3 and B-1.4 link the Soviet definition of genocide to the Forced Famine perpetrated by Soviet authorities in 1932-1933. These handouts describe the motivations for the Famine and serve as introductions to the human rights violations that continue in Ukraine today.

After students read Handout B-1.3 ask them to prepare written responses to the following questions:

- According to Hryshko, what percent of Ukraine's population perished during the Forced Famine?
- What were Ukraine's population losses during World War II?
- Why does the author think that Ukraine's population loss during the Famine was more severe than the loss during World War II?
- Explain the current Soviet policy of "merging" the non-Russian peoples.
- What were the "old Leninist nationalities policies"? How did these policies change during the Stalin era?
- What is meant by Russification?
- Describe some of the methods used by the Soviet government to Russify Ukraine.
- Identify Postyshev.
- According to the author, Moscow's past anti-Ukrainian tactics remain the same today. Why does he think this policy continues?
- According to Khrushchev, what were Stalin's plans for Ukraine?
- According to the author, what are the positive aspects of the Famine?
- Why does Hryshko think that the Russification policy will fail?

- Ethnocide

  "Ukraine is the largest un-nation in the world. According to Khrushchev, Stalin reluctantly dropped the idea of abolishing Ukraine altogether by deporting all the Ukrainians. He came to the conclusion that there were too many of them. But Stalin's successors have not abandoned efforts to find other ways of denationalizing their biggest 'national minority.'" *

Handout B-2 describes the Soviet attempts to alter the demographic composition of Ukraine. These Soviet efforts often referred to as Ethnocide, represent a continuation of the Russification process described in Unit I, Forced Famine in Ukraine. After students read Handout B-2, ask them to respond to the following questions:

- According to the article, what can be concluded about the growth of Ukrainian population as compared to the growth of Russian populations?
- What are some of the reasons for the slow growth of Ukrainian populations?
- Where do most immigrants to Ukraine come from? Where do they settle and why?
- What methods does the Soviet government use to Russify Ukrainians?
- The percentage of Ukrainians with university education is much higher in the RFSSR

* David Floyd, *London Daily Telegraph*, September 4, 1973.

(Russia) than in Ukraine. How does the article explain this difference? What significance does this difference have for the Ukrainians?

- –According to the article, what are some of the reasons that an increasing number of Ukrainians use Russian as their native language?
- –According to the article, what is the policy of bringing about the "merging of nations" in the Soviet Union?

- Handout B-3 provides a summary of those actions taken by the Soviet government in its attempt to complete the Russification process in Ukraine. You might outline this reading for students using the following five headings:

1. Russification Policy
2. Purge of the Communist Party of Ukraine
3. Prohibition of Ukrainian Scholarship and Culture
4. Destruction of Ukrainian Historical and Cultural monuments
5. Destruction of the Churches

After discussing each of these points with students, ask the following questions:

- –Define or identify each of the following terms:
  - Ethnocide
  - Samvydav
  - Bourgeois nationalism
  - Genocide
  - Pogrom
  - CPU
- –What kinds of activities did Soviet authorities describe as "manifestations of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism"?
- –Describe some of the actions taken by Soviet authorities to initiate the Russification policy in Ukraine.
- –Identify some of the methods used during the KGB purges in the 1970s to repress Ukrainian culture.
- –Describe some of the features of the political penal system in the Soviet Union. Compare some of the features of this system with the policies of the government concerning Ukrainian nationalism.
- –Discuss what actions the Soviet government has taken against the Catholic Church and other non- sanctioned faiths. Describe their possible significance and offer examples.

- Group students and ask different groups to read either Handout B-4.1 or B-4.2 and prepare written responses to the following questions:
  - –What is freedom of association?
  - –While the Soviet constitution guarantees freedom of association (Article 51), how does Article 72 of the USSR Criminal Code limit this freedom?
  - –According to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki by 35 nations, what human rights did the USSR guarantee for Ukrainians and other nationalities?
  - –Why was the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group founded? What were the aims of the Group?
  - –What were some of the activities of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group?
  - –Why is the Group viewed as a threat in the eyes of the Soviet Government?

- Handouts B-5.1 through B-5.4 describe the Soviet Union's limits on freedom of religion. In the United States, this freedom is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the other Amendments to our Constitution. Have students compare and contrast how this basic right is viewed in the Soviet Union and how the Soviet government has limited this freedom in Ukraine. Have students also refer to the Amnesty International Publication, *Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions*, pp. 32; 36-7. As students consider these Handouts, ask them to refer to the following study questions:
  - –What are the two largest religious denominations in Ukraine?
  - –What is the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church?
  - –When was it organized and what were its aims?
  - –What were the stated reasons for its liquidation? How did the Communists liquidate it?
  - –When was the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church liquidated?
  - –What was the Action Group and what were some of its activities?
  - –Give several examples which prove that the Soviet government was behind the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.
  - –What is the "Church in the Catacombs"?
  - –What are some of the methods the Soviet government uses to suppress religion in Ukraine? How do people resist these anti-religious efforts?
  - –Russian Communists used similar methods and techniques in liquidating the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1930 and the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church in the 1940's. Discuss this statement, giving pertinent details.
  - –Discuss the treatment of other religions in Ukraine.

- Handout B-6.1 and 6.2 present a series of personal accounts of human rights violations in the Soviet Union as described by Ukrainian dissidents. Handout B-6.1 summarizes Article 70 and Article 190-1 which are used by the

Soviet Government to suppress the freedom of expression. Have students explain how the Soviets use these Articles to limit and suppress this basic freedom. Then, have students refer to the case of Vasyl Stus included as Handout B-6.2 and apply these limitations to his case. The following questions will help students to organize the information included in the Stus case:

- Who was Vasyl Stus?
- What "crimes" did Vasyl Stus commit?
- Where was Vasyl Stus to complete his internal exile?
- Describe the working conditions in the mine.
- Describe, giving specific examples, how the Soviet penal authorities made Stus' life difficult.
- How did Stus react to these provocations?
- Why did Vasyl Stus join the Ukrainian Helsinki Group?
- Why did Stus admire Poland, especially the events taking place in Poland during the early 1980's?
- According to Stus, what example does Poland set for Ukrainians?
- Assuming that Stus' case is typical of other political prisoners, why do you think Soviet authorities subjected him to such treatment? What were they trying to accomplish?

• The handout materials included in B-7.1 focus on specific case studies about prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union. These case studies present brief overviews of each political prisoner and describe the reasons for his or her incarceration or exile. Group students and assign each group one individual to report on to the entire class. These oral reports should include the following components:

- Background information including family life
- A description of the activities which resulted in arrest or exile
- A description of prison conditions
- If known, the present whereabouts and condition of political prisoner.

Following these oral reports, you might conduct a full class discussion focusing on the following questions:

- What is the difference between political prisoners and other prisoners?
- According to Soviet authorities, what are the nature of their crimes?
- Would these actions be considered crimes in the United States? Why or why not?
- These political prisoners know that their actions will result in long prison terms. Why do you think that they persist and continue to oppose the Soviet system?

• Handouts B-8.1 and B-8.2 also detail prison conditions for these Ukrainian political prisoners. After students read these materials have them describe the living conditions in Soviet prisons. Students might also refer back to prisoners' rights as defined by the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Soviet Constitution. Ask students to discuss how political prisoners' rights are being violated in Soviet prisons. As a long-range project students might contact Amnesty International to learn more about prisoners' rights and to obtain other case study materials about Ukrainian political prisoners.

• As a concluding lesson in this unit, students should study the poems and statement included in Handout B-9. Students could then compose their own poems or statements which summarize prison conditions and the general outlook for Ukrainian political prisoners.

Handout B-1.1

UKRAINIAN HUMAN LOSSES DURING WW II

Taras Hunczak

World War II visited upon the Ukrainian people a level of destruction and suffering seldom recorded in the annals of history. Compounding the tragedy of WWII were the losses suffered by the Ukrainians in 1932-1933 when, as a result of a famine, artificially created by the Soviet government, some 7 to 8 million people perished. Despite the enormity of the crime, the journalists, who were aware of this tragedy, failed to bring it to the attention of Western readers. Indeed, even today, despite the frequent posturing in defense of human rights, one seldom encounters information, condemnation of the perpetrators or sympathy for the victimized Ukrainians.

During World War II, Ukraine was occupied in its totality by the Nazis for more than three years during which time it was subjected to devastating military operations, partisan warfare, deportations to slave labor and concentration camps, reprisals, and public executions. According to Soviet estimates, 714 towns and 28,000 villages were destroyed leaving some 10 million people homeless. During the same time some 16,000 enterprises, 33,000 schools and institutes of higher learning, 18,000 hospitals and medical centers, and 20,000 libraries were destroyed or seriously damaged. The material losses of Ukraine have been estimated at 285 billion rubles.*

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* Rubles are Soviet currency.

This devastation, which turned cities into rubble, was accompanied by a tremendous loss of population in the cities and in the countryside. The Soviet Ukrainian newspaper "Radianska Ukraina" of October 13, 1968, reports, for example, that the capital city of Ukraine, Kiev, which had a population of 900,000 in 1941, had in 1945 a population of only 186,000. During the 778 days of German occupation of the city, the Nazis killed 195,000 inhabitants and deported more than 100,000 to Germany as slave laborers.

It should be noted that the civilian losses of Ukraine were not only the result of military operations. On the contrary, the greatest losses resulted from the ruthless policy of the Nazi civil authorities. To be sure, their conduct in Eastern Europe was no accident – it was predicated upon the Nazi ideology which considered Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs (Poles, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russians) as sub-humans worthy only for physical work and ultimately annihilation. This ideology was stated clearly by the most prominent Nazi leaders.

Martin Bormann, a right hand man of Hitler, stated in his instructions to Alfred Rosenberg in August 1942: "The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we do not need them, they may die." (I.M.T. Doc. No.-5001).

Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS and of the German police, expressed a similar attitude in a speech he delivered in October 1943. He said:

> "Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only insofar as we need them as slaves . . . otherwise it is of no interest to me."

The men who were appointed by Berlin to govern the conquered Eastern territories were of the same views as Hitler, Bormann, and Himmler. Hans Frank, for example, the governor of the General Government, stated in his speech of January 14, 1944:

> "Once we have won the war, then for all I care, mince-meat can be made of Poles and the Ukrainians and others who run around here."

In fact, the Nazis were making mince-meat of the Poles, Ukrainians, and others even without waiting for the outcome of the war. In the course of the four years of the War, Ukraine suffered staggering demographic losses. In 1941 the population of Ukraine was 41.9 million. As a result of the War and of the Nazi occupation policies, the population of Ukraine was reduced to 27.4 million – thus a net loss of 14.5 million. Of these some were killed, some were evacuated or deported while still others were mobilized into German or Soviet armies or sent to Germany as slave laborers.

The full dimension of the Ukrainian tragedy can be comprehended only when we compare it with the losses of other nations which were, directly or indirectly, involved in WWII. This fact is best illustrated by the table on the next page*.

* Wolodymyr Kosyk, "Die Opfer der Ukraine wahrend des zweiten Weltkriegs" in *Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde 1984* (Munchen, 1984), pp. 125-126.

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Handout B-1.1 (cont.)

Country	The number of losses in thousands			Losses as a percentage of the whole population
	military	civilian	total	
Ukraine	2,500	4,500	7,000	16.7
Germany	4,500	2,000	6,500	9.0
Poland	123	4,877	5,000	19.6
Japan	2,000	350	2,350	3.4
Yugoslavia	300	1,400	1,700	10.6
France	250	350	600	1.5
Italy	400	100	500	1.1
Rumania	300	200	500	3.7
Greece	100	350	450	6.2
Hungary	136	294	430	4.6
Great Britain	290	60	350	0.7
Czecho-Slovakia	46	294	340	3.0
Austria	270	104	374	5.6
USA	300	—	300	0.2
Holland	12	198	210	2.4
Finland	84	16	100	2.7
Belgium	13	75	88	1.1
Canada	42	—	42	0.4
Bulgaria	25	10	35	0.3
Australia	35	—	35	0.5

Handout B-1.2

HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENOCIDE

According to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki, 1975), Principle XII, the 35 countries who signed the agreement agreed to respect the freedom of thought, conscience, and religious beliefs of their respective peoples. Human rights, as defined by Amnesty International, include the above principles as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement (emigration) – freedoms familiar to any American student of citizenship.

In addition, human rights include the primary, basic right that enables the others to be possible: the right to exist. Freedom from genocide or the threat of genocide (physical extermination of one nation or group by another) is a right which by its very extremism is rarely cited by human rightists. But it is a fact that many countries, Ukraine notable among them, have suffered from the effects of genocide.

Genocide, according to the Soviet Encyclopedia (2nd Ed. Vol. 10: Moscow 1953, pp. 440-441) is "any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national, racial or religious group." The Soviet *Encyclopedic Dictionary* defines genocide as "the extermination of individual groups in a population on the basis of racial and national identity."

There exist, at this time in the world, countries and ethnic groups which live under the domination of regimes, usually foreign, in which human rights are sacrificed in favor of national chauvinism. The resulting social atmosphere is one of enslavement to fear of ethnocide (destruction of ethnic culture) and linguicide (repression of the use of one's language).

EXCERPTS FROM: THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HELSINKI, 1975.

The participating parties will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms including freedom of thought, freedom of conscience and freedom of religion or belief.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will in this manner protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Excerpts from: THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, December 10, 1948.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 13

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 15

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality. . . .

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Handout B-1.2 (cont.)

Article 21

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27

1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirement of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

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Handout B-1.3

THE UKRAINIAN TRAGEDY OF 1933 IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Wasyl Hryshko

Some Historical Comparisons and Affirmations

The years since 1933 have been exceedingly rich in tragedy and catastrophe. One need only recall World War II, with the terror of Nazi and Communist occupation, particularly in Eastern Europe, and the recent wars and revolutions in Asia, with the mass destruction after the Communist victory in Cambodia. It is no coincidence that since 1945 the concept of genocide – the deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial, political, or cultural group – has been firmly established in international law.

Yet even in this dismal historical setting one tragedy remains without precedent. Its closing act was staged in 1933 in Ukraine and the adjacent lands of the Kuban and the Don, which were tied to Ukraine at that time by a substantial Ukrainian population. This was the first instance of peacetime genocide in history. It took the extraordinary form of an artificial famine deliberately created by the ruling powers. This savage combination of words for the designation of a crime – "an artificial, deliberately planned famine" – is still incredible to many people throughout the world, but it indicates the uniqueness of the tragedy of 1933, which is unparalleled, for a time of peace, in the number of victims it claimed.

Taken from: Wasyl Hryshko. *The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933* (Toronto: Bahriany Foundation, SUZHERO, and DOBRUS, 1983), pp. 107-108; 117-118; 120-123.

By the most conservative estimate, based on an analysis of Soviet statistics, the casualties of the famine in the Ukrainian SSR totalled 7.5 million Ukrainians, of whom 4.8 million starved to death in one year, 1932-1933, while the remainder is accounted for by the loss of natural increase in the Ukrainian population for this period. All together, Ukrainian losses throughout the USSR in this period totalled 8.1 million.[1]

According to a 1976 document of the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group, more than six million Ukrainians died in the artificial famine in Ukraine in 1933 alone. Yet this was but a part of the approximate total of ten million victims of the anti-Ukrainian terror that reigned between 1930 and 1933, when "dekulakization" (or, in the official terminology of the time, the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class") was carried out.[2]

Let us limit ourselves for the moment to the victims of genocide by starvation. The number of six million cited by the *samizdat** article must be viewed in context. Considered in relation to the Ukrainian SSR's population of thirty-two million, according to official data for 1932, this number is clearly more terrible than the losses suffered by Ukraine during World War II, which for a population of forty-two million, amounted to 5.6 million.[3] But surely one cannot compare the victims of war, an extraordinary, abnormal time of mass slaughter, with those of genocide in peacetime.

[1] *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin*, vol. 2, pp. 127-129.

[2] The Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, *Declaration and Memorandum No. 1* (Jersey City: Svoboda Press, 1977), pp. 11-12.

[3] Stepan Protsiuk, *The Question of the Potential of the Ukrainian Population. Suchasnist'*, 7, 1961, pp. 78-79.

* Samizdat are clandestine, uncensored publications.

One must also consider that the Ukrainian victims of 1933 were largely from the peasant population, with regard to which Ukraine's losses in 1933 constituted 19.4 percent, while war losses constituted approximately 15.6 percent, in terms of the entire population of Ukraine, including approximately one million Ukrainian Jews.[4]

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The Political Consequences of 1933 and the Present Ukrainian Situation

The Continuation of Moscow's Anti-Ukrainian Plan in the Post-Stalinist Period

The contemporary policy of "merging" the non-Russian peoples of the USSR on the basis of the "international" Russian language, which amounts to eliminating them through merciless Russification, makes clear, as never before, the aim of Moscow's genocide in 1933 and the consequences of that genocide for Ukraine. In the present Ukrainian situation in the USSR we have nothing less than a continuation and intensification of the nationalities course that Stalin applied so savagely to Ukraine in 1933.

Until 1933, Moscow followed the "Leninist nationalities policy," which Lenin himself had formulated under the pressure of difficulties in the non-Russian republics and under the influence of non-Russian Communists. The policy was declared a guiding principle by the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party in 1923, and then reaffirmed by the Sixteenth Congress in 1930. According to this policy, the chief danger throughout the USSR was the great-power na-

[4] *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin*, vol. 2, p. 129 and Protsiuk, p. 79.

tionalism of the ruling Russian nation. As Lenin put it, "all talk about the advantages of the Russian language and culture is simply an attempt to reinforce the domination of the Russian nation."[1] Favorable to the desires of the non-Russian peoples, this nationalities policy could be changed only if the balance of power in the non-Russian republics were changed and local national forces were paralyzed and eliminated. This is precisely what Stalin set out to do in the 1930s, first in Ukraine, as the largest and most powerful republic after Russia. . . . Stalin's first concern was to paralyze and eliminate the peasantry, as the army of the national movement, and then to liquidate the national intelligentsia, including the national Communists. This he accomplished in 1933.

Thus the genocidal destruction of Ukraine by Stalin and Postyshev* in 1933 was the first stage in the implementation of the nationalities policy that is being applied by the present leaders of the USSR, as a policy of liquidating the nationalities of the USSR and creating a unified Soviet nation. Today Moscow is able to treat the Ukrainian language as secondary, not obligatory even in elementary schools, not to mentionuniversities, and to plan the Russification of the language (by eliminating differences between Ukrainian and Russian in spelling and grammar). It was able to come to this audacity only because of the preconditions created by the Stalin-Postyshev operation of 1933.

The first of these preconditions is the increase in the percentage of Russians in Ukraine (between 1926 and 1959 the percentage increased from 8.1 to 16.9; in 1970 it reached 19.4, and it is continuing to increase) and the decrease in the percentage of Ukrainians who speak their native language (according to the census of 1970, only 69.5 percent of Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian).[2] The second precondition is the destruction of the independent Ukrainian intelligentsia, as a source of resistance to Russification, and of all opposition in the Ukrainian party and government, which ceased to be Ukrainian in 1933. Only after liquidating political opposition even in a Soviet form was Moscow able to begin liquidating the nationalities question in the USSR by liquidating the nationalities themselves. In this respect, the present situation in Ukraine is a direct consequence of 1933, an epilogue to the Ukrainian national tragedy.

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The Rehabilitation of the Stalin-Postyshev Genocide in Ukraine and the "Utilization of the Corpses" of the Ukrainian Victims

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To stifle any thoughts that there might be a review and censuring of its genocidal policies in 1933, Moscow completely rehabilitated Postyshev, Stalin's regent in Ukraine, and even renewed the cult of Postyshev that it itself had created. The rehabilitation of Postyshev in 1962, shortly before the thirtieth anniversary of the Ukrainian tragedy, has its particular significance today. It is an insult to the millions who were starved to death or shot under Postyshev's bloody command, and it is a clear demonstration that the genocidal policy begun by Moscow in 1933 continues unchanged.

The homage that Postyshev receives today has another important aspect. As Stalin's first viceroy in Ukraine, Postyshev was assigned to complete the genocide and to liquidate all opposition from the Ukrainian Communists. Having carried out this assignment, Postyshev was himself murdered in the torture chambers of the Kremlin. His replacement was none other than Nikita Khrushchev, Postyshev's fellow student in the school of Stalinist crime.

The years when Khrushchev ruled as viceroy in Ukraine were no less bloody than the Postyshev reign. These were the years of *Yezhovshchina*,* when hundreds of thousands of innocent Ukrainians were arrested and deported, when mass executions were carried out in Vinnytsia and other known and unknownplaces, and when even the Ukrainians in Moscow's puppet regime were destroyed. These were also the years of World War II, when Ukrainians were sent without arms to be slaughtered by the German army and when they were murdered in NKVD-MVD torture chambers for "betraying" Moscow. Finally, these were the years of still another famine in Ukraine the famine of 1946, which was caused not only by the ravages of the war, but also by Moscow's merciless robbing of Ukraine.

[1] Kostiuk, pp. 71-72. For a Leninist formulation of nationality policies regarding language and culture see *The Twelfth Congress of the RCP(B): A Shorthand Report* (Moscow, 1923), p. 646.

* Postyshev was officially the Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine who served as Moscow's viceroy of Ukraine from 1933 to 1937. He held dictatorial power in Ukraine and was, in part, responsible for the Forced Famine in Ukraine (see Unit I) and for terror during his reign.

[2] Volodymyr Kubiiovych, *Changes in National Relations in Ukraine in the Twentieth Century* in *Materiialy Kongresu ukrains'koi vil'noi politychnoi dumky*, Series A, Vol. 4 (Munich, 1976), pp. 14-15.

*Yezhow was Chief of the Soviet political police (NKVD) from 1936 to 1938. He instituted a wave of terror called "Yezhovshchina."

Handout B-1.3 (cont.)

All this took place under Khrushchev's leadership. By the gangster law that led Stalin to destroy Postyshev, Stalin was forced to go to his grave bearing all the responsibility for the Kremlin's crimes, so that his pupils could use new methods, in new conditions, to continue his criminal activities.

New Methods of Eliminating Ukrainians from Ukraine and the Conclusions from the Tragic Experience of 1933 for Ukrainians Today

In the decades that have elapsed since the tragedy of 1933 much has changed in the world and in Ukraine. The tactics of Moscow's anti-Ukrainian policies have also changed. Khrushchev and Brezhnev substituted Lenin's coat and tie for Stalin's police uniform. . . . Because all terror has its limits, the terrorist regime has changed its appearance, having achieved its end, and has now assumed a pose of legality.

But the essence of the anti-Ukrainian policies has not changed. Arrests and deportations to hard labor in Siberia are becoming more common. Even more people are sent – as "volunteers," of course – to construction sites in Siberia, where they do not perish as their predecessors in the 1930s did, but where they are nonetheless condemned to a sure national death, because the Ukrainian language and all contacts with Ukrainian cultural life are severely forbidden. More and more Russians are being brought into Ukraine, where schools, theaters, and newspapers are madeavailable for them. Thus Brezhnev and Shcherbytsky* are conducting the same anti-Ukrainian policy as Stalin, Postyshev, and Khrushchev before them.

In his "secret speech" about Stalin's crimes at the Twentieth Party Congress Khrushchev himself admitted that Stalin had hoped to deport the entire Ukrainian nation to Siberia. "The Ukrainians escaped this fate," commented Khrushchev, "only because there were too many of them and not enough room to deport them to."[4] Khrushchev, as the executor of Stalin's plans for Ukraine, can certainly be believed here. But one cannot believe that after the death of Stalin and all the changes in the Kremlin leadership Moscow has renounced its goal of ridding Ukraine of the Ukrainians.

The plan has certainly undergone some changes, to accommodate a longer period and new methods. The post-Stalinist nationalities program of the CPSU,* which calls for the "merger" of the non-Russian peoples with the Russians, has been made dependent on the construction of Communism in the USSR, which in this period of peaceful coexistence and detente with the West Moscow plans to accomplish within several decades. If the West gives Moscow as much moral and economic capital as it did in Stalin's day, then Moscow will not stop at anything to carry out its plan.

Yet Moscow's success in this venture will not depend solely on Moscow itself or on the West's attitude. The chief factor that makes Moscow's plan unfeasible is the resistance of the Ukrainians and the other peoples subjugated by Moscow. . . . In Ukraine, even after several decades of horrible genocide, national resistance has grown and strengthened. Moscow changes its methods of destroying the Ukrainian nation, but the nation's methods in its struggle for survival also change. Despite all its horrible consequences, the tragedy of 1933 has also had a positive aspect: it has taught all Ukrainians that Moscow ... cannot be trusted, no matter how "internationalist" and "fraternal" they may be.

• • •

* Vladimir Shcherbytsky is the current first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He has served since 1972 and is also a member of the Soviet Politburo in Moscow.

[4] Institute for the Study of the USSR, *Genocide in the USSR: Studies in Mass Destruction* (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1958), pp. 145-146.

* CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

HANDOUT B-1.4

SOVIET GENOCIDE IN UKRAINE

Wasyl Hryshko

The subject of this reading is Soviet genocide directed against Ukrainians as a nation within the borders of the Soviet Union. However, the genocidal aspect of the Communist Party general policy is directed in varying degree against all the nations under its totalitarian rule and is universal in its ideological motives and political goals. Because of this it is necessary at the outset to review briefly the nature of Soviet genocide against the background of the internationally recognized definition of genocide.

The concept of genocide attracted world-wide attention when the United Nations General Assembly declared in its resolution of 11 December 1946, that genocide is "a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world." Subsequently, a special committee of the United Nations Economic and Social Council drafted a convention on the subject, and it was unanimously approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948. The Convention defined genocide in Article II as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." This general definition was also detailed in five paragraphs, two of which were: "a) killing members of the group," and "c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." [1]

This Convention on genocide was ratified by the Soviet Union in 1954, and was then published in the official bulletin of the Supreme Soviet. It is noteworthy that in discussions at the General Assembly Soviet representatives proposed an even more detailed definition of genocide, emphasizing its nationality aspect and pointing in particular to linguistic, cultural, religious and racial forms of genocide. This included the following supplement: "Genocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds or national or racial origin, or religious belief." . . .

The essential feature of both the United Nations and the Soviet definitions of genocide is that the act is directed against a certain group of people rather than against individuals. As to the group, it may be an ethnic, racial or religious group, or a certain nationality, or any other group identified by certain common traits, including those of a sociopolitical nature. In other words, it can be summarized as follows: an act of genocide involves the *partial or complete extermination or an attempt at extermination applied to a group of people as a group, regardless of the nature of the group.*

What is most significant is that all of the above definitions of genocide, and especially those supplementary definitions offered by the Soviets, correspond precisely to those acts that typify the genocidal practices by the totalitarian partocracy* in the Soviet Union. Of course, the nature of the ideology and theory on which Communist political practice is based has made it possible for the Soviet rulers to camouflage their genocidal policy in such a way that it is not as obvious to external observers as the simple Nazi genocide that was the concern of the authors of the United Nations Convention on genocide.

A policy of genocide is implicit in the very goals proclaimed by the Communist ideological conception of "building a new world of socialism and then communism" by means of revolutionary destruction of the "old world" and the elimination of private property and certain classes and social groups of people connected with it, considered by Communist theory as "bourgeois" or "petty bourgeois." The latter are regarded as an obstacle on the path toward the "classless socialist society." Inasmuch as this also means the "creation of a new man," which involves the destruction and elimination of the "old bourgeois and petty bourgeois" culture based on nationality and religious consciousness and traditions, it requires Communists to wage permanent war against those national and religious forces which, being embodied in certain groups of people, are considered to be inimical to communist goals. In fact, since the ultimate goal in Communist theory is a unified world with centralized economic and political power and without national and religious divisions, the Communist struggle for this goal must assume an anti-national and anti-religious character and also call for the destruction of certain social groups.

. . . the Soviet Union, which consists of various nations with different languages, cuultures and

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Taken from: Wasyl Hryshko. *The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933* (op. cit. see Handout B-1.3), Introduction, pp. 1-6. Used by permission of Wasyl Hryshko.

[1] *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-1949*, New York, 1950, p. 959. For the first U.N. documents on genocide see *Yearbook. . . 1947-1948*, New York, 1949, pp. 595-599.

* A partocracy is a system of government in which one party rules, in this case, the Communist Party.

Handout B-1.4 (cont.)

religious and national traditions, and the communist ideology required a centralist unification policy. This policy inevitably. . .led the central government to apply genocidal methods to strike down any forces within the "union of republics" which might even potentially threaten the Communist goal of centralist uniformity. The main target for the Soviet partocracy* in this struggle was the so-called "bourgeois nationalism" of all nations under its rule except one: the Russians. The reasons for this exception is that Russian nationalism is traditionally related to Russian imperialism and by its nature is centralist in respect to the nations conquered by the Russians and incorporated into the Russian Empire which, after its disintegration in the revolutionary period of 1917-1921, was restored by the Communists in the form of the Soviet Union. Thus Russian nationalism is in harmony with Soviet imperialism and centralism, and it is used by the Communist partocracy as an essential element in the concept of "Soviet patriotism."

From this, of course, it does not follow that Russians themselves do not suffer from totalitarianism in the Soviet Union. They certainly do, as far as the socio-political aspects of Communist genocidal policy are concerned, since in this respect all peoples under Soviet rule are treated more or less in the same way. However, the non-Russian "nationals" are victimized by Soviet genocide to an incomparably greater degree than the Russians for an obvious reason: Russians in the Soviet Union are not oppressed as a nation, i.e., they are not subjected to those acts which even in the Soviet *Encyclopedic Dictionary* are described as "deliberate acts committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national group. . . on grounds of national or racial origin." Yet many other nationalities under Soviet rule are the victims of precisely such acts. Although such Communist acts of mass terror as the "liquidation" of various groups of "bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes," and the especially notorious "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" in the 1930s, were applied to all nations of the Soviet Union, including the Russians, there was nonetheless a difference. As applied to the Russians, these genocidal actions were limited to the named social groups as such, without being directed against Russians as a nationality – "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical group." In the case of some of the non-Russian nations these genocidal actions were not only intended to inflict a crushing blow to their national substance, but were also directly connected with the officially proclaimed and simultaneously conducted campaign of mass terror against "local nationalism" and "separatist tendencies" perceived in the normal cultivation by "nationals" of their national consciousness and their native language and culture.

It was precisely the combination of these social, national and cultural elements that made this Soviet elimination of certain class groups within the non-Russian nations especially severe and damaging to the vitality of these nations. Such acts contributed to the partial destruction of these nations and could be regarded as a step toward their total destruction. This was all the more so when certain social groups of these nations, as for example, the peasantry and the national intelligentsia, were the main preservers of native traditions. And it was this that made the difference between that aspect of Soviet Communist genocide which was directed against the Russians and the more lethal policies directed against other nations in the Soviet Union.

The nationality aspect of Soviet genocide has as its aim the virtual "liquidation" of the non-Russian nations, their forced fusion into a single supranational entity named the "Soviet people" with one common language – Russian – and a common culture based on this language, with one historical and political tradition – Russian – and at times even identified with the name "Russian" which, in fact, is used officially in Soviet Russia with greater frequency as synonymous with the adjective "Soviet." In practice this means the attempted total Russification of the non-Russian "nationals." This is an integral part of Soviet genocidal policy toward non-Russians which includes linguicide and ethnocide, accompanied by official propaganda regarding the superiority of the "great Russian people" ("the Elder Brother" of all the other peoples of the Soviet Union) and the patriotic duty of all these peoples to revere everything Russian and follow the lead of the Russians as the "first among equals." Of course, this does not mean that Russians have in the Soviet Union any special material privileges in their daily life, but the political and cultural privileges enjoyed by Russians as a nation are obvious and undeniable. There is no significant evidence that Russians disapprove of this kind of discrimination in Soviet nationality policy, while evidence to the contrary is plentiful. Because of this it is quite natural that non-Russian "nationals" generally accept the Russian imperialistic character of the Soviet genocide directed against them.

What has been stated on the nature of Soviet genocide as directed against the non-Russian nations under Soviet rule pertains first and foremost to the Ukrainians. As the most economically self-sufficient of the fourteen non-Russian republics, and therefore most capable of aspiring to independent statehood, Ukraine became the principal target of Soviet genocide. Thus it is

Handout B-1.4 (cont.)

the Ukrainian nation that suffered most from that deadly combination of social, national and cultural elements of Soviet genocide in which the "liquidation" of such a social group as the so-called *kurkuls* (the officially used Ukrainian translation of the Russian word *kulak*), i.e. the independent peasantry, was meant to destroy the very core of the mainly peasant Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian peasantry, historically, was the prime force in preserving the national tradition, language and identity through centuries of foreign occupations. It was the prime source for the emergence of the national intelligentsia, and because of this – the basic force in the national revival in the nineteenth century, in the national revolution of 1917-1918, in the rebirth of independent statehood in 1918-1921, and in the cultural renaissance during the post-revolutionary period of "Ukrainization."

In sum total all these elements of genocidal policy, rooted in both Communist ideology and in Russian imperialist "anti-Ukrainianism," were in the early 1930s developed into a series of terrible acts of Soviet genocide against the Ukrainians as a nation. The culmination of these acts of genocide in Ukraine (and in the Ukrainian areas of the Kuban and Don Cossack territories) was reached in 1933 when, after three years of a special expropriatory policy against the peasantry, an artificially created famine was used to eliminate millions of people, mainly peasants who opposed the total collectivization of agriculture. At the same time mass terror was used against the Ukrainian intelligentsia and nationally conscious Ukrainians in general under the pretext of "combatting Ukrainian nationalism as the main danger to the Soviet state in Ukraine," while "Ukrainian nationalism" was found in the cultivation of the Ukrainian language and in the developmentof Ukrainian culture in general. It was at this time that the official policy of Russification replaced the ill-fated "Ukrainization" of the 1920s, and one of its results was the policy of linguicide directed against the Ukrainian language followed by mass repressions and even executions of Ukrainian writers, philologists, historians, educators and others.

These actions of the Soviet government correspond exactly to those forms of genocide as defined in the United Nations convention ("acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical... group as such," and particularly "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part") and supplemented by the Soviets ("creation of conditions leading to premature death of members of the nationality concerned," and also "deliberate acts committed with intent to destroy the language and culture of a national group"). Thus we have a clear case of "classical" genocide which in terms of the number of its victims, counted in the millions, and in its magnitude can only be compared to Hitler's attempt to destroy the Jewish nationality in Europe during World War II.

Since the Holocaust has become a symbol of the horrors of totalitarian genocide (although genocide was a state policy in the Soviet Union in peacetime a decade earlier), the fateful chain of tragic events in Ukraine in 1933 has come to be called the "Ukrainian Holocaust."

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HANDOUT B-2

ETHNOCIDE OF UKRAINIANS

At a time when the population growth of Ukrainians in Ukraine is small (from 1959 to 1970 there was a 3.1 million increase of Ukrainians, or about 9.7%), the number of Russians in Ukraine grows much too fast (in the same period, their number has increased by 2 million, or, by 28% (!); thus in 1970 there were 9.1 million of them in Ukraine). Such a rapid increase of Russians can be explained mostly through artificial population growth, that is, by their migration from Russia.

The second issue of the *Ukrayinsky istorykoheohrafichny zbirnyk* (Ukrainian Historico-Geographical Journal) testifies to the fact that:

The numerical growth of Ukraine's urban population is increasing in all the regions at the expense of the villages of the R.S.F.S.R.... Ukraine's cities have had an artificial population growth at the expense of the rural localities in all the large economic areas of the country, without exception. The most significant contribution to this growth was made by those coming from the following areas: the Central Chernozem, the Central Regions, Kazakhstan, the Northwest, the Far East, and from Byelorussia....

The largest increase in population was due to the migration from the Russian Federation (it was much larger than from all the other republics put together).

In the years 1959 through 1963 the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East had lost 200,000 persons to Ukraine.

Of all the immigrants coming to Ukraine from the different republics of the U.S.S.R., 75.5% of them come from Russia. This is happening at a time when Ukrainians are forced to leave Ukraine in search of employment and migrate usually to Russia, the country the Russians are leaving for the "prosperous south of Russia" (as Ukraine was called up to 1917).

Therefore, when we take into account the reasons which are forcing Ukrainians to migrate out of Ukraine, it becomes clear that the migration of Russians into Ukraine is not a spontaneous process, but is primarily something that was thought up and organized by the authorities and motivated by political considerations.

The Russians settle almost exclusively in the cities (with the exception of the Crimean Region).

On the whole, 7,712,000 Russians live in Ukraine's cities, or 84.6% of the total number of Russians in the Ukr.S.S.R. In the cities of Ukraine's Western regions this percentage reaches 92.1%, or a total of 410,000.

The very fact that the Russians reside in the cities of Ukraine points to their privileged status, since living conditions here are better than in the Soviet village, with its system of neoserfdom.

The Russians are given preference when they apply for jobs, they find living accommodations immediately, and all cultural services (schools, the press, radio programs, theaters, etc.) are created for them.

The occupation regime in Ukraine, by bestowing upon the Russians various privileges and by constantly fanning among them the fires of fanatical Russian chauvinism, turns them into a convenient tool for the Russification of the Ukrainian population.

Soviet propaganda clamors constantly and in every possible way about the unparalleled flourishing of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. and likes to enumerate the number of institutions of higher education, schools, specialists, etc. They never forget to remind everyone about (supposed) equal rights to higher education, regardless of national or racial origin.

And now we will turn to the figures and take a look at what they are saying. A summary of the 1970 census reveals the following facts about the level of education among Russians and Ukrainians, per 1,000 inhabitants of each given nationality*:

Table 4.

	Ukrainians			Russians		
	With higher education:	With a secondary specialized education:	With a general secondary education:	With higher education:	With a secondary specialized education:	With a general secondary education:
U.S.S.R.	35	64	128	45	80	117
R.S.F.S.R.	73	105	133	43	76	110
Ukraine	30	58	127	66	100	175

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* A Summary of the 1970 All-Union Population Census, Volume 4 (The National Composition of the Population of the U.S.S.R.). Moscow, 1973, pp. 393-4, 405-6, 475-6.

Taken from: "Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R." in *The Ukrainian Herald*, issue 7-8, an underground journal of Soviet Ukraine published in 1974. Translated and published in the United States by Smoloskyp Publishers in Baltimore, 1976, 1981, pp. 66-73. Used by permission of Smoloskyp Publishers.

Handout B-2 (cont.)

As can be seen from the above table, for each 1,000 inhabitants of Ukraine, the number of Russians with a higher education is 2.2 times higher than the number of Ukrainians with a higher education, and there are almost twice as many Russians with a secondary specialized education.

In 1970 there were 601,000 Russians with a higher education in Ukraine. This was at a time when there was a total of only 1,583,000 inhabitants with a higher education in Ukraine. Russians account for over one-third of those with a higher education.

These figures reflect, as clear as day, the real state of affairs. Such is the "equality" which party propaganda cries about without restraint.

All this points to the social and national inequality of Ukrainians. Those 601,000 Russians, after all, hold in their hands the key positions in the Party, in the government, and in the administrative and economic ruling establishments.

The colonial regime in Ukraine is not only able to hold in its grip the entire economic and political power by all possible means, but, on top of that, by its continuous implementation of mass Russification, blocks the way to higher education for those Ukrainians who have resisted Russification and who retained their national pride and dignity.

The children of past and present political prisoners are barred from higher education, as are the children of those who were deported to Siberia in the 1950's. For children of Ukrainian intellectuals, admission to institutions of higher learning is drastically restricted. As a result, the doors to institutions of higher learning are closed to millions of Ukrainian youths and girls in their native land.

It is harder for graduates of rural secondary schools (who are the ones that constitute the bulk of non-Russified students) to hold their own in competition for admission to institutions of higher learning, because the level of their preparation is lower than that of graduates of city schools, among whom there is a considerable number of Russians and Russified Ukrainians.

In addition, the overwhelming majority of Ukraine's institutions of higher learning (with the insignificant exception of those in the Western regions of Ukraine) are Russified, because the whole educational process (and that means also the entrance exams) is carried out in the Russian language. This, in turn, creates additional hardships for graduates of Ukrainian schools when they enter institutions of higher learning. In Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, only in the university are lectures conducted in Ukrainian, and even there in far from all departments. In all the other institutions of higher learning in Kiev lectures are conducted in Russian. All of the above explains the continuous decrease in the percentage of Ukrainians with a higher education.

On the other hand, in the R.S.F.S.R, for every 1,000 Ukrainian inhabitants there are more persons with a higher education than there are for every 1,000 Russians. This explains the singularity of the Russian chauvinistic colonizers, who transfer a considerable number of highly qualified Ukrainian specialists to the R.S.F.S.R.; the distribution of cadres throughout the whole empire is, after all, centralized.

While the Russians living in Ukraine feel like masters in their own home, with full rights, the Ukrainians in the R.S.F.S.R. have absolutely nothing to satisfy their national needs, with the exception that on their passport or in a poll, they can write down "Ukrainian" in the column under "nationality." And even then it has to be transcribed in Russian. The colonizers kill two birds with one stone: go, they say, to Russia, to become Russified (if not you then your children), and to be of use as specialists; on the other hand, in your place we will work on your Ukrainian ethnic masses, and there we, as the "older brother," will put into effect – Russification, "great and noble, internationalistic."

Russia has been practicing this type of colonial policy for centuries. One could list thousands of Ukrainian scientists and representatives of culture and the arts who, though Ukrainian, worked for Russia and are counted among prominent Russians ....

Today we notice the very same (phenomenon) on a massive scale.

Soviet propaganda strains to present the Russification process as something positive and progressive, as a drawing together of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., and the Russian people as the ideal bearer of internationalism. Here is what L. Brezhnev said at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU:

> In the creation, strengthening, and growth of that mighty union of peoples, equal in rights, who have stepped onto the road to socialism, all the nations and nationalities of our country have played their part, and first of all, the great Russian people. Their revolutionary energy, selflessness, industriousness, and deep internationalism have by all rights earned them respect from all the peoples of our socialist Fatherland.

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Handout B-3

THE GENERAL POGROM

Maksym Sahaydak

"Summing up the heroic accomplishments of the past half-century, we have more than sufficient grounds to say that the national question in the form that we inherited from the past has been settled fully, settled definitively and irrevocably." (L. Brezhnev).

How this question continues to be settled by the CPSU *, although Brezhnev states unconditionally that it has been irrevocably settled once and for all, we will show in this section by citing concrete facts.

1. A Policy of Total Russification

The policy of Russification of the non-Russians in the U.S.S.R. has always been an integral part of the CPSU's internal policy. But in the last few years it has become even more intensified.

The Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU (1971) can be considered the beginning of a new stage in the nationalities policy of the U.S.S.R. a stage of total Russification. This congress fully deserves the name "the Congress of Chauvinists and Russifiers." Therefore, we will restrict ourselves exclusively to illuminating those events in Ukraine which followed this congress.

In Brezhnev's report to the Congress we find the "theoretical" justification for the policy of Russification. A newfangled "theory" about the emergence of a "new community – the Soviet people" has appeared on the scene, and once again,. . . the ever-growing role of all that is Russian is emphasized under the guise of internationalism.

Against the general background of the intensification of terror during the post-Congress period, the assault against the national Republics stands out especially.

Taking into account the Ukrainian (Ukr.)S.S.R.'s important role in the economic might of the Russian empire, the main thrust has been directed against Ukraine.

Guided by the general policy on the nationality question outlined at the Congress, the Party and the KGB began to move to specific, practical action. . . .

First the campaign stressed the allegation that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists in their subversive activities were exploiting the Ukrainian language as a means of nationalistic propaganda. Furthermore, it was explained that insistent demands for the use of the Ukrainian language in government offices, educational institutions, and in places of employment should be considered a manifestation of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. As can be seen, the forced introduction of the Russian language is not considered Russian nationalism. The Party calls this "internationalism."

Next, an intense press campaign was mounted, no longer directed against so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, but against nationalistic tendencies, national narrow-mindedness, and against outdated national customs. An avalanche of party resolutions and directives poured down to subordinate organizations, to educational, and scientific institutions, etc. Then a massive wave of arrests swept the ranks of the progressive intelligentsia. There were mass dismissals from work among the creative and scholarly intelligentsia, and purges among students. . . .

The KGB completely slipped out from under the control of the CPU (Communist Party of Ukraine) leadership. The number of KGB men and undercover agents increased sharply.

The head of the Republic's KGB, Fedorchuk, fired off reports to Moscow, (charging) that the leadership of the CPU was not helping the KGB in carrying out its work effectively. Shcherbytsky and Malanchuk, pursuing their careerist ambitions, tried to convince Moscow's Politburo that P. Shelest * was a nationalistic deviationist. Under such circumstances, the CC CPSU saw Shelest as an obstacle to the implementation of their pogrom policy in Ukraine.

2. The Purge of Party Cadres of the CPU.

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The situation was made even more complicated for Moscow by the fact that P. Shelest *, as a member of the Moscow Politburo, was supported by a number of party leaders in the national Republics, particularly in Georgia, Moldavia, and in others.

Therefore Moscow chose the old and tried route of underhandedness. P. Shelest was urgently summoned by a telephoned telegram to attend a meeting of the Politburo. This happened a few hours before it was to convene. The atmosphere in the Politburo was charged with open hostility towards Shelest. (He was even of-

* CPSU means the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Taken from: Maksym Sahaydak. *The Ukrainian Herald, issue 7-8: Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1976), pp. 125-138; 145-159. Sahaydak is the pen name of a dissident poet and writer who was the editor of the 7-8 issue of the Ukrainian underground magazine, "The Ukrainian Herald."

* P. Shelest – First Secretary of Communist Party of Ukraine.
CC CPSU – Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

fered the "penal" chair, that is, the one which is reserved for those who attend the meeting for the last time. Such is the ritual.) He was informed that he would take on the duties of a Deputy Prime Minister. Shelest was accused of provincialism and national narrow-mindedness, which allegedly had given rise to a nationalistic movement in Ukraine. Upon leaving the conference room, Shelest remarked to his aides: "Everything is finished."

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After Shelest's deportation out of Ukraine there began a massive purge of party cadres. One after the other, Shelest's supporters in the CC CPU and the regional committees were removed. One of the first to be ousted from his post was Ovcharenko, the CC CPU's Secretary for ideological matters. In his place, Brezhnev and Suslov demanded the appointment of a known Ukrainophobe and fierce Russian chauvinist, the careerist V. Malanchuk. . . .

A whole series of retirements, various job transfers, and "promotions" like the one Shelest received went into effect. The purge went into full swing after the April 1973 plenum of the CPU, which focused on cadres. . . .

At the regional, city, and district committee levels of the Party, 25% of the secretaries in charge of ideology matters were replaced.

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It is noteworthy that the purge of party cadres in Ukraine was numerically the highest in all of the U.S.S.R. It can be compared only to the purges of the thirties. In contrast to the purges of the thirties, however, it is even more markedly anti-Ukrainian in character and is being carried out in an atmosphere of strict secrecy under the guise of staff reshufflings, retirements, removal from top positions due to ill health, a campaign against corruption, etc. The real reasons are being painstakingly hidden from the general public.

3. The Prohibition of Ukrainian Scholarship and Culture

The Persecution of the Intelligentsia

Throughout the whole Soviet period, Ukrainian culture could not and did not develop freely. Even during Khrushchev's era of the thaw the processes of forcible Russification never ceased. But what is happening in Ukraine at this time cannot be compared to any other period before 1971.

The direction taken is towards a total all-encompassing Russification, thought out to the most minute detail.

Everything possible is done to amputate the people's memory of history, to destroy their language and culture. To describe all of this would take many volumes. We do not have the opportunity to do so. Therefore, we will try to describe these processes as laconically as possible, characterizing only the general tendencies of the occupational terror; for a better understanding of the political situation in Ukraine, we will cite numerous facts of malfeasance.

What is characteristic is that the repressions are differential; at the present (1974) the main thrust is directed against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. No longer are large masses of people being sent indiscriminately to concentration camps, as was done during Stalin's time. The leadership of the CPSU has decided to carry out spiritual ethnocide through the liquidation of the nationally conscious intelligentsia. All intellectuals are kept under KGB surveillance with the aid of an army of undercover agents, who are without fail present in every organization. Those whose "loyalty is doubtful" are kept under constant watch, which includes the tapping of telephones and surveillance by other electronic devices, and scrutiny of their correspondence. This type of surveillance can go on for a long period of time, in order to uncover as many contacts of the suspects as possible.

The active defenders of the national rights of Ukrainians and the disseminators of the *samvydav* are thrown into prisons and concentration camps. An analysis of many of the cases tried behind closed doors has confirmed the fact that information obtained from eavesdropping forms the basis for proof of guilt at the trials. False witnesses, who are acquainted ahead of time by the KGB with the surveillance materials that have been collected, are formally presented for this purpose. In the last two years (1972-1973), there has not been one instance of a political trial held behind closed doors in which the court found the accused not guilty, with the exception of those who bought their way out of concentration camp sentences with betrayal (of their friends).

In almost every case the duration of the investigation extended far beyond the limit prescribed by the Criminal Code (9 months). This is done so that those who are physically and spiritually weaker can be broken by the use of blackmail and provocations and coerced into betrayal of the principles of justice – recantations and slanderous letters (implicating others). In this way, people who were not involved in active work and against whom there is no proof which can be used to send them to prison for a term determined by the KGB, yet whom the KGB finds intolerable, are committed to psychiatric

Handout B-3 (cont.)

wards. Poets who do not wish to write against their own conscience often find themselves there. Just being acquainted with political prisoners is enough to lose one's job.

A thorough reexamination is being made of Ukraine's historical and literary heritage. Ukrainian historical research has been banned. Scholarly establishments are now busy manufacturing all kinds of forgeries, whose role is to distort and eradicate Ukrainian history. Those scholars who do not agree with this state of affairs are unceremoniously thrown out of such establishments. The same situation exists in the other social sciences.

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The Ukrainian language is persecuted as never before. The Institute of Linguistics, under the pretext of scholarship, is doing everything to legitimize the mutilation of the Ukrainian language through littering it with Russicisms, changes in the rules of orthography, etc.

You will not find an explicit law prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language; in theory it even has equal status. But it is enough for a student to ask a lecturer to present the material in Ukrainian in order to be suspected of Ukrainian nationalism and dismissed from the college. And at a public lecture a similar request will attract the attention of the KGB men who are always present at such meetings. Such a request is reason enough for a person to be placed under close surveillance. The lecturer will fall back on the excuse that "Lenin spoke in Russian." He will continue speaking in Russian, because he knows only too well what he is being paid for, and that otherwise this lecture would be his last.

The Ukrainian language is being forced out under all kinds of pretexts. In this manner, for example, all-Union centralization has reached new heights. Recently almost all of the ministries of the Republic have been turned into all-Union ministries. This has provided the excuse for conducting and writing everything in the ministries in Russian and to demand the same from all other agencies accountable to them.

In Ukraine almost all courses of trade specialization and for professional advancement have been made all- Union. And again we have the Russian language.

A group of students from another republic is sent to a given institute – lectures, therefore, have to be given in Russian.

Until 1971, 25% of the courses in the institutes of Western Ukraine, in general, were taught in Ukrainian, but in the last three years their number has dropped to 15% and the figure for the entire Republic is, on the whole, very meager.

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Starting in 1973 only those graduate students who were specializing in Russian literature or the literatures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. were being accepted into the college of literature. Not one single student was accepted into the Department of Ukrainian Literature. The same type of situation exists in the college of linguistics. . . .

In the last few years many talented Ukrainian writers have been expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine. Thus denying them the right to publish their works.

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Moreover, scores of writers have been forbidden to publish their works, which is in essence an expulsion from the writers' organization. The Press Committee has a list of writers whose works may not be published. First on the list is the name of B. Antonenko-Davydovych, a writer and a patriot, an unsurpassed expert and defender of the Ukrainian language, and a long-time inmate of Soviet concentration camps, against whom the pro-KGB leadership of the Writers' Union of Ukraine and the press are waging a constant underhanded campaign of harassment and slander. . . .

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After December 30, 1971, when the Politburo gave the KGB the assignment of destroying the *samvydav*, a wave of arrests engulfed the whole empire. Ukraine and Georgia have been the hardest hit by this rampage of terror.

Mass arrests and searches began in early 1972.

Consequently, in January through March of 1972 in the Lviv Region alone there were over 1,000 searches and arrests, during which 3,000 copies of *samvydav* literature were confiscated.

Without exception, arrests were made in all the regional capitals and in many districts, but as all of this was being executed under conditions of the strictest secrecy, it is hard to determine even an approximate number of those arrested. Most of the available information came from Kiev, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk, although even there only the arrests of the most prominent Ukrainian cultural leaders came to light. However, many engineers, teachers, doctors, students, and workers were also arrested. The broadcasters at Radio Liberty were far off the mark when they announced that approximately

Handout B-3 (cont.)

100 persons were arrested in Ukraine at that time. This number is absolutely too low.

Residents in a given building would not know for a long time that some of their neighbors had been arrested. In such instances the KGB makes the relatives sign an oath of secrecy; at the (victim's) place of work they spread the rumor that the person has gone on a business trip, has quit, or is sick.

Those who were released after their arrest were warned that they would be criminally charged if they made the secret public.

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LVIV UNIVERSITY was subjected to a pogrom in March to May, 1973.

Party officials and the KGB ordered the university president to forbid the holding of the traditional evenings in honor of Shevchenko*. The students tried to organize such an evening on their own initiative, but were dispersed. Flyers protesting this action were circulated and an illegal magazine, *Koryto* (The Trough), was published.

The KGB sent its agents among the students with their own provocative flyers. Mass arrests began. Those arrested were subjected to physical torture (rubber bags were pulled over their heads until they lost consciousness; they were beaten).

A mass wave of student dismissals swept the university. At first the KGB tried to organize the censures and expulsions at Komsomol (League of Young Communists) meetings, but seeing that the students were in support of those arrested, brought the expulsions about in semi-secrecy, through the orders of the rector. Access to the university was limited strictly to those holding passes. For every class missed, the student had to submit a written explanation and exonerating documents (a note from a physician, a telegram calling him home to sick parents, etc.).

During the summer vacation the students were herded into compulsory labor brigades and sent to work in various corners of the empire, mostly in Siberia. Those who did not leave with such contingents were obligated to leave the exact address at which they would spend their vacation.

All the expelled students were scholastically in good standing.

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In December 1973 a new group of students was dismissed from the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY for reading the Bible.

In 1974 the administration of the University of Lviv, on instructions from V. Malanchuk, decided to organize an evening "in honor" of Shevchenko. But only those students who were (Communist) activists and who had passes were allowed to attend the evening. Agitators from the Party bureau instructed the student activists not to stand during the singing of Shevchenko's "Testament" (the students, however, did not follow these orders). The evening's program consisted of songsabout the Party, and the Komsomol, while only a few of the numbers had anything to do with Shevchenko.

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The purges at the UNIVERSITY OF KIEV continue. Lately, one of the most gifted fifth-year students in the Department of Philology was dismissed, as were two students from the Department of Journalism. . . . All those students who at the student meeting voted against the expulsion from the university of the above-named students were thrown out of the Komsomol; their names were entered on the KGB's "black" list.

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Former political prisoners are truly marked men.

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In January 1973 the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr.S.S.R., I. Hrushetsky, made a tour of the Lviv Region. While passing through Sokal, Brody, and Kamyanka-Buzka, he demanded that the local administration give him a list of former political prisoners and categorically forbade the issuance of residence permits to any of them at the present time.

Another very characteristic example of the KGB's terror tactics is the case of Y. Hoysak. A resident of the village of Dashava in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region, Hoysak, who is the village blacksmith, was held under arrest for three days and fined in 1973 because he had painted his gate in yellow and blue.* Following this incident, he is being continuously harassed by the local authorities.

* Taras Shevchenko, a poet who was persecuted by the Russian tsarist regime, is a symbol of Ukrainian nationhood.

* Blue and yellow are the colors of the flag of the Ukrainian National Republic. The flag symbolizes Ukrainian independence.

Handout B-3 (cont.)

Dobryk, the First Secretary of Lviv's Regional Committee, at a meeting held in December 1973, strongly criticized the KGB because, supposedly, they were not waging a strong enough battle against Ukrainian nationalists. He personally examines the repertoire of performing groups.

The work of Lviv's television studio is practically paralyzed. In general, it broadcasts only all-Union programs.

Lviv radio's Sunday concerts, which used to be programmed around listeners' requests, have been discontinued (now the program is either put together by the staff itself or only Russian chauvinistic requests are played).

Artists' groups all over Ukraine are being purged. Ukrainian *dumas* (historical ballads) and historical songs are completely forbidden. Repertoires may include only current topical songs and even then those which are in Russian and which praise the Party must predominate.

Ukrainian books are also included in the ban. Libraries are constantly getting instructions to remove Ukrainian books from circulation. . . .

Hellish conditions are created for political prisoners in prisons and concentration camps. With each year the conditions in the camps become more inhumanly cruel.

The camps themselves are moved to more distant regions, where the climate is more severe. And so it is that the camps of Mordovia have been relocated in the Urals. In mid-1972 Mordovian concentration camp No. 3 in Barashevo was closed down. Those prisoners who were nearing the end of their terms of imprisonment were transferred to other camps in the Mordovian A.S.S.R., while 500 prisoners, most of them Ukrainians, were transferred into the area of Solikamsk in the Urals.

The prisoners are used for hard physical labor that is beyond their strength while they are kept on semi- starvation diets.

Thus, Ukrainian political prisoners are put to work at the plant for grinding glass, where the rules of safety are practically nonexistent. . . .

4. The Destruction of Ukrainian Historical and Cultural Monuments

Within the overall framework of the policy of Russification, the occupiers assign an important place to the destruction of historical and cultural monuments of Ukraine's past.

All of this is done for the purpose of destroying that which Ukrainian people have created throughout the centuries.

In step with the general intensification of the regime's terror in the last few years, there has been a sharp rise in the tendency to destroy everything that is Ukrainian in our historical heritage.

The Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments was given a directive to concentrate its attention mainly on the preservation of the so-called historical-revolutionary monuments, as well as the monuments dedicated to the "liberators." Special attention is given to Lenin's monuments.

In 1973 more than 100 Ukrainian cultural monuments were taken off the list of the Society. The majority of them were churches. With regard to many registered monuments, nothing is done with them except that explanatory plaques are attached.

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In 1972, at the Yaniv Cemetery in Lviv, on the eve of the Pentecost, all the remaining crosses in the memorial section of the cemetery, where the graves of the soldiers of the UHA (Ukrainian Galician Army) are located, were destroyed.

The same has been done to other cemeteries.

The communists have destroyed all the graveyards associated with the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. Who can cite just one example of similar acts of banditry and savagery being committed anywhere else in the world?

A unique collection of ancient Ukrainian pictorial art is rotting away in the Armenian Cathedral in Lviv.

In 1972, on orders of the KGB, I. Honchar's Ukrainian Museum in Kiev has been shut down. Honchar himself is constantly being harassed by the authorities.

The construction of a Cossack museum and national park on the island of Khortytsya* has been stopped.

(Editor's note: There are many other examples of monuments, statues, or plaques of Ukrainian national heroes having been dismantled and removed by the communists. The activities of Ukrainian museums have been limited by Soviet restrictions.)

5. The Destruction of Churches and Persecutionof the Faithful

In Eastern Ukraine almost nowhere in the villages can you see a church. And once they were in every village. . . .

Now the same thing is being done step-by-step in Western Ukraine.

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* A Cossack military fortress dating back to the 16th century.

Handout B-3 (cont.)

In the Lviv Region after the war (World War II) there were over 1200 functioning churches; in 1961 there were 528. With every year their number grows smaller. All this is done very cunningly. If a priest dies or retires, he is often not replaced or his place is taken by such an ignoramus or provocateur that the faithful are forced to reject him. (Editor's note: In the Soviet Union, despite the separation of church and state, all priests of the registered churches receive their salaries from the state. No priest can be dismissed or appointed to a parish without state approval.)

Various administrative obstructions are placed in the way. As a result, not a single priest has been assigned to the Stryi District in the last two years.

In the spring of 1972 the villagers of Volytsya. . . demanded that the Lviv Eparchy send them a priest. But Soviet officials categorically refused to assign one. The collective farm workers there went on strike for a week. The cattle breeders were especially steadfast and refused to be swayed by threats. The KGB agents immediately tried to identify the organizers of the strike, but good organization and manliness determined the outcome. The villagers won. So far, we know of only this one case where the uneven battle was won by the people.

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In 1971 the church in the village of Pidlisky was destroyed. A teahouse was built on the site. The Church of the Epiphany in Zhytomyr is in danger of being torn down.

The faithful suffer endless persecution. The persecutions become especially intensified during the greatest Christian holy days and take on the form of mass campaigns against the faithful.

Thus, Easter, Christmas, and other holy days are workdays even when they fall on calendar days otherwise free from work.

Students and schoolchildren are assigned Sunday sessions, various obligatory excursions, etc.

Before Christmas in 1973, the directors of schools throughout the Lviv Region were summoned to district party committee offices and warned that if even one student was seen in or near a church (for this purpose, especially appointed persons took turns in keeping watch near the churches), the director would be immediately dismissed from his post.

In the last two years teachers are obliged to warn their students in school not to go caroling, strewing grain* or to participate in any such other traditional religious folk customs.

On Easter and Christmas, the Party's district committees send out their communist activists to the churches in order to take note who among the communists, teachers, management personnel or white-collar workers in general, has come to the church for the holy day. These party watchdogs are issued special passes. That is because the KGB also keeps watch near the churches and if a party member should come under KGB observation and later it turns out that he came to the church on his own initiative, then nothing will save him from losing both his party membership card and his job.

Bus drivers are warned, under the threat of losing their jobs, not to take any passengers who are going to church to bless their *paskas*.**

* A Ukrainian New Year's Eve custom.
** Easter bread.

Militiamen take turns standing on church steps and turning away parents with children.

In the city of Kozova in the Ternopil Region in 1973, a priest was fined 50 rubles only because he had extended the Mass by one hour (in rural and urban churches, with the exception of the big cities, the time of Liturgical services is determined by government officials; as a rule, Mass should end no later than 9 a.m.). In most cities it is forbidden to ring church bells.

On the night of December 18, 1973, all crosses along the village roads of Babukhiv, Verbylivtsi, Zaluzhzhya, some of which had been erected in commemoration of the end of serfdom, were sawed down and broken.

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The Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine and throughout the Soviet Union suffer the most cruel persecution.

Following the forcible liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine after World War II, the Ukrainian Catholics have waged an uneven battle for their rights.

All Catholic churches where the priests refused to accept union with the Muscovite Orthodox church were closed down and marked for eventual destruction. In some places, the parishioners refused to turn the church keys over to the authorities and met to pray secretly, without a priest. But in recent years the repression has been intensified, especially after V. Malanchuk admitted at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPU that the Catholic Church in Western Ukraine had not been fully liquidated, and that the Party should devote more time to the struggle with this Church, because it had always been in the vanguard of Ukrainian nationalism.

Handout B-3 (cont.)

Following this, Ukrainian Catholic priests are being persecuted even more. They fulfill their spiritual mission under extremely difficult circumstances. They are harassed, thrown into prisons, and tortured.

At the same time, the persecution of those Catholics who are faithful to their religious beliefs has been intensified. Their churches are being desecrated.

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In addition to the Catholics, the Ukrainian Evangelical Christians are carrying on a truly heroic battle for their spiritual rights.

Together with the multi-million, freedom-loving Ukrainian people, Ukrainian Christians of all faiths are fighting for their national and spiritual rights.

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HANDOUT B-4.1

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Article 51 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution (1977) states:

> In conformance with the aims of strengthening communism, citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to associate in public organizations that promote their political activity and initiative and satisfaction of their various interests.
>
> Public organizations are guaranteed conditions for successfully performing the functions defined in their rules.

. . . it has happened consistently that citizens who have associated together for the advancement of aims which are at odds with official policy have not obtained official recognition but have been subjected to repressive measures including imprisonment. This has happened to a succession of groups established since the mid-1960s to publicize human rights violations within the country, other groups trying to advance the national and cultural rights of national minorities and various "new left" groups which have persistently sprung up in cities around the country since the mid-1950s. Autonomous groups which have tried – even on ostensibly non-controversial subjects – to work outside the officially-established network of public organizations have been subjected to the same treatment. . . .

One article of criminal law which explicitly circumscribes freedom of association is Article 72 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which states:

> "Organizational activity directed toward the preparation or commission of especially dangerous crimes, against the state, or toward the creation of an organization which has as its purpose the commission of such crimes, or participation in an anti-Soviet organization, shall be punished in accordance with Articles 64-71 of the present code."

This article has been applied to bring charges against a number of dissenters over the years. In July 1978, for example, Viktoras Petkus, a member of the unofficial Helsinki monitoring group in Lithuania, was tried on this and other charges and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and 5 years' internal exile. However, as far as is known to Amnesty International, the authorities have much more frequently charged members of disapproved of groups under other articles of criminal law.

The following is a selection of examples from recent years of imprisonment of members of unauthorized groups.

Beginning in May 1976, five unofficial Helsinki monitoring groups were established in the U.S.S.R. with the express purpose of monitoring Soviet implementation of the human rights provisions of the Final Act (1975) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Groups were established in Moscow and in the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian and Armenian republics. By 1978 a total of about 50 people had become members of these groups, of whom no less than 17 were arrested and tried in 1977 and 1978. Eight of them were sentenced to terms of imprisonment and exile of 10 years or more. The others were sentenced to lesser terms of imprisonment or, in two cases, to terms of exile. In 1979, six more members of the Helsinki monitoring groups were arrested: Victor Striltsev, Oles Berdnyk, Petro Sichko and his son Vasyl and Yury Litvin of the Ukrainian group and Edward Arutyunian of the Armenian group.

Ukrainian (Kiev) Monitoring group was the largest of the five Soviet monitoring groups. It consisted of 37 members. All of the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki group have either been arrested or forced into exile. Four members have died in Soviet penal institutions. They are: O. Tykhy (teacher); V. Marchenko (literary critic); Y. Lytvyn (historian); and V. Stus (poet, writer).

ARTICLES OF SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW WHICH RESTRICT THE EXERCISE OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

Most Soviet prisoners of conscience are imprisoned for violations of six articles of Soviet criminal law: [1]

Article 64: This defines as an act of treason "flight abroad or refusal to return from abroad to the U.S.S.R."

Article 70: *Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda.* Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime or of committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state, or the circulation, for the same purpose, of slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system, or the circulation or preparation or keeping, for the same purpose, of literature of such content, shall be punished by deprива-

Taken from: *Prisoners of Conscience in the U.S.S.R.: Their Treatment and Conditions* (Amnesty International Report, 1975).

[1] Reference here is to the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The translation is from Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler, *Soviet Criminal Law & Procedures: The RSFSR Codes* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972). The same articles are to be found with different numeration in the criminal codes of each of the union republics of the U.S.S.R.

Handout B-4.1 (cont.)

tion of freedom for a term of 6 months to 7 years, with or without additional exile for a term of 2 to 5 years, or by exile for a term of 2 to 5 years.

The same actions committed by a person previously convicted of especially dangerous crimes against the state or committed in wartime shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of 3 to 10 years, with or without additional exile for a term of 2 to 5 years.

Article 72: *Organizational Activity Directed to Commis sion of Especially Dangerous Crimes against the State and also Participation in Anti-Soviet Organizations.* Organizational activity directed to the preparation or commission of especially dangerous crimes against the state, or to the creation of an organization which has as its purpose the commission of such crimes, or participation in an anti-Soviet organization, shall be punished in accordance with Articles 64-71 of the present code.

Article 142: *Violation of Laws on Separation of Church and State and of Church and School.* The violation of laws on the separation of church and state and of school and church shall be punished by correctional tasks for a term not exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding 50 roubles.

The same acts committed by a person previously convicted of violation of laws on the separation of church and state and of school and church, as well as organizational activity directed to the commission of such acts, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding 3 years.

Article 190-1: *Circulation of Fabrications known to be False which Defame Soviet State and Social System.* The systematic circulation in an oral form of fabrications known to be false which defame the Soviet state and social system and, likewise, the preparation or circulation in written, printed, or any other form of works of such content shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding 3 years, or by correctional tasks for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding 100 roubles.

Article 227: *Infringement of Person and Rights of Citizens under Appearance of Performing Religious Ceremonies.* The organizing or directing of a group, the activity of which, carried on under the appearance of preaching religious beliefs and performing religious ceremonies, is connected with the causing of harm to citizens' health or with any other infringements of the person or rights of citizens, or with the inducing of citizens to refuse social activity or performance of civic duties, or with the drawing of minors into such groups, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding 5 years or by exile for a similar term with or without confiscation of property.

The active participation in the activity of a group specified in paragraph one of the present article, or the systematic propaganda directed at the commission of acts specified therein, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding 3 years, or by exile for the same term, or by correctional tasks for a term not exceeding one year.

Note: If the acts of persons stated in paragraph 2 of the present article, and the persons themselves, do not represent a great social danger, measures of social pressure may be applied to them.

Handout B-4.2

FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI GROUP

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, by thirty-five nations, including Canada, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.. The Act contains extensive guarantees of human rights and provides for the monitoring and review of compliance with its provisions.

The Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords was founded in Kiev on November 9, 1976, to inform the citizens of Ukraine and the world of the Soviet Union's compliance with the Act. It constituted itself openly and publicly pronounced its principles, demands, and membership. The formation of the Group opened a new phase in the struggle for human and national rights in Ukraine: for the first time, activists had compelling moral grounds to demand not only that the Soviet government uphold human rights as guaranteed in the constitution of the U.S.S.R. and international human-rights declarations and covenants, but that the Western democracies intervene in violations and support their struggle for human rights.

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The Group provided a focus and forum for the dissident movement.

Taken from: *The Persecution of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group* (Toronto, Canada: Monolith Publishing, 1985), Human Rights Commission, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, pp. 5-11; 16-17.

Activities of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group

Despite the difficult and precarious circumstances under which the Group must pursue its activities, it has managed to publish extensive documentation of widespread repression, Russification and abuse of power in Ukraine. It has reported illegal and brutal searches, arbitrary arrests, beatings and psychological torture, persecution of the families of political prisoners, religious persecution, and the destruction of Ukrainian cultural monuments, national traditions, and language.

The Group has published eighteen memoranda, of which twelve have reached the West. Other documents received abroad are five issues of the Group's **Information Bulletin**, several **Reports** on human rights violations. . . . In addition to these documents made public by the Group, individual members have appealed to various agencies of the Soviet government, signatories of the Helsinki Accords, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and Amnesty International.

Principles and Demands

The Ukrainian Helsinki Group subscribes to the principles of human, democratic and national rights. These three principles, enunciated in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, link the struggle in Ukraine with the world-wide struggle for human rights.

The Group stresses the importance of the individual over that of the state: "We believe that the law must presuppose the **primacy of the person** and the derivative nature of the state, for practically speaking the person is the sole reality, the sole value of being and the sole value of the law."

It demands that the Soviet government respect and realize in practice – not merely on paper – the individual's fundamental rights to life, liberty and security of person; justice and the equal protection of the law; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of movement and residence; freedom of association; and full participation in government and cultural life.

Further, the Group demands that the Soviet system be democratized:

> Any social transformation should be approved by the nation through a national referendum.... Without an independently formed public opinion, democracy is a farce. But such public opinion is impossible unless the public is correctly informed of what is happening in politics.... If the public is to have effective control over government policy it must have a genuine choice at elections.

National rights have received relatively little attention abroad. The high percentage of Ukrainians (over 40%) among known Soviet political prisoners is one indicator of national discrimination; another is the severity of the sentences received by the Ukrainian dissidents and the release of only a few of them to the West.

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Only one's own independent state can ensure the free development of a nation's culture. The Group demands sovereignty for Ukraine, a right granted by the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, which declares Ukraine to be "a sovereign Soviet national state" (Article 68) with "the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R." (Article 69). Ukraine is also a member of the United Nations and as such is formally recognized as a sov-

ereign state. The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act agreed to "respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination" (Principle VIII).

In reality, however, Ukrainian independence is little more than a legal fiction. Important areas of national life – defense, foreign affairs, trade, communications – are controlled by U.S.S.R. ministries. In other fields that are supposed to be under Ukraine's control, its ministries can be overruled by Moscow.

The Group demands that the constitutional guarantees of Ukraine's sovereignty be put into effect: that Ukraine have its own representatives at international conferences, including the Helsinki review conferences, and in foreign capitals; control over foreign relations; its own armed forces; that Ukrainian be established as the official language in Ukraine; that Ukrainian minorities in other republics be provided with their own schools (a right enjoyed by the Russian minority in Ukraine).

Finally, the Group supports the struggle of other peoples for human rights and national self-determination, and rejects chauvinism:

> The Ukrainian human rights group must struggle according to its principles against the policies of official and unofficial great-power chauvinism in its various manifestations and defend the right of every nation to independent development without which no successful campaign for social and individual freedom can be waged.

* Article 134 of the Soviet Constitution states that "the Council of Ministers of the USSR, within the limits of its competence, has the right to suspend the execution of decrees and resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the Union Republics."

At the same time the Group will struggle against every type of ethnic animosity in the Ukrainian SSR.

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Ukrainian activists are determined to maintain the Helsinki Group's existence. In spite of strong KGB pressure for public recantations, few of the Ukrainians arrested have renounced their convictions. This testifies to the moral strength of the human – rights struggle in Ukraine.

In the words of the Group's Memorandum of autumn 1979:

> The Group has become a force in the national- liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people for its national and political liberation, for the right of the individual to a free life in his own land.

DECLARATION of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords

"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19)

We Ukrainians live in Europe, which in the first half of the twentieth century has been twice ravaged by horrible wars. These wars inundated the Ukrainian land with blood, just as they did the lands of other European countries. And that is why we consider as illegal the fact that Ukraine, a full member of the UN, was not represented by a separate delegation at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Nevertheless, we take into consideration that according to the treaty of December 27, 1922, on the creation of the Soviet Union, all international treaties signed by the Government of the Soviet Union are in force also on the territory of Ukraine. It follows from this, therefore, that the Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the Declaration of Principles on which the states that participated in the Helsinki Conference are to base their relations, also apply to the Ukrainian people.

Experience has shown that the implementation of the Helsinki Accords (especially the humanitarian sections) cannot be guaranteed without the participation of the general public of the participating countries. Accordingly, on November 9, 1976, the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords was formed. Since the humanitarian articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are based wholly on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Ukrainian Public Group has set for itself the following objectives:

1. To promote the familiarization of wide circles of the Ukrainian public with the Declaration of Human Rights; to demand that this international legal document become the basis of relations between the Individual and the State;
2. Convinced that peace among nations cannot be guaranteed without free contacts among people and the free exchange of information and ideas, to promote actively the implementation of the humanitarian articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Handout B-4.2 (cont.)

3. To demand that Ukraine, as a sovereign European state and member of the UN, be represented by its own delegation at all international conferences at which the results of the implementation of the Helsinki Accords will be discussed;
4. For the sake of the free exchange of information and ideas, to demand the accreditation in Ukraine of representatives of the foreign press, the creation of independent news agencies, and the like.

The group regards as its primary task informing the governments of the participating countries and the world public about violations in Ukraine of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the humanitarian articles accepted by the Helsinki Conference. To this end, the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote (the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords):

a. Accepts written complaints about violations of Human Rights and does everything necessary to bring them to the attention of the governments that signed the Helsinki Accords and of the world community;
b. Compiles information collected on the state of legality in Ukraine and, in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, disseminates it regardless of frontiers.
c. Studies the facts of violations of Human Rights with regard to Ukrainians living in other republics, in order to give wide publicity to those facts.

In its activity the group is guided not only by political, but by humanitarian and legal considerations also. We realize that the long-time bureaucratization of state life, which continues to grow, is capable of taking countermeasures against our legitimate aspirations. But we also fully understand that the bureaucratic interpretation of Human Rights does not exhaust the interpretation that is embodied in international legal agreements signed by the government of the U.S.S.R.. We accept these documents in their full scope, without bureaucratic distortions or arbitrary limitations by officials or state agencies. We are deeply convinced that only such an understanding of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords is capable of bringing about a genuine relaxation in international relations. It is to this noble end that the humanitarian and legal activities of our group should be devoted.

Handout B-5.1

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

28 Ukrainian Orthodox Metropolitans, Bishops and Archbishops as well as 10 Ukrainian Catholic Bishops were all declared executed, perished or missing in Soviet Russian prisons and concentration camps. Not included are approximately 6 thousand priests, nuns and monks whose fate is unknown to the present day. The 9-million- member Ukrainian Catholic Church has been declared "illegal" since 1945.

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The Revolution of 1917 and the proclamation of an independent Ukrainian National Republic gave rise to a strong movement for the autocephaly or independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Moscow.

In the fall of 1917, an All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council was formed by... Ukrainian clergy and laymen. The Council demanded the Ukrainization of the Church, complete autocephaly (independence) from Moscow, and the restoration of the traditional forms of counciliar government (for the church). . . .

The Sobor* was called for the beginning of 1918. Faced with the hostility of the Russian episcopate to the Ukrainian cause, the Sobor could not reach any major decisions before its deliberations were interrupted by the first Soviet Russian invasion of Ukraine in early February (1918).

* Sobor (council) is the highest governing body of the Eastern Orthodox Church consisting of bishops, clergy, and laity.

In October, 1921, the First All-Ukrainian Sobor of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was convened. It confirmed the autocephaly of the Church and undertook a number of reforms. . . .

The Sobor elevated Vasyl Lypkivsky to Metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine, and named Archpriest Nestor Sharaivsky as his deputy and Archbishop of the Kievan diocese. They, in turn, consecrated four bishops for other dioceses.

In spite of bitter opposition from the Russian Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) swiftly grew throughout Ukraine, and spread into the Ukrainian settlements in other parts of U.S.S.R. as well as among Ukrainian emigres in Manchuria, Yugoslavia and Western Europe. In 1924 the UAOC dispatched Archbishop Ivan Teodorovych to the United States to assume the spiritual leadership of Orthodox Ukrainians in North America. By the middle of the 1920s, the UAOC encompassed several million faithful served by some 34 bishops, 1500 clergy and having 1200 parishes.

THE SOVIET SUPPRESSION OF THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH

After 1922, the Soviet authorities undertook increasingly severe repressive measures against the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and unsuccessfully attempted to infiltrate it and fragment it. In 1926 Metropolitan Lypkivsky, several bishops and a large number of clergy were arrested and imprisoned for varying lengths of time or exiled, while the All-Ukrainian Church Council was forcibly disbanded because of its allegedly nationalistic nature. At the Second All- Ukrainian Sobor, held in October, 1927, Soviet authorities forced the dismissal of Metropolitan Lypkivsky, and the less outspoken Mykolai Boretsky was appointed the new Metropolitan.

However, by 1929, even this period of "toleration" by the Soviet authorities came to an end. A new wave of persecution descended upon the autocephalist episcopate and clergy, and most of the Ukrainian parishes were closed. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was linked by the Soviet police with the underground League for the Liberation of Ukraine* to prove that it was guilty of "counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet activities." In January, 1930, the authorities staged an "Extraordinary Sobor" of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which resolved to "dissolve" formally the central and regional Church organs. Most of the UAOC parishes were suppressed. With the greater part of its leadership under arrest or deported, the remnants of the Church were allowed to continue a closely-controlled existence, under Metropolitan Ivan Pavlovsky of Kharkiv, as the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church," until its final suppression during Stalin's purges in the late 1930s.

The losses of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church under the Soviet regime were extremely heavy, including three metropolitans (M. Boretsky – arrested in 1938; I. Pavlovsky – deported in 1937; and V. Lypkivsky – arrested in 1938), some 20 archbishops and bishops, approximately 1,150 priests, and many thousands of lay members of regional and parish councils of the UAOC. Of the entire UAOC, only 270 priests and two bishops could be located in Ukraine in late 1941.

* An underground organization which aims to reestablish an independent Ukraine.

Handout B-5.1 (cont.)

The Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine had also come under attack as Stalin's regime undertook a violent anti-religious campaign against all denominations in the U.S.S.R.. During the 1930s many churches were closed, along with the remaining monasteries and convents. By 1938, all remaining bishops and large numbers of clergy were imprisoned or deported. At the time of the German invasion in mid-1941, no more than a handful of Russian Orthodox parishes were still in existence in Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Russian Orthodox Church was not as completely suppressed as had been the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. . . .

Following the Nazi-German occupation of Ukraine in 1941, there occurred a spontaneous revival of religious life which led to the re-establishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church under the leadership of Archbishop Polikarp (Sikorsky). . . .

1944 saw the reoccupation of Ukrainian territories by Soviet troops. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was immediately and totally suppressed and its flock was once again forcibly incorporated into the official Russian Orthodox Church. Autocephalist priests and lay leaders who did not willingly accept "reunification" were deported to forced labour camps.

Singled out by the Soviet government as the most "patriotic" Church, the Russian Orthodox Church now enjoyed privileges denied other denominations. Not only was it allowed to retain the churches and monasteries reopened in Ukraine during German occupation, but given jurisdiction over the Orthodox parishes in the forcibly-dissolved Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church in Western Ukraine.

Since 1944 an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church has existed only outside the U.S.S.R.. Continued propaganda attacks against the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Soviet press attest to the sympathies it continues to enjoy among the Ukrainian flock of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE

There are currently 18 dioceses within the Ukrainian Exarchate (office of the Bishop represeting the Partriarch in the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine), with a total of some 2,500 to 3,000 churches.* The number of clergy, however, is much lower, and there exists a real problem in replacing the priests who have died or been deprived of "registration" by the authorities. The only surviving theological seminary is in Odessa, which in 1973-74 had an enrollment of some 117 students. Many congregations remain without a priest, with reported cases of believers themselves performing religious rites, although at the same time the Moscow Patriarchate "exports" Ukrainian clergy to minister to Russian Orthodox parishes outside the U.S.S.R.** Since 1966, the post of the Exarch of Ukraine has been occupied by Archbishop, now Metropolitan, Filaret (Denysenko), who has demonstrated complete loyalty to the regime by his frequent endorsement of Soviet policies both at home and abroad and who evidently enjoys the confidence of the authorities. . . .

Although publication of the Ukrainian-language monthly Orthodox Herald was resumed in 1968, there exists a great shortage of service books, Bibles, and prayerbooks.

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Ukrainian has been banned as a liturgical language and, outside Western Ukraine, Russian is used predominantly as the language of sermons and church administration in the urban centres.

Although the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys, relatively speaking, the best treatment, it too is subject to continuous anti-religious pressure. The persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox and other religious believers continues. Administrative harassment and discrimination are common occurrences. Known believers are barred from all public service, including the teaching profession, and from all the responsible positions. Individual clergymen and believers are persecuted. The best known recent victim of Soviet repression against the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy is Reverend Vasyl Romaniuk.

* According to K. Z. Lytvyn, the present Chairman of the governmental Council for Religious Affairs in the Ukrainian SSR, there are "close to 4.5 thousand parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church (and) over 1,100 congregations of the Evangelical Christians (and) Baptists" in Soviet Ukraine. In our estimate, this is a grossly inflated figure produced to impress the West with the alleged freedom of conscience in the Ukrainian SSR (K. Z. Lytvyn, Freedom of Conscience An Inalienable Human Right, *Visti z Ukrainy*, Kiev, No. 15 (April 8, 1976), p. 5.

** According to canonical law of the Eastern Orthodox Church, only ordained priests can perform the religious rites.

Handout B-5.2

DISSIDENT PROFILE
THE REV. VASYL ROMANIUK: FREED FROM EXILE

When the Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk, a 57-year-old Orthodox priest and member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, was released from exile in Yakutia last year, he had served a total of 10 years' imprisonment and exile. He was reported to be in extremely poor health, and there were unconfirmed reports that he had recanted his views. News from Ukraine, a Soviet newspaper distributed only in the West, ran a letter purportedly written by the priest in which he said that he renounced his previous human-rights and nationalist activities, and wanted to be left alone.

It is impossible to verify whether the Rev. Romaniuk actually wrote the letter. The Soviets have been known to plant such letters to discourage human-rights activists in the West from supporting their counterparts in the Soviet Union. The Rev. Romaniuk did, however, write a letter in January 1982 to Bishop Robert Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury, in which he expressed the desire to emigrate, and asked the leader of the Church of England to intercede with Soviet authorities.

"I...request your help as I am convinced that the Soviet government will not be able to refuse you as the leader of England's Christians," wrote the Rev. Romaniuk.

The son of Ukrainian peasants, the Rev. Romaniuk was born on December 9, 1925, in Ukraine. He was first arrested in 1944 at age 19 for "nationalist and religious activities," and deported to Siberia for 10 years along with his family. His father died there and his brother was shot while trying to escape. In 1946, he was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" on testimony coerced from other prisoners.

After his release, he began his theological training and was ordained a deacon in 1959. Five years later, he became a priest.

As a priest, the Rev. Romaniuk fought against church corruption and state suppression of religion. As a result of his activities, he was moved from parish to parish. In his last parish, Kosmach, his home was searched and several books were confiscated. In 1970, he received several death threats.

In 1972, the Rev. Romaniuk was arrested after he wrote a letter in defense of imprisoned Ukrainian dissident Valentyn Moroz, who was to be exiled to the West in 1979.

In July, he was sentenced to two years in prison, five years in a special-regimen labor camp and three years of internal exile under Article 62 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code – "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

While in the labor camp, the Rev. Romaniuk lodged over 400 complaints with officials about his sentence and the harsh living conditions prisoners were forced to endure. In addition, he addressed numerous appeals to Western organizations on behalf of other imprisoned believers and human-rights activists.

In 1976, shortly before he was to go into exile, the Rev. Romaniuk renounced his Soviet citizenship and declared his desire to emigrate to the West, where he said he would be able to worship and live freely.

While in exile, he continued lodging complaints and appeals to Western organizations. In the fall of 1979, he joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Group from his place of exile.

In 1982, he was released from exile, but his exact whereabouts are unknown. It is possible that he joined his wife, Maria, in Ivano-Frankivske, but human-rights organizations in the West have been unable to communicate with her.

It is known that in the past year his wife has been harassed by Soviet authorities. The hundreds of registered letters sent to her by Amnesty International have never reached her.

The couple's son, Taras, has also been the target of official abuse. In 1977, he received a "vyzov" from a source in Canada inviting him to emigrate, a first step in securing an exit visa. He was then expelled from university because of his father's "criminal record," and in 1978 he was drafted into the army.

He was assigned to a so-called construction battalion in Kharkiv. These battalions usually consist of "undesirable" elements who cannot be placed elsewhere in the armed services. After completing his army service, he tried to be reinstated at the university, but was rejected.

Taken from: "Dissident Profile – The Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk: Freed from Exile," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (June 19, 1983), p.2. Used by permission of *The Ukrainian Weekly*.

Handout B-5.3

THE FORCIBLE "REUNION" OF THE UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLICS WITH THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church dates back to 1596, when the Council of Brest proclaimed the Union of Ukrainian and Belorussian dioceses with the Roman Apostolic See. According to the terms of the Union, the Ukrainian Uniates retained all the rituals and customs of the Orthodox Church, such as the Divine Liturgy and the canons, etc., while recognizing the Pope as the head of the Church.

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The Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland in September 1939 resulted in the annexation of Western Ukraine to the USSR, bringing down upon the Uniate Church the first wave of Communist persecution. Between September 1939 and June 1941, all Greek Catholic monasteries and convents, church schools, publications, charitable institutions and lay organizations were suppressed. The diocesan seminaries were closed. As for the clergy, discriminatory taxation was imposed upon it and a number of its members arrested. Over 40 priests were either deported or executed. At the same time the Communists unleashed a campaign of anti-religious propaganda, some of it aimed specifically at the Uniate Church. . . .

Taken from: *Soviet Persecution of Religion in Ukraine* (Human Rights Commission, World Congress of Free Ukrainians).

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After the three-year-long German occupation of Western Ukraine during World War II, the Soviet regime re-established its hold over the area by the summer of 1944. . . .

After a brief period of relative tolerance that lasted until March 1945, the Uniate Church was subjected to a campaign of slander and intimidation in the Soviet Ukrainian press. Acting in concert with the Kremlin, the newly-elected Patriarch of Moscow, Aleksei, issued, early in 1945, a pastoral letter inviting the Ukrainian Uniates to "rejoin" voluntarily the Russian Orthodox Church.

On April 11, 1945, the entire Greek Catholic hierarchy in Western Ukraine, including Metropolitan Josyf Slipyi was arrested by the NKVD. In late May the police rounded up leading members of the clergy.

On June 26-27, 1946, the Communist Polish authorities seized and extradited to the USSR Bishop Josafat Kotsylovsky and his co-adjutor, Bishop Hryhorii Lakota.

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On May 28, 1945, the so-called "Action Group for the Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church" appeared on the scene. . . .

The first step of the "Action Group," whereby it proclaimed itself as the only legal leadership of the Church to be recognized by the Soviet authorities, encountered determined opposition from the Ukrainian Catholic clergy and laymen. A group of 300 Uniate priests signed a protest and appealed for the release of the arrested Bishops. Nevertheless, on June 18, 1945, the Soviet government, recognized the "Action Group" as

...the sole provisional, ecclesiastical and administrative organ having the right to direct, without reservation, the existing Greek Catholic parishes in the Western Regions of Ukraine and promote their reunion with the Russian Orthodox Church.

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The "Action Group" now undertook a campaign of intensive indoctrination designed to "persuade" the Uniate clergy to attend special conferences. At these conferences the Uniate clergy was asked to renounce the Union. At first, anti-Uniate arguments were used. Then threats were brought into play. If the clergyman was not yet "convinced" of the need for the "reunion," the NKVD (Soviet secret police) took over. If NKVD "persuasion" failed to break the resistance of a "recalcitrant" cleric, he was summarily sentenced to forced labour or deportation, the average sentence being 10 years.

In this way, some 986 priests, or 49% of the entire Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy, were "convinced" by March 1946, of the need for "reunion." Yet there were 1,020 "recalcitrant" priests, 740 of whom were imprisoned, deported or in hiding and 280 of whom were still at large as of March 1946.

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Meanwhile, in Kiev, at the beginning of March 1946, having refused to be "converted" to Russian Orthodoxy, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishops were indicted for their alleged "traitorous activities and collaboration with the German occupation forces." In a secret trial the following June the hierarchs were sentenced to long terms at forced labour. . . .

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Handout B-5.3 (cont.)

Following the sentencing of the bishops, "Reunion Sobor" was staged in Lviv from March 8 to 10, 1946. No election of delegates was held in advance. The agenda and rules of the "Sobor" were not published beforehand. The event itself was withheld from public knowledge until after the "reunion" was proclaimed. Only 216 clerics and 19 laymen, allegedly "representing" the entire Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, participated in the "Sobor" by invitation of the "Action Group."

By means of an open vote it was "resolved" to annul the 350-year-old Union with Rome and to "return" to Orthodoxy and to the Russian Orthodox Church. . . .

Shortly after this, the "Action Group" leaders travelled to Moscow for the "reunion" festivities held in Moscow. On this occasion, the leaders of the "Action Group" informed T.A.S.S. reporters that the liquidation of the Ukrinian Greek Catholic Church was of a perfectly "voluntary" nature: "there were no arrests of Greek Catholic clergy either before or after the Sobor; and, as for the arrests of the episcopate and "several priests," they were arrested. . . for their treasonable activity."

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There can be no doubt that the Soviet government was the real initiator of the "Sobor", since it was the government which had vested the uncanonical "Action Group" with supreme authority within the Greek Catholic Church, endorsed its programme of "reunion" with the Russian Church, and employed its propaganda media and the police to compel the rank and file clergy to submit to the "Action Group." The "Sobor" was convened with the permission and aid of the Soviet authorities, with their representatives present during the proceedings; which were also recorded on film by Soviet cameramen. The government's involvement in calling this "Sobor" was also evident from the eagerness with which the authorities, the police and the courts proceeded to implement its decisions.

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For years a portion of the Uniates, particularly the urban intelligentsia, boycotted the "reunited" churches, attending instead the few Roman Catholic churches remaining in Western Ukraine. In numerous priestless parishes the faithful refused to allow Russian Orthodox clergy to take over the local church.

As for the clergy who "accepted" Orthodoxy, their forcible "conversion" was in form only and they remained Uniates at heart, continuing to observe the traditional Greek Catholic practices.

IN THE CATACOMBS*

Ukrainian Catholic communities continue to exist in the Soviet Union almost thirty years after the official abolition of their Church. Numerous references in Soviet sources are proof of this. Other evidence, including documentation coming from Uniate sources in Ukraine, conclusively demonstrates that the Russian Orthodox Church has not been accepted in the Western Ukraine. The most telling proof of this is the fact that Soviet propaganda and Orthodox Church representatives are continuously waging a vigorous campaign against the Ukrainian Catholic Church – through books, pamphlets, periodicals and television programmes, movies, lectures and exhibits – designed to falsify the historical record of this Church, slander its leaders and the clergy, and intimidate its faithful.

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Today the underground Uniate Church is said to embrace at least 300-350 priests, headed by three or more secret bishops. They recognize the authority of the Church's primate, Cardinal Josyf Slipyi, who after nearly eighteen years imprisonment was released by the regime in 1963 and allowed to leave for Rome. He died in Rome in 1984.

A certain number of Unkrainian Catholic priests live outside Western Ukraine, in exile or as free settlers in Siberia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and also in Eastern Ukraine, often serving their flocks from afar.

Members of religious communities and monastic orders have maintained close contact with each other and most have remained faithful to their vows. In a few cases they have preserved the nuclei of communal living. In 1974, a clandestine Uniate convent was uncovered by police in Lviv.

Almost invariably these clergymen and monastics hold full-time secular jobs or have now retired from such employment. The identities of the older clergy seem to be known to the Soviet police who frequently subject them to searches, interrogations, and fines but stop short of arrests unless they have extended their activities beyond a narrow circle of friends in private homes. However, it appears that Soviet authorities are much more ruthless in dealing with the "new," secretly-ordained priests.

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* Underground

Handout B-5.3 (cont.)

Some of the "illegal" religious activities carried out by the priests and the faithful are: holding of religious services, education of children in the Catholic faith, baptisms, wedding rites, confessions and anointments of the ill, funerals, copying religious materials, prayer books, icons, church calendars, and possession of religious books and other sacred objects. Soviet sources reveal numerous instances of this. A recent example is the case of Rev. Ivan Kryvy who was arrested in 1973 for organizing the printing of a Ukrainian Catholic prayer book (actually a reprint of a prayer book published in Canada in 1954) in three consecutive editions (1969, 1971, and 1972) totalling 3,500 copies. The work was done by two employees of the Lviv state printing shop who were also arrested in 1973, together with another person involved in the distribution of these materials. In the same manner, the clandestine printers also produced 150 copies of a "Carol and Church Songs" book, and 150 copies of the "Missal."

The most active lay people and clergy of the "illegal" Church try to use legal means to defend their Church. There were cases where the believers tried to legalize their Ukrainian Catholic communities according to Soviet law by petitioning the proper authorities to permit their parish congregation to operate openly. A number of such petitions were sent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. All of these petitions were refused. Most recently, a Ukrainian Catholic priest, the Rev. Volodymry Prokopiv, was arrested for accompanying a delegation of Ukrainians to Moscow with a petition, signed by large numbers of faithful from the Lviv region, asking for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The Soviet response to such petitions was to sharpen repressive measures against the activist Uniate clergy, monastics and lay people and to intensify their propaganda.

The case of the persecuted Ukrainian Catholics was taken up by the Ukrainian dissent movement. Its organ, the **Ukrainian Herald**, has, since 1970, carried accounts of the harassment, searches, arrests and trials of the Uniates.

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RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN UKRAINE

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Although it is not prohibited, the Roman Catholic Church has been on the decline due to anti-religious government policies.

In the course of Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign of 1959-1964, the overwhelming majority of Roman Catholic churches were closed. At present there also exists a serious lack of clergy as a result of the unavailability of facilities for their training. The remaining Roman Catholic parishes in Ukraine are without a bishop or vicar-general of their own.

A representative case of the persecution of the Roman Catholic Church is that of the **Rev. Bernard V. Mitskevych (Mickevicius)**. Rev. Mitskevych was arrested at the end of 1973 and sentenced to an undisclosed term of imprisonment. His "crimes" consisted of attempting to recruit new members to his congregation from among the local townfolk, repairing the dilapidated church buiding, teaching religion to children, and organizing prayer meetings.

THE EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS AND BAPTISTS

The Evangelical Christians and Baptists enjoy by far the largest following of any Protestant group in Ukraine, being particularly strong in the industrialized urban centres where most of the Orthodox churches have been closed.

The more radical wing of this church split away from the government-recognized All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (ECB) in the early 1960s, in protest against its passive position **vis-a-vis** government interference into internal church affairs. Popularly known as the **initsiatyvnyky**, the dissidents formed a Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, which is banned and severely persecuted by the authorities for its insistence on religious freedom. During the past decade its adherents have suffered repressions more severe than has any other religious group in Ukraine.

At least 43 **initsiatyvnyky** from the Ukraine SSR are known to be currently serving various sentences. The total number no doubt far exceeds this. Among the victims of Soviet repressions one leading Baptist dissident should be mentioned:

Pastor Georgii Vins of Kiev, the executive secretary of Churches of the Evangelical Christians and Baptists and one of its foremost activists, was arrested in March 1974 and in January 1975 and was sentenced to 5 years in prison and 5 additional years in exile for his "unauthorized religious activities." Vins is currently living in the United States.

UKRAINIAN REFORMED AND LUTHERAN CHURCH

Banned since World War II in Soviet Ukraine are the Ukrainian Evangelical Reformed

Handout B-5.3 (cont.)

Church and the Ukrainian Lutheran Church. Dating from the 1920s, the two Churches had by 1939 about 30 congregations and some 15 ministers each with a combined total of 10,000 followers in Western Ukraine. During the first Soviet occupation, a number of Reformed and Lutheran ministers and laymen were arrested or deported. Among them was the Reformed Pastor Teodosii Dovhaliuk who met a martyr's death in a concentration camp on the Solovetsky Islands in 1943, and the Lutheran Pastor Teodor Yarchuk who disappeared after his arrest by the NKVD in 1939. Other ministers of the two churches were imprisoned by the Soviet authorities after 1944. Some of them, including Lutheran preacher S. Ostapovych, were still in Siberian exile as late as 1973.

Today, of the evangelical denominations, only Hungarian Calvinists in Transcarpathia – some 80 to 100 thousand strong – are allowed by Soviet authorities to worship legally, albeit under strict governmental supervision.

SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS

Although officially "recognized" by the state, the Seventh Day Adventists, like other religious groups, have been subjected over the past two decades to recurrent attacks and slander. During Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign, the central body of the Soviet Adventists was suppressed. More than half of the Adventists churches have been closed. As in the case of other religious groups, the Adventists are not allowed to offer religious instruction to their children. As a result, there have been cases of children being forcibly taken away from their parents because of the latter's "violation" of this ruling.

One such case was that of two sisters, Mariia Floreskul and Orysia Kondriuk from Berehomet, Chernivtsi **oblast**. In early 1976, they were both sentenced to "prolonged incarceration" for practising their religion and attempting to teach it to their nine- year old orphaned nephew.

PENTECOSTALS

Also active in Ukraine are the Pentecostals, the more radical wing of which has refused to join the "official" Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists. It continues its activities underground.

Recently some independent Pentecostal congregations have been registered by the authorities in Kharkiv, Odessa and Chernivtsi. This has occurred because they apparently "turned away from fanatical rites and began to conduct legal activities." But other Pentecostal communities continue to experience administrative harassment and persecution.

One of the better-known persecuted Pentecostal believers is **S.H. Salamakha**, a senior presbyter for Voroshylovhrad **oblast**. He was tried in March 1973 and sentenced under article 209-1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR for "unauthorized religious activities" to a term of 5 years' imprisonment and 4 years' exile.

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES

The Jehovah's Witnesses are banned in the Soviet Union as a sect whose doctrines allegedly have an "anti-state and fanatic character." The Jehovah's Witnesses have been severely persecuted and many of them (primarily from Ukraine) are reportedly imprisoned or have been sent into exile.

An example of such a case is that of **Vira Iovna Bozhar**, born in 1924. She was arrested in 1963 and sentenced under article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" to 7 years' severe-regime labour camp and 5 years' exile.

JUDAIC COMMUNITIES

The Jewish population of the Soviet Union has long endured religious and national persecution, the two being closely intertwined. This persecution has been intensified as a result of the anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli overtones of official Soviet propaganda.

In the Ukrainian SSR, where some 800,000 Jews reside, most of the Judiac religious communities have been disbanded, with only eight synagogues and one active rabbi remaining. Most of the Jewish cemeteries have been destroyed. Recently the cemetery in Sarny, **Rovno oblast**, has been turned into a refuse dump.

The Jewish population in the Ukrainian SSR is not allowed any central or regional representation, and contacts with Jewish religious centres abroad are prohibited. There is a ban in the USSR in general on the teaching of Hebrew, and, since 1949, of Yiddish as well. There are no facilities in Ukraine for the production of religious articles, and no Judaic publications.

Handout B-5.4

PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE: Yosyp Terelia

Andrew Sorokowski

On September 9, 1982, Yosyp Terelia and four associates founded the Action Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church with the aim of obtaining legalization of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church. Formerly known as the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, this branch of the Uniate Church formed by the 1596 Union of Brest was forcibly dissolved and incorporated in the Russian Orthodox Church at the staged Lviv Synod of March 8-10, 1946.

Recent information appearing in the underground Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine and Ukrainian Catholic Herald indicates that Soviet authorities have offered to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church, but only as an "autocephalous" church with no ties to the Holy See. According to the Chronicle, Mr. Terelia has refused the offer. Obviously, breaking with Rome would be tantamount to renouncing Catholicism. But Mr. Terelia's objection is also based on another, possibly independent ground. It concerns the manner and effects of legalization under Soviet law and under Soviet religious and political conditions.

The sixth issue of the Chronicle contains a mock transcript, evidently compiled from memory by Mr. Terelia, of his conversations of April 23-24, 1984, with representatives of the Soviet Ukrainian government, the Communist Party, the atheist educational establishment and, apparently, the KGB, in Uzhhorod, Transcarpathian region. In response to their urgings to register his Church with the authorities, Mr. Terelia pointed out one advantage of illegal status: "Presently, the Ukrainian Catholic Church is not under your control and we make the decisions concerning our own matters... I do want legalization, but not the kind that you're offering."

Mr. Terelia's objection to the kind of legalization offered by the Soviet representatives becomes clear when one examines the Soviet legislation on religious associations (Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of April 8, 1929, as amended by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of June 23, 1975). Registration of a religious society or group of believers is only the first of a series of requirements that permit the state to interfer directly in the affaris of a Church and confine its activity to the performance of religious rites. Christians who, like Mr. Terelia, believe that their faith goes beyond worshipping within the four walls of a Church, find that these regulations suffocate the Christian life.

The first issue of the Ukrainian Catholic Herald, dating from about the same time as Mr. Terelia's encounter with the Soviet representatives, includes an article cast in interview format and titled "Ten Answers to Ten Questions." "Sometimes the thought arises within me," muses Mr. Terelia, "do we really need this legalization? Under conditions of constant terror against Christians, is it not better to be underground?... And having given us 'freedom,' the KGB would destroy everything that is alive in our Church..." He relates that after his last term of imprisonment (December 24, 1982, to December 26, 1983) he became a fierce opponent of legalization.

"It would be very convenient for you," retorts Mr. Terelia to the Soviet officials in the account of the Uzhhorod meeting, "to transform our Church into what the Russian Orthodox Church already is." Certainly the experience of that Church illustrates the dangers of legalization. One need only peruse the "Furov reports" – in which the Council on Religious Affairs informs the Communist Party Central Committee on the Russian Orthodox Church in the late 1960s and early 1970s – to see how the government controls the Church from the patriarch and the hierarchy down to the parish level. Furthermore, one can deduce that it is government policy not merely to regulate a Church, but to subvert and, in the long run, to liquidate it.

If this last point seems an exaggeration, Ukrainians need not look far for its proof. In the 1920s the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, tied to no foreign center and in full compliance with Soviet legislation, was progessively manipulated, divided and undermined. Finally, in 1930, the Soviet authorities compelled it to liquidate itself altogether.

This lesson has apparently not been lost on Ukrainian Catholics. If legalization presents the prospect of submitting to crippling and ultimately fatal regulations, it is not surprising that Mr. Terelia and his group are skeptical. It is a poor substitute for religious liberty.

Meanwhile, Action Group member the Rev. Hryhoriy Budzinsky was detained for six weeks late last year, and its chairman, Vasyl Kobryn, was arrested and sentenced on March 22, to three years in a labor camp under ordinary regimen. Mr. Terelia, arrested on February 8, is reportedly charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and is presumably awaiting trial.

Andrew Sorokowski is researcher on Ukraine at Keston College. The article above is reprinted from the commentary section of Keston News. Used by permission of *The Ukrainian Weekly*.

Handout B-6.1

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The criminal codes of the Union Republics of the USSR contain in identical form two articles which explicitly circumscribe freedom of expression. In the RSFSR Criminal Code they are Article 70 and Article 190-1.

Article 70 states:

"Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime (*vlast*) or of committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state, or the circulation for the same purpose of slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system, or the circulation or preparation or keeping, for the same purpose, of literature of such content, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of six months to seven years, with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years, or by exile for a term of two to five years.

"The same actions committed by a person previously convicted of especially dangerous crimes against the state or committed in wartime shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of three to ten years, with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years."

The official Commentary to Article 70 states... that agitation and propaganda may be carried out orally or by circulating written materials or pictorial art. "Agitation" consists of disseminating materials of anti-Soviet character to a "small" group of people, while "propaganda" consists of disseminating such materials to a "larger" group of people.

Section 3 of the Commentary states:

Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of undermining or weakening the Soviet regime – this is disseminating within a more or less sizeable circle of people opinions or ideas which communicate hatred towards the Soviet state or social system and an effort to overturn the Soviet regime, to renounce the conquests of the socialist revolution to the benefit of the restoration of capitalism and similar actions committed to the advantage of anti-socialist forces.

Section 5 states:

Distributing for the same purposes slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system – this is passing on to other people by one means or another (verbally, by printed means, through pictures) information which is known not to correspond to reality and which is aimed at discrediting the Soviet regime, the Communist Party, Soviet democracy or socialist social relations to the advantage of anti-socialist forces.

These passages make clear that the purpose of this law is to make punishable by imprisonment the dissemination of ideas or information on the grounds that their dissemination is inimical to the established political order.

The Commentary to Article 70 includes stipulations which would have the ameliorating effects of at least restricting the application of Article 70 and requiring stringent standards of proof for convictions under it. Section 10 of the Commentary states:

"Anti-Soviet agitation or propaganda is a crime committed *with the direct intention* and the special goal of undermining or weakening the Soviet regime or of committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state. *While committing the crime the culprit (vinovny) is aware* that it is with the aforementioned purpose that he is disseminating anti-Soviet ideas and opinions or slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state or social system, or *is conscious* that he is disseminating, preparing or storing literature of such content and that in this *he aspires* to the undermining or weakening of the Soviet regime or to the commission of particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state. (Emphasis added by Amnesty International.)"

Thus, according to the Commentary, people can be convicted of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda only if it can be proved that in disseminating any material it was their considered intention to undermine or weaken the Soviet state, or if it can be proved that at the time of their actions they knew that the material which they disseminated or stored contained slanderous falsehoods against the state.

In practice, these restricting clauses have not been observed by Soviet courts when dealing with cases of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Similar to Article 70 is Article 190-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. This article states:

"The systematic circulation in an oral form of fabrications known to be false which defame the Soviet state and social system and, likewise, the preparation or circulation in written, printed or any other form of works of such content shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding three years, or by corrective tasks for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding 100 rubles."

This article differs from Article 70 in that it carries less severe penalties. However, Article 190-1 can more easily be applied since conviction under it requires no proof of "anti-Soviet intent" on the part of the defendant.

Handout B-6.2

VASYL STUS: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A UKRAINIAN POET

Marco Carynnyk

The bare biographical facts are clear. Born in 1938, the Ukrainian poet Vasyl Stus published his first poems at the age of 21. Five years later he began graduate studies in literature. In 1965 he joined the dissidents movement that had begun to emerge in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev's revelations of the crimes of the Stalin era and wrote appeals in defense of persecuted intellectuals.

The Soviet regime's response was the standard one: Mr. Stus was expelled from graduate school, blacklisted as a writer and prevented from finding employment.

In January 1972, when the KGB was ordered to smash the samvydav* and hundreds of Ukrainian dissidents were arrested, Mr. Stus was charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." After nine months of imprisonment and interrogation, he was sentenced to five years' labor camp and three years' internal exile.

Perhaps because he was one of the most outspoken critics of the regime, Mr. Stus was treated with particular severity in the labor camp. Despite a severe ulcer that led to the removal of most of his stomach, he was denied medical care, and many of his manuscripts – some 600 poems and translations – were confiscated and destroyed....

But the poet's plight, if not his poetry, attracted the attention of his colleagues. Amnesty International took an interest in his case; American universities invited him to lecture; the English section of International PEN made him an honorary member, and at The Writer and Human Rights Congress in Toronto in 1981 Mr. Stus was one of seven imprisoned writers for whom chairs were reserved on the platform.

When he had completed his labor-camp term, Mr. Stus was transported to his place of exile: the vast Kolyma region of arctic Siberia. He described his experiences there in a notebook that reached the West in 1983. Excerpts from this notebook follow.

VASYL STUS' NOTEBOOK

Vasyl Stus

Translated by Marco Carynnyk and George Luckyj

Part I: Life in internal exile

... on March 5 (1977) I arrived at Kolyma. Behind me were 53 days, almost two full months, of transit. I remember the cell at the prison in Cheliabinsk and the swarms of roaches on the walls; as I looked at them I felt my whole body itching. Then came the Novosibirsk transit prison and the terrible jail at Irkutsk, where I was thrown into a cell with alimony defaulters. Lousy, dirty, stupefied, they spread a spirit of asphyxiating provincial freedom that made me want to howl like a wolf: this sort of life is also possible; this prison misery is also endurable. The drunken guards at Irkutsk seemed to resemble despotic gendarmes of the time of Nicholas I or Alexander II. One of them almost beat me because I spoke up about his brutal behavior.

Finally, Khabarovsk, and then a passenger plane in which the free and the unfree were separated by rows of seats....

And then, suddenly, Kolyma[1]: a cold, low sky, a small prison in a clearing, relatively good food and a warm, dark solitary cell. Once they had been deloused, even my clothes were tolerable.

Several days later I was driven in a Black Maria[2] with a small cast-iron stove inside to Ust-Omchug, 400 kilometers from Magadan. After being held in a preliminary-detention cell for several days, I was called in by Pereverzev, the militia commandant, who told me that I would be working as a miner at the Matrosov Mine and living in Room 6 at the communal quarters. Since I had complained about my health, he promised to have me examined. The doctors looked me over in about 20 minutes; all of them declared that I was fit. On the evening of March 5 I was brought to the village. In the room that I was to share, several young men were drinking vodka. No one was surprised to see me. Two radios and a tape-recorder were blasting. Gaiety filled the room.

I was assigned to a Communist shock brigade. Almost half the workers were party members. They were to rehabilitate me. The dust in the mine was terrible because there was no ventilation: blind vertical drifts were being drilled. The hammer weighed about 50 kilograms (110 pounds), the bar 85. When "windows" were being drilled, we had to use shovels. The respirator (a gauze mask) would become wet and covered with a layer of dust within half an hour. Then you would take it off and work without protection.

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* Samvydav – Clandestine, underground publication.

Taken from: Marco Carynnyk. "Vasyl Stus: The Life and Death of a Ukrainian Poet," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (September 15, 1985), pp. 7; 12-14. Used by permission of *The Ukrainian Weekly*.

[1] A region in northeast Siberia.

[2] A Black Maria is a panel truck or van used to transport prisoners.

Handout B-6.2 (cont.)

They say that young men (who have just finished their military service) develop silicosis[3] after six months of such work. You cannot see the shovel you are working with because of the dust. When you finish work, there isn't a dry thread left on you, and you step out into the icy air of the unheated cage. Pneumonia, myositis and radiculitis are the scourge of every miner. And then there are the vibrations and the silica dust.

The accident rate at the mine is quite high. Ceilings cave in, crushing miners; drillers fall down slopes or under trucks; almost every second man has had his arms, legs, or ribs crushed. But for 500 to 700 rubles a month people are afraid of nothing. If he doesn't go to drink or become a cripple, a miner can save enough money in five years to buy a car. And Kolyma does offer food, although you can't always get meat. But then, where can you?

I would come back to my room and collapse with exhaustion. There was only work and sleep – nothing in between. I endured this for three months and then had to declare that with my health I was not up to work like this. The militia was angry and the first persecution began. In addition, I changed my room. This was a new infraction of the rules: how dare I do so when (contrary to the regulations dealing with exile) I had been ordered to live in this room and no other, with these people and no others! But their constant drinking left me no peace.

In May I was summoned to the district center and warned that if I disobeyed any other rules I would be brought to trial again. I cited the rules of exile, which allowed me to decide where I wanted to live within the district. Pereverzev only smiled maliciously and began swearing. I decided to put him in his place; no one had used such language with me even in the concentration camp, and if he didn't stop swearing, I would leave. It was he who summoned me, and so he had better speak decently.

Then my wife came to visit, and we were given a room at the so-called hotel, where two KGB agents listened to everything we said. Once they broke into our room, sat down at the table, and one of them, taking out a knife, began to test my nerves. I refused to fall for this cheap trick. One of my roommates wanted to give me a knife; I turned down the gift even though I didn't know that this was a provocation that could lead to a conviction (possession of a weapon).

When my wife left, I had an accident: my roommate had taken off for a few days without leaving me the key, and when I tried to get in through the window, I fell and broke both heels. I was taken to the hospital; my feet were placed in casts, and a new occupant was moved into my room. Having become used to the total surveillance, I had no doubt where this occupant came from. After two months in the hospital, I came back to my room. I had plaster casts with metal arches on both feet. Outside there was frost and snow. The outhouse was 200 meters away. I had crutches, and my toes protruded from my casts. This time the room was empty. Going for water, down to the canteen or out for nature's call became a very difficult problem. I'd come back from these voyages with my forehead covered in cold sweat.

Having solved the transportation problem simply by cutting off the casts, which I was supposed to have worn another two months, I worked on my poems. Occasionally I went to the post office, which in the life of an exile provides a semi-existence and makes human contacts possible. . . .

I had to fight a real war with the KGB over my letters. Dozens of letters just disappeared. My complaints were answered in a very peculiar way: the mailbag at the Magadan airport had a hole. Several times I whipped off telegrams to Andropov (then the chairman of the KGB): your service is stealing my letters. The telegrams went off, but they brought no results. Or only negative ones. This became apparent during my monthly visits to the militia (for the so-called registration). It was a trip of more than 30 kilometers, to the village of Gastello.

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Then the hounding took a new turn. Several drunkards were put in my room. (They would be witnesses at my next trial.) They drank in my room, and one of them even urinated in my tea pot. When I protested, they said, "Keep quiet, or you'll find yourself where you were." I demanded that they be moved – in vain. I tried to find another room and was forbidden to do so.

I learned that the KGB, the militia and the party committee were assiduously setting people against me. One man was asked to plant a rifle or a knife among my belongings, another – to get me drunk. They were promised 1,500 rubles (twice the monthly wages at Kolyma). And to what state? Just as long as there's a scent, came the answer. But I didn't know this yet. Every evening someone would visit me – a Komsomol patrol or the militia. The conversations were malevolent, provocative. Captain Liubavin was especially obnoxious. I decided simply not to react whenever he appeared.

Just then I received a telegram that my father was on his deathbed. But the militia wouldn't let me go home, and I had to declare a hunger strike in protest. They allowed me to go in a week, but

[3] Silicosis is a lung disease.

Handout B-6.2 (cont.)

before they did so they held me overnight in a preliminary-detention cell for posting a sign on my door: "Do not disturb. A hunger striker demanding the right to bury his father." All the way home from Ust-Omchuga to Donetske* I was accompanied by a squad of KGB spies. After burying my father, I returned to Kolyma as if it were prison. I sensed that I could be locked up again at any time.

While I returned to Magadan, a summons to the regional KGB was awaiting me. I had to spend the night at a hotel (60 kilometers by road). Safonov, the deputy commandant, received me. He read me a second warning with a threat to put me on trial.

In Ust-Omchuga, when I went to see militia commandant Pereverzev, a new surprise was awaiting me: Supriaga, the assistant editor of the regional newspaper Leninist Banner, announced that she was planning to write an article about me and asked several provocative questions. I told her that I was familiar with her genre and preferred not to answer. Sure enough, in a little while a long article titled "Vasyl Stus's Friends and Enemies" appeared. It mentioned everything: I was receiving parcels from abroad; I had torn up my trade- union membership card when I learned that the trade unions were objecting to my receiving medical treatment; many workers at the mine had given "testimony" against me.

As it turned out, Supriaga had not wasted time: she had been making expeditions to the mine and preparing her article while I was in Donetske. A number of people told me later that they had said nothing of the sort, but Supriaga, fortified by her KGB armor, understood her journalistic duties in her own way. "Stus is ready to rob and kill," testified a nurse in the Transportation Department. "He looks like the Fascist who killed children in my presence."

I had once refused to work because there were no respirators. I was promised one for myself. I rejected it, stressing that every miner had to have a respirator. I was defending a general principle and protesting against a violation of industrial safety rules. Respirators were finally found, and every man was issued one. But I was punished for a "strike." Supriaga did not fail to mention this incident, but distorted the facts beyond recognition.

Just then my wife arrived. The article had its effect. People avoided me like the plague. I realized how easy it is to manipulate public opinion, especially when there is no public and people have no opinions. Seeing that it was useless to sue Supriaga (no Soviet court would agree to take such a case), I insisted that I be allowed to reply to her publicly. The authorities agreed. They summoned an open meeting of the mine committee and invited selected members of the public. There was even a reporter from the paper (Supriaga did not come.)

When I began to rebut the lies, the stage managers saw that their show might flop and refused to let me speak. There was nothing left to do but to accuse the public of cowardice and to leave the meeting hall with my wife. The storm in the press did not die down; in the usual Soviet fashion, dozens of readers expressed indignation about my behavior.

Now my situation became even more dramatic. Saying good-bye to my wife, I told her that we would probably meet again in a camp. She tearfully agreed. But I was prepared not to bow my head no matter what happened. Behind me stood Ukraine and my oppressed people, whose honor I had to defend to the death.

All this time I was not receiving any medical treatment. On coming home from work, with no sensation in my feet, I would heat water in a basin with an electrical heater and soak my feet in a salt bath. My left foot was permanently crippled: the surgeon had simply not noticed. I had to put on the paraffin applications by myself.

But the provocations increased. Once after a heavy cold, when my roommate had come back from the "continent," I drank a bit of brandy, not knowing that I was not allowed to drink. The militia immediately found out, and when I went outside for a moment that evening, they pounced on me and took me to a sobering station. I told them that I would go on a political hunger strike if they didn't stop the joke. The doctor who was summoned by the militia diagnosed light intoxication. I sat down to write a protest to the procurator. My attackers took me back to my room.

Later I learned that the militia had decided to sign me up for compulsory alcoholism treatment and needed some small pretext. That was when they offered 1,500 rubles for getting me drunk. But the trick didn't work. I would often find the door broken in when I came home from work and had to check my belongings in my room to make sure that no rifle, knife or pornography had been planted.

So I submitted a declaration to the procurator's office; if weapons, explosives or gold dust were found among my belongings, that would be the result of a provocation. Driven to the very limit, in late 1978 I sent a declaration to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in which I again renounced my Soviet citizenship. I wrote that the ban on writing, the constant denigration of my human and national dignity, the conditions in

* An industrial city in eastern Ukraine.

which I was made to feel a property of the KGB and in which my Ukrainian patriotism was regarded as a crime against the state, the national and cultural pogrom in Ukraine – all these compelled me to declare that holding Soviet citizenship was quite impossible for me. To be a Soviet citizen means to be a slave. I am not fit for such a role. The more I am tortured and abused, the greater is my resistance to my slavery and to the system of abuse of a man and his elementary rights.

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CONCLUSION

After completing his term of exile in August 1979, Vasyl Stus returned to Kiev and was assigned a job in a foundry. He also joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, which Mykola Rudenko had founded to monitor Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords.

When I returned to Kiev, a surprise was awaiting me. A week before my arrival, KGB agents had broken into my apartment, seized my wife when she tried to get in, forced her into a car and drove her around for two hours while the visitors rummaged in the apartment.

I also learned that the people close to the Helsinki Group* were being brutally persecuted. Ovsienko. Horbal and Lytvyn had been put on trial, and scores had been settled with Chornovil and Rozumny. Such a Kiev I did not want to see. Realizing that the group had been forsaken, I decided to join it, because I could not do otherwise. If my life had been taken away, I did not need the crumbs. I set about rescuing my poems and contributing to the informational work of the group.

Psychologically, I understood that in a matter of days the prison gate would close behind me for a long time. But what could I do? Ukrainians are not allowed to go abroad, and I was not very keen to go. Who would remain, here in Ukraine, to be the voice of indignation and protest? Such was my fate, and fate cannot be chosen. We accept it, such as it is. If we do not accept it, it chooses us by force.

On May 14 (1980) KGB men came to the factory where I was working. That night I was driven to KGB headquarters, where I saw that a warrant for my arrest had been signed on Monday. They had given me two days' grace. There was nothing I could do. A trial was unavoidable. The investigation was a redundant and unnecessary procedure. In the USSR you have to go to jail a second time. Then everything is clear and simple. No surprises.

Charged again with anti-Soviet agitation and propa ganda, Mr. Stus was sentenced in 1980 to 10 years' imprisonment and five years' exile. He was sent to a concentration camp in the Perm region (about 1,000 miles northeast of Moscow).

The present (prison) conditions are worse than those people remember from Mordovia, the black zones or Sosnovka. The police regimen has reached its peak. All appeals remain unanswered and are frequently punished. Three times within six months I was denied visitors; a month later I was forbidden access to the prison shop, and three whole weeks I spent in solitary. Nowhere else was one punished for a hunger strike by the withdrawal of visiting privileges, but here hunger strikes were an infraction of the rules. I was twice punished for hunger strikes – on January 13, 1982, and on the anniversary of the death of Juri Kukk, Mart Niklus's co-defendant. It had never happened before that a guard beat a prisoner, as was the case with Niklus.

Mart was in an isolation cell, writing complaints. The drunken guard Kukushkin opened the cell, struck him in the face with his fist and then began kicking him with his boots. Niklus raised an uproar. We all began to shout and ring the bells. This stopped the drunken boor, who became alarmed. But the administration took him under its wing and began to punish Niklus, accusing him of slandering a vigilant guard, for our demands to punish Kukushkin. In other words, Moscow had given the authorities here carte blanche, and anyone who has any illusions that laws regulate our relations with the administration is profoundly mistaken.

A law of complete lawlessness is what regulates our so-called relations. In the camps we were never forbidden to take off our shirts during the recreation period, but here it is forbidden, and we are punished when we try to catch a bit of sunshine. Searches are conducted in the most arbitrary fashion: they seize anything they like without any notice or official record. We have lost every right to be ourselves, not to mention the right to have books, notebooks and writings.

There is a saying that when God wishes to punish someone, he deprives him of reason. We cannot go on in this way much longer. Pressure such as this is possible only before death. I do not know when death will come for the others, but I personally feel it approaching. I think that I have done everything that I could during my life. Writing is absolutely out of the question: every poem I write is confiscated... .

* A group of Ukrainian dissidents who monitor Soviet human rights violations.

Handout B-6.2 (cont.)

... there's absolutely nothing to read. The gifted writers are either silent or are doing God knows what.

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Impotence in the face of injustice is insulting. How can you remain silent when you know that somewhere behind the prison walls Oleksa Tykhy is in critical condition and is being maltreated? And yet your voice is impotent. As complaints to the procurator are impotent. (They are sure to find "impermissible expressions" in every complaint and to punish the author; I think they punish us just for using the complaint form.) It's insulting when, contrary to Soviet regulations, they forbid you to strip to the waist and sickly Semen Skalych is forced to wear a quilted jacket in terrible heat. It's insulting to talk to a procurator and commandant who cynically and automatically reply "not allowed" to every complaint. Then your voice breaks, and you either refuse to talk to the militia captain or you call him a hangman and a murderer. It's insulting when guards burst into your cell and take away all your writings and books, leaving only five books (including magazines). Confiscation of letters is insulting: almost no one gets letters from indirect relatives or friends.

Everyone has only one permitted addressee, but even his letters do not arrive easily. No hospital or medical treatment, practically speaking, exist. People wait to see the dentist for two to three months, or longer, and even then he does nothing more than pull teeth. And yet almost all the prisoners are ill. . . .

In summer 1981 Oleksa Tykhy* was thrown into a punishment cell three times in a row, for 15 days at a time. It was very cold, and he was bothered by his bad stomach. He couldn't even get up during those 45 days. Noticing his catastrophic condition, a doctor granted permission for him to be given a hot water bottle at night. Oleksa was transferred from the punishment cell to a hospital, where he spent three months, and then returned to his cell.

How painful it is that under our conditions ordinary human solidarity – a general hunger strike and protest – is impossible. For one, people are exhausted by the long struggle; for another, there is the complete ineffectiveness of any sort of resistance under these completely closed conditions. How the soul is crippled when you see but remain silent. Vitaliy Kalynychenko made a few attempts to get in touch with the outside and all in vain. He has no luck. The KGB got hold of his sharply worded protest, and on October 15, 1981, he was placed in solitary for a year.

Six months later, on April 8, 1982, Mart Niklus was given a year of solitary. I was next – after three refusals to be granted a visit and three weeks in a punishment cell. The latter occurred because I lost my temper and called KGB agent Cherkasov a Fascist andGestapo agent. I've stopped writing statements: they produce absolutely no results.

I have been following events in Poland since my time in Kiev. Long live the champions of freedom! The Poles' opposition to Soviet despotism is heartening, and their nationwide tremors are remarkable. Everyone – the workers, the intelligentsia, the students – is on the move, everyone except the Army and the police. If these events continue, the flames will spread to the military. What will the Brezhnevs and Jaruzelskis do then? No other nation within the totalitarian sphere is defending its human and national rights with such dedication.

Poland is setting Ukraine an example. (Psychologically, we Ukrainians are closest to the Poles, but we lack what is most important – the holy patriotism that unites the Poles.) What a pity that Ukraine is not ready to learn from the Polish teacher. But the Soviet and Polish regimes, having resolved to fight their people with brutal police measures, have once again revealed their despotic nature. After Poland, only a complete fool or a scoundrel can believe in Moscow's ideals.

Unfortunately, I do not know what impression Poland has made on the peoples of the USSR and the entire camp. The idea of liberation through free trade unions would be very effective in the USSR. If the beginnings made by the engineer Klebanov were supported throughout the country, the Soviet government would encounter perhaps its most modern antagonist.[1] The Helsinki movement, after all, is "advanced mathematics" for this country, as is the national-patriotic movement. But a movement for living quarters and bread, for proper wages for the worker – that is a common language.

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On September 5, 1985, Vasyl Stus's wife received a telegram from the authorities at the prison where her husband was being held. Mr. Stus had died the previous day. He was the fourth member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group the other three were Yuriy Lytvyn, Valeriy Marchenko and Oleksa Tykhy who died in Soviet prisons this year. The conscience of an oppressed people has been stilled. A voice of indignation and protest has been stifled. Or has it?

* Tykhy was a teacher and human rights activist. He died in prison.

[1] Vladimir Klebanov, a mining foreman from the Donbas, tried to set up an independent trade union and was incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital.

Handout B-7.1

PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE MARCHENKO: UKRAINIAN JOURNALIST ON TRIAL

The trial of Valeriy Marchenko, a Ukrainian journalist, writer and former political prisoner (1973-81) took place in Kiev on March 13, 1984, in the municipal court building at 15 Volodymyr Street.

On March 12, the eve of the trial, Valeriy Marchenko's mother sent a telegram to CPSU General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, and to the head of the Ukrainian S.S.R. KGB General Mus, requesting that her son's trial be open and that his relatives be admitted. When Marchenko saw that none of his relatives or friends were in the courtroom, he announced a hunger strike. The judge then adjourned the trial to the following day.

The trial began on March 13 at 9:30 in the morning and lasted until nine o'clock in the evening. The verdict was read on March 14 at four o'clock in the afternoon. In the courtroom were Valeriy Marchenko's mother (after her interrogation as a witness) and his aunt.

Valeriy Marchenko actively participated in the trial, addressing questions to the witnesses, the judge and the attorney.

He provided clear and precise answers to the prosecutor's questions.

Below we provide an example of the dialogue between Valeriy Marchenko and the prosecutor.

Prosecutor: "For what purpose was the document, anti-Soviet and hostile in its content, prepared?"

V.M.: "For the purpose of telling people the truth."

Prosecutor: "You assert that everything written by you is the truth?"

V.M.: "The pure truth."

Prosecutor: "By what means did this document end up beyond the boundaries of the corrective labor colony?"

V.M.: "I won't say."

Prosecutor: "Why?"

V.M.: "Because you are sentencing people. You have no need of truth. Your need is to put a person in jail."

Prosecutor: "By what means did the indicated document (naming it) get abroad?"

V.M.: "That I do not know.... I won't say.... The Lord alone knows.... I won't answer.... "

Prosecutor: "Imagine, Marchenko, what would happen if every person in our country started writing whatever came into his head, and sending it abroad as well?"

V.M.: "It would be just as in a genuine democratic country."

Prosecutor: "With what purpose was the indicated document sent abroad?"

V.M.: "For publication in the press, and so the people would read it."

Prosecutor: "You are glad that it is being printed there and transmitted by hostile radio stations as well?"

V.M.: "Of course. I would be even gladder if it were printed in my own country.

Valeriy Marchenko, despite his poor health, was sentenced to ten years' confinement in a special regime (harsh labor) camp and five years' exile.

Six months later, on October 7, 1984, Valeriy Marchenko died in prison from the lack of medical attention at the age of 37.

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"Attempts to further 'Russify' Ukraine continued during the review period. Although 75 percent of the Ukrainian SSR is Ukrainian, only 25 percent of available books are in Ukrainian. Ukrainian cultural and historical objects have been neglected and Uniate churches burned. Ukrainians account for 20 percent of the Soviet population, but 40 percent of all Soviet political prisoners."

PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE

HANNA MYKHAILENKO – IN THE PSYCHIATRIC PRISON

Hanna Mykhailenko was well known within the small Ukrainian community in Odessa. Her home was always open to those Ukrainian dissidents who needed a respite from the KGB's surveillance and harassment. Gradually, her home became the center of Ukrainian community life in Odessa. In addition to shelter, Hanna was ever willing to share her meager earnings as a librarian with those who had even less. Her hospitality provided a place for the audiences that came to the seminars offered by the art expert Vasyl Berladianu.

Hanna's skillful pen was often helpful when, under conditions of escalating repression, someone needed to be defended. Among those who were aided by this frail woman were the Siryj

Taken from: Smoloskyp.

Taken from: World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations. Compiled by: Nina Strokata, political prisoner of the USSR (1971-1975), a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, who in 1979, was forced to emigrate from the USSR and now resides in the United States.

family, Leonid Tymchuk, and the author of this article during the difficult period following the release from a labor camp.

Hanna's most obvious character trait was her belief that Ukrainians on Ukrainian soil should be allowed to speak Ukrainian.

In a Russified Odessa, Hanna was an example to those who, exhausted by their immersion in a foreign- language environment, had no strength to defend the Ukrainian language. For example, working as a librarian in Odessa school No. 1, Hanna tried to make sure every child leaving the library took home a Ukrainian language book.

Hanna's activity soon became known to the KGB, and they quickly dubbed her a nationalist. Her home was searched by the KGB for the first time in 1970 or 1971, and continually thereafter for the next ten years. Although no basis for criminal prosecution was found, the KGB clearly attempted to harass Hanna into forsaking her activities. Finally, criminal charges against her were fabricated in 1977. According to the laws of the USSR, the administration of the institution where the accused is employed submits a character description of the accused to the court. In the USSR such a description is traditionally written in Russian. In the Russian text describing Hanna, among other accounts of her, is the following:

"While working for the Odessa school system, Hanna Mychailenko demanded that too much attention be given to the Ukrainian language."

With such a unique characterization, Hanna prepared to stand trial in autumn of 1977.

As it turned out, just as her trial was about to begin, the Soviet government issued an amnesty for some political dissidents on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the charges against Hanna were dropped. She was, nevertheless, dismissed from her job.

This amnesty, however, was short lived for Hanna Mykhailenko. In 1979, new charges were fabricated against Hanna, mentioning her opposition to the Russian chauvinists; her attempts at defending her national dignity were viewed as acts of hooliganism. The court sentenced her to pay 20% of her salary for the next year and a half. She, however, had been unable to find another job since her earlier dismissal, and was thus sentenced by the Court to a period of manual labor. This sentence came down despite medical evidence that Hanna could not perform such labor because of her physical ailments – asthma, a heart ailment, as well as after effects of oncological surgery. Unfortunately, under Soviet law court fines can only be paid from the money earned by the convicted person after the trial. In order that those fined by the court may not avail themselves of aid from other people, a procedure of payments is instituted that excludes such possibilities: the guilty person does not pay the fine himself, but has it paid by the administration of the institution at which he or she works.

Hanna Mykhailenko was one of those Ukrainians who supported the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Groundless arrests of the members of this Group took place with simultaneous repressions against potential members.

The repressions against Hanna from 1977 to 1979 turned out to be a prelude to her current oppression. Hanna was arrested in February 1980. We know now that in September of that year she was undergoing psychiatric tests in the Serbsky Institute in Moscow. In November 1980, on the same day that the Madrid Helsinki Conference convened, Hanna's trial began in Odessa. The Court sent her to a psychiatric prison-hospital. . . .

No information about Hanna has been available since trial in Odessa. The only new information received is that of a change in her address. The length of Hanna's imprisonment cannot be predicted, since psychiatric hospital sentences are indeterminate.

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DISSIDENT PROFILE

MYKOLA RUDENKO: KIEV HELSINKI GROUP CHAIRMAN

To several Ukrainian human-rights activists who knew him, poet Mykola Rudenko was an unlikely candidate for dissent. A decorated Red Army veteran and a former editor of Dnipro, the official journal of the Young Communist League of the Ukrainian SSR, Mr. Rudenko surprised many when he joined Amnesty International in 1974 and, two years later, became a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

But, like many other talented and conscientious Ukrainian intellectuals, Mr. Rudenko could no longer reconcile the obvious hypocrisy of the Communist system with the harsh reality of Soviet life. His decision to speak out was to cost him his position at the top of the official literary establishment, his place in Soviet society and, ultimately, his freedom.

Mykola Danylovych Rudenko was born in 1920 in the Ukrainian village of Yuriyivka in

Taken from: "Mykola Rudenko: Kiev Helsinki Group Chairman," *Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City, New Jersey). Used by permission of *The Ukrainian Weekly*.

Handout B-7.1 (cont.)

the Voroshylohrad region. After completing his education, he served in the Red Army during World War II. Severely wounded, he was classified as an invalid of the second category. For his service, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star and other medals.

After the war, Mr. Rudenko became an editor in an official Ukrainian publishing house, The Soviet Writer. In addition, from 1947 to 1950, he was the managing editor of Dnipro. Also during this period, Mr. Rudenko held the position of deputy secretary and, later, secretary of the party organization of the Writers' Union of Ukraine.

A talented poet, Mr. Rudenko had numerous collections of his poetry published officially in the USSR.

By the early 1970s, however, Mr. Rudenko's work began to change. His verses started to be criticized for idealizing the peasant and the peasant life style.

Soon, he was unable to have his works published, and he was forced to get a job as a factory watchman.

In 1974, Mr. Rudenko was expelled from the Communist Party. Later that year, he joined Amnesty International. Shortly afterwards, he was arrested in Kiev and detained for two days.

In June 1975, Mr. Rudenko was expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine for "behavior incompatible with membership."

On November 9, 1976, Mr. Rudenko and nine other Ukrainian intellectuals and activists founded the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. . . .

In its first declaration, the group called for the free exchange of information and ideas among people, for Ukraine to be represented by its own delegation, at all international conferences and for the accreditation in Ukraine of representatives of the foreign press.

In a brief notice released two days later, on November 11, Mr. Rudenko said that on the day following the formation of the group, his apartment was pelted with rocks by unknown assailants. He reported that Ms. Meshko, then a 70-year-old former political prisoner and one of the founders of the group, was injured by a rock.

"The police summoned to the scene refused to compile a record," he wrote.

One month after the formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, the police conducted a series of searches at the homes of group members. Group documents and manuscripts were confiscated from Mr. Rudenko's apartment.

On February 5, 1977, Mr. Rudenko was arrested along with Mr. Tykhy. The two were charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" under Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.

The closed trial was held in July 1977. Mr. Rudenko was sentenced to seven years in a harsh labor camp to be followed by five years' internal exile. Mr. Tykhy, who was also charged with "illegal possession of a firearm," was sentenced to 10 years in a harsh labor camp to be followed by five years' internal exile.

The court verdict was a lengthy document which contained some 50 individual counts against Mr. Rudenko. Among them were charges that he sent copies of such works as his "Economic Monologues" and samples of his poetry to the West for publication, specifically in Svoboda and the Ukrainian-language journal, Suchasnist.

Among the allegedly anti-Soviet books Mr. Rudenko was accused of having was Ivan Dzyuba's "Internationalism or Russification," a Marxist-Leninist critique of Soviet nationalities policies.

During the trial, the court insisted that the court- appointed lawyer conduct the defense, even though both defendants objected. The attorney defied the defendant's own views by acknowledging them as guilty, conducted only a formal defense and pleaded only for mitigation of the sentence.

Mr. Rudenko is currently ... in a labor camp located in the Perm oblast of the Russian SFSR. Other Helsinki monitors in the same camp are Messrs. Kandyba, Lukianenko and Tykhy, as well as Vitaliy Kalynychenko, Vasyl Ovsienko and Vasyl Stus*.

But the Soviet persecution of Mr. Rudenko did not stop with his arrest and imprisonment. On April 14, 1981, Soviet officials arrested Raisa Rudenko, the poet's wife and tireless co-worker. On September 11 of that year, a Soviet court sentenced the 43-year-old laboratory assistant to 10 years' imprisonment – five years in a labor camp and five years' exile.

She was sent to a labor camp in Mordovia, not far from where her husband was initially imprisoned. But, in a cynical act of inhumanity, Soviet officials transferred Mr. Rudenko to Perm even though, as a prisoner, he would not have been able to visit his wife.

• • •

* Oleksa Tykhy and Vasyl Stus have died since this article was published.

Handout B-7.1 (cont.)

PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE
OKSANA MESHKO

Oksana's fate and that of her family is not dissimilar to the fate of many families who had been persecuted by the Soviet government in Ukraine.

In the period following the Bolshevik Revolution, Oksana's husband was a member of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Upon Stalin's ascension to power, the group was liquidated for its "nationalistic leanings" and Oksana's husband was continually persecuted (including intermittent imprisonments) from 1925 until his death in 1958.

After the birth of their two children, Oksana and her husband moved from Ukraine to another part of the Soviet Union, hoping to escape Stalin's continuing wrath. As it happened, they came to reside in an area which became a battleground between the Nazi and Red Army forces during World War II. Oksana's son Evhen was killed during a bombardment. Oksana perceived this tragic death as a sign that trying to escape from Ukraine would not bring her salvation, and she and her family returned after the war.

Their return brought new crushing blows. Her family had participated in the Ukrainian insurgent groups which had fought both the Nazis and Soviet occupiers of Ukraine. In 1947, one of Oksana's sisters was arrested, and when Oksana sought to defend her, she was also arrested and imprisoned. After Stalin's death, in 1954, Oksana was finally released, and, in 1956, even "rehabilitated."

Taken from: World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations.

During her imprisonment, Oleksander, her other son, contracted tuberculosis, and, his young impressionable mind poisoned by the Soviet propaganda, began to turn away from his mother. Upon Oksana's release and return to her family, however, the past family ties were restored. By the early 1960's, her son was already the subject of surveillance and interrogation by the KGB. In 1972, during a massive anti-Ukrainian move by the KGB, Oleksander was arrested for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," and sentenced to 10 years in a labor camp. Oksana defended her son with the same enthusiasm as she had once defended her sister, and this again brought KGB recriminations against her.

In 1976, Oksana became one of the founding members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, and from that time on her life became a continuing struggle with the Soviet authorities. Finally, shortly before the pageantry of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, Oksana was arrested and sent to a psychiatric hospital. A public outcry in the free world forced the Soviet government to release Oksana from the psychiatric hospital, but could not save her from another arrest and imprisonment. In 1980, she was sentenced to 6 months in a labor camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

The following is an excerpt of a letter received from Oksana when she began her internal exile in Ayan (Khabarovsk region):

"I arrived on July 3, during a rainstorm, and I still feel drenched. You of course know about the devastation of Khabarovsk, it did not bypass us either. In Ayan there are torrential rains, the airport was ruined and air travel – this only link of ours with the world – has stopped. At one time, even the telegraph was not operating. Over 80 telegraph poles are down and now everything is sent through Okhotsk. In two months only three passenger ships arrived, they are now waiting for the fourth and last one, because these ships will no longer be able to maneuver in the Okhotsk sea in September, and others are not planned to arrive in Ayan, for the population in this tiny place is no more than 1,700, therefore most trips are not at all economical. The officials travel in helicopters.

"My son (Oleksander Serhienko) is finishing (his exile term) on the fourth of August and we still don't know how he will leave here, but leave he must without fail. His wife is seriously ill after the birth of their second child – I now have in addition to my 10 year old grandson, Ustym, a granddaughter, Olenka, born March 28 of this year – my daughter-in-law almost does not walk at all.

"I will be left alone in isolation. The winters here are very frightening and the people here frighten me so that it seems impossible to live here. We have three basic problems here: wood for fuel, water, and food. When there is a snow storm, the houses and roads are so totally covered that to get out is impossible. And although my dwelling is close to the center of the village, no one will come to give help in these conditions. I asked for a telephone and petitioned the head of the regional authorities – whose denial read: "...there are no numbers available, you must wait your turn," and my turn comes up in 2-3 years; and how long have I left to live, no one cares.

"My long trek through the Euro-Asiatic vastness began March 17; I made all the historic stops in Kharkiv, Sverdlovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, Nikolayev-on-Amur. I cannot complain, they were treating me in order to prepare me for the long voyage. After 9 months I

was left with extreme hypertension. The drug therapy which they tried did not work.

> "To become used to living in this totally adverse climate at my age and with my ailments is impossible. To spend the winter here alone is equivalent to an untrained sportsman climbing Mt. Everest. But what can one do? Whether you can or not – you must.

"I'm glad that my son will go home and we are saying goodbye to each other. I hope that kind people will at least write to me – it's a pity that communication has become so difficult here, although even before the flood it was disrupted by bad weather and other things.

"A curious thing happened with my pension. According to law, the pension is discontinued during imprisonment (mine was for six months) but in exile pension payments are to be renewed. I wrote an appeal to the authorities on July 8; in an answer to an inquiry made by the Ayan authorities, the Kiev authorities answered that I am "not on the list." They sent a second tracer in search of my pension. That is their way of playing with me.

"Food presents a serious problem here: fruits and vegetables are only canned and from last year's shipment; in this season they delivered potatoes only once (allowed to buy only 2 kg.) and some fresh cabbage. They promised to deliver cabbage for pickling. Milk is available, but will not be during the winter. The only bread available is white bread, buckwheat is also not available. Because of my diabetes, I find it difficult to find suitable food. I salted fish for the winter, but again there is only the salted fish, and because of my hypertension I should avoid salt. My son brought wood for burning, cut it up and is now chopping it. The roof of our dwelling leaks, Oleksander has tried to repair it, but the rains have interrupted him. The stove smokes. But we whitewashed the inside and it was a joy to be able to sleep under something other than a cement ceiling. My rheumatism has worsened and torments me constantly...."

The termination of exile occurred in October 1985 and Oksana Meshko returned to her home in Kiev.

YURIY SHUKHEVYCH
UKRAINIAN PATRIOT
POLITICAL PRISONER OF
THE SOVIET UNION

Thirty years in Soviet prisons and labor camps, merely for refusing to renounce his father, the man who headed the Ukrainian liberation movement.

Arrested August 22, 1948 (at age 14), Sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

Re-arrested August 21, 1958 (the day of his release). Sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

Arrested a third time in March, 1972. Sentenced to 10 year's imprisonment, 5 years' exile.

"A few weeks later, Lieut. Galsky summoned me and admitted that, of course, the verdict had been delivered on the basis of false testimony by the witnesses, that it was groundless, but (I quote his words) 'With your opinions, with your convictions, we cannot set you free.' I was to give evidence of my loyalty in the form of a press conference, an article, a pamphlet, or a radio appearance, in which I would denounce the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, my father, etc."

> – From Yuriy Shukhevych's letter to Soviet authorities, protesting 1958 arrest and trial.

A brief three and one-half years – that is all the freedom Yuriy Shukhevych has known since his first arrest on August 22, 1948. The rest – time spent in the prisons and concentration camps of the U.S.S.R., a total of thirty years by the time his third ten-year term expired in March, 1982.

• • •

Yuriy Shukhevych, however, has committed no crime, he has never been a threat to society. But the Soviet regime considers him a dangerous enough threat to its rule that it violates its own laws to keep him silenced behind bars. For Yuriy Shukhevych is a symbol, the son of Roman Shukhevych, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought the Nazis in World War II and continued to fight Soviet forces occupying Ukraine.

Though it would have gained him his release, Yuriy Shukhevchy has rejected Soviet proposals that he renounce his father and denounce the movement for Ukrainian independence he headed.

Shukhevych was born March 28, 1934, in Lviv. He was ten years old when Soviet forces took over the city, shot his uncle and sent his mother into Siberian exile. In 1948 Yuriy, though not yet fifteen, was arrested and sentenced – not by any court, but by a special tribunal of the Ministry of State Security – to a ten-year prison term. Less than two years later, he was brought back to Lviv to identify the body of his father, killed in a battle with Soviet security

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Text by Bohdan Yasen. Published by SMOLOSKYP. AN ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE. P.O. BOX 561, Ellicott City, Md. 21043, USA.

Handout B-7.1 (cont.)

forces. In 1956, Yuriy Shukhevych was released as one who had been tried illegally while still a minor. But the Prosecutor-General of the U.S.S.R. Roman Rudenko, immediately protested the release on the grounds the Yuriy Shukhevych was "the son of a nationalist leader," and Yuriy was returned to Vladmir Prison to serve out his term.

An authoritative underground journal, *The Ukrainian Herald*, reported on what happened in 1958:

> *Shortly before Shukhevych's eventual release, K. Galsky/a KGB officer specializing in fabricating cases against political prisonners/went to Vladimir Prison for talks with Yuriy Shukhevych, urging him to publicly renounce his father and denounce the movement he had led. Y. Shukhevych categorically refused.*
>
> *On the day of his release, Y. Shukhevych was confronted with new charges of 'anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation' while in his cell; a new, com pletely fabricated case was begun against him, as a result of which he was sentenced to another ten years' imprisonment. . . .*

Shukhevych protested against the 1958 trial in Lviv (among other illegalities, the trial had been closed) in numerous letters to Soviet authorities. In 1967 he wrote to the Head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R.:

> *During the court inquest, only witnesses for the prosecution were heard; while, at the same time the court deemed it unnecessary to hear the testimony of 12 other witnesses who could have refuted the testimony of Burkov and Fomchenko . . Members of the court and the prosecutor were more interested in my beliefs – as if they were on trial – than in the details of the case, and constantly focused on them (the beliefs) and on my parentage.*

• • •

Shukhevych was released in August 1968 but was forbidden from returning to Ukraine for five years. He married and settled in Nalchik, where he found work as an electrician. In 1970, a son, Roman, was born and, in 1972, daughter Iryna. The family lived in the home of Nina Strokata, who was herself being persecuted for refusing to renounce her husband, Ukrainian writer and political prisoner Svyatoslav Karavansky.

Yuriy Shukhevych's brief period of freedom and family happiness ended with his third arrest, in March, 1972. . . . The charge again was "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," specifically, that he had compiled personal memoirs of his previous twenty years in Soviet prisons and labor camps. The sentence Yuriy received at his trial on September 9, 1972, was the harshest yet: five years in prison, five year's special-regime labor camp, five years in exile.

> . . . the over thirty years of persecution have not broken Yuriy Shukhevych, who has remained true to the memory of his father. In Autumn, 1979, Shukhevych renounced his Soviet citizenship; he joined the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Though decimated by arrests, exile and repressions, this Ukrainian citizens' group has continued its work of monitoring Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords. . . .

(Editor's Note: As of February 1986, Shukhevych is serving a term of internal exile in Tomsk Region in Siberia. He is now blind and suffering from other chronic diseases.)

Yuriy Shukhevych's fate has moved many – in the Soviet Union, as well as in the West, Amnesty International among them – to come to his defense. One of the most eloquent appeals on his behalf was made by Avraam Shifrin, a former political prisoner in Soviet concentration camps, who in 1970 emigrated to Israel. On May 18, 1972, he wrote the following open letter:

> *I sat with Yuriy in the same concentration camp, and he had been there for 20 years. And now he has been arrested again. Again the persecution of his family, again his children without bread.*
>
> *The sole "crime" of the Ukrainian, Yuriy Shukhevych, consists in the fact that he is the son of General Shukhevych, who courageously fought against the enslavement of the Ukrainians. The sole* "crime" of Yuriy consists in the fact that he loves *his country – and in Ukraine one cannot be a Ukrainian. And so, after 20 years of prison, Yura is once again in jail.*
>
> *He is silent. You won't hear him. But I, a Jew, who is proud of being a nationalist, appeal to you, citizens of the free world: Help Yuriy Shukhevych! Demand that the Soviet authorities let him go!*

Jerusalem
May 18, 1972 *Avraam Shifrin*

Handout B-8.1

PRISON CONDITIONS

...I was again taken from prison to prison, from one transfer cell to another. Again it was "Black Marias"... prison carriages, violence, rape, card games in the cells. The guards did whatever they felt like....

The streams of blood spilled, the violence that I witnessed during that trip, both in the transit prisons and the trains, was incredible. In Odessa and Kharkov we were beaten with wooden hammers for our complaints about the lack of sanitary conditions and poor quality food. In Ruzaevka we were made to take showers with luke-warm water in a bath-house that had broken windows – in winter. In Ulyanovsk a group of juvenile delinquents were placed in our train carriage and half of them were raped. They were children who were starting to live and so many of their lives were already broken. ...

Among other accounts of beatings by guards or by prisoners acting for them is a document by an anonymous inmate, or former inmate, of a prison in Andizhan in the Uzbek republic which arrived outside the USSR in 1979. This prisoner recounted:

"On the day they brought me to Andizhan prison the deputy director Umayukulov and the head of the special section Azimov summoned me. They began to torment me and threatened me with physical reprisals: 'You'll find that this isn't some camp in Bukhara – we have cells here such that if we put you there you'll renounce both your opinions and your life.' Later I found out that there really are such cells, where bandits are kept, their agents."

After describing how criminal prisoners were employed to beat other prisoners, the anonymous author went on to describe beatings by guards themselves, which he witnessed after he was brought back from a failed escape attempt with five other prisoners:

"After my escape I found myself under investigation in cell number 139. Opposite me, in cell number 137, the guards murdered the prisoner (blank space in document – Amnesty International note) known as Boxer. I saw the assault on this prisoner from beginning to end with my own eyes. This happened either in January or early February 1977. The guard who killed him was named Yury, nicknamed "Hooligan" by the prisoners. Azimov and Yumayukulov were there too. They didn't kill him at once – his torture lasted four days."

The incident described in the following account took place in Vladimir prison.

On 23 November 1975 they put the criminal prisoner Tikhonov into cell number 1-13. (He was more than 50 years old, an invalid of the Second World War, missing his left arm and suffering from a stomach ulcer. He was receiving diet food.) When he was put in this cell, the criminal prisoners there, Vagrov, Yury Varinov and another known as "The Tartar" said that there was an irreconcilable enmity between them and Tikhonov. In spite of this the guards shoved Tikhonov into the cell. The prisoners started to beat Tikhonov. The beating lasted a whole day (several days, according to some accounts). A number of criminal prisoners in the neighbouring cell 1-14 heard his cries and demanded that the administration put an end to the beating. This had no effect. When they were taken out for their exercise and were returning from exercise the prisoners from cell 1-14 (amongst them Vladimir Khoroshkov, born in 1933) appealed to the head of the operations section, Ugodin, and the operations officer, Senior Lieutenant Khripunov, who watched the beating through the eye-hole of cell 1-13. Then the prisoners asked again that the beating be ended. Ugodin replied: "No one is being beaten – he's just shouting like that."

The account continues to say that eventually the prisoner was taken from the cell and died shortly thereafter. "On his body there wasn't one place untouched, they'd broken his ribs and smashed his kidneys and liver."

Rivalries and reprisals of this sort are common among criminal prisoners in the USSR, but in this case as in others the administration itself evidently played a part. While the three prisoners named in the account as the direct perpetrators of the murder were reportedly tried and received additional sentences for this, apparently no one from the administration was called to account. Ugodin was subsequently promoted to director of the prison.

I can't say that prison hunger was particularly agonizing – it wasn't a biting hunger but, rather, a prolonged process of chronic undernourishment. You very quickly stopped feeling it badly and were left with a kind of gnawing pain, rather like a quietly throbbing toothache. You even lost awareness that it was hunger, and only after several months did you notice that it hurt to sit on a wooden bench, and at night, no matter which way you turned, something hard seemed to be pressing into you or against you – you would get up several times in the night and shake the mattress, toss and turn from side to side, and still it hurt. Only then did you realize that your bones were sticking out. But by then you didn't care any longer. Nevertheless, you

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Taken from: Amnesty International. *Prisoner of Conscience in the USSR.*

Handout B-8.1 (cont.)

didn't get out of your bunk too quickly in the mornings, otherwise your head would spin.[11]

Issue number 42 of *A Chronicle of Current Events* (8 October 1976) reported as regards Vladimir prison:

Because of underfeeding prisoners on strict regime suffer from swelling of their finger joints and swellings and red patches show up on their bodies.

The same issue of the *Chronicle* reported as follows on the condition of the prisoner of conscience Gabriel Superfin at the end of a period on strict regime (isolation cell with a starvation diet) in Vladimir prison:

On 26 August Superfin finished three months on strict regime. In the evenings his legs swell up, and he is having difficulty with his stomach and liver; he has persistent pains.

Prisoners normally suffer severe weight loss while serving their sentences, and, as well as the stomach ulcers from which many prisoners suffer after a few years of imprisonment, vitamin starvation and related ailments are common. Prisoners in Perm camp 36 reported in 1976 that some prisoners there were suffering from scurvy.

It is not uncommon for prisoners to resort to eating grass, wild flowers, nettles and the like in order to compensate for the deficiencies of their diet. The Ukrainian journalist Valery Marchenko reported in 1976 from his camp in Perm that he had gathered and dried some birch tree buds to eat as a complement to his diet, but the guards took them away from him as "not authorized."

• • •

The following excerpts, from a letter by a group of prisoners in Mordovia camp 19, dates from 1972 but applies to prisoners' labour conditions in the late 1970s as well:

In the machine tool shop the most dangerous part of the process is the removal of the finished piece and the installation of a new one. There is no provision for switching off the press during this technical operation, which is a serious infringement of technical safety completely inadmissible in an outside environment. The rotating reamer may easily injure the prisoner's hand: such injuries are fairly common. In addition, sharp, hot chips fly out from under the reamer. To work in gloves is forbidden in case the glove – and with it one's hand – becomes caught and pulled into the reamer. As well, there are splashes of emulsion which burn the skin, fumes, and horrible noise, not only from one's own press but also from the entire workshop. Shimon Levit has small cuts all over his hands.... No one is able to fulfil the work quotas, which are tremendously high; failure to fulfil means punishment.... The loading work is even worse. We all fear assignment to this particular job, which consists basically of loading and unloading railway wagons. The work is very difficult and dangerous, and one may be awakened (for work) at any time of the day or night without advance warning. Even on Sundays, one works.

...At first glance, sewing mittens in the camp workshop appears to be fairly light work. Such shops exist in almost all the camps. Women imprisoned for political reasons are engaged exclusively on this work, but even they find the job tiring. What can one say about those who have to do it?... Excessively high demands must be met in dimly lit buildings using machinery which is constantly breaking down.... Sylva Zalmanson suffers from constant backache and dizzy spells due to the continuous eye strain. Because of acute eye strain Yury Fyodorov (another political prisoner) has been transferred from sewing mittens to turning them inside out – work which is less conducive to strain and acute conjunctivitis. He is lucky, because the sewing norm can be fulfilled by few. Even healthy people are unable to achieve it, and all suffer the consequences.

...In outside construction work the situation is aggravated by the fact that it is almost impossible to endure the Mordovian frosts in the so-called "special work clothing".... Changes and transfers are frequently made; at any time one may expect a transfer to even more difficult and strenuous work. This happened to Altman and Shepshelovich, who are now both working on a concrete mixer in penetrating winds....

Handout B-8.2

BIZARRE BEHAVIOUR
Anatoly Marchenko

In helpless protest many a prisoner was driven to bizarre behaviour. Some cut their stomachs open; others filled their eyes with ground glass; a few at times pulverized sugar (if they had any) and inhaled it until abscesses formed on their lungs.

Another common practice was to swallow strange objects. If the doctors in the prison hospital had made a museum of the things pulled out of our insides, it would have been an amazing collection – spoons, toothbrushes, pieces of wire.

• • •

If the men involved were abnormal, what were they doing in prison? If they were normal, then what must be said of the conditions that drive normal men to such actions?

Taken from: Anatoly Marchenko. *My Testimony*.

Handout B-9

PROCEDURES WITH DEAD PRISONERS

Avraham Shifrin

We had to put these corpses near the gate. Then came a soldier with a big hammer on a big handle. He crushed the skulls of the corpses to see maybe, if these naked corpses in forty degrees below zero were still alive. Another soldier put a red-hot iron into each corpse to see if it were alive so that it would not escape.

When this procedure is finished the corpses are put on sleds like firewood and are taken away to the nearby forest. Since you cannot make a grave in permafrost we put them in a standing position or lay them in the snow.

The next day these corpses would disappear for they would be eaten in the night by wild beasts, bears, black foxes, and sables. The concentration camp guards were always putting traps in this "cemetery" to catch these black foxes and sables. Thousands of them were sold to other countries as expensive Russian furs. I have seen them myself here in the beautiful shops of New York, Washington, London and Paris.

Taken from: Avraham Shifrin. US Senate Hearings, February 1, 1973.

PRISONERS

Vladimir Bukovsky

"I had two cell-mates:
an old Ukrainian nationalist who spent 16 years in prison,
and a criminal who slew his children
and cut off his ears...
Every minute and during the sleepless nights,
the Ukrainian orated about the
independence of Ukraine...
They beat the Ukrainian every day.
Simply, they tied him up
and kicked him in the stomach.
Sometimes, they put the inmates
in a special soundproof isolator
and beat them incessantly.
I knew a few people who died afterwards..."

(February 11, 1972)

AGAIN AND AGAIN

V. Chornovil

Again and again
there will be a need
to throw behind bars
those who persistently do not wish to call black white.
There will be a need for trampling
on the conscience of people
instead of leaning on people
with a developed sense of honour and conscience.
There will be a need to undercut the roots
of the tree on which new branches should be grown,
of which we are in such a shortage
after the devastating hurricanes.
Because later on there will be a need
after all to rehabilitate people
and admit the truth
for which they have sacrificed their youth.
History always brings up everything into clear waters...

HOW GOOD IT IS

Vasyl Stus

How good it is that I've no fear of dying
Nor ask myself how ponderous my toil
Nor bow to cunning magistrates, decrying
Presentiments of unfamiliar soil,
That I have lived and loved, yet never burdening
My soul with hatred, curses or regret.
My people! It is to you I am returning.
In death I somehow find my fate.
I turn my pained but goodly face to living
And in filial prostration I begin.
I meet your eyes in fair thanksgiving
And join my kindred earth as closest kin.

UNIT III. THE KILLING OF CAMBODIA

Statement of Purpose:

In April 1975 the Communists under Pol Pot came to power in Cambodia as the government of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). From that date until January 1979, when the Vietnamese took control of Cambodia, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians died from starvation or were assassinated by the Khmer Rouge. Historians continue to debate the exact number of Cambodians displaced and murdered from 1975 to 1979. However, most scholars agree that the Pol Pot years in DK represented years of chaos and persecution, as well as possible genocide of the Cambodian people.

Objectives:

- Students will locate Cambodia and its major cities and rivers;
- Students will develop a chronology of the major events leading up to the Communist takeover in April 1975;
- Students will identify the key individuals, political parties, and nations involved in the Cambodian years of chaos;
- Students will investigate why scholars disagree about the exact number of victims of the Khmer Rouge.

Learning Activities and Student Materials:

- Using the map provided as Handout C-1, along with a world map or globe, students should locate Cambodia and identify its neighboring countries. Have students locate:
  - –The Mekong River
  - –Tonle Sap
  - –Siem Reap
  - –Lomphat
  - –Kampot
  - –Samrong

  Have students use the scale of kilometers to determine distances between the major cities as well as between countries in the region.
- Handout C-2, "The Killing of Cambodia," presents an overview by David Hawk of the conditions that existed during the Pol Pot years. As students read this article, have them consider the following questions:
  - –Why does the author claim that genocide has occurred in Cambodia?
  - –Why, as the author claims, has there been so little reaction to the genocide in Cambodia?
  - –What rationale did the Pol Pot regime use for its suppression of certain "elements" in the Cambodian population?
  - –What steps might the world have taken to have prevented the destruction of the Cambodian people?
- Provide students with copies of Handouts C-3 and C-4. These handouts present more recent interpretations of the events which took place in Cambodia during the years from 1975 to 1979. Have students compare and contrast these two articles in terms of the following issues:
  - –Both authors served in Cambodia and are familiar with the culture and the languages spoken there. Yet, they disagree about the exact number of victims of the Khmer Rouge. Why might they disagree? How would you determine which figures are accurate?
  - –How does David P. Chandler describe conditions in Cambodia after the Communist takeover in 1975?
  - –How does Chandler describe conditions in 1982?
  - –Why does Chandler title this section of his book "Cambodia in Chaos"?
  - –How did Michael Vickery determine the number of victims of execution in DK?
  - –How does Vickery account for the burial pits and mass graves found in Cambodia?
- As a concluding activity for this Unit, you might ask students to consult other sources and references listed in the Bibliography for this volume or in *Readers' Guide* to determine the extent of the destruction of Cambodia from 1975 to 1979. A variety of sources, each with their own frames of reference, will help students to formulate their own conclusions about the mass killings, famine, and destruction in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.



Map taken from: David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, Editors. Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays (No. 25), (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983). Used by permission.

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Handout C-2

THE KILLING OF CAMBODIA

David Hawk

From the middle of 1975 to the end of 1978, between one million and three million Cambodians, out of a population of about seven million, died at the hands of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge. Former government employees, army personnel, and "intellectuals" were executed in the hundreds of thousands. Others were killed by disease, exhaustion, and malnutrition during forced urban evacuations, migrations, and compulsory labor. Families were broken apart and communal living established; men and women were compelled to marry partners selected by the state. Education and religious practices were proscribed. These facts and others about Pol Pot's brutal reign are well known. Yet the destruction wrought by Pol Pot overshadowed by the Cambodian famine and refugee crisis of 1979-1981, and the political conflict that followed the ouster of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin's dissident Khmer Rouge faction has received scant attention. Except among relief and refugee workers and a handful of scholars and journalists, there has been remarkably little reaction to what was one of the most violent and massive human rights violations of the twentieth century.

Why is this so? Cambodia was a mere "sideshow" to Vietnam, and after the war few in the West, particularly in the U.S., wanted to be reminded of Indochina's troubles. The atrocity stories coming out of Cambodia after 1975 quite simply were not believed. Few at the time could imagine that the intended victims of the brutal bombing campaigns would turn out to be far more indiscriminate executioners than the American B-52s.

Moreover, evidence about Pol Pot's brutalities was, and continues to be, shrouded in polemic and rationalization. An early theory was that the evacuation of Phnom Penh was necessary to avert starvation, and that it was sound agricultural policy to turn doctors, students, tradespeople, and city folk into peasant farmers. Then followed the convoluted notion that the early atrocity reports were Thai and American propaganda, magnified by biased news media to prove the "bloodbath theory" (mass murder would follow Communist victory in Indochina) propounded by apologists for U.S. policies in Vietnam. A corollary to this argument was that the accounts of Cambodian refugees (unlike, for example, those of Salvadoran, Chilean, or Soviet emigres) were unreliable and exaggerated. After the Khmer Rouge were ousted by the Vietnamese, their human rights violations were seen as regrettable mistakes. Now, when questions of bloodbaths and genocide are raised, they are deflected as legitimizing Vietnamese expansionism.

The most informative and reliable surveys of the human toll in Cambodia can be found in the 1975-1976 refugee accounts gathered by the governments of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Norway, the United States, and two human rights organizations, Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists. These materials were submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in 1978. Based on these materials, the chairman of the U.N.'s Subcommission, an official body of human rights experts, prepared a report that concluded that the Cambodian situation was "the most serious that had occurred anywhere in the world since Nazism," and was "nothing less than autogenocide." But the Commission, caught up in the geopolitical realignments that accompanied Vietnam's ouster of Pol Pot, disregarded the Subcommission's report.

Subsequently the Vietnamese Mission to the U.S. submitted the conclusions of a 1979 tribunal held in Phnom Penh. This too has been largely ignored, and the most important part of the proceedings – reportedly over nine hundred pages of personal testimony that corroborates and elaborates upon the early refugee – accounts is virtually impossible to obtain. The problem of Cambodian self-determination has almost entirely superseded the problem of Cambodian genocide. Now the Human Rights Commission is treated to the ironic spectacle of human rights complaints filed by the Khmer Rouge who, when in power, promised to make "mincemeat" of the "imperialist" maneuvers at the Commission.

Propaganda charges and countercharges at the U.N. make it hard to decipher the real issues, and cynical politicization skews the debates. The Soviet bloc, which was not much interested in U.N. consideration of the Cambodian horror when it was going on, has now discovered how bloody it all was. Some of the Western democracies that spoke out before have fallen silent for fear of giving comfort to Vietnam's ally, the Soviet Union. It all serves to obscure the central failure of the international community's response to the Cambodian tragedy: although enough information reached the outside world about the terrible human destruction while it was going on, it failed to believe and failed to act. The United Nations has "risen above principle" and ducked the issue.

Taken from: David Hawk, "The Killing of Cambodia," *The New Republic*, November 15, 1982, pp. 17-21. Reprinted by permission of *The New Republic*, (c) 1982, *The New Republic*, Inc.

Handout C-2 (cont.)

During a recent trip to Cambodia, my second since Pol Pot's ouster, I was able to see the results of his rule. A year earlier – in the spring of 1981 – I had been to Phnom Penh and to Cambodia's southeast provinces in the course of relief and refugee work. My talks with new refugees and Khmers who had come to the Thai border for food had made it clear that the 1975-1976 refugee accounts had not been exaggerated. From my previous work in human rights, dealing with issues and problems of political imprisonment and torture, I was aware of standards of documentation for human rights violations. On my return from that first trip – after conferring with Cambodia and Indochina scholars, legal experts, and other human rights specialists about ways to investigate what happened in Cambodia between 1975 and 1978 – I applied to the press office in Phnom Penh to visit Cambodia again for further investigations.

I stayed for three weeks. I saw the prison-extermination centers, mass graves, and destroyed Buddhist pagodas that the Pol Pot regime had left in its wake. I listened to the agonized stories of survivors, and saw the hurt, confusion, and bewilderment still in their faces. To see and hear these things is to understand that what happened in Pol Pot's Cambodia was not the all-too-common "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." It was something more akin to Stalin's Russia or Hitler's Germany.

There are many ways to assemble the evidence. One can visit and photograph the mass graves – fields of sunken, and now emptied, pits where hundreds to thousands of the executed were buried. An unknown number of the mass graves have been opened, originally to count the skulls and multiply by the number of pits to estimate the number of dead at a given site. Now the skulls and bones are being collected and piled into protected enclosures (I saw one that contained eight thousand skulls), where traditional Buddhist funeral rites are performed to allow the deceased spirits a peaceful passage into the afterlife. These wooden enclosures with their racks of bones, if they survive the tropical elements and the passage of time, may turn out to be the only way the terrible witness will be preserved and remembered. Relief workers and foreign observers who saw the graves in the process of disinterment, as did I in 1981 and 1982, were advised to do so early in the morning, before the midday's tropical heat made the stench unbearable. I saw five of these mass grave sites (at Cheng Ek, Tonle Bati, Ta Mon, Siem Reap, and Krang Ta Chan) in four provinces, sometimes in areas so remote that armed escorts were provided (Khmer Rouge guerrillas are trying to make a comeback), and passengers had to help push the cars over gulleys in the dirt roads.

The authorities in Phnom Penh do not have comprehensive information about the major mass grave sites – locations, estimates of the number buried, methods of execution, or the individual identities of victims. But provincial officials, press office translators, and relief workers have collected some of these details. The image of Pol Pot's Cambodia as a vast graveyard is a plausible one. And the mass graves contain those who were executed – not the old, young, and sick who died along the road during the forced evacuations, and not those who died of malnutrition, of preventable or curable sickness, or from forced labor.

It is not surprising that in a third world country with one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world most of the murder was anonymous and without record. Yet Cambodia was not without its bureaucracy of torture and death, its Asian equivalent of Auschwitz. At the Tuol Sleng, or "S21," prison and execution center in Phnom Penh, Khmer Rouge officials kept meticulous records of their murders, which were left behind when the Vietnamese captured the city in 1979. There are documents on more than fourteen thousand people. Because the materials for June to December 1978 are missing, it is estimated that perhaps fifteen to twenty thousand were exterminated at Tuol Sleng.

"S21" is a former school with four three-story buildings. Some classrooms were used as common cells where forty to one hundred persons were lined up and shackled in leg irons. Others were subdivided into tiny cinderblock cubicles, sixteen or eighteen to a room, where important prisoners or those undergoing interrogation were isolated and shackled to chains cemented into the floor. "S21" held an average of one thousand to fifteen hundred prisoners at a time.

Forty categories of men, women, and children – mostly Khmer Rouge officials and cadre suspected of dissidence, but also including captured foreigners, workers, and intellectuals – were brought to be photographed, interrogated, and tortured into confessing to be agents for the CIA or KGB, naming their contacts, meeting places, and accomplices. They were then executed.

Officials of the successor Cambodian government in Phnom Penh have made the Tuol Sleng prison into a museum of the Cambodian nightmare. One exhibit is a huge wall map of Cambodia constructed of wired-together skulls. But the macabre map seemed superfluous after having seen the torture implements and victims' photographs and having walked through the interrogation rooms and cells.

The former prison rooms on the upper floor of the central building now house the nearly one

Handout C-2 (cont.)

hundred thousand pages of handwritten prisoners' confessions, summaries of the confessions typed by the Khmer Rouge prison officials for forwarding to Party higher-ups, typed execution schedules, and mug-shot photographs. Phnom Penh officials have given scholars access to these documents. Eventually translations and analyses may afford at least a glimpse into the pathology of the Khmer Rouge. Cambodians come to search among the thousands of photographs for missing relatives.

To look at the file folders containing prisoners' photographs and the piles of confessions overflowing the shelves and stacked on the floor is to be overwhelmed by the incomprehensible; the archives of death for a barely literate peasant society that was run by Paris-educated ideologues who had abolished schooling and prohibited reading and writing. One Tuol Sleng survivor told me of the yearly stages of improvement in the identification tags used to photograph the incoming prisoners.

The international human rights laws and institutions that were established after World War II to guard against such large-scale massacres have failed in some fundamental ways, and ironically, it is the most egregious violations that they are least able to do anything about.

The lawyers and diplomats who drafted the 1948 U.N. Genocide Convention provided a flawed but necessary definition of the term "genocide" when they sought to make "this odious scourge" a criminal act under international law. Ninety nation-states, by ratifying or acceding to the treaty, have agreed that an act that caused death or "serious bodily or mental harm," or that inflicted conditions calculated to bring about the destruction "in whole or in part" of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group would be an act of genocide.

The Genocide Convention is weak in several ways. Although Americans helped draft the Convention, the U.S. has never ratified it – originally because Senate segregationists blocked it, and later because Presidents who wished to see it ratified had higher priorities in their dealings with the Senate. Thus the U.S. cannot readily take a case of genocide to the U.N. or the World Court. And the final text does not include political or economic groups among those presumably protected against acts of genocide. Obviously a great deal of the Khmer Rouge regime's killing was precisely to eliminate its political or "class" enemies. And much of the slaughter would be more accurately defined in international human rights terminology as "extrajudicial execution." But some social groups specifically covered by the Convention were the objects of executions, massacres, and other acts calculated to bring about their destruction. Such was the case regarding at least one major ethnic minority group, the Cham, and the preeminent religious group in Cambodia, the Buddhist monkhood.

The Cham, an Islamic non-Khmer minority group, migrated from the central coastal region of what is now Vietnam between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries and settled in Cambodia. Recognizable by their distinctive dress, religion, and dialect, the Cham lived apart from the Khmer in their own hamlets and communities. Under Pol Pot a policy was instituted to, in effect, "Khmerize" the Cham. Their communities were broken up, community and religious leaders executed, the people dispersed. Islamic practices and the speaking of Arabic or the Cham dialect were rigorously prohibited. According to Mat Ly, an official in the Agriculture Ministry, some of the Cham resisted "Khmerization." In response to this resistance, massacres began.

There are allegations of entire villages being wiped out. It is reported that as many as forty thousand may have been killed from hamlets in the districts of Kang Meas and Kompong Siem in Kompong Cham province. Estimates of the number of Cham before 1975 range from four hundred thousand to seven hundred thousand; a Cambodian census in 1981 showed a Cham population of roughly two hundred thousand. Mat Ly lost his father, his wife, three married children and their spouses, three grandchildren and, he says, unknown numbers of nephews and nieces. Corroborating stories of the destruction of the Cham are available from 1975-1976 refugee accounts, post-1979 refugee accounts, testimony presented at the 1979 Phnom Penh tribunal, and survivors in Cambodia and in refugee settlements interviewed by scholars and journalists.

Less is known about the Khmer Rouge's treatment of other ethnic minorities. But extrapolations based on 1980 interviews with ethnic Chinese conducted in the refugee camps by a leading American Cambodia scholar would indicate that perhaps as many as half of the urban ethnic Chinese died during the Pol Pot years. Ethnic Thais from the southwestern and western provinces of Cambodia also speak of harsh treatment. A Khmer Buddist monk, formerly of Seim Reap province, told me that the ethnic Indians there were taken away for execution. Even less is known about the fate of the Shan (Burmese) minority in the Palin area or how the hill tribe (Khmer Leou) fared. Some ethnic Vietnamese remained in Cambodia during the Lon Nol and Pol Pot regimes. Given the Khmer Rouge's effort to purge Cambodia of Cambodians considered insufficiently hostile to Viet-

Handout C-2 (cont.)

nam, it is reasonable to assume that the remaining ethnic Vietnamese were subjected to massacre. At Tur-a-Kur village in Pursat province, I encountered a middle-aged Cambodian peasant, Heng Chan, who was running a roadside tea stall. His wife had been of Vietnamese descent. He told me that the Khmer Rouge had killed not only her, but five of their sons, three of their daughters, three of their grandchildren, and sixteen other members of his wife's family.

The destruction of the Buddhist monkhood is another clear-cut case of a genocidal act. The Khmer Rouge had a general animus against religion. The Catholic cathedral in Phnom Penh, apparently a symbol of French colonialism and Vietnamese colonization, was removed stone by stone from its former site on Monivong Avenue. Protestant churches and Moslem mosques were destroyed or converted into warehouses. But the antireligious animus fell most heavily on Buddhism. Before 1975 Buddhism was the established state religion. For centuries it was the main source of learning and transmitter of culture. It had been the focus of life in the villages, where most Cambodians lived until the U.S. bombing and the Lon Nol-Khmer Rouge war drove people to the cities in the early 1970s. Like Roman Catholicism in Poland, Buddhism to a large extent represented Cambodia's tradition, culture, and identity.

According to a surviving monk, during the struggle against Lon Nol, at least in his area, the Khmer Rouge respected the monks and the Buddha. Many of the "country monks," he said, had been sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge, in part because of its alliance with Prince Sihanouk and because these monks "were not very familiar with Communist doctrine." But once in power the ultra-revolutionaries prevailed, and the Khmer Rouge began to desecrate and destroy Buddhist books, statues, and holy objects. Worship, prayer, and meditation were prohibited, as were Pali and Sanskrit, the languages of Khmer Buddhist scripture.

Buddhist temples too were destroyed or converted into warehouses or workshops. One surviving monk made a list for me of the temples destroyed in his former district of Prey Veng province: Kok Sandek, Vihear Thom, Tangkok, Wat Thmei. . . . After listing nine such places, he stopped, sighed, and wrote, "etc." I saw many ruined temples along the roads of Cambodia places with quaint names such as "Temple of the Satisfied Crocodile" and "Temple of the Three Tamarind Trees."

The Khmer Rouge policy toward Buddhism was one of the most brutal and thoroughgoing suppressions of religion in modern history. The monkhood was disrobed, disbanded, and destroyed. Of an estimated pre-1975 population of forty thousand to sixty thousand monks, only eight hundred to one thousand survived and returned to their former monastery sites, where bamboo and thatch temples now rise on the foundations of the destroyed brick-and-tile temples that once were as much a fixture of the Cambodian landscape as coconut palms. Conversations with surviving monks inside Cambodia and in the refugee camps reveal regional variations but tell the same basic story: some of the most venerated monks were taken away for execution; others died of malnutrition, sickness, and exhaustion; others were forced to marry; and many others were sent to their native villages or elsewhere, and their fate is unknown.

How extensive were the abuses perpetrated by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge? The demographers and Khmer scholars need to develop the statistics more precisely, but according to the most sophisticated study currently available, *Kampuchea: A Demographic Disaster*, by the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center, there was an absolute or gross population decline of 1.2 million to 1.8 million Cambodians during the three-and-one-half years under Pol Pot. Inasmuch as there were births during these years, the number of deaths would be higher. And Cambodia scholars now believe that the death toll for 1978 – an unusually bloody year even by Khmer Rouge standards – was substantially higher than the CIA assumed.

Whether or not human destruction of this magnitude – one-seventh to one-third of the Cambodian population – fits the Genocide Convention's provisional definition of the partial destruction of a "national group" is something lawyers can consider. But as one legal expert noted, "this type of murder is precisely the type of crime the Convention was intended to prevent." There is no language in the Convention to preclude responsibility because the destruction was carried out by a nation's leaders against its own people.

Most important, the will and means must be sought to deter recurring outbursts of political massacre. It may not matter so much what the human destruction in Cambodia is called, so long as it does not continue to be overlooked by the international community. Yet the Genocide Convention remains particularly relevant to Cambodia, because, unlike Uganda, for example, Cambodia – and specifically the "Democratic Kampuchea" regime of Pol Pot – is a Contracting Party to the Genocide Convention. And the Genocide Convention, based on the revulsion against Nazi genocide and on the Nuremberg experience, is unlike subsequent international human rights treaties in that it introduces the notion, if not the means, of pun-

Handout C-2 (cont.)

ishing those responsible for the crime, "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals." Yet Democratic Kampuchea remains the internationally recognized government of Cambodia, and Ieng Sary, usually considered number-two man in the Khmer Rouge, represents Cambodia in the U.N., while his brother-in-law, Pol Pot, remains the presumed head of the again-clandestine Khmer Rouge Communist Party and the public commander of its guerrilla army.

Considerable interest and energy go into trying to hold various countries to the human rights provisions of their executive agreements and legally binding treaties. Why should the application of international law, as limited as it is, be suspended regarding Cambodia? What precedent does this set for tomorrow's Pol Pots and Idi Amins? Genocides and other kinds of large-scale political murder more often than not happen in distant lands, away from the TV cameras, to globally unimportant peoples whose suffering is quickly forgotten in the vagaries of international politics. This was a major and severe problem of the world in the 1970s and, most likely, will continue to be in the 1980s: in addition to Cambodia and Uganda there have been East Timor, East Pakistan, Paraguay, Rwanda, Burundi, Guatemala, and more. The murders are in the millions. But now, for Cambodia, it remains to be explained how the issue of self-determination can be justly resolved without first confronting the reality of the Khmer Rouge genocide.

Handout C-3

CAMBODIA IN CHAOS

David P. Chandler

The debate between radicals and republicans, stifled in the 1950s and 1960s, reemerged on a small scale after 1967 when Communist insurgency against Sihanouk began and took the form of a full-scale civil war after Sihanouk was overthrown, in large part by remnants of the Democratic party, in the spring of 1970. For the next five years, while Phnom Penh and a few other urban centers were governed by the Khmer Republic, the Cambodian landscape was laid waste by U.S. bombing and by a civil war, fought with the uncompromising ferocity of Jayavarman's campaigns against Champa and the wars of the nineteenth century. When the Communists under Pol Pot came to power in 1975 as the government of Democratic Kampuchea, millions of Cambodians were displaced, and hundreds of thousands starved to death or were assassinated by supporters of the new regime. From that point on, the entire society was mobilized, under frequently fearsome conditions, to "build and defend" the country, first against class enemies, "feudal remnants" of the Lon Nol period, and then against the outside world, in particular against Cambodia's "traditional enemies," the Vietnamese.

Despite its sweeping revolutionary claims, the Pol Pot regime resembled the Cambodian governments that had immediately preceded it in three important ways. First, it showed no patience with or compassion toward political opponents, including or perhaps especially those with socialist credentials. Thousands of these people were tortured to death at the interrogation center at Tuol Sleng on the outskirts of Phnom Penh in 1976-1978. Second, the regime did little to alleviate shortages of food or to remedy the inadequacies of education and hygiene among Cambodia's rural poor, in whose name the revolution was allegedly being carried out. This is because the authorities in charge of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) were interested in power, organization, warfare, and ideology but paid little attention to the costs or consequences involved. Neither, as we have seen, did Jayavarman VII. Finally, the regime made no attempt to live in peace with its immediate neighbors.

It is tempting, indeed, to seek some parallels to this behavior in the actions of rulers throughout Cambodian history.[31] Those in command in the Pol Pot years were a kind of ruling family; they had been in clandestine association for more than twenty years; they were convinced that they had, in a sense, been born to rule the Cambodian people. But their time together, and the behavior of the regimes they successively opposed, intensified what may have been a shared suspiciousness among them. Ironically, their suspicions increased with victory. From 1975 to 1978, politics at the center came to resemble the factional politics of the eighteenth century, mixed with the kind of impositions favored by Jayavarman VII. Was the DK government strong or weak?

Like nearly all the governments that had preceded it, it was too weak to trust itself to the people it "consumed." Like very few of them, it was strong enough, right up to the end, to impose its will on the *sruk*, assassinating hundreds and perhaps thousands of cadres who urged, or were thought to believe in, a compromise with Vietnam. It was not, like Hitler's Third Reich, a popular dictatorship, except among "liberated" segments of the society and then only for a couple of years. At the same time, it commanded sufficient loyalty among the armed forces and cadres to keep the entire country at work, without pay or material incentives, on what was often a starvation diet for three and a half years. Had war not broken out with Vietnam, it is conceivable that the DK regime would have lasted a good deal longer.

Relations between Democratic Kampuchea and Communist Vietnam were never good, and with hindsight it appears that the war that broke out between the two countries in 1977-1978 was more or less inevitable. Pol Pot's regime often boasted that it had brought to an end "two thousand years" of Cambodia's history. Spokesmen for Democratic Kampuchea claimed that liberated peasants and workers owed nothing to Cambodia's past. Interestingly, however, the regime chose to pursue an anti-Vietnamese foreign policy that closely resembled policies followed by Lon Nol's ill-fated Khmer Republic and by Sihanouk in the 1950s and 1960s. Pol Pot chose to stress this continuity for many reasons, including his alliance with China, which was also anti-Vietnamese, but largely because the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were fearful of the "special relationship" that the Vietnamese claimed to perceive between the Vietnamese Communist party and its counterpart in Cambodia. Moreover, the ideology of Democratic Kampuchea was ferociously nationalistic; many

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Taken from: David P. Chandler. *A History of Cambodia* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 191-193.

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[31] Some of the ideas that follow can be traced to David P. Chandler, "The Tragedy of Cambodian History," *PA*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Fall 1979):410-419; and to my conversations over the last four years or so with Ben Kiernan, Michael Vickery, and Milton Osborne. See also William E. Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party," *PA*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Summer 1981):209- 227; and Kiernan and Thion, *Khmers Rouges!* passim.

Handout C-3 (cont.)

speakers emphasized the "sacredness" of Cambodia's territory; and quarrels arose with Vietnam about the ownership of offshore islands as early as July 1975. In 1976-1977, conflict between the two countries intensified. Full-scale warfare broke out toward the end of 1977. In December 1978 and January 1979, Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia in strength; within two weeks they were in control of almost all of the country. Pol Pot and perhaps fifty thousand supporters, including most of his army, escaped – in many cases by rail – to the northwestern corner of Cambodia. Meanwhile, in Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese installed a government sympathetic to them made up of defectors from Pol Pot's Communist party, survivors from earlier regimes, and Cambodians trained in Hanoi in the 1950s and 1960s – a group that had been decimated by Pol Pot's faction when they were infiltrated into Cambodia by Vietnamese in the early 1970s.

As these lines are written (December 1982) most of Cambodia is occupied, quite peaceably, by Vietnamese troops and governed from Phnom Penh by a pro- Vietnamese group of radical Cambodians, styling themselves the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The systematic killings of certain opponents in Phnom Penh and the countryside have stopped. But guerrillas loyal to Pol Pot, or to the DK's form of revolution, and others loyal, perhaps, to Cambodia's precommunist past, as exemplified by Sihanouk and one of his former ministers, Son Sann, are poised along the Thai frontier, clashing occasionally with Vietnamese troops, occasionally with each other, while seeking foreign assistance and support. In the meantime, tens of thousands of Cambodia's bourgeoisie have taken up residence in the West. Others with less affluent connections are holed up in refugee camps in Thailand, fearful of going home and unable to find shelter somewhere else. Hundreds of thousands of Khmer of all social classes have had their families decimated over the last eleven years by warfare, starvation, assassination, purges, and disease. The PRK, in other words, is a society of survivors, like Germany or Japan in 1945-1946. With these two examples in mind, moreover, it is hazardous to talk about the "survival" or "extinction" of Cambodia.

It is less hazardous to point out some of the changes that have occurred. Over the past few years, the Cambodian people, removed for so long from the pages of their history, have burst upon the consciousness and conscience of other cultures as diplomatic playthings in a game of realpolitik, objects of pity, emblems of guilt, or exemplars of revolution. At enormous cost to themselves, only partly inflicted on them by outsiders, and without asking for the privilege, they have also come into their own history, perhaps only briefly, but probably for a longer time.

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Handout C-4

THE HUMAN COST

Michael Vickery

Democratic Kampuchea (DK) has suffered almost universal condemnation because of the numbers of people who were executed or who died unnecessarily from hunger or illness.

Such a judgment is valid, even though, as Chomsky and Herman demonstrated, it was made too soon and for the wrong reasons. It was also often made by the wrong people. A news magazine which considers the killing of half a million people in Indonesia to be "the West's best news for years in Asia" has no business adopting a high moral tone about DK; and those who are complacent about close U.S. ties to a country in which one-third of the youth (16 million persons) "are growing up in circumstances so deprived that they are unlikely ever to play a useful role in modern society" and which within 20 years "will be burdened with millions of adults so undernourished, unskilled and uneducated that they will be impervious to any kind of civilizing process" should be able to view Pol Pot's DK with equanimity, unless they wished to argue explicitly that brutalities are legitimate when imposed on the lower orders, but become atrocities when the tables are turned.[398]

The Bangkok-based journalists who so eagerly purveyed stories of DK hardships would have been more credible if they had also noticed that "many school children, especially in rural areas, were starved and suffering malnutrition" in Thailand, that perhaps even "eight per cent of the Thai children have been under the malnutrition classification," or that "the most dreadful problem is pervasive proverty in 37 provinces (over half the country)," or that outside of Bangkok "one doctor served between 30,000 and 50,000 people in rural areas," a ratio approximating that prevailing in Cambodia at the end of the war in April 1975.[399]

The strictures against DK, whatever their factual validity, have rarely been set in a proper comparative context nor have they taken into account that the conditions in which the country was left in April 1975 would have meant large death tolls over normal, whatever regime came to power, not just from hunger and illness, but also from violence caused by the near total breakdown of ordered society. Democratic Kampuchea only deserves special blame to the extent that a 'normal' figure, if it could be determined, were (sic) exceeded.

I do not believe it is possible to determine with any precision the number of people who died of starvation, illness, or execution, but because of the attention directed to this aspect of DK, some discussion is unavoidable. There is no point in reviewing all of the various estimates of deaths or population decline which appeared during 1975-79, and which ranged from tens of thousands to the 3 million which appeared in the account of Dith Pran, a former associate of foreign journalists in Cambodia[400] and which was also adopted as the view of the Vietnamese and the PRK (People's Republic of Kampuchea) government. Most were nothing more than *ad hoc* extrapolations and subject to the imprecision of all such guesses. One attempt at statistical precision was made by the CIA, which claimed that by January 1979 the population had been reduced from over 7 million to 5.8 million.[401]

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In their report on Cambodian demography, the CIA used a figure of just over 7 million for 1970, which is as good a guess as any for our purposes, and 7.3 million by April 17, 1975, which means they accepted both a decrease in the rate of growth and a war loss of over 500,000.[405] Of that 7.3 million, there were about 200,000 Vietnamese who were immediately repatriated to Vietnam, leaving 7.1 million Cambodians (including Chinese and Chams) for the starting DK population.

In an earlier publication on this subject I accepted some of the CIA premises, but modified the death rates in an *ad hoc* manner based on impressionistic differences among 'good' and 'bad' regions, and proposed a total population figure for early 1979 of 6.5 to 6.7 million, which I considered temerarious at the time, and probably too high due to lacunae inherent in the CIA data. Nevertheless, by the end of 1980 the U.N. and FAO organizations were estimating the Cambodian population at 6 million, then 6.5 million.[406] Their figures were also limited to population within Cambodia, excluding an estimated half million in the various border camps

[398] *Time*, July 15, 1966, on Indonesia; the second country in question is Brazil, one of the models of 'free world' capitalist progress. See *Time*, September 11, 1978, pp. 14-15, for those estimates, which are worse than the equivalent points of the Cambodian STV, and which even *Time* found disturbing.

[399] *Nation Review* (Bangkok, September 29, 1980), quoting from Tia Rath, 8-16-81; Bangkok *Post*, October 18, 1981.

[400] *New York Times*, October 12, 1979.

Taken from: Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982* (1984), published by South End Press, 116 St. Botolph St., Boston, MA 02116.

[401] "Kampuchea: A Demographic Disaster."

[405] "Kampuchea: a Demographic Catastrophe;" 7.1 million (1970) compounded annually by 2.2would have produced over 7.9 million by 1975.

[406] "FEER, November 14, 1980, p. 9; and December 19, 1980, p.37.

Handout C-4 (cont.)

and refugee centers, which meant that Cambodian survivors from the DK period totalled 6.5 to 7 million; and if a 2.2 percent growth rate had prevailed throughout 1979-80 there would have been between 6.2 and 6.7 million survivors in early 1979, virtually the same as my own *ad hoc* extrapolations.

That would still represent a serious decline from a projection for 1979 (7,745,000) which assumed normal growth after the end of the war (the 7.1 million estimate for 1975 increased by 2.2 percent per year), and it is an absolute decline of at least 400,000 from the 1975 estimate. Of course all such conclusions depend on the base figure from which calculations are started, and the true figure could vary either way.

By mid-1981 the Cambodian government (PRK) was suggesting a total population figure of 6.8 million within the country, but admitted that it was only a projection.[407] More precise statistics were the numbers of people registered in *krom samakki* ("solidarity groups"), a total of 6,353,690, which would comprise most of the rural working population. Since there were possibly 3,400,000 in the larger towns (Phnom Penh, Battambang) unregistered in solidarity groups and some unregistered in the countryside, a total population figure of 6.8 million is not unreasonable, and including people who had fled the country since early 1979, a figure of 7.1 (million) living Cambodians could be postulated. Assuming they had increased at 2.2 percent per annum since early 1979, the number of DK survivors at that date would have again been over 6.7 million; and if the rate of increase in 1979 was less, which seems likely, the total for early 1979 would have been even higher.

[407] Interview with Mat Ly, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Phnom Penh, August 28, 1981.

Thus accepting the CIA figure for 1975 and the latest population estimates, it is only possible to suggest that an absolute decrease of about 400,000 between 1975 and January 1979 is likely;[408] and there are various ways to theoretically account for it. If, for example, as some people were saying in 1976, all Cambodian women were becoming sterile, the excess of deaths over births could perhaps be accounted for by a zero birth rate, and one would not have to postulate executions at all. In fact, given the normal pre-war death of 18 per thousand, there would have been at least 511,200 natural deaths. Of course we know that such a projection of Cambodian birth rates was incorrect and that at least tens of thousands of executions did occur. The qualitative assessment of the population decline depends on the reasons for the excess of deaths over births; and this in turn depends on the birth rate.

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Given the lack of precision inherent in all the data and estimates, it is impossible to reach more accurate final totals, or to more precisely apportion the decrease among executions, deaths from illness and hunger, or failure to reproduce due to changed living circumstances. Some of the burial pits discovered provide the evidence that mass executions occurred, but there is as yet no way to count the number of executions separately from death due to other causes. Yathay pointed out that in Pursat in 1976-77 mass graves were for those who died of hunger and illness, while executions took place in isolation in the forest.[411] Moreover, some of the 500,000 war victims are buried in mass graves, and without forensic tests it is probably impossible to determine whether death occurred before or after 1975. A decline of 400,000 does, I would say, indicate failure of the DK system, but some of the more extreme estimates of deaths from execution and hunger must be relegated to the realm of black propaganda. It is simply impossible to take the generally accepted population figure for April 1975, the population alive today, demographically acceptable birth rates, and project an extermination figure of 1-2,000,000.

[408] Projections of a 1980 population based on the assumption of peacetime conditions since the census of 1962, and which thus show a total of nearly 10 million, are irrelevant for an assessment of the DK period. Examples are Serge Baudouin, "La volonte de vivre du peuple cambodgien," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, November 1982, p. 16; and Meng-Try Ea, "Population in Kampuchea: an Assessment," presented at Kampuchea in the 1980s: Prospects and Problems, An International Conference hosted by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, November 12-14, 1982.

[411] Yathay, p. 149

UNIT IV. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CAMBODIA

Statement of Purpose:

This unit serves as a continuing introduction to the concept of human rights. Violations of human rights continue in Cambodia under Vietnamese Communist rule. As students study the readings included in this unit, they will make connections between the human rights violations in Cambodia and those described in Unit II. With this background, students can apply the concept of human rights to other case studies of persecution and genocide.

Objectives:

- Students will continue to define their concepts of human rights and apply them to the present situation in Kampuchea (Cambodia);
- Students will describe the present conditions in Kampuchea;
- Students will explain how the Vietnamese came to power in Kampuchea;
- Students will describe the official United States position regarding Kampuchea;
- Students will explain why the United States should be concerned about conditions in Kampuchea.

Learning Activities and Student Materials:

- Begin this unit by asking students to restate their concepts of human rights. Ask students to review the concept of human rights as applied in Unit II, "Human Rights Violations in Ukraine." Help students to refine their concepts of human rights by providing them with additional examples of human rights cases. Students should also refer to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Handout D-1 presents an official (United States Department of State) position in regard to Kampuchea as expressed by former U.S. representative to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick. Ambassador Kirkpatrick presented this statement before the UN General Assembly on October 30, 1984. Ask students to read this statement and respond to the following questions:
  - How does Ambassador Kirkpatrick describe conditions in Kampuchea?
  - According to Ambassador Kirkpatrick, what were Vietnam's reasons for invading and occupying Cambodia?
  - How is the Socialist Republic of Vietnam violating human rights in Cambodia?
  - What does Ambassador Kirkpatrick want Vietnam to do to help resolve the situation in Kampuchea?
  - How could the United States help to resolve the problem?

  Have students compare Kirkpatrick's remarks with a more recent Department of State statement on the situation in Kampuchea. Ask students to continue to follow and report on the changing conditions in Kampuchea.
- Handout D-2 serves as a more recent appraisal of conditions in Cambodia as presented by an Australian researcher. Stephen J. Morris, author of this handout, visited Cambodia in 1983 and 1984 and is presently working at the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. As students read his account of Cambodia, have them compare and contrast it to the other handouts about conditions there. Ask students to prepare written reports that summarize the changing conditions in Cambodia (Kampuchea) from the Communist Khmer Rouge take-over in April 1975 to the present. Have students prescribe a role for the United States in Cambodia.

Handout D-1

SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Statement before the UN General Assembly on October 30, 1984.[1] Ambassador Kirkpatrick was former U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

A principal purpose of this United Nations is to preserve the right to self-determination, independence, security, and sovereignty of all nations. The Charter is clear, so is the history of the United Nations in emphasizing and encouraging self-determination and independence of nations. The United Nations can, indeed, be proud of its role in advancing self-determination for millions of people and in working to preserve the independence of all nations. There is no principle that was more widely shared or more basic than that one nation should not use force to invade and subjugate another people.

The people of Cambodia, however, continue in occupation by a foreign power, denied their right to self-determination and independence by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which invaded and continues illegally to occupy Cambodia. Five times the world community has called on Vietnam to withdraw its illegal expeditionary force and to restore to the Khmer people their right to seek their own destiny under a freely chosen government without outside interference. The overwhelming margins which have supported the General Assembly's call for withdrawal of foreign forces reflect the concern of the great majority of the world's nations at the continuing tragedy in Cambodia.

What has occurred in the wake of these resolutions? Hanoi, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, ignores those resolutions, continuing its illegal occupation of Cambodia and its oppression of the Cambodian people in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and in defiance of the expressed will of the General Assembly, offering to the Cambodian people no opportunity for self-determination or self-government. The need to address the situation in Cambodia for the sixth time is testimony to the stubborn policy of military conquest and colonization being pursued by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

During the past two decades, Cambodia's people have endured unmatched suffering. Hanoi's use of Cambodian territory in its war against the South and the war between the Khmer Republic and the Communist Khmer Rouge, aided by Hanoi, destroyed Cambodia's economy. Khmer Rouge victory in 1975 brought a horror the world still struggles to comprehend. Systematic political murder and starvation took the lives of more than 1 million Cambodians and nearly destroyed an ancient culture.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam must bear a full measure of responsibility for the tragic tyranny of the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam's support was critical to the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975. Hanoi's claim that it invaded Cambodia to liberate the Khmer people from Pol Pot and that it remains there only to prevent his return to power is a transparent deception. Vietnam deposed Pol Pot only when it became apparent that it could not dominate and control the Khmer Rouge. No one laments the demise of the Khmer Rouge, a regime detested universally. But Hanoi did not invade Cambodia for the purpose of returning Cambodia to its people. Instead, Vietnam did so in order to install a puppet regime largely comprising former followers of Pol Pot, including the hated Heng Samrin himself.

Now, the Cambodian people are threatened with the loss of their homeland and the extinction of their culture. Thousands of Vietnamese nationals have settled throughout Cambodia, abetted and encouraged by Hanoi. Independent observers have estimated their number to exceed 500,000. Vietnam's clients in Phnom Penh have been instructed to assist Vietnamese, both former residents and new immigrants, in any way possible and to consult with their Vietnamese superiors before taking any action affecting Vietnamese settlers. Vietnamese immigrants are also given extraterritorial status and many have reportedly received Cambodian citizenship. This officially sanctioned Vietnamese immigration raises serious questions about Hanoi's long-term intentions toward Cambodia. It will be the ultimate tragedy if Cambodia, decimated by war and famine, should now be extinguished as an entity, overrun, submerged, and colonized by its expansionist neighbor.

Nearly 250,000 Khmer civilians remain encamped along the Thai-Cambodian border, unable or unwilling to return to their homes. Assistance to them remains an international responsibility. The United States will continue to do its share and urges other nations to continue their support for this program of humanitarian assistance. We offer our sincere appreciation to the Secretary General and his Special Representative for Humanitarian Assistance to the Kampuchean People, Dr. Tatsuro Kungi, for their efforts on behalf of the Khmer people uprooted by invasion and war. The staffs of the UN border relief operation, the World Food Program, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and other specialized UN agencies, the Interna-

[1] USUN press release 106 of Oct. 30, 1984.

Taken from: Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. "Situation in Kampuchea," *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC, 1985), pp. 57-58.

tional Committee of the Red Cross, and the various voluntary organizations continue their important and untiring work in providing emergency food and medical care to the displaced Cambodian people, often under dangerous conditions caused by Vietnamese attacks. Their efforts have earned the commendations of the international community and our admiration. Special thanks are also due to the Royal Thai Government for its aid to the Khmer people, particularly during the fighting earlier this year.

Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia is a challenge to the UN system and to the international community. The challenge is to induce Vietnam to withdraw its army and to restore Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, and neutrality without permitting a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. The members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have provided the world the leadership to meet the challenge here at the United Nations and beyond.

The 1981 UN-sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea, in its final declaration, worked out the principles which must guide a settlement of the Cambodian problem: a ceasefire and withdrawal of all foreign forces under UN supervision; free elections under international auspices; and arrangements to ensure that armed groups do not interfere in free elections and respect the results of those elections. Ninety-four nations participated in that conference. Its principles have been endorsed by five successive resolutions of the General Assembly. They provide the best basis for meeting the challenge posed by the Cambodia crisis. The United States supports these principles and extends its appreciation to Mr. Willibald Pahr, Chairman of the International Conference on Kampuchea, and to Ambassador Massamba Sarre and his colleagues of the *ad hoc* committee for their continuing efforts in seeking a settlement in Cambodia.

The United States affirms its support for Mr. Pahr's recent proposal to internationalize the temple complex surrounding Angkor Wat so that these ruins can be restored free from danger of war. Mr. Pahr's proposals merit international support. The ruins at Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom represent the greatest achievements left by classical Khmer civilization and are a cultural treasure of importance to the entire world. Their destruction through neglect and war would be a tragic loss to us all. Despite political concerns, the ASEAN nations have endorsed Mr. Pahr's initiative. Unfortunately, Phnom Penh and its Vietnamese masters have denounced the proposal. It is not surprising that Hanoi shows no interest in preserving these relics of Cambodia's glorious cultural heritage. But it is sad that Hanoi's Cambodian clients are unable to assert enough independence even to save the enduring symbol of Khmer civilization.

Vietnam, unfortunately, rejects the reasonable proposals of the ICK (the International Conference on Kampuchea), insisting that the situation in Cambodia is irreversible. ASEAN has sought to work out the framework of a settlement which preserves the legitimate security concerns of Cambodia's neighbors, including Vietnam, as long as the key elements of Vietnamese withdrawal and free elections are preserved. The September 1983 ASEAN "Appeal for Kampuchean Independence" proposed a territorially-phased Vietnamese withdrawal, coupled with an international peacekeeping force and reconstruction aid in the area vacated, as part of a Vietnamese commitment to a complete withdrawal and elections. Hanoi rejects this proposal, insisting that it will maintain its clients in Phnom Penh for as long as necessary until the world finally accepts its domination of Cambodia. Hanoi ultimately seeks, then, the legitimization of its client regime.

But that regime clearly does not represent the Cambodian people and its pretensions to do so have been repeatedly rejected by the people of Cambodia, by its neighbors and by the General Assembly. Vietnam no longer offers its clients as claimants to Cambodia's seat at this Assembly. Their regime remains dependent on Vietnamese soldiers and Vietnamese officials to remain in place. The growing appeal of the nationalist organizations led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and former Prime Minister Son Sann is indicative of the fact that the Khmer people are unwilling to accept a regime established on the bayonets of a foreign army. The United States welcomes the presence in this debate of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann. They and the organizations they lead are the true embodiment of Khmer nationalism and the hopes of Cambodians for a future which is neither Khmer Rouge nor Vietnamese.

To what lengths will Vietnam's rulers go to impose their will on others? The war in Cambodia, and the confrontation with China it has engendered, have drained Vietnam's economy. With a per capita income far lower than any of its ASEAN neighbors, indeed, one of the lowest in the world, Vietnam supports the world's third largest standing army. Unable to pay the costs itself, Vietnam has turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for assistance. Massive Soviet aid meets Hanoi's military needs but cannot meet the needs of the Vietnam people, thousands of whom have risked their lives to flee in small boats rather than remain in a Vietnam op-

Handout D-1 (cont.)

pressed and destitute. Other nations have reduced their aid because of their opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. Moscow has traded on its aid to increase its military presence in Vietnam establishing now a major air and naval base at Cam Ranh Bay and underlining the falseness of Vietnam's claim to be a nonaligned nation.

Even Vietnam's rulers have begun to realize that their efforts to control Cambodia have failed and that they face an increasingly difficult situation. In recent months Hanoi has tried to demonstrate to the world its willingness to reach a political settlement. In speeches and interviews, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister has hinted at Hanoi's willingness to negotiate a settlement at a conference and its willingness to consider peacekeeping activities in Cambodia.

Genuine Vietnamese willingness to negotiate a settlement in Cambodia based upon the principles of the International Conference on Kampuchea and successive resolutions of the United Nations would be a welcome development, above all, for the Cambodian people. But Hanoi apparently still views a political settlement simply as a means, one more tactic, to legitimize its client regime and secure it against the threat from the Cambodian resistance. Then, Vietnam says, it will withdraw the "bulk" of its army. The world rejects this concept of a settlement and will continue to reject it.

It should be noted that Vietnam put on its "peace mask" in March of this year during its Foreign Minister's trip to Indonesia and Australia. Days after his return to Hanoi, the Vietnamese Army launched its dry season offensive along the Thai-Cambodian border. In March and April of this year, Vietnamese forces launched a series of assaults, backed by armor and heavy artillery, against the civilian encampments, there forcing more than 80,000 people to flee to safety inside Thailand. Nearly 50,000 of these civilians still remain in temporary encampments, unable to return because of the ever-present threat of Vietnamese shelling or attack. Even as Hanoi talks of a settlement and negotiations today, the Vietnamese Army is building up its forces near Thailand, threatening the civilian encampments which house 250,000 Cambodians. New units have moved up near the border and artillery fire continues to threaten the residents of these camps. It is an ominous harbinger for the coming dry season, which may begin only after this General Assembly completes its work. The world will mark Vietnam's actions in Cambodia as well as hear its words.

In time, the Cambodians' quiet, heroic determination will convince its leaders that they cannot subjugate the Khmer people. We hope that realization will lead to a settlement of the Cambodia problem to the satisfaction of all parties, most importantly the Cambodian people. The way to a fair and just settlement has been shown by the international community. The General Assembly resolutions on Cambodia, the 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea, and ASEAN's "Appeal for Kampuchean Independence" all outline a basis for a comprehensive settlement for Cambodia involving complete withdrawal of foreign forces, UN-supervised free elections and nonintervention and noninterference in Cambodia internal affairs. Such a settlement would guarantee a free and neutral Cambodia and constitute a threat to none of its neighbors. It would also end Vietnam's international isolation, restore Vietnam's dignity and freedom of action and permit Vietnam to turn to the task of building its own economy and uplifting the living conditions of the long-suffering Vietnamese people.

The United States looks forward to that day and in the meanwhile offers its full support to the efforts of the Secretary General and his representatives, to the ASEAN countries and, above all, to the people of Cambodia in their struggle.

Handout D-2

VIETNAM'S VIETNAM

Stephen J. Morris

Few nations in modern history have suffered a fate as terrible as that endured by what used to be known as Cambodia. Cambodia's recent past has included a five-year war, which began in April of 1970, followed by a Communist revolution, which lasted until 1978, followed by foreign invasion and famine. All told, these calamities killed somewhere between two and three million Cambodians from 1970 to 1980, which was between 20 and 35 percent of the pre-war population.

Approximately 75 to 80 percent of these deaths occurred in peacetime. At least three to four times the number of people died during the three and a half years of "peace" wrought by the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian Communist revolutionary movement led by Pol Pot, as died from the bullets, rockets, shells, and bombs of the previous five years of war. Perhaps half as many died of starvation during the first year of the country's "liberation" by Vietnam, which invaded Cambodia in December of 1978, as died in those same five years of war. These deaths were not the product of the "American war," as radical apologists have suggested. They were the result of the policy calculations of the victors – the Communist regimes that won the wars in Indochina.

Today the suffering of the Cambodian people continues. It may not involve enormous population losses like those of the previous decade – though Cambodians still die in battle for one side or another. But there is deep psychological suffering all the same, because Cambodia, after twenty-five years of independence, is once again under the direct occupation of a hated foreign army.

The Khmer Rouge, the regime that ruled Cambodia – or Democratic Kampuchea, as it was officially titled – from April, 1975, to January, 1979, was not a small clique of "fascists," as Vietnamese propaganda has suggested. It was, rather, like the regime in Hanoi, committed to a form of Marxism-Leninism. Unlike the Hanoi regime, however, the Khmer Rouge was inspired by the agrarian communism of Mao Tse-tung's China in particular Mao's abortive Great Leap Forward of 1958-1959 and his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969. The policies introduced inside Democratic Kampuchea – the mass executions, the depopulation of the cities, the abolition of money, the communization of all aspects of social life, and the suppression of religion – took Maoist concepts to an extreme. But these policies were carefully planned by the central Party leadership, and systematically pursued by a disciplined Communist Party and its military apparatus at the grass roots. Indeed, these policies had already been tried out in the "liberated zones" of Cambodia long before the war against the Khmer Republic was completed. (Khmer is the linguistic and racial designation of the dominant ethnic group in Cambodia.)

When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, they were at first regarded as liberators who had broken the iron grip of the Khmer Rouge over the Cambodian population. Initially they introduced conciliatory policies, such as the dissolution of the large communes, the reunion of divided families, a return to the native villages, and free religious practice. But the popular sense of relief did not last.

In 1979 the Vietnamese leaders were responsible for a widespread famine that killed tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Cambodians. The invasion prevented the planting of the 1979 rice crop. Also, in pursuing the retreating Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese army adopted a "scorched earth" policy in many areas. By May of 1979 most of Cambodia's grain reserves had been consumed. The country was on the edge of famine. Because of the deterioration of the transportation infrastructure – airports, docks, cranes, and trucks – during the Khmer Rouge era, adequate international relief aid could not get through. The little aid that did trickle in was partly siphoned off by the Vietnamese army. Realizing this, several international relief agencies, including the Red Cross and the International Rescue Committee, advocated feeding the starving population by means of a "land bridge" of trucks coming in from Thailand. Their plea was tardily supported by the Carter Administration. But the Vietnamese, fearing that their authority would be undermined by the independent activities of capable international relief organizations, and fearing that such a "land bridge" would also feed the Khmer Rouge, angrily refused the offer. In order to justify their decision, the Vietnamese Communists denied that there was a food shortage. In spite of this decision by Hanoi, on the Thai border the Khmer Rouge and some lucky civilians were fed, but in the interior tens of thousands of Cambodian civilians died of starvation. The CIA estimate is that 350,000 civilians died in 1979. The extent of starvation has been challenged in an important new book by William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy*. But Shawcross

Taken from: Stephen J. Morris. "Vietnam's Vietnam," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January 1985, pp. 71-72; 80-82. (c) 1985 by The Atlantic Monthly Co., Boston, Massachusetts. Reprinted with permission.

does not know how many thousands actually did die.

The Vietnamese army, rather than giving the Cambodians a chance to choose their own leaders, as the United Nations was demanding, installed a regime trained and chosen by the Hanoi politburo. It thus became obvious very quickly that the Vietnamese role in Cambodia was a colonial one. By the use of conscription the Vietnamese have built an indigenous army – popularly referred to as the Heng Samrin army, after its nominal head – of about 30,000. But that army is virtually useless as a fighting force on behalf of the Vietnamese. Fraternization with anti-Vietnamese resistance forces – which sprung up all over the country as soon as the Vietnamese occupation began – has become endemic, with agreements between the sides not to engage each other.

Hanoi's failure to construct a viable surrogate army in Cambodia can be attributed to two factors. The first is widespread resentment among ordinary Cambodians at Vietnamese military and political control over all major institutions. The Vietnamese historically have looked down upon the Cambodians as inferiors, and racial and cultural chauvinism has not dissipated with the advent of a Communist regime in Hanoi. But the Cambodian population is also enraged that the Hanoi regime is allowing, and to some extent directly organizing, the migration to Cambodia of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese civilians, who now hold many visible urban jobs – as merchants, cafe owners, technicians, and mechanics. Many Vietnamese girls have come to the cities to work as "taxi girls" – prostitutes – for the Vietnamese army and civilians.

Equally important, Vietnamese civilians have come as fishermen, to work on the Tonle Sap (or Great Lake), long the source of ample food for the Cambodian people. The older generation of Cambodians, remembering pre-war abundance, attribute food shortages in the country to pillaging by these Vietnamese settlers.

The Hanoi regime insists that the settlers are merely former residents of Cambodia, evicted by the anti-Vietnamese policies of the governments of Lon Nol (the U.S.-backed general who ruled Cambodia from 1970 to 1975) and Pol Pot, and that they are now returning to their homes and occupations. But refugees from Phnom Penh, whom I have interviewed in the non-Communist resistance village of Rithisen, are adamant that many of the settlers have never lived in Cambodia before and that, unlike former residents, these new people do not understand the Khmer language.

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Should the United States care about what is happening to Cambodia today? I believe it should, for two reasons: American national interests, and the most basic issues of international human rights. What the United States does or does not do will affect both.

American interests are involved because the struggle for Cambodia is important to the security of Southeast Asia, which is in turn central to the vital economic and strategic interests that the United States has in the entire East Asia and Pacific region.

What are the United States' economic interests in the region? U.S. trade with East Asia and the Pacific is greater than U.S. trade with any other region of the world. Japan is the second most important trading partner of the United States, after Canada. More than ten percent of U.S. foreign investment goes to the region, principally to Japan and Australia, though the proportion going to the Southeast Asian nations is growing. The growth of all the East Asian nations (China excepted) has been based upon a high volume of international trade. Japan in particular is totally dependent upon imports for its raw-material resources. Thus the security of the sea-lanes of East Asia, and in particular those of Southeast Asia (through which most of Japan's energy resources pass), is vital for the economic well-being of East Asia and the Pacific.

Here is where the economic and strategic interests of the United States intertwine. All of the countries of East Asia and the Pacific, with the exception of Vietnam, North Korea, and Laos, are friendly to the United States. Six of them – Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand – have defense treaties with the United States. Australia provides communications bases that are vital to U.S. strategic forces, particularly the nuclear-submarine fleet. Thus the security of the international trade routes is essential to the economic survival of the East Asian and Pacific nations. And the economic viability and pro-Western political orientation of the East Asian and Pacific nations are important to both the United States' economy and its strategic position.

The greatest potential threat to these interests comes from Vietnam in concert with the Soviet Union. Since the fall of Saigon the Communist government of Vietnam has allowed the Soviet Union increasing access to naval and airport facilities, particularly those constructed by the United States at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. The Soviet Union, whose trade in the Southeast Asian region is minuscule and whose

Handout D-2 (cont.)

economy is marginally oriented toward international trade, has no vital defensive interests in the region. The only conceivable purposes of the increasing Soviet military presence in Vietnam are offensive: to enhance the capacity of the Soviet Union, particularly its naval forces, to interdict the vital sea-lanes of the pro-Western countries of the region and the United States; to provide a convenient logistic supply depot for its highly militarized client state; and to sustain that country's ground offensives against pro-Western governments on the mainland of Southeast Asia.

The first motive is not open to serious discussion. The interdiction capacity has been realized. Also, in the event of future conflict (on the Korean peninsula or in the Philippines), Soviet logistic reach could be a real menace. Fifteen years ago the United States was the dominant force in the Pacific Basin; today it has a powerful rival.

The second motive hinges upon an interpretation of Vietnamese behavior, and it may be somewhat more difficult for Westerners to comprehend. Of course, as we have seen, there can be little doubt that Vietnam aims at colonizing Cambodia permanently. But why should anyone fear further expansion of Vietnamese power and influence beyond Cambodia? One way of demonstrating Vietnamese ambitions is by presenting what the Vietnamese leaders say. Le Duan, in *The Vietnamese Revolution*, wrote:

> The fundamental interest of the proletariat, the people, and the nations of the world lies in *safeguarding world peace while promoting the revolution in various countries.* These two objectives are organically linked together; each is the premise of the other. Both are perfectly attainable once the Communists, thoroughly conscious of the strategically offensive position of the world revolution, are successful in setting up a united front bringing together all currents of the world revolution, all forces fighting for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism, and are resolved to crush all imperialist aggression, repel every one of imperialism's belligerent moves and schemes, drive it back step by step, destroy it piecemeal, and eventually overthrow it entirely.

But more important than what Hanoi leaders say is what they do. The Vietnamese Communists are training guerrillas to fight in several neighboring countries. Most significant is the training of Thai Communist guerrillas in Laos. The Thai insurgency began to unravel after its principal patron, China, cut off aid. Vietnamese attempts to revivify that insurgency, though not immediately dangerous, pose a long-term threat and indicate long-term intentions. And Vietnam's one million-man army, armed with Soviet weapons, represents a menacing colossus that could be decisive in the absence of countervailing power.

Thus the activities of the Vietnamese army and the increase in and positioning of Soviet air and naval forces on Vietnamese territory pose a significant threat to American political and economic interests in the Far East.

But there is a second reason why Americans should be concerned about the outcome of the struggle for Cambodia, and that is the issue of human rights. The deprivation of human rights in Cambodia over the past decade has been one of the most profound in the modern world. This disaster did not, as some argue, happen because the United States brought the Vietnam War to Cambodia. The Vietnamese Communists did that first by using Cambodia as a supply route and a sanctuary from which to wage war on South Vietnam, and thereby eventually attracting a "secret" American air response (which received Sihanouk's qualified acquiescence); second, and more important, by launching a full-scale military assault against the new Lon Nol government in early April of 1970, one month before American ground troops entered the country. Although many in the West believe that the March, 1970, palace coup that overthrew Sihanouk and brought Lon Nol to power was instigated by the CIA, no credible evidence supports this contention, as Stanley Karnow and others have pointed out.

The real basis of American obligation to Cambodia is that the United States abandoned that nation in 1975. The United States had intervened to support the Lon Nol government in 1970, but, exhausted by ten years of war in Indochina, Congress cut back military aid to the Cambodian government just as the Chinese were increasing their aid to the Khmer Rouge insurgents. The cut in U.S. aid made the Khmer Rouge's victory inevitable. And although by 1976 everyone knew that the victors had wrought a terrible bloodbath inside Cambodia, the United States, like the rest of the world, sat back and did nothing.

Guilt should not be the sole basis for moral action. But a desire to provide some restitution to the victims of a failed policy certainly can be.

There are four policy options open to the United States. The first is to recognize Vietnamese hegemony over Cambodia as a fait accompli, and do whatever is necessary to ease the process of integration. The arguments usually presented in support of such a move are that the Cambodians prefer the Vietnamese to Pol Pot and that it would help wean the Vietnamese

Handout D-2 (cont.)

away from the Soviet Union and make them more amenable to Western influence.

This option is totally inconsistent with the United States' professed concern for human rights. Whether or not the Cambodians prefer the Vietnamese to Pol Pot could be determined by a general election, such as the United Nations has been demanding. But the Vietnamese and Pol Pot are the only choices available to Cambodia. The suggestion that they are reminds one of the argument made by Stalin's apologists that the Soviet army was the only alternative that East Europeans had to the Nazis.

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The second option is to continue pursuing the current policy – giving economic and diplomatic support to the Son Sann and Sihanouk forces while making proper gestures of abhorrence toward their coalition partner. This policy lacks a concrete military element and is useless, because it does not redress the imbalance in the quality of weapons, which favors Vietnam. It leaves the Pol Pot forces dominant within the resistance coalition, and thereby reinforces Vietnamese propaganda that the main choice Cambodians face is between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge. Finally, it is defective in that it leaves all effective anti-Vietnamese leadership in the region in China's hands. This is dangerous for two reasons. First, it enables Moscow and Hanoi to divide the ASEAN bloc, by playing upon Indonesia's and possibly Malaysia's fears of China. Second, it guarantees that the political outcome of the conflict will be decided by the Soviet Union and China. The United States, which has strategic interests at stake, has no influence via the Cambodian forces involved.

The third option is for the United States to give military assistance to all segments of the resistance. This policy would make sense from a purely Asian realpolitik perspective, because it would be likely to result in serious reverses for the Soviets and the Vietnamese. It would be pleasing to China, a strategic partner of the United States, because it would assist China's client, the Khmer Rouge, as well as impede China's enemies. But, most important, it would anger most of this country's European allies, and it would not be acceptable to the American Congress and the public, because it would be quite inconsistent with even the minimal standards of a human-rights policy.

This leads us to the final option, which is the only one that is simultaneously consistent with a concern for human rights and supportive of American economic and strategic interests. The United States should provide military assistance to the non-Communist resistance of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann. These forces are the only ones that represent nontotalitarian Cambodian nationalism. And they are not clients of America's major adversary, the Soviet Union. That is why they have the enthusiastic backing of the ASEAN nations, the United States' major allies in the area. Interestingly, despite their commitment to the Khmer Rouge, the Chinese have indicated privately that even they would like the United States to give military aid to the non-Communist forces....

That the non-Communist forces not only have survived but also continue to grow, in the face of 180,000 heavily armed Vietnamese, while receiving limited external aid, testifies to their grass-roots support. If rifles, ammunition, field radios, and – most important – anti-tank weapons were provided, the non-Communists could expand their manpower and effectiveness dramatically. This would not in itself drive out the Vietnamese army. But by breaking that army's protective shield of Soviet-supplied armor, the non-Communists would inflict heavy losses. (The Vietnamese conscripts fighting in Cambodia, especially the southerners, absolutely lack motivation for this fight.) And the growth of the non-Communist forces would make them equal to, if not more powerful than, the Khmer Rouge. These two factors are crucial. Only if the Vietnamese are forced to pay heavily for their aggression are they going to contemplate a negotiated solution. And only if they have a powerful opponent other than the Khmer Rouge, which they regard as an implacable enemy, will they have an incentive to negotiate. A major increase in the strength of the non-Communists would be necessary to allay the fears of the Vietnamese, and of many Cambodians, that a Vietnamese withdrawal would lead to a takeover by the Khmer Rouge.

Those who today denounce the Khmer Rouge holocaust should explain what they have in mind to prevent such a thing from happening again. Helping Son Sann and Sihanouk will not bring back the two million Cambodians who died in "peace" and under "socialism." But it will give the living a better chance to avoid a similar fate.

United States help to the non-Communists probably would not be countered by an escalation on the other side. The Vietnamese army, occupying Laos as well as Cambodia, and pinned down by China to the north, cannot escalate much further. The Soviet Union, burdened by its aid to the desperate Polish, Cuban, and Vietnamese economies, and still unable to deal with its own Afghanistan quagmire, is in no position for large-scale intervention in Cambodia.

Aiding the non-Communists in Cambodia

Handout D-2 (cont.)

would not be the prelude to "another Vietnam" for the United States, because no American troops, and perhaps no Americans at all, need be directly involved. (ASEAN would gladly act as a conduit.) It would instead lay the groundwork for "Vietnam's Vietnam."

V. GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING CASE STUDIES

Statement of Purpose:

The history of humankind provides us with other examples of genocide against minority peoples. Teachers can develop their own case studies for student analysis to fit within local and State curriculum frameworks. Students should apply the concepts identified in Volume I, Unit I, "The Roots of Intolerance and Persecution," as well as the skills of case study analysis as they investigate the causes and effects of other genocidal acts.

Developing Case Studies:

The following outline for preparing case studies was adapted from the New York State Education Department publication, *Incorporating Skills into Social Studies Programs, K-12* (The University of the State of New York, Bureau of Curriculum Development, 1981). The outline serves as both a listing of student objectives and a framework for developing a case study.

These five steps make up this case study analysis process:

1. *Define* the components of the case study
2. *Evaluate* differing points of view
3. *Collect* data
4. *Analyze* data
5. *Conclude* and *generalize*.

The following outline describes each of these steps and specifies student outcomes. These steps also serve as content organizers as teachers plan and develop their own case studies.

Case Study Analysis:

1. Provide students with materials that help them to *define* the components of the case study.

   Students should be able to –
   a. Clarify historical background, terminology, and concepts
   b. Locate regions and areas affected
   c. Identify political leaders, ethnic groups, key individuals, and others affected
   d. Restate the facts of the case study
   e. Develop a chronology of events
   f. Place the key events within the context of other world events taking place at the same time
2. Provide students with materials that help them to *evaluate* differing points of view. Students should be able to –
   a. Differentiate fact from opinion
   b. Identify frames of reference
   c. Identify value-laden words
   d. Detect the use of various propaganda techniques
   e. Evaluate author's qualifications
3. Provide students with materials that help them to *collect* additional information related to the case study. Students should be able to –
   a. Identify a variety of sources of information
   b. Recognize the advantages and limitations of various sources of information
   c. Identify the types and kinds of information needed
   d. Organize information in an orderly, meaningful presentation
4. Provide students with materials that help them to *analyze* information. Students should be able to –
   a. Identify the relationships between the various kinds of data
   b. Detect inconsistencies in data
   c. Weigh conflicting statements of fact and opinion
5. Provide students with materials that help them to develop *conclusions* and *generalizations*. Students should be able to –
   a. Apply previously-learned concepts to the data and the case study
   b. Check reasoning used to develop conclusions against basic principles of logic
   c. Identify inconsistencies in reasoning and limitations in data collected
   d. Create a broad statement that encompasses findings
   e. Propose areas for continued study and analysis based upon their findings

As teachers apply this case study analysis framework, they should refine and adapt it to fit their unique situations. The steps and student objectives are generalizable so that teachers should modify them for each different case study.

Resources for Case Study Analysis:

While each case study will require specific information and materials for student use, a number of resources seem common to most case studies on persecution and genocide. The following list identifies those sources consulted in preparing the case studies that appear in this series and in other State Education Department publications concerned with human rights.

1. **The Minority Rights Group**
   35 Claremont Ave., #45
   New York, NY 10027
   MRG publishes reports about the treatment of minority groups around the world. Representative titles include:
   "Religious Minorities in the Soviet Union" (No. 1)
   "Selective Genocide in Burundi" (No. 20)
   "The Original Americans: U.S. Indians" (No. 31)
   "The Ukrainians and the Georgians" (No. 50)
2. Amnesty International
   National Office
   304 West 58th Street
   New York, NY 10019
   Amnesty International (AI) is a worldwide human rights organization that works on behalf of prisoners of conscience.
3. Books include –
   a. Leo Kuper. *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Penguin Books, 1981).
   b. Irving Horowitz. *Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976).
   c. Richard L. Rubenstein. *The Cunning of History: Mass Death and the American Future* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
4. Government documents available from –
   a. United Nations
      (1) Reports of the proceedings and resolutions of the General Assembly, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, the Legal Committee, the Economic and Social Council, the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
      (2) *Special Reports. Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern Africa.* E/CN. 4/950 dd. 27 October 1967. E/CN. 4-984/Add. 18 dd. 28 February 1969. E/CN. 4/1075, dd. 15 February 1972 *(Study concerning the question of apartheid from the point of view of international penal law).* A/32/226, dd. 10 October 1977 *(Deaths of detainees and police brutality in South Africa since the Soweto massacres in June 1976).* E/CN. 4/1311, dd. 26 January 1979 *(Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa).*
      (3) *Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.* E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/416, dd. 4 July 1978 *(Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).*
      (4) *United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights.* New York: 1974.
   b. United States Congress
      International Protection of Human Rights. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs – House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, First Session. August – December 1973. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974.
   c. Department of State
      Report on Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.
   d. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
      Hearings of May 24, 26, 1977 on the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 (95th Congress, 1st Session).
      Genocide Convention. Hearings before a Sub- committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 1st Session, April – May 1970. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

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